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1. A BASIC APPROACH TO THE CHILD WITNESS IN THE 
ACCUSATORIAL SYSTEM 
1.1 Introduction 
The present concern in many jurisdictions throughout the world about children and the legal system can be traced 
to the work of the American paediatrician, Henry Kempe, and his colleagnes in the early 1960s. They conclusively 
demonstrated that physical violence to children was far more prevalent in the United States of America than was 
generally supposed . These results were accepted in the United States and rapidly acted upon, resulting in a number 
of enactments regulating the reporting of child abuse to authorities. These views spread to the United Kingdom 
where the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children started a publicity canlpaign about battered 
children (Spencer and Flin 1990:8-9). 
TItis new awareness and concern about the abuse of children resulted in an increasing number of cases going to 
court where children were called upon to testify. Public attention was focused on the unsatisfactory way in which 
the legal system treated the evidence of children. The experience of giving evidence was a frightening and 
distressing one for children and led , in dIe early 1980s, to demands for changes in the rules regnlating the evidence 
of children. In the United States changes were introduced to the rules relating to competency and corrobor-ation, 
and alter-native methods of giving evidence were introduced, enabling children to give evidence, for instance, via 
closed-circuit television (Spencer and Flin 1990: 10). 
In the United Kingdom the public were further roused in the early 1980s by studies which highlighted the indignities 
the legal system forced witnesses, especially those involved in sexual offences, to undergo. Public outcry came 
to a head in 1983 when a well -known television actor was charged with indecently assaulting two eight year old 
girls. One of the girls was so disturbed by having to appear in court dlat she attempted to conunit suicide. This 
led the defence barrister, George Carman QC, who had cross-examined the gi rls and reduced them to tears, to make 
the following statement in his closing speech for the defence, as quoted by Spencer and Flin (1990: 11): 
"It may be that a case such as this may require tile law to look again and reappraise tile problem 
of how children may give evidence more infomlally and more privately rather than in tile presence 
of the public and tile press." 
The matter was not ordy taken up by the press and the public, but paediatricians, lawyers, psychiatrists, 
psychologists. policemen and social workers also began to research the problems associated with children'S 
evidence. Psychiatrists at Great Ormond Street Hospital experimented with new teChniques for interviewing child 
victims, while police joined with social welfare in an experiment to improve the investigation of child sexual abuse 
cases . This resulted in the Bexley Report, tile proposals of which have now been introduced throughout the United 
Kingdom. In respollse the Government introduced a number of legislative reforms to dIe law relating to children's 
evidence. A Home Office Advisory Committee was set up as a result of pressure in Parlianlent for more radical 
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changes, and culminated in dIe introduction of videotaped evidence and closed-circuit television for children who 
had to give evidence in sexual abuse cases (Spencer and Flin 1990:11-12). 
In South Africa increased attention to dIe plight of children giving evidence in court led to an investigation on this 
topic by the South African Law Commission in 1989. Proposals were published by dIe Law Commission in their 
Working Paper 28, and resulted in dIe introduction of sl70A of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 which 
enables child witnesses to give evidence via closed-circuit television. 
1.2 Purpose of Study 
For the purpose of this study tbe child witness in the accusatorial system will be viewed as a source of information. 
When a witness gives evidence in court , the function of the witness is to provide the court with certain information. 
A number of crucial questions arise when dIe witness is a child. Do children bave dIe ability to remember and 
relate an event accurately? Are children prone to suggestion and fantasy? What effect, if any, does the court 
environment have on a child 's ability to convey infomJation? Wbat perceptions do children bave about the legal 
process, and how do these perceptions affect their ability to testify? Do adults influence the information which 
children impart by the techniques dley employ to obtain such information? 
Accepting the hypothesis dlat child witnesses are sources of information, the purpose of dus study is to evaluate 
all aspects of the crimittal justice system relating to child witnesses as well as available research on children to 
determine whether it is possible to obtain reliable and accurate information from children. Proposals will be 
formulated regarding the most successful medlOds of Obtaining reliable and accurate information from children, and 
how these can be adapted for use by dIe legal system. The purpose of the study is to develop an approach to 
children in the legal system dlat will be fair to children while at the same time protecting the rights of the accused, 
and which will lead to a successful method of obtaining accurate information. 
1.3 A Model for Evaluating Children as Sources of Infonnation 
In order to understand children as participants in the criminal process, an ecological systems approach will be used. 
In temlS of this approach an individual 's experiences are seen as subsystems within systems within larger systems. 
Since these various systems are interlinked, au ecological systems approach professes that it is not possible to do 
just one thing in isolation. Any single action in one system will have an effect on another system. The ecological 
perspective, dlerefore , focuses on dIe interplay between various social systems (Gabarino and Stott 1989:292-5). 
When evaluating children as sources of information, dIe ecological perspective will be used to focus on two kinds 
of interaction. The first is the interaction between the child as a biological organism and its immediate social 
enviromnent. The second is the interaction between the child's social envirolllnent and larger social systems 
(Gabarino and Stott 1989:8). According to Cashmore and Bussey (1990: 177) it is essential to study dIe child 
witness within his or her social enviroIlll1ent . It is impossible to evaluate the evidence of a child without looking 
at the context in which this evidence is given. The quality of a child's evidence is dependent on a number of 
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interacting factors, namely the child himself (his age, competence, educational and family background, cognitive 
ability and perceptions of tlle court process), tlle setting in which evidence is given (open court, videotaped evidence 
or closed-circuit television) and the personnel involved in the court process. The most important characteristic of 
an ecological perspective is that it requires one to look inside tlle individual child and simultaneously beyond the 
child to the environment in order to understand a child's behaviour in the legal process. The focus here is therefore 
the social and physical environnlent presented by legal institutions (Gabarino and Stott 1989:292-3). 
In terms of the ecological perspective, these factors are interrelated and any single change in one system is going 
to have an effect on another system. The following example given by Gabarino and Stott (1989:298) illustrates this 
principle by showing how the competence of a child can be affected by the personnel the child comes into contact 
with: 
"A child who appears competent when interviewed by a supportive and skilful therapist or a 
specially trained and intuitively sensitive prosecutor may appear incompetent when cross-examined 
by a hostile and intimidating defense attorney bent on undernlining the child. The sanle child 
might not say anything at all to a bored, brusque judge. " 
In accordance with this model, it WOUld, therefore, not be correct when evaluating the competence of a child to 
focus exclusively on the child's ability to understand and communicate without paying attention to the person 
interviewing the child as well. 
Since all systems are linked in this model, intervention can take place at any level. Intervention in one system will 
have an effect on another system. For instance, the introduction of videotaped evidence will lead to the defence 
having access to the videotape on the basis of discovery. This, in turn, will assist the defence attorney in preparing 
his cross-examination and place him in a better position to attack the credibility of the child (Gabarino and Stott 
1989:297). In this way certain procedural changes designed to improve the position of the child may resnlt in an 
increase in stress for the child. This is, in fact , what has happened in the United Kingdom. Legislation was 
introduced permitting the videotaped evidence of a child to be admissible in court in lieu of the child personally 
giving evidence-in-chief. provided that the child was available for cross-examination at the trial. The defence are 
entitled to a copy of the videotape to enable tllem to prepare for trial. This gives tlle defence an opportunity to 
prepare their cross-examination in detail. At the trial the child is then cross-exanlined in detail about the contents 
of a statement he made many months before. The child is thus placed in a very stressful position where he is forced 
to remember tlle details of his statement or have his credibility attacked, and thus finds himself in an even worse 
position. 
An ecological systems approach argues tllat it is not possible to predict reliably the future of a system without 
Imowing sometlling about the other systems to which it is linked. For instance , when trying to determine whether 
courtroom participation as a witness will harnl a child's development, the answer will depend On the child's age, 
level of development, emotional state, the quality of adult support available, the timing of interrogations, tlle quality 
of tlle judge's training as well as the child's understanding of the proceedings (Gabarino and Stott 1989:295-6). In 
terms of an ecological perspective, the ilnmediate relationships and situations of the child's life would fornl 
microsystems, and would include family , school and friends. Legal microsystems that affect child witnesses would 
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include the training of judges, the preparation of the child witness and reorganising the courtroom to maximise the 
child 's potential. In order to assist the child witness, as many links as possible should be developed between the 
different microsystems. LiIIks would be used to strengthen the child 's ability to cope in the different microsystems. 
Possible links would include having professionals from the courtroom visit dIe child at home, and where appropriate 
drawing dle parents into dle process . If the child is the only one to participate ill both home and court, then the 
linkage is weak and the child is at risk. But if the parents are used to participate in both as well , as in the case 
where a young child is all owed to sit on a parent 's lap ill dle courtroom, dlen the links become stronger (Gabarino 
and Stott 1989:297-300). 
Settings which exercise an influence over dle child's life without playing a direct role dlerein, are referred to as 
exosystems. TIlese would include, for instance, the parent's place of work, which would exercise an influence over 
the child via the parent . Exosystems would include governmental bodies that make decisions affecting the child's 
life. Legal exosystems are found in policy-making, as when legislation alter rules of evidence to make them 
compatible or incompatible for children (Gabarino and StOtt 1989:297-302). 
All these systems operate withinlllacrosystems which are the broad cul tural, economic and political systems which 
provide the blueprints for day-to-day life. These would include, for instance, a constitution which could provide 
protection for an accused by insisting on confrontation with and cross-examination of a witness (Gabarino and Stott 
1989:298-303). 
This ecological perspective on children as sources of infonnation forces us, therefore, to look both inward to the 
child 's capabilities and outward to the social and physical contexts in which infornJation is sought from children. 
It is impossible dlen to view dIe child wituess in isolation since all systems are interlinked. For this reason this 
srudy aims to focus on all interrelated aspects of dle child witness, broadly divided into the child himself and the 
context in which he is requi red to perfonn. 
In focusing inward on the capabilities of the child witness and outward on the enviromnent, the following issues 
will have to be addressed: 
1.3.1 Child Development 
In dle course of development, children change physically, emotionally and intellectually as they progress dlroUgh 
different stages. Child development is viewed as a progression dlfough generall y accepted milestones. It is, 
therefore, necessary to know what the developmental milestones are and to understand the general characteristics 
of each age period in order to detenlline a child 's abili ty to suppl y infomlation about events they have witnessed 
or experienced. As Gabarino and Stott (1 989:9-10) explain , dle better dle knowledge one has of child development, 
the better prepared one is to identify effective ways of conlfllunicating with children. 
5 
1.3.2 Competence 
A child's ability to provide accurate information depends on his ability to perceive, remember and communicate. 
In order to determine a child 's competence, one will have to understand the basic processes of cognitive and 
language development (Gabarino and Stott 1989: 16). This will include an investigation into the development and 
accuracy of memory in children, including the ability to store a memory and retrieve it at a later stage. It is 
important as well to understand the development of language in children, so that questions can be framed in a 
manner understandahle to the child . For instance, children develop the ability at a certain stage to understand 
concepts of time and place . In questioning a child , one needs to be aware of these stages so that questions are not 
posed in a manner that is incomprehensible to the child. 
1.3.3 Children's Perceptions 
A child's ability to provide accurate information will depend on the child's feelings about being competent and how 
ule child reacts towards adults. Issues of self-esteem and coping may influence the way a child communicates. 
A child may act in a particular way in an effort to cope with stress rauler than to reflect what ule child is really 
feeling (Gabarino and Stott 1989: 11). 
A child's perceptions of court proceedings and court persOlmel will have an effect on the child 's ability to give 
effective evidence. Research has shown Ulat children find a court appearance stressful, and that one of the sources 
of this stress has been traced to uleir lack of understanding of the trial procedure and what their role as a witness 
in this particular procedure would entail (Flin, Davies and Stevenson 1989:286). A study conducted by Cashmore 
and Bussey (1990: 179) found that the majority of seven year olds in Ule study believed that a court was a jailor 
a police station. If children as old as seven view the court as a jail. ulen this has serious implications on their 
effectiveness as witnesses, increasing the stress and trauma associated with testifying. 
Since a child 's perceptions of court proceedings and the role he has to play therein have important implications on 
his effectiveness as a witness, children's perceptions will have to be investigated and proposals forwarded as to how 
these perceptions could be corrected. 
1.3.4 Credibility 
TIle manner in which people, and court personnel in particular, perceive the abilities of children can bave a 
dramatic effect on a child 's evidence. Evidence of these perceptions can be found in laws governing the testimony 
of children. The IllOSt obvious example of this would be ule cautionary rule which requires a presiding officer to 
warn himself against the dangers of convicting on the evidence of a child . Children have been viewed as inept and 
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even described as "the most dangerous of all witnesses" (Goodman 1984:22). Children have been accused of lying, 
not being able to distinguish between fact and fantasy and of being highly suggestible. An investigation of relevant 
research will have to be undertaken to determine whether children do tell lies more frequently than adults, whetller 
they have ule ability to distinguish between fantasy and reality, and whether they are more suggestible than adults. 
1.3.5 Environment 
A cltild witness has to give evidence in a particular court envirolUuent. It is possible for a child to give evidence 
in an open court or via closed-circuit television. In certain instances a court appearance is avoided and replaced 
with a videotaped deposition. The various options available will have to be investigated to determine which setting 
will enable the child witness to give evidence effectively while at the sarne time protecting the accused. A further 
issue to be addressed is whether proceedings involving child witnesses should be open to the public or whether they 
should be held in camera. 
1.3.6 Personnel 
A child witness is forced to come into contact with a number of persOlmel involved in the crimiltal justice system. 
These would include police, prosecutors, defence attorneys and judges. The professional role as well as the 
motives, attitudes and expectations of persOlmel will have a great influence on the nature of the information obtained 
from ule child. For instance, if an adult has a preconceived idea of what he is looking for, he will 'find' evidence 
that confimls his own bias (Gabarino and Stott 1989: 14). 
Persomlel involved in Ule criminal justice system must be trained in appropriate techniques of eliciting evidence 
from children. An obvious exanlple would be the training of police in interviewing techniques that are appropriate 
to children and which, at the same time, are legally acceptable. 
1.3.7 Rules of Evidence 
An important exosystem relevant to child witnesses would include rules of evidence, whether created by legislators 
or the courts. These rules of evidence operate within a broader procedural envirorunent, nanlely the accusatorial 
system. Elements of ule accusatorial system relevant to the child witness will be identified and examined to 
determine what effect Uley have on a child's ability to testify effectively. These would include the rule against 
hearsay, competency requirements and ule cautiOltary rule. 
1.3.8 Influence of Social and Political Systems 
Since all systems operate within a larger macrosystem, it is important to investigate the implications of Ulese social 
and political norms on the child witness. The most important influence here would be the Constitution and the Bill 
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of Rights, in temlS of which all the other subsystems operate. Of particular relevance here would be the rights 
afforded an accused person in temlS of the Constitution, namely the right to confront witnesses and to cross-examine 
witnesses. One would then have to examine the effect of confrontation and cross-examination on children, and 
whether it enables children to give evidence effectively. 
1.3.9 Conclusion 
In order to understand children as sources of information, it is assumed that an interplay of various factors 
motivates the developing child 's behaviour (Gabarino and Stott 1989: 10). The child, and questions relating to his 
competency and credibility, cannOt be viewed apart from tlle context in which the child operates . For this reason 
an ecological perspective has been adopted for the purpose of developing an approach to children in the legal system 
that is fair to them and respects their developmental needs while at the same time being fair to the accused and 
protecting his rights with the overriding aim of obtaining accurate infomlatioll. 
1.4 Accusatorial System of Procedure 
Legal microsystems and exosystems all operate widlin a larger legal macrosystem, l1aDlely d,e model of procedure 
adopted in a particular country. Since dIe model of procedure used will determine the roles of parties involved , 
it is important to analyse what the essential features of a particular model are and what effect it will have on me 
child witness. Finally, it will have to be determined whedler a child is able to give evidence effectively in the 
model adopted. 
Modern systems of criminal procedure are ctivided into two basic models: me accusatorial model or me inquisitorial 
model (Herrmann J 978:3). Although traditionally dIe English and American systems are quoted as examples of 
the accusatorial model, and the French and German systems as examples of me inquisi torial system, it should be 
noted that almost no civilised country today has a system which is purely accusatorial or purely inquisitorial 
(Dugard 1977: 117). Tllis is explained by Goldstein (1974: 10 19) as follows: 
"These portraits of accusatorial and inquisitorial systems are, of course, idealized. European 
crintinal procedures are no more purely inquisitorial than ours are purely accusatorial . Europeans 
too have accusatorial elements and mixed systems; they may tolerate more discretion than meir 
literature concedes and may, in many instances, be moving toward a greater role for counsel and 
more explicit protection for dIe accused. Nevertheless, mere are central tendencies." 
The accusatorial process originated from the first form of litigation in post-primitive society where confrontation 
between two parties before an impartial arbiter replaced private vengeance . The procedure WjlS oral and took place 
in public (Snyman 1975 : 10 I). This element of confrontation forms dIe basis of the accusatorial model. Here each 
party tries to prove its own case and destroy dIe case of dIe adler party by highlighting the latter's weaknesses. 
Bodl parties constantly try to prove to the presiding officer that different answers can be given to dIe charge, thus 
giving me latter a stereoscopic view of tbe dispute (Hermlarm 1978:4). 
8 
The inquisitorial model, on ule oUler hand, began to develop towards the end of the middle ages. In this procedure 
the judge investigated ule case lIimself, with all evidence taken down in writing. The accused was seen as the 
object of Ule inquiry and had no procedural rights . The confrontation here took place between the accused and the 
court, rather than between two parties (Snyman 1975:101-2). The modern approach is to view the inquisitorial 
procedure as "a quasi-scientific searcb for the trudl rather than a dispute" whereby the presiding officer makes an 
objective and comprehensive analysis of dIe offence by integrating all available evidence (Hemlanll 1978:6). 
The essential features of the accusatorial system will be investigated in order to understand the model in which the 
child gives evidence, and comparisons with the inquisitorial procedure will be made. The description of the features 
here will be somewbat superficial since only general trends will be exanlined. 
1.4.1 The Role of the Presiding Officer 
The role of dIe judge in the accusatorial IlIodel is mainly passive. His function is to listen to the evidence that is 
presented to him by bodl parties and then to make a decision thereon, often leading to him being described as an 
umpire (Snyman 1975: 103). In Thomson v Glasgow Corporation 1961 SLT 237 Lord Justice-Clerk Tbomson 
described dIe role of dIe accllsatorial judge as follows: "Like referees at boxing contests they see that the rules are 
kept and count the points". He is, however, uot completely inactive since he has to decide on the athuissibility 
of evidence and may intervene when necessary to control the proceedings or ensure the necessary expedition of the 
trial. He also has the power to put supplementary questions to the witnesses, and to call witnesses who have not 
been called by eidler party but whom he believes will be able to assist the court in the matter before them 
(Herrnlallll 1978: 5). 
The inquisitorial judge plays a more active role, both during and sometimes even before the trial. He introduces 
and elicits the evidence by questioning the witnesses and ule accused, and orlly ulen allows the prosecutor and 
defence to put questions to the witnesses. He is not bound by ule evidence introduced by the parties but can ensure 
that necessary infornlation be investigated and produced at the trial. This has often given rise to the view that Ule 
inquisitorial judge searches for ule material truth, whereas the accusatorial judge searches only for the fomlal truUl 
since he relies upon the infomlation that has been placed before him (Snyman 1975: 103). TIle term ' inquisitorial ' 
is used to describe a system in which the state, rauler ulan ule parties, has an overriding responsibility for eliciting 
the facts of the crime, but ulere are many variations of this system. 
Hermlann (1978: 12-3) argues that an advantage of the active judge in the inquisitorial model is that, since he has 
to decide dIe case, he lmows hest what infomlation he requires and what questions he needs to put to the witnesses 
and the accused. By being able to conduct the interrogations himself, he obtains ule necessary evidence rather than 
having to wait for the evidence to be presented to him by ule parties. 
In different accusatorial systems ule judge will exercise ule powers wbich he has in different ways. For instance, 
in some states of the USA the judge in jury trials may not comment on the weight of the evidence nor on the 
credibility of the witnesses, whereas in OUler states he may comment on the evidence. In England dIe judge is more 
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active and may exercise his power to control the trial and call witnesses where deemed necessary (Hermlann 
1978:7). However, he is not allowed to descend into the arena since this would cause him to lose his objectivity, 
as held in Yuill v Yuill (1954)1 All ER 183 at 189 where the Court of Appeal explained that: 
"a judge who himself conducts the examination ... , descends into the arena and is liable to have 
his vision clouded by the dust of the conflict. Unconsciously he deprives himself of the advantage 
of calm and dispassionate observation" . 
In South Africa the power of the judge to play an active role in proceedings is contained in s l86 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act 51 of 1977 which provides that dIe court ' shall' subpoena and examine any person if his evidence 
appears 'essential to the just decision of dIe case'. The judge, therefore, does not have a discretion to intervene, 
but must do so when it is essential to dIe just decision of the case. His discretion, however, lies in the 
determination of when it would be essential to a just decision. 
One of the main criticisms levelled against the inquisitorial system relates to the double role which the judge has 
to fulfill. He has to act as both an investigator who has to find dIe evidence and the arbiter who bas to make an 
objective decision. Snyman (1975: 107-8) argues that these two functions contradict one another as it would be 
difficult for a judge to be completely unprejudiced against the accused if he has to act as prosecutor and judge at 
dIe same time. Although the judge also has to investigate circumstances which favour the accused, he is, 
neverdleless, perceived by dIe accused to be associated with the state-prosecuting audlOrities. 
The accusatorial system, on dIe other hand, is criticised as not being a search for dIe material truth, since the judge 
is limited in making his decision to the evidence placed before him by dIe parties and has very little discretion to 
move beyond this (Snymall 1975:108). 
1.4.2 Two Opposing Parties 
In the accusatorial system dIe trial is party-centred, widl each party presenting his case to the judge or the jury. 
Bodl parties have to collect their own evidence in order to prepare for the trial . They will decide the order in which 
evidence is to be presented and examine witnesses . Goldstein (1974: 1016) explains that both parties "play an 
aggressive role in preseming and examining witnesses and in shaping legal issues". The parties are, however, nor 
on an equal footing . The prosecution must prove their case beyond a reasonable doubt while the defence only have 
to raise doubt. The prosecution is also not under a duty to obtain a conviction, but must rather present all relevant 
evidence to the court in an attempt to see that justice is done. The defence, on the other hand , is entitled to "fight 
for an acquittal widl all legitimate means" (HermlalUI 1978:5) . This has given rise to the 'contest' or 'sporting' 
theory of justice where parties are left to prove their own case and dIe judge acts as au impartial umpire to see dtat 
dIe rules of the game are observed (Suyman 1975: 109). The fact that there are two opposing sides highlights the 
combat between the two parries. Volkmaml-Schluck (1981 :2) describes dIe proceedings as "combative or 
aggressive" while Brouwer (198 1:207). quoting Dressler, putS it as foll ows: 
"Today, instead of fighting widl legal weapons, we use legal arguments. Where combatants 
fonnerly met face-to-face, dley now have surrogates - attorneys - who fight for them. 111e judge 
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acts as a referee, theoretically protecting the contenders against foul blows. The jury decides 
which 'side' fought the better fight. But fight it is and the object is to win, not necessarily to 
reveal tile trutil. " 
The existence of two opposing parties has caused the accusatorial model to be criticised as being partisan . The 
judge relies on what he is being told by tile parties, and the parties can manipulate the truth in order to favour their 
own cases. The aim of each party is to win the case irrespective of whether tile outcome will be in accordance with 
trutil and real justice. A furtller criticism levelled against this model is that, because each party presents a one-sided 
picture of evidence tilat supports their side, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to create a coherent picture of the 
facts of a case (Snyman 1975:108). 
In the inquisitorial model tile prosecution and the accused are in principle not seen as two parties opposing each 
other. The prosecutor is not perceived as the adversary of the accused . Both he and the judge "must objectively 
consider and examine all evidence wi til a view simply of discovering the truth" (Snyman 1975: 106). This has the 
effect that no party has to bear the burden of proof. Since tilere are no opposing parties, there is no burden of 
proof on the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt nor a burden of adducing evidence on the defence. 
The burden is On tile court. The court muSt be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt once it has heard all the 
evidence (Langbein 1979:208). 
1.4.3 Cross-examination 
An essential element of tile accusatorial trial is the distinction between evidence-in-chief and cross-examination, and 
the right to cross-exanlination. Once a witness has given evidence in a trial, the opposing party is afforded an 
opportunity to cross-examine the witness. If the party does not take advantage of tilis opportunity to cross-examine 
the witness, then the court will accept tile evidence of the witness. In fact, cross-exanlination is so vital that 
evidence in respect of which cross-examination is not possible must be excluded, even if it is relevant (Brouwer 
1981 :220). 
Cross-examination is so fundamental to the accusatorial model that it has been regarded as a right and not a 
privilege, as explained by Cleary (1984:47): 
"For two centuries, comlllon law judges and lawyers have regarded the opportunity for cross-
exanlination as an essential safeguard of tile accuracy and completeness of testimony, and they 
have insisted tilat the opportunity is a right and not a Illere privilege." 
In fact, Wigmore (1974:32) has referred to cross-exanlination as "the greatest legal engine ever invented for the 
discovery of Ole truth". 
In the inquisitorial system little emphasis is placed on oral presentation of evidence or on cross-examination 
(Goldstein 1974: 1018-9). Rather. cross-exanlination is regarded as "an attempt to 'corner' a witness into an attitude 
which the cross-examining party has himself decided upon beforehand, and as a metilOd whereby the most honest 
witness can be driven or twisted into contradicting himself" (Snyman 1975:109). Snyman (1975:109), quoting 
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Schmidt, explains that, viewed from the inquisitorial model , cross-examination is seen as being able to achieve 
anything except dIe discovery of the truth . 
Since all questioning of witnesses is done by dIe judge, the distinction between examination-in-chief and cross-
examination is unknown (Hemllann 1978: 5). In dIe German criminal trial dlere is no cross-examination. Section 
239 of the German Criminal Procedure Code does provide for cross-exanlination , but in practice dtis section is 
never invoked. A further restraint upon dIe use of cross-examination is the fact that bodl the prosecution and 
defence must agree that cross-examination is needed (Richings 1978:55). Although in the German system dIe judge 
must give the prosecution and the defence an opportunity to put additional questions once he has completed his 
interrogation of the witness, amendments to dlis procedure have been introduced. In 1975 an amendment was 
introduced to dIe Gerumn Code of Criminal Procedure which provided that a witness under dIe age of sixteen had 
to be examined solely by the judge. The purpose of this amendment was to protect both the minor as well as the 
factfinding process against the danger of improper questioning (Herrmann 1978:9). In dIe French system the 
interrogation is conducted by the presiding judge. The latter will decide dIe order in which the witnesses are to 
give evidence. aldlOugh generally witnesses for dIe prosecution are heard first. Witnesses are not interrupted while 
giving evidence. Once dley have completed their evidence, the interrogation will be conducted by dIe judge. The 
prosecution and dIe accused are dlen given an opportunity to direct questions through the judge. This does not 
mean that the judge repeats the questions, he merely signifies to the witness to respond to the question (Brouwer 
1981 :2 17-8). 
1.4.4 Rules of Evidence 
Closely related to the presence of cross-examination in dIe accusatorial system is ille existence of an elaborate law 
of evidence. For instance, the general rule is that an accused may not be questioned about previous convictions, 
and hearsay evidence is inadmissible. The detailed law of evidence is also linked to the presence of juries, since 
lay persons may not be in a position to accord ille correct weight to certain prejudicial evidence. The various 
components are so intertwined that Snyman (1975: 109) explains lhat "any proposed introduction of cross-
examination is seen in Gennany as necessarily entailing a take-over of the whole Anglo-American law of evidence". 
In dIe accusatorial procedure dIe empbasis is placed on dIe admissibility of evidence. There are strict rules wltich 
exclude certain types of evidence. For instance, in order to give evidence in court a child must be found to be 
competent. The presiding officer will conduct an examination to detennine whedler a child is competent. If the 
cltild is found to be incompetent, dIe child's evidence will be excluded . The cautionary rule warns against the 
dangers of convicting on the evidence of a child and requires corroboration of this evidence in certain instances. 
The rule against hearsay requires that evidence, which is not capable of being tested by cross-exanlination. must 
be excluded. The intracies of these rules vary from one accusatorial system to anodler, but they are all based on 
a system which emphasises admissibility. 
In contrast, the rules of evidence are less technical and less restrictive in the inquisitorial system. The GerulallS 
believe that "the presence of professiolmls in deliberatioIlS and the requirement of written findings of fact and law 
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are sufficient safeguards against the misuse of potentially prejudicial varieties of evidence" (Langbein 1979:207). 
The general principle, therefore, is that nearly all relevant evidence will be admissible. Richings (1978:254-5) 
illustrates this witll reference to tlle Gemlan system. The function of the court in this system, according to s244 
of the Gemlan Criminal Procedure Code, is "to investigate the truth" which has the effect that exclusionary rules 
are virtually unknown. Hearsay evidence is, tllerefore, athrtissible as well as the accused's previous convictions, 
since the latter indicate tl,at the offence is not foreign to the accused's nature. 
The emphasis in the inqui sitOrial model is not on tlle athrtissibility of evidence, but ratller the weight that is to be 
attached to the evidence. In tlle case of hearsay evidence the focus is on how much weight will be attributed to the 
hearsay , not on whether it will be admissible or not. 
This does not imply that there are no exclusionary rules of evidence at all. In order to be admissible evidence must 
be relevant. Any statements obtained by unfair means, such as duress or deception, are also excluded (Richings 
1978:255). There are obviously rules of evidence in tlle inquisitorial model , but these are far less in number and 
not as restrictive as those found in (he accusatorial model. 
1.4.5 Conclusion 
Only a few of the important differences between tlle accusatorial and tlle inquisitorial models bave been highlighted 
here. Since the procedural model provides a macrosystem within which children have to give evidence, the model 
itself will have to be evaluated to detemline whetller it enables children to act as effective witnesses. Any possible 
reform will also have to be evaluated in terms of tbis macrosystem. 
In conclusion, the accusatorial model is characterised by twO opposing parties wbo have to place their version 
before the court, in accordance with elaborate rules of evidence. Each party is given an opportunity to cross-
examine opposing witnesses. The presiding officer, whose role is mostly passive, has to listen to the evidence 
presented to him and then make a decision. It should be noted that both the accusatorial and tlle inquisitorial 
systems are the consequence of historical growtll and political developments. They have not developed as a result 
of scientific inquiry into which of the two models is better equipped for accurate factfinding. Belief in either system 
is based on popular conviction and speculation rather than on empirical research (Herrtnann 1978: 12). Finally, it 
mUSt be borne in mind that it is an over-simplification to talk about accusatorial and inquisitorial systems as if they 
are mutually exclusive. All systems have characteristics drawn from both models, the final flavour, according to 
Spencer and Flin (1993:80), depending only on the mix. 
It is the above-mentioned elements of the accusatorial model whicb will have to be evaluated in terms of child 
witnesses and any possible refomls suggested. The following issues will have to be addressed: does the partisan 
namre of the procedure affect children negatively? Should presiding officers be better trained and accorded more 
power to deal witll children? Can a tl1lthful account be obtained from children using the traditional tools of cross-
examination? What effect does Ule elaborate network of rules of evidence have on child witnesses? How do the 
rules of evidence affect chi ld wi tnesses? [s tlle competency examination effecti ve? Do tlte rules against hearsay 
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prejudice children? What is the basis of the cautionary rule and what effect does it have on a child's evidence? 
In short, can child witnesses give evidence effectively in an accusatorial framework? 
1.5 Conventions and Constitutions 
Conventions and constitutions foml another macrosystem in which courts, and ultimately the child witness, have 
to operate. In temlS of the ecological model, any change in legislation relating to the child witness will have to 
be evaluated within tile framework of the constitution or convention regulating that particular country. As explained 
supra, a change in anyone system will have an effect on another system. This became particularly apparent in the 
United States of America when a number of states introduced legislation enabling a child witness to give evidence 
outside of the courtroom while simultaneously relaying the child's image via closed-circuit television to the court. 
The change in this legal microsystem had an immediate effect on the macrosystem created by the constitution, since 
the United States Constitution provides that an accused is entitled to face-to-face confrontation. 
Since rights have been entrenched by constitutions and conventions, it is important to investigate those sections 
which would be relevant, whetller directly or indirectly, to the child witness . As the study is to be conducted from 
the point of view of the child witness in tlle accusatorial system, and a comparative study will be made of the 
Uni ted Kingdom and the United States of America with reference to certain inquisitorial features in the French and 
German systems, aspects of the following conventions and constitutions will be discussed in this study: the 
European Convention on Hwnan Rights, the Constimtion of the United States of America and the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa. 
1.5.1 European Convention on Hwnan Rights 
In the United Kingdom there is no written constimtion, therefore there is no question of rules of evidence being 
held to be unconstitutional. However, any legislative act of Parliament would have to conform to the European 
Convention on Human Rights, although this is not directly binding on the courts (Spencer and Flin 1993:78). The 
European Convention does not support the accusatorial system in the same unqualified way as the Constitution of 
the USA, and tlle provisions have to be considered in the context of both the accusatorial and inquisitorial models 
since the convention applies to tlle European communities and includes countries which fall into either or even both 
of these models (Jacobs and White 1996: 158). 
The relevant provision concerned with the right to a fair trial is contained in Article 6, and the text provides as 
follows (Jacobs and White 1996: 122): 
"1. In the detennination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against 
him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an 
independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgement shall be pronounced 
publicly but the press and public may be excluded by law. Judgement shall be 
pronounced puhlicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of tile 
trial in tlle interest of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, 
where tile interest of juveniles or tile protection of private life of the parties so require, 
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or the ex tent strictly necessary in dIe opuuon of the court in special 
circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interest of justice. 
2. Everyone cbarged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty 
according to law. 
3. Everyone charged witll a criminal offence has the following minimnnl rights : 
(a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of 
the nature and cause of the accusation against bim; 
(b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; 
(c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, 
if he bas not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free 
when the interests of justice so require; 
(d) to exanline or have exanlined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance 
and exanunation of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as 
witnesses against him; 
(e) to have tbe free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the 
language used in court. " 
Article 6 of dIe European Convention on Human Rights undertakes to provide a party with a fair trial in civil and 
criminal cases, which is a basic element of the rule of law. However, for tlle purpose of this study only those 
elements relevant to the child witness will be highlighted. 
1.5.1.1 Public Hearing 
Article 6(1) provides that everyone is entitled to "a fair and public hearing" and judgement must "be pronounced 
publicly". Publicity is regarded as a guarantee of the fairness of the trial, which creates confidence by allowing 
tbe public to see justice being ailillinistered (Jacobs and White 1996: 140). 
Article 6(1) contains a number of limitations on tlle right to a public trial. The public may be excluded in tlle 
interest of morals, public order or national security, where it is necessary to protect the interests of juvelules or 
the private life of the parties, and where it would be necessary in the interests of justice. The public can, therefore, 
be excluded in a wide variety of cases, but of special relevance is the provision relating to juveniles. In terms of 
article 6(1) the courts would be entitled to exclude the public in order to protect children. The language employed 
is very vague ("where the interests of juveniles ... require") and a furtller discretion is given to exclude tlle public 
where it would be in dIe interesls of justice to do so. 
1.5.1.2 Confrontation 
Article 6(3)(d) provides that an accused has a right "to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on bis 
behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him". The purpose of this article is to ensure tlIat the accused 
is placed on an equal footing with the prosecution irrespective of whether the system is accusatorial or inqnisitorial 
(Jacobs and White 1996:158). 
According to Spencer and Flill (1993:79) this right is not dIe same as the right to confront a witness face-to-face 
while the latter is giving evidence persolIally at the trial. The European Court of Human Rights has emphasised 
that the Convention does nOt give an accused the right to insist on a witness being brought to court to give evidence 
persOIIally. In Delta v France, Judgement of 19 December 1990, Series A, No.191-A (1993) 16 EHRR 574 the 
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accused was convicted of robbery on ule basis of identifications which were made at the police station by the sixteen 
year old victim and her friend, neither of whom gave evidence at the trial. This was held to be a violation of the 
Convention, altbough the European Court of Human Rights added that the Convention does not insist on a witness 
facing dIe accused in court, all that was necessary was tbat the defendant be given "an adequate and proper 
oPPOrtunity to challenge and question Idlel witness against him, eiuler at the time ule witness made his statement 
or at some later stage of dIe proceedings". This was also the approach adopted by dIe court in Unterpertinger V 
Austria, Judgment of24 November 1986, Series A, No. 110 (1991) 13 EHRR 175. The court relied on witness 
statements at ule trial , ule makers of which declined to attend court and give evidence in person, since they were 
members of ule accused's family and had the right to decline to testify. The European Court of Human Rights held 
that in certain circumstances dIe use of statements of dlis kind would not necessarily breach dIe Convention, but 
in this case they fanned dIe essential proof of the accusations made against me accused and dIe evidence could not 
be tested in dIe nomlal way. 
In Kostovski v The Netherlands , Judgement of 20 November 1989, Series A, No.166 (1990) 12 EHRR 434 the 
identity of a witness was kept confidential to avoid the possibility of intimidation. One of the accused was convicted 
on the basis of evidence which had been taken down by the judge in me absence of me prosecution, the accused 
and his counsel. The European Court of Human Rights found that me Convention had been violated because ule 
accused had nOt been given a proper opportunity to challenge the witness. 
From the above cases it would appear that Article 6 does not provide ule accused WiUl me right to insist that a 
witness face him personally in court. Rather, dle emphasis would seem to be on dle right to challenge the evidence 
against dIe accused. 
1.5.1.3 Cross-examination 
Article 6(3)(d) provides that an accused has a right "to examine or have examined witnesses against him". This 
must be seen in the context of both dIe accusatorial and inquisitorial models. In ule accusatorial system witnesses 
are examined and cross-examined by dIe parties or their representatives while in the inquisitorial system witnesses 
are examined by dIe court (Jacobs and White 1996: 158) . The emphasis here is on the right to cballenge me 
evidence against the accused rather Ulan give the accused himself the right to cross-examine the witness. TIlis is 
supported by the decision in Delta v France (supra) where the European Court of Human Rights held mat me 
prosecution can make use of written statements obtained from witnesses before the trial, provided the defendant was 
afforded all opportunity to have the evidence tested, and ulis could be done eidler at tile time the statement was 
made or at dle trial. The Convention , therefore , does not insist mat cross-examination has to be conducted by me 
accused or his representative, nor does it have to take place at me trial. 
In Unterpertinger v Austria (supra) ule Convention was found to be violated because me evidence could not be 
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tested in the nonnal way. and in Kostovski v The Netherlands (supra) the accused had not been afforded an 
adequate and proper opportunity to challenge and question the witness. 
The Convention, therefore, insists that an accnsed be given an opportunity to challenge any evidence which is to 
be used against him at the trial. The provision would include the procedures adopted in both inquisitorial and 
accusatorial countries, namely that the questioning be conducted by the accused, his legal representative, a judge 
or other court official. The questioning also does not have to take place at the trial, but could be conducted at an 
earlier stage of the proceedings. 
1.5.2 Constitution of the United States of America 
In the United States there are certain minimum rights for litigants which are guaranteed by tile Constitution. These 
rights are nOt absolute in the sense U,at exceptions can never be made, but they are legal absolutes in that it is not 
open to any United States Court or the legislature to make exceptions to them on the grounds that it seems fair and 
sensible to do so (Spencer and Flin 1993 :77). 
The rights which are relevant to this study are contained in Amendment VI and Amendment XIV which entrench 
certain aspects of tile accusatorial system. Amendment VI deals with specific rights in an accusatorial system, such 
as confrontation and cross-examination, whereas Amendment XIV entitles a citizen to due process of law. 
The relevant amendments. as quoted by Tribe (l988:xli-xliii), are set out below: 
1.5.2,1 
"Amendment VI [1791] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy a right to a speedy and a pnblic trial, by an 
impartial jury of tile State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district 
shall have previously been ascertained by law and to be infortlled of the nature and cause of the 
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for 
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have Ule assistance of counsel for his defence. 
Amendment XIV [1868] 
Section I. All persons bortl or naturalised in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
tilereof, are ci tizens of the Uni ted States and of the State wherein they reside. No state sball 
make or enforce any law which shall abridge Ule privileges or inmmnities of citizens of tile United 
States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of tile laws. " 
Public Hearing 
The Sixth Amendment provides that "the accused shall enjoy a right to ... a public trial ". This provision, according 
to Tribe (1988:959), implies that the govenmlent does not have Ule discretion to treat trials as a confidential matter. 
This publicity, although an aspect of Anglo-American tradition. is an explicit constitutional command. In Gannett 
Co. v DePasqulae, 443 U.S. 368 (1979) Ule US Supreme Court held at 368 that "the SiXtll Amendment ... presumes 
open trials as a nonn" . 
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Although dle right to a public trial is an express constitutional conunand, it is not absolute and can give way in 
certain cirCUlllStanCes to competing interests. However, any exception to this right must be construed as strictly 
as possible (Spencer and Flin 1993 :425-6). In Globe Newspaper Co. v Superior COllrt , 457 U.S. 596 (1982) the 
court was faced with a Massachusetts law which required a trial judge to exclude dle public and press from the 
courtroom when minor victims of sexual offences give evidence. The trial judge, relying on this statute, closed 
the entire trial where it was alleged that the defendant had forcibly raped three girls, aged sixteen and seventeen 
at the time of the trial. The US Supreme Court found the Massachusetts statute to be unconstitutional. At 607-8 
dle court conceded tbat the protection of young victims from further trauma and embarrassment was a competing 
interest, but even such a compelling interest couldn' t justify a mandatory closure rule which did not take account 
of the interests of dle pUblic, the parties involved and dle witnesses. The majority added dlat a case-by-case 
detennination would bave to be made after dle presiding judge has reviewed "the victim's age , psychological 
maturity and understanding, tbe nature of the crime, dle desires of tbe victim, and tbe interests of parents and 
relatives" (608). 
1.5.2.2 Confrontation 
The Sixth Amendment provides further that "the accused shall enjoy a right ... to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him", The right to be confronted, according to Gordon (1992:59), includes the following rights: tbe right 
to face-to-face confrontation between tbe witness and the accused; the right to cross-examine witnesses; the right 
for dle jury andlor the court to view dle demeanour of the witness; and the right to have hearsay evidence excluded. 
In United States v Benfield, 593 F.2d 815 (8th Circ. 1979) tbe court held that tbe right to confrontation included 
a face-to-face meeting at trial whicb was "additional to dle right of cold, logical cross-exanlination" (at 821) . 
The right to face-to-face confrontation is not absolute. The Supreme Court in Ohio v Roberts , 448 U.S. 56 (1980) 
held at 64 tbat dle preference for face-to-face confrontation can in certain instances give way to competing interests 
where dlis would be in dle interests of justice. Therefore, when the need for accurate evidence and the tramna 
suffered by children as a result of face-to-face confrontation are balanced against the defendant's right to face dle 
c1lild in an open court, the preference for face-to-face confrontation can be yielded (Myers 1987:401). 
Tbe most important component of the right to confrontation is dte right which an accused has to confront wi tnesses 
who give evidence against him. [n Douglas v Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965) the Supreme Court explained that 
"an adequate opportunity for cross-examination may satisfy the clause even in the absence of physical confrontation" 
(at 418). In fact, Wigmore (1974: 28) is of the opinion d,at coturontation is simply anodler tenn for cross-
examination. 
1.5.2.3 Due Process 
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides tltat no state shall "deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law". The due process clause requires dlatjudicial proceedings 
must comply widl dle principles of fundanlental fairness. According to Tribe (1988:772-3) the Court, in 
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interpreting the Fourteemh Amendment, has looked to the Bill of Rights for guidance to such an extem that many 
of the rights guaranteed in the first eight Amendments have been absorbed into the Fourteenth Amendment. The 
due process has, therefore. been held to include, amongst all the other rights incorporated in the first eight 
Amendments, the right to a speedy and public trial before a jury and the right to confront opposing witnesses. 
TIlese rights have been included in the due process clause as they are regarded as fundamental in the American 
system of jurisprudence. 
In deterttlining whether the due process will yield to a competing interest, the interest will have to be balanced 
against the degree to which the defendant is deprived of a fair trial. 
1.5.3 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 was adopted by the Constitutional Assembly on 
8 May 1996. Chapter 2 of dIe Constitution incorporates the Bill of Rights. The rights which are of particular 
relevance to this study are contained in s35: 
"s35(3) Every accused has a right to a fair trial , which includes the right -
(a) 
(b) 
(c) to a public trial in an ordinary court; 
(d) 
(e) to be present when being tried; 
(I) ...... (h) 
(i) to adduce and challenge evidence;" 
In addition to the above section, s28 relates specifically to the rights accorded to children; and provides as follows: 
1.5.3,1 
"s28(1) Every child has dIe right -
(a) ....... (c) 
(d) to be protected from maitreaunent, neglect, abuse, or degradation; 
(e) ...... . (i) 
(2) A child' s best interest is of paramount importance in every matter concerning 
dIe child. 
(3) In dlis section, "child" means a person under the age of 18 years." 
Public Hearing 
Section 35(3)(c) of the Constitution provides that an accused has a right to a public trial in an ordinary court. In 
S v Baleka and Others (2) 1986(4) SA 192 (T) at 200 the Court accepted that the guiding principle was that the 
courts are open to dIe public and should always be so, except in exceptional circumstances. 
The reason for making judicial proceedings public is to ensure d,at evidence is trustworthy and complete, according 
to S v Leepile and Others (I) 1986(2) SA 333 (W) at 338D-F. In addition, allowing dIe public to be present at 
a trial increases respect for the law and gives the public confidence in judicial remedies. 
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Although an accused person has a right to a public trial, this right is not absolute and exceptions to this right are 
to be found in legislation. The decision whether an accused's right to a public trial should yield "involve[s] a 
careful weighing up of all the factors in the two scales, namely those favouring the open trial and those favouring 
the protection of the witness against harm", according to S v Leepile(1) (supra) at 340A. 
Exceptions to this right are found in sl53 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, which allows a bearing to be 
closed in the following instances: where it would be in the interests of the State to do so; where a witness would 
be hafIlled by giving evidence in public; where the witness is a complainant in a case relating to indecency; and 
where the witness is a child under the age of eighteen. 
1.5.3.2 Confrontation 
Section 35(3)(e) of the Constitution provides tilat the accused has the right to be present when he is being tried. 
This right enables an accused to be present in court at his trial. It does not specifically set out that he has the right 
to confront or face witnesses, as does the US Constitution, which grants an accused the right to be confronted with 
the witnesses against bim. 
Joubert (1995:521-3) argues that the right to be present at a trial is very closely linked to the right to present your 
case and the right to cross-examination. He argues furtiler that the right to be present encompasses more than 
simply requiring that the trial and the decision of the court take place in his presence. In fact, be believes that it 
demands confrontation in tile sense of being able to see the witnesses and view their demeanour. Joubert 
(1995:522) explains it thus: 
'''n Konfrontasie word vereis: die besknldigde moet getuies op 'n kart afstand kan waarneem, 
sodat hy (bykomstig tot die inhoudelike van bulle getuienis) ook hulle gesigsuitdrnkkings, handing 
en stembuiging kan evalueer." 
The denial of confrontation amounts to an irregularity, on the basis of which a conviction can be overturned. In 
S v Motlatla 1975(1) SA 814 (T) the court held that a denial of confrontation amounted to a failure of justice. The 
accused in this matter was only added as an accused after the complainant had already given evidence. The 
recorded evidence of the complainant was played back to him, and tile trial proceeded from there. The court 
referred to sI56(1) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act 56 of 1955 which provided tilat every criminal 
trial, except in special circumstances, shall take place and the witnesses shall give their evidence in open court and 
in the presence of the accused. Colman, 1. explained the meaning of tilis section at 815E-F: 
"That is a very important provision in our criminal law and it means more than that an accused 
person must know what the State witnesses are saying or have said about him. It means even 
more than that he shall be able to hear them saying it. There must be a confrontation; he mnst 
see them as they depose against him so tbat he can observe their demeanour. And they for tileir 
pa11must give their evidence in the face of a present accused." 
Although the Constitution does provide an accused witb the rigbt to be present at a trial, this right is not absolute. 
There are certain statutory provisions which specifically exclude confrontation. Section 159 of the Criminal 
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Procedure At 51 of 1977 provides tilat if an accused at criminal proceedings conducts himself in a manner which 
makes the continuance of the proceedings in his presence impracticable, tilen the court may remove the accused and 
have tile proceedings conducted in his absence. 
Section 158 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1977, as amended, enables bOtil witnesses and the accused to give 
evidence via closed-circuit television, where it would prevent unreasonable delay , save costs, be convenient, be in 
the interest of justice or prevent prejudice or haml to anyone. Another statutory exception is contained in s.l70A 
of the above-mentioned act , and provides d,at child witnesses can give their evidence via an intermediary while they 
are situated in another room. The accused will be able to observe the child with the aid of electronical equipment. 
Traditional confrontation is tilerehy excluded. This has been justified on the grounds of the trauma experienced 
by youthful witnesses (Jouben 1995:77). 
A further exception is found in sl71 of tile Criminal Procedure Act 1977 which provides for evidence to be taken 
on conunission. In ternlS of this section, where it is not possible to obtain the attendance of a witness without 
undue delay, expense or inconvenience or where the witness is outside the Republic, a magistrate or competent 
person may go to the witness and take down his evidence. Confrontation in these circumstances is, therefore, not 
possible. When making an order for evidence to be taken on commission, the court has to be very careful. In S 
v Hassim and Others 1973(3) SA 443 (A) tile coun at 453A explained that "in such circumstances it would not be 
in the interests of justice to take the evidence of the witness on commission where the advantage of cross-
examination, and benefit of observing his conduct and demeanour, would be lost". In S v Hoare and Others 
1982(3) SA 306 (N) Janles AlP, in granting an application til at evidence be taken on commission, moved away from 
dle approach in Hassim (supra). At 309 D-E it was explained as follows: 
1.5.3.3 
"[t]he fact tilat dIe ultimate triers of fact do not physically see and hear the witness is a factor dlat 
must be given due weight but to a large extent its importance is reduced because tile triers of fact 
are not a jury but men of some legal experience, who are fully aware of the dangers of accepting 
the disputed evidence of witnesses who are not personally heard in preference to the evidence of 
witnesses who have given evidence viva voce". 
Cross-examination 
Section 35(3)(i) of the Constitution provides that dle accused has a right to adduce and challenge evidence. 
According to Klink v RegionaL Coult Magistrate NO and Others 1996(3) BCLR 402 (SE) at 409F-G, "[a]lthough 
the right to cross-examine is not mentioned in dlis section, the right to cross-exantine is regarded as so fundamental 
that its denial will almost invariably lead to prejudice". 
This right is regarded as a fundamental right of our criminal procedure at conilllonlaw and is also enshrined in sl66 
of the Criminal Procedure Act 1977, wltich reads as follows: 
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"(1) Any accused may cross-examine any witness called on behalf of the prosecution at 
criminal proceedings or any witness called on behalf of such co-accused at criminal 
proceedings ... " 
Although cross-examination plays a vital part in a trial court's decision, this right is not regarded as absolute. 
Melunsky J at 41OA-B in Klink (supra) accepted that "[v]ital as the right to cross-examine may be, it is not an 
absolute right, for the trial court retains a discretion to disallow questioning which is irrelevant, unduly repetitive, 
oppressive or odlerwise improper". 
Although the right to cross-examine is not absolute, any limitation of tlus right will have to be construed as 
narrowly as possible. In each case the court will have to determine whether the limitation of cross-examination has 
resulted in the negation of tile right [0 a fair trial. 
1.5.3.4 Rights of Children 
Section 28(1)(d) of the Constitution provides tbat every child has the right to be protected from maltreannent, 
neglect, abuse or degradation, while subsection (2) provides that a child's best interests shall be of paramount 
importance in every matter concenung the child. 
The right relevant to tlus study is dIe right which a child has to be protected from neglect and abuse. This 
subsection is specifically aimed "against executive or adnulustrative action or legislation which renders children 
vulnerable to neglect or abuse" (Chaskalson et al 1996:33-8). The position in South Africa would be much wider 
than that currently in force in the USA. For instance, in DeShaney v Winnebago County Department Social 
Services , 489 US 189, 109 SCt 998 (1989) dIe Uluted States Supreme Court held that a state's failure to protect 
a child from his father, after reports of possible abuse were made, did not violate the cluld's right to due process 
in terms of the Fourteenth Amendment. At 199 tile court explained that tile "[p]urpose of the due process clause 
was to protect tile people froUl the state, not to ensure tllat the state protected them from each other". The Soutl] 
African position would, however, appear to be different since s28(1)(d) specifically provides tllat tile child has a 
right to be protected. According to Chaskalson et al (1996:33-8), a child in the position of Joshua DeShaney 
would be successful in a South African COurt. 
The right which a cluld has to be protected from abuse and neglect may, according to Chaskalson et al (1996:33-8), 
have implications for the rules of evidence in tile case where a child is a witness. For instance, it is suggested that 
a refusal to adnlit a child's hearsay statements or to allow a child to give evidence via closed-circuit television in 
cases of child abuse may he unconstitutional. 
Since child abuse is capable of being defined so widely that it would include a psychological interpretation (where 
tile abuse is of a psychological nature), a sociological interpretation (where tile abuse is linked to the environment, 
as in poverty), and a cultural illterpretation (where society views children as being weaker and therefore capable 
of being victimised), the efficacy of the law to elinunate child abuse is minimised (Chaskalson et al 1996:33-9). 
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However. the above section would serve to place an obligation on the state to initiate progranunes. both therapeutic 
and educational, which would attempt to address the problem of abuse. This would have important implications 
insofar as progranunes aimed at preparing child witnesses are concerned. There would then, in terms of this 
interpretation, be an obligation on the state to provide such progranunes. According to Chaskalson et al (1996:33-9) 
constitutional law in this way "gives the law greater scope than tile connnonlaw or statute to combat the problem". 
Subsection (2) fnrtiler provides that a child 's best interests is of paramount importance in every matter concerning 
the child. The common law determinant of judicial decisions in matters relating to children has always been the 
best interests of the child. This conmlOn law standard has now been constimtionalised in s28(2). In terms of this 
section the best interests of cbildren are paramount (Chaskalson et al 1996:33-1). 
Although the standard 'best interests' has traditionally been used in matters relating to family law, such as issues 
of custody and access, the question tilat is raised is whether this standard has now been extended to include criminal 
matters as well. In balancing tbe interests of the child witness Witll the accused's rights to confrontation and cross-
examination, are the child 's interests paramount? In Klink v Regional Court Magistrate NO and Others (supra) 
Melunsky J referred to this section at 413H, implying tilat the concept of best interests may be extended to matters 
of evidence in crintinal proceedings. The actual wording of the section would support tilis arg!lJllent, since it uses 
the phrase "in every maUer concerning tbe child" . However, it was not necessary in this case to deal with this 
issue: 
"In the circumstances it is not necessary for me to consider whether a declaration that section 
170A was unconstitutional would conflict wi til section 30(3) of tile Constitution which provides, 
inter alia, tilat in all matters concerning a child his or her best interests shall be paramount." 
(413H) 
In referring to s30(3) the coun was referring to the counterpart of s28 in the Interim Constitution Act 200 of 1993. 
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2. PROCEDURES ADOPTED IN OTHER ACCUSATORIAL 
SYSTEMS WITH RESPECT TO CHILD WITNESSES: UNITED 
KINGDOM 
The legal system of England is based on tbe accusatorial system and this has the following implications insofar as 
criminal cases are concerned: 
i. there is a trial at which witnesses give oral evidence; 
ii. a wi tness who gives evidence is cross-examined by the opposing party ; 
Ill. witnesses give evidence in the presence of the accused; 
iv. trials are conducted in an open court; 
v. there are specialised rules of evidence relating to:-
a) the competence of child witnesses; and 
b) tlte cautionary rule relating to child witnesses (Spencer and Flin 1990:66). 
2.1 The Constitutional Position 
England does not have a written constitution, so the accusatorial system is not guaranteed protection in this way. 
An Act of Parliament would be able to change any aspect of the system (Spencer and Flin 1990:68). Althougb the 
courts themselves are quite ready to allow departures from the accusatorial system when they are of dIe opinion 
that it is necessary, in practice, however, any cbanges introduced by means of a statute or judicial decision would 
have to conform to the European Convention on Human Rights (Spencer and Flin 1990:68). 
The European Convention on Human Rights does guarantee certain of tile rights which form part of the accusatorial 
system, although perhaps not as strictly as does the American Constitution. Briefly, the European Convention 
guarantees the following rights which fonn part of the accusatorial system in tlte United Kingdom: 
2.1.1 Oral Evidence 
Article 6(1) provides that tile accused is entitled to a "hearing ... by an independent and impartial tribunal established 
by law". Article 6(3)(d) refers to tile right tilat the accused has "to examine or have exanlined witnesses against 
llim and to obtain the attendance of witnesses". 
2.1.2 Cross-examination 
Article 6(3)(d), mentioned above, grants an accused tlte right to cross-examine witnesses himself or have the cross-
examination done on his behalf. 
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2.1.3 Presence of Accused 
Article 6 simply gives the accused the right to cross-examine witnesses called against him, but does not specifically 
grant the accused the right to face-to-face confrontation, as is found in the Sixth Amendment of the American 
Constitution. 
There have been a number of decisions of the European Court of Human Rights which have condemned convictions 
which have been based on out-of-court statements made by witnesses who have not been called to give evidence 
at the trial. This was the decision in Delta v France supra where a French court convicted a man of robbery on 
the basis of identifications made at a police station by a 16 year old victim and her friend, neither of whom later 
gave evidence at the trial. The European Court of Human Rights held that this was a violation of the European 
Convention, although they did emphasise that the Convention did not insist on ule witnesses having to give evidence 
personally in court. This could be done by means of obtaining written statements from the witnesses before the 
trial, provided that ule defendant was given a proper opportnnity to challenge the evidence, either when the 
statement was made or at a later stage (Spencer and Flin 1993:79). 
In Asch v Austria, Judgment of 26 April 1991. Series A, No . 203-A (1993)15 EHRR 597 the court made certain 
obiter dicta that the Convention would probably not even be violated in Ule situation where a defendant was 
convicted partly on dIe out-of-court statement of a witness. whom the defendant had not had an opportunity to 
challenge, since Ule latter had become impossible to arrange (Spencer and Flin 1993:79). 
2.1.4 Public Hearing 
Article 6(1) provides that the accused is entitled to a "fair and public hearing". The right is, however, qualified 
by a number of exceptions. The public can be excluded from a trial where it is in the interests of morals, public 
order, national securi ty, juveniles, protection of private lives or jnstice. It would seem, therefore, that there would 
be no objection to a court being cleared in the interests of protecting a child witness. 
2.2 Oral Evidence 
2.2.1 Introduction 
One of the fundamental assumptions on which the rules of evidence are based in an accusatorial system is that oral 
evidence of witnesses given personally at a trial is superior to any other fonn of evidence (Spencer and Flin 
1990:218). 
A number of rules of evidence emanate from the belief in the primacy of oral evidence. For instance, hearsay 
statements are generally regarded as inadmissible. In temlS of English law hearsay evidence is evidence given by 
a person who is not present ill court to prove the truth of its contents. Further, statements made by a witness, who 
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gives evidence at a trial. on a previous occasion are generally inadmissible except where it is introduced to show 
that the earlier statement was different and the witness is therefore untrustworthy (Spencer and Flin 1990:218). 
Another major implication of the tradition of oral evidence is that it requires a trial at which witnesses are called 
to testify. This is often referred to as 'one 's day in court' . Spencer (1990:113) explains it as follows: 
" ... and a preference for hearing witnesses orally , has traditionally meant that each party must put 
llis case together and present it as one continuous helping, orally, at a single 'day in conrt' on 
which everyuling turns, and at which everything is decided." 
According to Judge Pigot, the use of oral evidence loses its validity when weighed up against the delays which are 
inherent in the present adversarial system. Since it has been proved that the younger the child, the more rapidly 
his memory will fade, this has the implication that by the time the matter comes to trial , ule quality of the child's 
evidence will be impaired and would be used to undermine his credibility (Pigot 1990:211). Added to this is the 
fact that stress can impair Ule power of recall and witnesses are known to experience stress when giving evidence 
personally in court (Spencer and Flin 1990:220). This would seem to indicate that ule quality of the evidence 
given by witnesses who appear persollally in court, namely the giving of oral evidence, is not necessarily superior. 
2.2.2 Exceptions to the General Rule 
The general rule in the Ullited Kingdom is that evidence is given orally by all witnesses, including children, at a 
trial. There are, however, certain limited circwllstances under which this rule is departed from, as far as child 
witnesses are concerned. 
Provision is made for ule evidence of a child under ule age of fourteen years to be taken before the trial begins. 
This section was introduced so as to ellable a child to give evidence against the person who had abused the child 
where ule latter had been too badly injured to appear in court. This is provided for by s42 and s43 of the Children 
and Young Persons Act of 1933: 
"s42 (1 )Where a justice of the peace is satisfied by the evidence of a duly qualified medical practitioner 
that the attendance before a court of any child or young person in respect of whom any of tlle 
offences mentioned in the First Schedule to this Act is alleged to bave been committed would 
involve serious danger to his life or heaWl, Ule justice may take in writing Ule deposition of the 
child or young person on oath, and shall thereupon subscribe the deposition and add ulereto a 
statement of his reason for taking it and of dIe day when and place where it was taken, and of the 
nanles of the persons (if any) present at tlle taking thereof. 
(2)The justice taking any such deposition shall transmit it with llis statement-
(a) if tlle deposition relates to an offence for which any accused person is already committed 
for trial. to the proper officer of tlle court for trial at wbich the accused person bas been 
conulli t(t!d; and 
(b) in any other case, to the clerk of the court before which proceedings are pending in 
respect of the offence. 
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s43 Where, in any proceedings in respect of any of tile offences mentioned in the First Schedule to 
this Act, the court is satistied by the evidence of a duly qualified medical practitioner that the 
attendance before tbe court of any child or young person in respect of whom the offence is alleged 
to have been committed would involve serious danger to his life or health, any deposition of the 
child or young person taken under. . . this Part of the Act, shall be admissible in evidence either 
for or against the accused person without furtller proof tllereof if it purports to be signed by the 
justice by or before whom it purports lO be taken: Provided that tile deposition shall not be 
admissible in evidence against the accused person unless it is proved that reasonable notice of the 
intentionlO take the deposi tion has been served upon him and that he or his counsel or solicitor 
had , or might have had if he had chosen to be present, an opportunity of cross-examining the 
child or young person making tile deposition. " 
The offences referred to in schedule one include: murder or manslaughter of a child or young person; aiding or 
abetting their suicide; infanticide; exposing children so as to endanger life; childstealing; common assault or 
aggravated assault where tile victim is a child or young person; child cruelty or neglect; permitting a cltild under 
16 to be in a brothel; pertnitting a child under 16 to beg; exposing a child to risk of burning; letting children take 
part in dangerous perfonltances; certain statutory sexual offences against children under 16; indecency with 
cltildren; and taking, possessing , distributing or publishing indecent photographs of children. 
There are a number of limitations attached to the above procedure. In fact, the Pigot Committee Report mentions 
that the procedure is very rarely used in practice (Home Office 1989: 12). Spencer and Flin support tllis view and 
say that they have found no written record of tlte procedure being used and have only heard of one attempt to use 
the procedure, which failed because the child was young and not believed to be competent (Spencer and Flin 
1990:74). 
This procedure can only be used where the court appearance is going to involve "serious danger to his life or 
health". Qualified medical evidence of the child's condition must be presented to the Court. A medical practitioner 
will have to examine the child and give sworn evidence to the magistrate who will take the deposition. The medical 
practitioner will also have to give evidence to the court before which the matter appears (Home Office 1989:12) . 
There appears to be uncertainty as to whetller the danger referred to here is limited to physical harm or whether 
it includes psychological ham). The Ingleby Conmlittee on Children and Young Persons assumed that it excluded 
the latter since it suggested that the wording be changed to include mental health . Spencer is of the opinion that 
the phrase is wide enough to include mental as well as physical injury (Spencer and Flin 1990:74) . According to 
the Pigot Committee Report tile danger would include both physical and mental injury (Home Office 1989:13). 
The deposition must be made in the presence of a magistrate, and the accused or ltis legal representative must be 
afforded an opportunity to cross-examine the child. The deposition must be sworn, which implies that the child 
must be competent to take tile oatil. 
A further restriction on the avail ability of the deposition is that it can only be used where the chi ld is the actual 
victim of the offence. It is therefore Itot available where the child is simply a witness to an alleged offence i. e. 
where the child has seen her sister raped. The deposition can also only be used where tile offence fortns part of 
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schedule I of the Act (supra). 
Section 42 does not set out where the deposition must be made, so it would seem that it could be taken down at 
any place that would be convenient for the child, for instance in a hospital or at a child's home, provided that the 
accused or his representative is given the opportunity to be present (Home Office 1989: 13). 
Spencer suggests tllat a further reason why this procedure has been used so rarely is the strength of the oral tradition 
of justice. A written statement of a witness's evidence makes a very poor comparison with the actual vivQ voce 
evidence of the witness. Spencer and Flin (1993:86) refer to the following statement made by tlle Deparunental 
Committee on Sexual Offences against Young Persons in 1925: 
"Save in ... exceptional circumstances, we are convinced that it is necessary for the child to give 
evidence in court. A written statement is much less impressive than oral evidence. It is far less 
likely to carry conviction to the mind of tlle court or jury, especially when they know that the 
child could itself give evidence before them." 
As Spencer suggests. if tlle sections were amended to include videotaped statements so that the court could actually 
hear and see the statement of the child, greater use may be made of tllis procedure in future. This amendment was 
attempted both in 1988 and in 1991, where it was argued that the sections already admit a written statement and 
a videotaped statement would simply provide a better record. However, these amendments were blocked by tlle 
govenmlent on both occasions (Spencer and Flin 1993:86). 
2.2.3 The Position in Scotland 
Since 1980 tlle High Court and tlle Sheriffs Court have had tlle power to take the evidence of a witness on 
commission in a criminal case. The commissioner, accompanied by both parties or their legal representatives, will 
visit the witness. and the parties will be given an opportunity to put tlleir questions to the witness. The proceedings 
will be recorded and tlle transcript will be handed in at the trial. Theoretically, this provision would apply to 
children as well and enable their evidence to be taken ahead of the trial, but in practice it is rarely used (Spencer 
and FlinI993 :90). 
The Scottish Law Commission in their Report on tire Evidence of Children and Other Potentially Vulnerable 
Witnesses evaluated the procedures adopted in some states of the USA which enabled a child to be examined before 
the trial. These proceedings were then videotaped and used at tlle trial to replace the child giving evidence (Scottish 
Law Commission 1990: 16). 
In their deliberations the Commission felt that the advantages of such a procedure would be that they would take 
place in small, comfortable surroundings and would therefore be less frightening for children. In addition, the child 
would be spared tlle isolation of heing in the room on his own and the judge would be able to control the 
proceedings more effectively (Scottish Law Conullission 1990: 17). 
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Consequently the proposals, based on the American procedure, put forward by the members of the Commission 
in their Discussion Paper were accepted by most consultees. However, certain qualifications were snggested 
regarding the above procedures. [( was proposed that pre-trial depositions take place as close to the trial date as 
possible. The advantages of this were perceived to be the following: that the accused be given an opporttllllty to 
prepare his defence properly so that he would know what questions to put during cross-examination; that it will 
make it more likely that the judge who is to hear the trial will preside over the deposition; and that by that stage 
it will be known whether the identificalion of Ihe accused is going to be an issue at the trial, in which case a pre-
trial deposition is not reconlliended (Scollish Law Commission 1990: 17). 
It was pointed out dlat an obvious disadvantage of this proposal was an account, taken as soon as possible after the 
offence when the event was still fresh and the child had not forgotten any of the details, woold be lost. But the 
Commission felt, in view of the above, that the balance of advantage lay with the taking of the pre-trial deposition 
a few days before the trial. altllough tlley emphasised that this should not be an absolute rnle. There might be 
exceptional cases where an early pre-trial deposition may be necessary or even a very late one where a child breaks 
down in court and caillot give evidence by conventional means (Scottish Law Connnission 1990:17). 
A further recommendation made in the Discussion Paper was that this procedure should not be available as of right 
but only by application to court. It was also proposed that dIe accused be allowed to be present during the 
proceedings, although he would not nonnally be seen by the child. He would either be separated from the child 
by one-way glass or observe tile child by means of closed-circuit television, while he was linked to his legal 
representative by some form of earpiece. Since the purpose behind these proposals is to protect the child from 
having to face the accused in person, tllese proceedings will obviously not be appropriate where the accused is 
undefended (Scottish Law Commission 1990: 18) 
Tbe above proposal of the Commission was enacted in 1993 as section 33 of the Prisoners and Criminal Proceedings 
(Scotland) Act, and canle into effect on I January 1994. It provides: 
"(1) ... where a child bas been cited to give evidence in a trial the court may appoint a 
conmlissioner to take the evidence of the child if -
(a) in solemn proceedings, al any time before the oath is administered to the jury; 
(b) in sununary proceedings, at any time before the first witness is sworn; 
(c) in exceplional circumstances in either solemn or summary proceedings, during 
the course of the trial. 
application has been made to the court in that regard; but to be so appointed a person 
must be, and for a period of al least five years have been, a member of the Faculty of 
Advocates or a solicitor. 
(2) Proceedings before a conlliissioner appointed under subsection (1) above shall be 
recorded by video recorder. 
(3) An accused shall not, except by leave of the conmlissioner, be present in the room where 
such proceedings are taking place but shall be entitled by such means as seem suitable 
to the commissioner to watch and hear the proceedings. " 
Although the section does not expressly forbid the child to be exanlined a long time before the trial, this would in 
practice hardly be possible, because the section says dlat tile child must bave been "cited to give evidence in a trial" 
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and this happens at a late stage in the preparation of a trial in Scotland (Spencer and Flin 1993:92). 
2.3 Cross-examination 
The cross-examination of a witness is a fundamental part of the accusatorial procedure and is a right which belongs 
to the accused. The general mle is that children who give evidence, like adults, must undergo cross-examination. 
There are certain exceptions to this rule in civil proceedings that deal with the custody and the welfare of the child. 
2.3.1 Custody Proceedings and Wardship 
Here the court manages to avoid questioning the child by relying on reports prepared for the judge by people who 
have interviewed the child on behalf of the court (Spencer and Flin 1990:81). Usually it is the court welfare officer 
who interviews the children, but the judge can question tile child if he so wishes. If he does, this will usually take 
place privately in his chambers (Spencer and Flin 1993:96). This procedure was approved by the Court of Appeal 
in H v H (1974)1 WLR 595 at 598: 
"It is of course most desirable in matters of this sort that the judge hearing the case should see 
them otllerwise than in an open court. One can well understand that in matters of this sort the 
children may be reluctant to express themselves freely and frankly when there is the possibility 
that what they say may be made knowll, particularly, perhaps, to tlleir parents." 
Although this procedure is available to a judge, magistrates have been forbidden to see the children privately. They 
are allowed to see tile child in tlleir retiring room but the parties' representatives have to be present (Spencer and 
Flin 1993:97). The above procedure remains in the discretion of the judge. The Children Act 1989 only provides 
that the child's welfare must be tile court's paramount consideration, and does not prescribe how a judge is to see 
a child. In Re R, The Times, Law Reports, 3 November 1992, a judge refused to see the child privately, and the 
Court of Appeal rejected an appeal based on tllis ground. 
2.3.2 Care Proceedings: Children's Hearings 
In care proceedings the courtS have moved away from tile traditional adversarial procedure of cross-examination. 
If the child does appear in COlirt. the presiding officer will do most of the questioning (Spencer and FlinI990:81). 
2.3.3 Cross-Examination by the Accused 
A major stress factor experienced by children who give evidence in court, is cross-examination, especially when 
conducted by the accused himself. Since legal aid is routinely available in such cases in England, tilere would in 
theory be no need for the accused to conduct the cross-examination himself, but tile accused does have the right 
to represent h.imself if he so wishes (Spencer and Flin 1993:95). Because of this, the Pigot Committee proposed 
that an unrepresented accused should not be allowed to cross-examine child witnesses: 
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" .. and we believe that defendants should be specifically prohibited by statute from examining 
child witnesses in person or through a sound or videolink." (Home Office 1989:23) 
This recommendation has become s55(7) of the Criminal Justice Act 1991. It provides that in a trial for a sexual 
offence, violence or cruelty, the defendant may not himself cross-examine a child who is the alleged victim or 
witness to dIe offence if the child is under 14, or under 17 in dIe case of a sexual offence. 
2.3.4 Appointment of an Interlocutor 
In 1987 Glanville Williams suggested, what at dlat time was regarded as quite far-fetched , that a child be allowed 
to give his evidence through dIe medium of a specially appointed examiner, who would conduct the interview in 
a room other than the cour(rootll. The acclised would be allowed to observe these proceedings, either via closed-
circuit television or through one-way glass. The accused would put his questions to the child via the examiner, to 
whom he would be cOlUlected by means of a microphone in the examiner's ear (Spencer and Flin 1990: 157). 
A practical example of how this procedure would work is recorded in an article by Jones and Krugman (1986:255), 
where a three year old girl was questioned by her psychiatrist. The interview was videotaped and counsel and judge 
were separated from dIe child by one-way glass. The interviewer was the child's psychiatrist and he had a micro-
receiver in one ear so that the attorneys could pose their questions through him. He had been given authority to 
veto questions that were developmentally inappropriate or hamlful to the child. Although the little girl had shown 
many symptoms of having experienced severe trauma after the offence was conmtitted (nightmares, weight-loss, 
anxieties, post traumatic play) , dIe above procedure adopted in court did not disturb ber and it only took two 
sessions for her to re-establish a tllerapeutic relationship with her psychiatrist. 
During the passage of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 certain proposals were forwarded for the taking of a child's 
evidence. One of these proposals provided for dIe cross-examination of the child to take place Waugh an 
interlocutor, who would be a social worker, a chi ld psychiatrist or a probation officer. In the course of the debate 
varying arguments emerged both for and against the use of a specialist interlocutor to question the child (Home 
Office 1989:6-7). AltllOugh tllis proposal was not accepted, the goverlllllent referred the matter to the Pigot 
ConmliUee for furtller investigatiou, since they felt that tlle employment of an interlocutor "would undermine the 
defendant's right to conduct adversarial cross-examination in practice " (Spencer and Flin 1990:93). 
The Pigot CODUltittee looked at the appointment of such an exanliner, whom they referred to as an interlocutor, and 
proposed that tlle presiding officer be given tlle power to make special arrangements for the examination of very 
young or very disturbed children if he thinks dlis is appropriate. In such a case a judge should allow questions to 
be relayed tllfough a paediatrician. child psychiatrist, social worker or a person who enjoys the child's confidence. 
The Pigot ConUllittee admitted that tlle introductiou of such a procedure would be a "substantial change", and that 
some of the advocate's forensic ski lls, timing and intonation would be lost, but felt that it was no different from 
conducting examination and cross-examination tllfough an interpreter (Home Office 1989:24). 
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Despite dle Pigot Committee's approval of the appointment of an interlocutor in certain circumstances, the Home 
Office did not accept dJe proposal and it has not been enacted. 
TIle Scottish Law Conmlission al so looked at dle proposal put forward by Professor Glanville Williams. Their main 
objection to his proposal was tbat tbe accused would not be able to have all the relevant facts to put bis case to the 
best effect since tbe interview was to take place as soon after dle event as possible. A further objection was that 
"tbe limited opportunity given to the accused to put questions to the child would be no real alternative to cross-
examination, and could cause grave prejudice". In view of the above, the Conmlission were of tbe opinion that 
it would not be appropriate to recommend such a "radical innovation" (Scottish Law Commission 1990: 15). 
2.4 Presence of the Accused 
Traditionally at a trial in tbe adversarial process, evidence is given in the presence of the accused. He bas the right 
to confront witnesses wbo give evidence against him. Tilis feature of tbe accusatorial system has a tremendous 
effect on child witnesses wbo, in many instances, are called to give evidence in the presence of their abusers. 
Spencer (1987:83) refers to incidents described in the Magistrates' Association's Memorandum on Criminal 
Procedure and Cbild Victims of Sexual Offences, 1962, where small children, when confronted in court with their 
attackers, dived screaming under dIe Clerk's desk in terror and bid dJere for tbe rest of tbe proceedings. 
As a result of tbe trauma experienced by child witnesses confronting dle accused, various ways bave been devised 
in wbich a cbild can be protected from the physical presence of the accused. This can be done by rearranging the 
courtroom so that dle cbild does not see tbe accused, by placing dJe child behind a screen, by allowing the child 
to give evidence in anodJer room via a television link, or by allowing into evidence a videotape of dJe child's 
evidence wbich will replace bis evidence-in-cbief in court. Eacb of diese options will be investigated in detail. 
2.4.1 Rearranging the Courtroom 
Tbe courtroom was rearranged as early as 1919 in dIe case of Smellie (1919)14 Cr App R 128 where dIe defendant 
was cbarged widl various counts of assaulting and ill-treating bis daughter wbo was aged about eleven years old. 
Before bis daughter was called to give evidence against him , dle judge made the defendant sit on the stairs leading 
from the dock to dle cell so dIat the child could not see him, aldlOugh he was able to hear her. The defendant 
appealed on die grounds dlat tbe wbole trial was invalidated by the judge's removal of him during the hearing of 
the trial. He argued dIat be was entitled at common law to be widlin the sight and dle hearing of all witnesses 
during the course of the trial, and dlat dIe effect of his removal on the jury at the moment his daugbter entered the 
witness box was incalculable. He also argued dIat bis removal would have an effect on the evidence of his 
daughter as she might be inclined to say untrue dlings in his absence wbich she would not have been able to say 
in his presence. Lord Coleridge J held tbe following at 130: 
"If tbe judge considers dlat dIe presence of the prisoner will intimidate a witness there is nothing 
to prevent him from securing the ends of justice by removing the former from the presence of the 
latter. " 
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A similar order was made by a judge in 1986 when he allowed an eight year old to sit next to him while she gave 
evidence and the defendant had to sit at the back of the court (Spencer and Flin 1990:83). 
2.4.2 Removing the Accused 
This procedure entails removing the accused from the courtroom. In criminal matters the accused has the right to 
be present when a witness gives evidence against him. Where the accused is not defended, his removal from the 
courtroom would be very prejudicial since the accused would not be able to hear the evidence given against him 
and it would be virtually impossible for him to cross-examine the witness (Spencer and Flin 1990:91). This 
argument becomes weaker when the accused is represented, because his legal representative will be able to hear 
the evidence that is being led and cross-examine dIe witness on his behalf. 
In Demnark, which also has an accusatorial system, the defendant has a right to be present in court dlroughout his 
trial. This right is, however, curtailed where dIe witness is a raped woman who is giving evidence against her 
attacker. The accused can be removed temporarily where the court believes dlat dIe victim's testimony will be 
affected by giving evidence in the presence of dle accused, and in order to protect dle victim from fear and 
humiliation. There is dle obvious proviso that the accused must be infomled of dle evidence which was led in his 
absence (Spencer and Flin 1990:91). 
In Queensland, which also has an accusatorial system based on dle English procedure, dle court does have the 
option to exclude dIe defendalll from court when a child under the age of 12 is giving evidence. Provision must 
then be made for dle accused to see dle proceedings , for instance via a television monitor i.e. basically the video 
link in reverse (Spencer and Flin 1990:91). 
2.4.3 Screens 
In 1987 Judge Pigot QC presided over a case where a group of men were tried for certain sexual offences involving 
children. A thirteen year old girl giving evidence at the trial broke down under cross-examillation (Davies and 
Westcott 1992:215). There were five child witnesses in dIe case and dIe prosecution applied for screens to be used 
since the witnesses would be too scared to testify otherwise (Spencer and Flin 1990:83). This application was 
upheld, and the practice was used in a number of cases after that. The practice involved the child giving evidence 
behind a screen which protected him from seeing dIe accused but allowed dIe accused to observe the child as the 
latter gave evidence. 
In the year dlat followed screens were used in over a hundred cases at the Old Bailey (Morgan and Plotnikoff 
1990: 191). The practice of using screens has spread to Crown Courts and even to certain 
Magistrates' Courts. This model has now been improved and has a television monitor and a microphone placed 
in sucb a way as to enable the accused to see and bear die child giving evidence. It would appear dlat this screen 
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prevents the accused from seeing the witness at all. since Spencer points out that they were originally used to 
preserve the anonymity of a witness giving evidence in tile presence of a terrorist (Spencer and Flin 1990: 83). 
This practice was fomlally adopted by the Court of Appeal in 1989 in dIe case of R v X, Y and Z (1990)91 Cr Ap 
R 36. Here there were five child witnesses between the ages of eight and twelve, giving evidence against the 
accused who was charged widl various acts of sexual perversion. In previous cases of a similar nature child 
witnesses had been unwilling or unable to speak and this had resulted in the cases being withdrawn. The Crown 
Prosecution Services had approached the trial court in the hope that the si tuation could be improved by the use of 
screens in the courtroom. The screen was erected in court in such a way that counsel could plainly see the children, 
but that dIe screen prevented the children frOIll seeing the dock. At the beginning of the trial dIe judge told the jury 
not to allow dIe presence of dIe screen to prejudice dIem in any way against the defendants as the purpose of dIe 
screen was to prevent dIe children from being intimidated by their surroundings. Defence counsel opposed dIe idea 
and appealed on the ground that it was unfai r and prejudicial to erect dIe screen, the suggestion being dlat dIe jury 
might have been unduly influenced and unfairly prejudiced against dIe accused by the use of the screen. The court 
refused the application and had dIe following to say at 515: 
" ... dIe trial judge had a duty to see d,at justice was done which meant that he had to see that the 
system operated fairly not only to dIe defendant but also to the prosecution and also to the 
witnesses . ... The Court agreed wi th dIe judge's conclusion d,at in the circumstances the necessity 
of trying to ensure that the children would be able to give evidence outweighed any possible 
prej udice by the erec Lion of the screen. " 
No statutory authority exists for dIe use of screens, but none is needed, for dIe judge may re ly upon his common 
law discretion to do what is necessary to ensure dlat the trial is fair. It would appear dlat screens cannot be used 
automatically. The judge must balance the lfawna experienced by the child with any possible prejudice dlat dIe 
accnsed may experience by the use of the screen. The double advantage of using dIe screen is that it reduces the 
stress experienced by the child giving evidence, and it also enables dIem to give evidence more coherently (Spencer 
and Flin 1990:83). 
One of the major problems associated widl the use of screens in court is that some judges use screens and others 
do not - it all depends on individual preference and the use dlereof is erratic. A court ruling or rrde of practice 
all dIe matter is required. Morgan and Plotnikoff(1 990:91) give an example of a case involving five girls between 
the ages of II and 14 who had been indecently assaulted. One judge granted an application for screens, but the 
case was dlen relisted to anouler court where the new judge refused dIe application for the use of the screens. 
Anodler problem widl the use of the screens is dlat since there is no clear directive as to who is responsible for 
applying for the screens, it has been left lip to the prosecution to do so. There are some prosecutors who believe 
that it strengthens dleir case if the child hecomes upset in the presence of the accused, and they therefore do not 
apply for the use of screens (Spencer and Flin 1990:84). 
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In 1989 the Scottish Law Commission (1990: 19) evaluated various procedural adaptations for child witnesses in 
their Repon. In their original discussion paper a number of reservations were expressed about the use of screens, 
based 011 tbe concern that the screens may not in fact reduce the child 's stress since the child would still be aware 
that the accused was nearby. Furdler concerns were that, if erected on an ad hoc basis, they may prejudice the 
accused in dIe eyes of the jury. Also, the layout of the courts themselves may make the erection of the screen 
impractical. 
Despite the above concerns expressed by the ConUllission, it appeared that screens had already beell used in both 
the High Courts and the Sheriffs Courts and were found to be very helpful. They ellabled fearful children to give 
evidence with greater confi dence and were nOt perceived as being prejudicial to dIe accused (Scottish Law 
Commission 1990: 19) . Their increasing use, especially in England and Wales, suggests dlat the above possible 
disadvantages were overestimated by the Conunission (Nicholson 1990:206). 
It was, however, felt by the Connnission that the practice of using screens should be regulated by a statutory 
provision. This would serve to remove any doubt regardillg dIe Court's discretion to allow the use of screens, 
especially where the accused objects to their use. It would also be helpful if the grounds for authorising the use 
of screens were set out so that parties would be aware of what amounted to sufficient justificatioll (Scottish Law 
CODllllission 1990: 19) . 
The members of dIe Connllission were also concerned about the nature of the screens themselves. They were afraid 
that the screen may also prevent the accused from seeing dIe child and dley were of dIe opinion that it was 
important for dIe accnsed both to see and hear the witness. This problem could be overcome by using screens dlat 
were constrncted of olle-way glass or by allowillg dIe accused to watch the witness giving evidence via closed circuit 
television (Scottish Law Commission 1990:20). 
Consequently the Scottish Law Commission proposed a statutory provision in dleir draft Bill to regulate dIe use 
of screens, which granted the court the audlOrity to use a screen to conceal dIe accused from the sight of the child, 
evell where the defence objected. However, arrangements would have to be made to ensure that the accused both 
hears and sees dIe child while the latter is giving evidence . 
The Commission made it clear that they were aware that dIe statutory provisions relating to closed circuit televisioll 
in England did not set out dIe grounds when these applications would be allowed, but they felt that it would be 
helpful to give statutory guidance as to the factors which should be taken into account when hearing such an 
application. These specified criteria are nOt meant to be exhaustive and are simply examples of the factors which 
the court should take into account (Scottish Law Commission 1990:24). Section 4 of dIe draft Bill sets out the 
circumstances under which an application to use dIe screen will be authorised: 
"4. (I)The court may grant an application under section 1, 2 or 3 of this Act only on cause 
shown having regard in particular to: 
<a) dIe possible effect on dIe child if required to give evidence in open court; and 
(b) whether it is likely that tile child would be better able to give evidence if not required 
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to do so in open court. 
(2) In having regard to the matters referred to in paragraphs (a) and (b) of subsection (1) 
above, the court may take into account, where appropriate, any of the following -
(a)the age and maturity of the child; 
(b) the nature of the alleged offence; 
(c)the nature of the evidence which the child is likely to be called on to give; and 
(d)the relatiOlLShip, if any, between the child and the accused. ' 
2.4.4 Live Television Link 
A live television link, also known as a videolink or live link, requires a room near to the courtroom where the child 
will sit together with a court appointed supporter, known as an usher. A two way videolink cormects the child's 
room to the court where monitors are available to observe the child giving evidence. The judge, the prosecutor 
and the defence counsel have their own screens and cameras. The child himself has a monitor so that he can see 
the courtroom and the people addressing him. ExanIination-in-chiefand cross-examination take place in the nonnal 
way, except that counsel have to remain seated in order to be seen on the monitor (Davies 1991:184). 
The videolink is live. This mealLS that the court hears the child as he is testifying. The evidence is not 
prerecorded. The videolink only transmits the child' s image to the courtroom. It does not make a recording of the 
evidence (Spencer and Flin 1990:84). The evidence will be recorded in the courtroom by the normal means. 
2.4.4.1 Statutory Authority 
The live link was introduced into England by s32 of the Criminal Justice Act of 1988 which came into force on the 
5 January 1989. It reads: 
"(I) A person other than d,e accused may give evidence through a live television link on a 
trial on indictment or an appeal to the criminal division of the Court of Appeal or the 
hearing of a reference under s 17 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 if -
(a) the witness is outside the United Kingdom; or 
(b) the witness is under the age of 14 and the offence charged is one to which subsection 
(2) below applies, but evidence may not be so given without the leave of the court. 
(2) This subsection applies -
(a) to an offence which involves an assault of, or injury or a threat of injury to, a 
person; 
(b) an offence under section I of d,e Children and Young Persons Act 1933 (cruelty to 
persons under 16); 
(c) to an offence under the Sexual Offences Act 1956, the Indecency with Children Act 
1960, the Sexual Offences Act 1967, section 54 of the Criminal Law Act 1977 or the 
Protection of Children Act 1978; and 
(d) to an offence which cOlLSists of attempting or conspiring to commit, or of aiding, 
abetting, counselling, procuring or inciting d,e commission of, an offence falling within 
paragraph (a), (b) or (c) above." 
The system in England at present works as follows: the technical equipment is automatic and therefore does not 
require the presence of cameramen. The conrt is able to see both the child and any person that accompanies the 
child in the room. The child sits in a room d,at is near to the court. This is a practical arrangement in case any 
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articles or documents need to be identified by the child. The child sits at a table, facing a television set, which has 
a concealed camera built into it or a small camera clipped on top of it. The face of whoever is speaking will appear 
on dIe screen. The room is supposed to be "agreeably decorated and furnished" (Scottish Law Commission 
1990:21). 
In the courtroom there are large screens for the accused, the jury and the public. Counsel have monitors with built 
in or clipped on cameras and their screens show the face of the child and the face of whoever is speaking to the 
child. The judge also has a monitor. The latter can see what is being shown to counsel as well as a view of the 
whole room where the child is sitting (Scottish Law Conmlission 1990:21). Some ofthe systems are voice activated 
so that ule image moves to whoever is speaking, while in other systems the presiding officer can control what is 
on the screen (Davies and Westcott 1992:214). 
There is one oUler adaptation of ulis system. A pilot study was carried out in Australia which involved placing the 
accused in an adjacent room and relaying his image to the court. Davies and Westcott (1992:213) argue that this 
loses sight of the fact that Ule main purpose of using the live link is to remove the child from the alien environment 
of the courtroom and make it easier for him to testify. 
2.4.4.2 The Usher 
The first court case in which the videolink was used took place in Chelmsford Crown Court on 9 January 1989 (R 
v Smith 1989 unreported). The accused was charged with the rape and attempted rape of a 12 year old girl, Julie. 
Julie sat in another room and gave her evidence using closed-circuit television. At Olle stage during the course of 
giving evidence she began to cry and the screens were switched off and Ule court adjourned. The accused was 
found not guilty on both charges. A request was made UIat a victim support volunteer accompany Julie in the 
separate room, but ulis request was refused by the judge, and a female court usher accompanied her instead (Sharp 
1989:95). 
The judge has a discretion to allow a person to accompany the child when the latter testifies from a separate room. 
The judge usually sends a court usher who has had no previous dealings WiUI the child and is, in fact, a stranger 
(Spencer and Flin 1990: 87). 
Sharp (1989: 95) argues Ulat, although ule court usher may have been acceptable in the Smith case supra, she may 
not be appropriate where younger or more traumatised witnesses are involved: 
"However sympathetic a court usher Illay be, her appearance in a black gown, the fact that she 
is unknown to the child and the necessary restrictions upon the usher's ability to relate to ule child 
may, in some cases, produce great difficulties ... 
The relevant section and the court rules do not contain any guidelines as to what the usher is allowed to do once 
she is in the room. It is preswned that her only function is to accompany the child in the room but she may not 
communicate WiUI the child. 
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Sharp (1989:95) bypotllesises about a situation, not difficult to imagine. where the child is reluctant to go into the 
room with tlle usher. Once there. the child will have to be persuaded to answer distressing and intimate questions. 
What will the role of the usher he? Is she simply to ignore the child? Since there are no guidelines available, this 
would depend on the discretion of individual judges. 
Section 10 of the Crown Court Rule 23A (infra) provides that the child witness "shall be accompanied by a person 
acceptable to a judge of the Crown Court ". The wording of dlis section is wide enough to include an independent 
adult who may accompany dIe child . This would appear to be supported by the prescribed fonn that is used for 
making application to use the live link. This form includes a section where dIe applicant may propose a named 
individual to accompany dIe witness and give his or her reasons for doing so. The final decision on who 
accompanies dIe child in the witness room rests widl the judge who considers the application. A copy of the 
prescribed notice of application for leave to use dIe television link under section 32(1)(b) of the Criminal Justice 
Act 1988 is attached as Allllexure A. 
In 1991 the Deputy Chief Justice. Lord Justice Watkins. issued a set of guidelines to dIe judiciary in which it was 
clearly set out tllat a court usher, selected and trained for the task. was the only person allowed to be present in 
the video room when the child gave evidence. In very exceptional cases a social worker or a police officer may 
accompany the child . but only if dIe defence agrees, provided, of course, dIe defence is not being unreasonable. 
The social worker or police ofticer act ing as the usher should not be dIe person who conducted the initial interview 
with dIe child witness (Watkins 1991). 
2.4.4.3 Application to Use the Live Link 
The use of dIe live link was confined to cases involving violence or sexual assault and to children under tbe age 
of fourteen. The 1991 Criminal Justice Act extended dIe age to seventeen where sexual offences were involved 
(Davies and Westcott 1992:24). The live link is only available for trials on indictlllent in dIe Crown Court, whicb 
means it cannot be used in Magistrates' Courts. 
Anybody who wishes to make use of the live link for a child to give evidence, must do so by means of a written 
application to the judge. He will decide the matter without a hearing. This is provided for in the Crown Court 
Rules 1982. r 23A (SI 1988 No.2 160). which provides that any party may apply for evidence to be given via live 
television link where dIe witness falls within tlle requisite age group. The application must be made by giving 
notice in writing on the prescribed form widlin 28 days after the date of the committal of the defendant. Notice 
of the applicationlI1ust be sent to the appropriate officer of the Crown Court and copies to all adler parties to the 
proceedings. Any party who wishes to oppose dIe application must notify the applicant and the appropriate officer 
of the Crown Court within 14 days of his desire to oppose the application, setting out his reasons for so doing. 
The application is decided by a judge of the Crown Court without a hearing, altllough the judge may decide to hold 
a hearing. The parties will then be informed of dIe judge's decision. If the application was successful, dIe 
notification to the parties will include the name of dIe witness and, if known, the name, occupation and relationship 
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(if any) of the person who is to accompany the witness, as well as dIe location at which the trial will take place. 
Finally, dIe Rules provide dlat when a witness under the age of 14 gives evidence via a television link, that witness 
may be accompalued by a person who is acceptable to a judge of dIe Crown Court, but no other person. 
Although the judge does have the discretion to decide applications without a hearing, there appears to be some 
unease because dlere is no official guidance in the Crown Court Rules as to how dIe judge should exercise this 
discretion (Spencer and Flin 1990: 87). What is important is that dIe prosecution does not have to make a special 
case for the use of the live link, because dlere is a presumption of need (Davies and Westcott 1995:206). 
Spencer and Flin (1990:87) refer to an unreported case in dIe Leeds Crown Court in December 1989 where the 
judge in dIe case, Judge Herrod QC, made a wriuen ruling in which he set out the principles that should be taken 
into account when this discretion is exercised: 
t. The application should not be granted automatically . The risk of harm to the child should be weighed up 
against the prejudice that dIe accused might suffer. 
ii. If the prosecution wishes to make use of the live link, then tlley must put evidence before court that the 
child will be hanned. 
iii. Where the child is very young, the child' s age itself can indicate that it will be hamlful for the child to 
give evidence . 
The Scottish Law Conllllission (1990:24) recommended tllat tile court should take into account the following factors 
when trying to detemline whether special precautions should be taken to assist a witness: 
"The court should be entitled to grant authority for tllat on cause shown, taking into account 
matters such as: the age of the witness; the physical condition and mental capacity of the witness; 
dIe nature of the offence: the nature of the evidence which the witness is likely to be called on 
to give; dIe relationship, if any. between the witness and the accused; the possible effect on the 
witness if required to give evidence in open court; and the likelihood tlIat tile witness may be 
better able to give evidence if not required to do so in open court." 
The Scottish Law Connnission (1990:24) felt , as with dIe use of screens, that it was important that there be some 
statutory guidance as to when the live link should be used. It had been proposed that the use of the live link in 
Scotiand be restricted to children WIder the age of 14 and to matters relating to "sexual misbehaviour" where the 
child was a victim or a witness. hut the Conullissioll disagreed with tllese restrictions as they felt there might be 
a case where dIe procedure could be advantageous in the case of a child older than 14. 
"So far as dIe suggested restriction to sexual offences is concerned, we are even more firmly of 
the view that such a restriction would be unwise. Children may be required to give evidence in 
cases where they have heen physically, as opposed to sexually abused, or they may, for exarople, 
have to give evidence as a witness to some horrific crime such as homicide. We are unable to 
accept dlat such children are any less likely to be in need of special procedures than those who 
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have been the victims. or the witnesses, of sexual misbehaviour. " (Scottish Law Commission 
1990:24). 
2.4.4.4 Evaluation of the Live Link 
The Home Office funded research to detemline whedler the live link facility was operating effectively under the 
new legislation. and appraisals were conducted over a 21 month period in the fourteen specially equipped courts. 
The final report found that there was widespread acceptance of dIe live link's value anlong the judges, court clerks 
and barristers who had made use of the process (Davies 1994:225). The most widely cited reason for this 
acceptance was that the stress experienced by the child witness was reduced and the quality of the child' s evidence 
was thus improved. Odler positive features identified were the fact that the child did not have to face the accused 
and that dIe child did not have to go into the courtroom (Davies 1994:226). One of the judges, in his evaluation, 
made the following conmlent: 
"My experience with the live link is that children no longer dry up from stage fright. .. dleir minds 
are flowing and not frozen." (Davies and Noon 1991:105). 
A complaint forwarded by some barristers in the evaluation was that there was a loss of rapport and eye contact 
with the child when leading dleir evidence via the live link. Davies and Noon (1992:25) point out dlat 
communication via the live liuk is indeed an artificial mediwn and training and experience are required for it to 
function effectively. Many exanlples of inept use of the live link were noted during the evaluation. For instance, 
some barristers did not talk directly into the camera and therefore presented a view of the top of their head to the 
child (Davies and Noon 1992:25). 
These improved conditions enabled a greater nunlber of children to give evidence due to the reduction in stress 
(Davies 1994:226). Originally the Scottish Law Conullission was unendlUsiastic about the fact that dIe live link 
would reduce dIe stress experienced by child witnesses. since tbey thought that a child might be just as frightened 
by having to face all dIe technological equipment. However, it appears from practice that the equipment used is 
highly sophisticated, unObtrusive and therefore unlikely to appear threatening to children (Nicholson 1990:207). 
In fact, ule Scottish Law Commission (1990:22) were so impressed widl what they saw in England, that uley 
recommended dm dIe li ve link be introduced into Scotland, proposing that "[p)rovisioll showd be made to enable 
courts in Scotland to authorise dIe use of a live closed circuit television link to enable children to give evidence 
from outside dle courtroom II • 
In spite of the above, there appears to be a backlash against using the live link as a mediunl for enabling children 
to testify. Lawyers appear to have the perception that televised evidence is a second-hand form of evidence and 
will thus have less impact on a jury (Davies 1994:226). In the Smith case supra where 13 year old Julie gave 
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evidence via tile live link, Sharp (1989:96) poi illS out tilat tile evidence seemed "impersonal and assumed a quality 
of unreality". As Julie gave evidence, according to the observations of Sharp, even tile jury seemed to experience 
this sense of unreality because when she described intimate details and became distressed, tbe jurors remained 
impassive and did not seem to show any signs of sympathy, Also, when Julie broke down, the screens were 
switched off inmlediately and" ... tile jury filed out for a tea break, people began to chat and there was a feeling 
that we were having a 'commercial break'. When the screens were switched on, julie was composed and she 
continued giving her evidence". 
There appear to be two views: firstly, that seeing tile child on a monitor enhances the impact of the child' s 
evidence, which is supported by some judges in tbe USA (Hochheiser v Supreme Court, 161 Cal. App.3d 7771 208 
Cal Rptr 273 at 278-9 (1984»; secondly, it has been argued that the videolink makes the evidence appear 
impersonal and unreal. Two American psychologists, who used adults instead of children, came to the conclusion 
that both views were true i. e. some witnesses came across better 011 a monitor while others did not (Miller and 
Fontes 1979:75). 
Toby et al (1995:214) conducted a similar experimelll in which children, giving evidence via live link about a 
harmless incident in which they had heen involved, were rated by volunteers acting as jurors. The live testimony 
of the children was perceived as being more credible and more attractive than the testimony given via live link. 
Davies (1994:226) argues that these results would have been Strong evidence for preferring live evidence in court 
except that only a few of the children who were asked to give evidence in dle experiment were actually prepared 
to do so. Many of dle children refused to give evidence and he argues that one calmot compare a few children 
confident enough to give evidence with the large majority who are too intimidated to do so . The study itself 
empbasises the fact that the live link is probably the only way dle court is going to bear dle evidence of many 
children at all. 
Although the live link appears to be successful in getting children, who would not nomlally have been able to give 
evidence, to do so, tilere has nevertheless been a decrease in the use of the live link. In 1990 it was used in 128 
cases and in 1992 only in 91 cases (Davies 1994:226). Even after the 1988 Criminal Justice Act introduced the 
live link, it was found that in practice the equipment was not being used as often as had been anticipated. 
Technically the live link appears to he working well. The equipment itself does not appear to be giving trouble, 
One of the complaints that has been raised is that it is difficult for the jury to get an idea of the child's size . This 
was observed as well in the S v Smith case (supra) where Sharp (1989:96) nOled that monitors only showed a head 
and sltoulder image, which llIade it impossible to judge the height or size of dle witness. In this case, Julie was 
several inches shorter than the usher, but 011 the monitor they appeared to be the same height. This could definitely 
have an effect on tile jury as, for installce, ill a rape case where the complainant might be very small of build and 
tilis could not be seell on Ule monitor. According to Spellcer and Flill (1990:88) this could be combatted by 
allowing the jury to see the child afterwards. 
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2.4.5 The Use of Videotapes 
2.4.5.1 Introduction 
The general rule is that videOtapes of interviews conducted with children will be inadmissible as evidence in court 
because they contravene the rule against hearsay if they are used to replace the child's evidence in court. If the 
child does give evidence, tbe videotape will still be inadmissible as a previous consistent statement (Home Office 
1989: 11). 
s23 of the Criminal Justice Act of 1988 is a statutory exception to Ulis rule and provides that a statement made by 
a person in a document shall be admissible if direct oral evidence by that person would be admissible, and certain 
conditions have been complied with . The tenll 'document' is defined as including audiotapes and video-recordings. 
Tbis section can be used where the person who made the statement has subsequenUy died, is mentally or physically 
unfit to attend Ule trial, is out of the country and it is not reasonably practical to secure his attendance, or if he is 
missing and all reasonable steps have been taken to find him without success. Included here are statements made 
to the police or investigating officers if the witness call1lot give evidence due to fear. Even if all these requirements 
are complied with, this does not mean that dIe evidence will automatically become admissible. There is a statutory 
duty on tbe presidiug officer to exclude evidence if he is of the opinion dlat it will be in the interests of justice to 
do so (Home Office 1989:13). 
Videotapes were originally introduced into England in two ways. Firstly, through wardship proceedings, where 
interviews conducted by psychiatrists were videOtaped , and, secondly, through a pilot project known as the 'Bexley 
Experiment', where police and social workers videotaped their interviews with children. 
2,4,5,2 Wardship Proceedings 
In wardship proceedings it was a conUllon procedure for judges in the High Court to appoint a psychiatrist to 
examine a child and give his opinion on whedler tbe child had been abused or neglected. In providing these 
cbildreu with treatment, video-recordings were made of interviews conducted with Ule children and their families. 
The purpose of tllese video-recordings was to enable oUler professionals involved in the treaunent of the child to 
see the interview (Bentovim and Tranter 1988:55). 
Originally the children referred for diagnosis were between the ages of eleven and fifteen, but as time progressed 
younger and younger children were being referred until interviews were being conducted with children as young 
as three. It soon became clear dlat dte standard open-ended questions employed did not assist the children in talking 
about their experiences. Other forlll s of questions, such as hypothetical or circular questions, had to be used in an 
attempt to get tbe children to talk. Bentovim and Tranter, (1988:55-6) explain the type of questions that were used 
in the interviews: 
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"Thus, instead of asking a child 'what has happened to you', or 'has anything rude happened to 
you'. we used the foon of questioning: ' if something rude has happened to you, for instance being 
touched on the vagina (demonstrating on dolls with explicit sexual features) , who would you speak 
about it to? Would you say if you had such a touch it would hurt more if the touch was just on 
the outside or inside, or a little way inside your vagina or a long way?' Then we might proceed 
to questions such as : 'if you were touched in this way, did it hurt a little or a lot?" . 
Multichoice questions were also used to get the children to disclose allegations of abuse. Multichoice questions are 
those which list a nwnber of options such as: 'Would it be the vaginal area or the anal area?' (Bentovim and Tranter 
1988:56). 
When psychiatrists were called to give evidence in court, they frequently made reference to these videotapes, which 
led opposing parties to demand access to the tapes in order to dispute the psychiatrist's evidence. This was allowed 
and it became Ole usual practice I(lr judges to see videotapes of a psychiatrist interviewing a child (Spencer and Flin 
1990:144). 
The judges were not impressed with the teclnuques used in tile videotaped interviews. The videos were criticised 
for ule way in which the interviews were conducted which were found to contain strong elements of suggestion and 
reinforcement. These interviews had originally been developed as a clinical tecllltique to assist in making a 
diagnosis and were now being analysed in coun as a forensic technique (Bentovim and Tranter 1988:56). These 
interviews then had to be adapted to make ulem acceptable in court. Judge Ewbank in Re E and G, The Times, 
Law Reports, 16 July 1986, echoed this need for modification. In this particular case Judge Ewbank's criticism 
was aimed at the social worker assigned to the case, whom he alleged believed that abuse had taken place before 
the interview was even conducted, and ulen used a number of leading questions to come to the conclusion that 
sexual abuse had in fact taken place (Bentovim and Tranter 1988:57). 
Mr Justice Latey in Re M Minors, The Times, Law Reports, 2 May 1982, identified that there was a contradiction 
between the needs of clittical therapeutic methods and Ole needs of the courts . For clillical therapy it was necessary 
to get the children to give an accoum of what had happened to them, which might necessitate the use of leading 
questions. However. this would not meet the needs of a legal interview. For ulis reason Justice Latey felt that it 
was necessary to videotape all interviews: 
"There should always be a video recording. The reason is Otis: where there is a dispute whether 
Olere has or has not been abuse. the court is anxious whether it SllOUld accept Ole ipse dixit of the 
interviewer or ilUerviewers. however skilled or experienced. This is because cases have shown 
Olat Ole precise questions, the oral answers (if Olere are any), Ole gestures and body movements, 
Ole vocal inflection and intonation may all play an important part in interpretation. Where there 
is a dispute , there should be an opportuttity for another expert in the field to form a view. Often, 
no doubt, he would reach the same interpretation and conclusion. In other cases he might not and 
in the interest not only of justice between Ole parties but of doing its best to arrive at Ole truth of 
Ole matter in Ole interest of the child, the courts should have the benefit of such evidence to be 
infooned." (Bentovim and Tranter 1988: 58) 
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As a result of the difficulties experienced with these videotapes people began to assume that videotaping an 
interview with a child was a bad idea, and that videotaped interviews with children should therefore not be 
admissible. However, the interviews were still taking place, and the court, by refusing to see the so-called bad 
interview, was only camoutlaging the problem. The fact that the interviewing techniques being used were not 
acceptable by the court was rather an argwnent for allowing the videotapes to be admissible so Ulat Ule court could 
make an accurate evaluation of Ule expert's opinion (Spencer and Flin 1990: 145). In fact, in Re M [1987]1 FLR 
293 the court went so far as to insist that where there was no medical evidence of abuse or where the perpetrator 
denied the allegation, Ulere had to he a videotape. The argument is Ulat in such a situation the court is forced to 
accept Ule opinion of Ule psychiatrist. The availability of the videotape will enable another expert to form an 
opinion from what he sees of the interview. 
2.4,5.3 The Bexley Experiment 
In 1984 the Metropolitan Police set up a Working Party to review Ule meUlOds used in conducting and recording 
interviews wiul victims of child sexual abuse. The purpose of such a working party was to address two 
troublesome issues. Firstly, the traditional meUlOds of police interviews, which included the taking of written 
statements, gave rise to a number of problems where children were concerned . It created difficulty in developing 
sufficielll rapport with the child to enable the child to make a statement. In addition to this there were evidential 
shortcomings in trying to pur the child 's words imo an acceptable fomlal written statement, especially where the 
child's vocabulary did not extend to adult tenninology (Bexley Report 1985: 1). Secondly, Ule traditional procedure 
of the criminal justice system did not protect the child from undergoing multiple interviews by various agencies, 
including the courts (Bexley Repon 1985: I). When a child has been abused and a charge has been laid, the chi ld 
will have to be imerviewed hy a nwuher of people ranging from a parent to a police officer, social worker, 
psychologist, doctor and prosecutor. 
The danger of multiple interviewing is twofold: 
I. the child's memory hecomes corrupted by false details Ulat have been implanted as a result of the various 
people interviewing the child; 
ii. the child has to repeat his evidence so often to so many people that it loses all spontaneity and when the 
child gets to coun. his evidence sounds rehearsed (Spencer and Flin 1990: 146). 
The Working Party was Ulen called upon to investigate the two main areas of concertl~ whether the police 
investigative role could be improved by using new interview practices such as anatomically correct dolls, drawings 
and video recordings: and whether the various agencies involved in sexual abuse could interlink and work together 
in the interesls of the child's welfare (Bexley 1985:2). 
A pilot project was started in 1985 in tenus of which the Metropolitan Police and the Department of Social Services 
for Ule London Borough of Bexley joined forces to fonn a joint investigation teanl with the above aims in mind. 
The fundanlental objective remained at all times the protection of the child 's interests (Bexley 1985:3). 
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It was felt dlat , since child abuse entailed so many different facets, it required a co-ordinated approach from all 
agencies. Traditional approaches were fragmented with each agency acting within its own territory . The benefit 
of joint investigation would reduce the munher of times dIe child had 10 be interviewed and increase effective 
communication between professionals involved in child abuse. This would in turn give rise to more accurate and 
comprehensive knowledge of individual cases. In dlis way services could be delivered to both the victim and family 
in a co-ordinated way (Bexley 1985). 
It was proposed that in dIe case of referrals one social worker and one police officer would be appointed as joint 
investigators. Only after background iuformation on the particular case was obtained and interviews conducted with 
the informant would the victim he approached and interviewed in the specially equipped recording room where the 
interview would be videotaped (Bexley 1985). 
The main purpose of dIe interview conducted with the child victim is to establish what has occurred. The normal 
procedure is for a police officer and social worker, who have been trained, to conduct the interview together. The 
report sets out guidelines as to how the interview should be conducted, namely how the interviewer should build 
rapport, where he should sit, how to use anatomically correct dolls in the interview etc. (Bexley 1985). Since the 
video was not intended for court, it was suggested that, where necessary, leading questions could be asked. 
"If leading questions or other 'hreeches' of the 'evidence rules' are necessary to do tillS, then use 
them . There is no point in sticking rigidly to rules of evidence and obtaining no information. 
An evidencially unacceptable interview is better than nothing and at least it may assist the 
investigator to find 'evidence' that is acceptable." (Bexley 1985) 
The use of the above mentioned aids tagedler with dIe videotaping of the interview had the following benefits, as 
summarised by Gwynn ( 1988:65): 
I. it captured gestures and non-verbal conlllUlllCation dlat were impossible to record in a written statement; 
ii. it enabled the child's spontaneity to be seen; 
nl. it could be used where the child did not have an adequate vocabulary to describe what had happened; 
IV. it removed the necessity of repetitive interviewing. 
The police officer was responsible for the handling, recording and storing arrangements of the videotape. 
Representatives of other agencies involved in the case . for instance the child psychiatrist, were aUowed to see the 
videotape, but access was only allowable wi dlin the scope of the written autbority. Tbe video recording of the 
imerview widl the victim was shown to the suspect and his defence solicitor. Security and privacy were, however, 
to remain paramount (Bexley 1985). 
In 1987 dIe Metropolitan Police published a further report in which dley evaluated the project, found it to be a 
success and the procedure was tilen introduced dlroughout tile Metropolitan Police Area. TIle project produced very 
encouraging results. The members from both diSCiplines were able to work well and effectively together. The 
interviewing tecillllques were effective and facilitated conmlUnication. and also appeared to reduce trauma. The 
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videotape itself was seell as a major improvement on the written statement (Bexley 1985 :7) . The project was so 
successful that in 1988 the Home Office issued a circular to all English police forces urging them to join with social 
services when interviewing children and to videotape the interviews (Spencer and Flin 1990: 146). 
Although the original purpose of the intetv iews was to provide a co-ordinated approach to dealing with victims of 
child sexual abuse and thereby to prevent multiple imerviews, it was not long before people began to argue that 
these videotapes should hecome admissihle in criminal proceedings and replace the child's evidence-in-chief 
(Spencer and Flin 1990: 147). 
2.4.5.4 The Pigot Committee 
2.4.5.4.1 Introduction 
During dIe passage of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 which contained dle proposal to allow children to give evidence 
via dle videolink. certain odler proposals relating to dle video recording of children's evidence were put forward 
as well. It was proposed that the video-recorded imerview conducted by the police officer and social worker with 
the child be admissi~le as evidence. The idea was to make these video recordings capable of replacing dle child's 
evidence-in-chief. A further proposal was included to allow cross-examination to take place via a live television 
link system dlfough dIe medium of an interlocutor (Home Office 1989:6). 
The Government undertook to investigate dIe idea of dle pre-recorded videotape, and so the Home Office issued 
a Consultative Paper. AldlOugh most of the responses favoured the idea, the Government nevertheless refused to 
support the idea (Spencer 1987a: 103 1). In the course of dIe debate it became clear that a number of varying 
opinions were held by the Members of Parliament. The main concerns raised can be briefly summarised as follows: 
i. There was doubt that dIe admission into evidence of the child's videotaped interview would actually reduce 
dIe stress since the child would have to he cross-examined later in court. At the stage when cross-
examination took place, the chi ld would have to reconcile his evidence on the videotape with his present 
recollection. This will encourage the defence to cross-examine the child in even greater detail (Spencer 
1987a:1031). 
11 . There were serious reservations regarding the idea that cross-examination should take place duough a 
professional person, called an interlocutor. 
Ill. There were also concerns about the techniques employed by police and social workers in conducting the 
interviews. and whedler dlese would affect the admissibility of video-recorded interviews (Home Office 
1989:7). 
Although dle proposals, as tlley stood in the Bill. were not acceptable to the Govenunent, they did receive so much 
support dlat the Govenullem set up an advisory group to investigate the use of video technology as far as vulnerable 
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witnesses were concerned (Spencer 1992: 120). The mandate of the advisory group was to investigate the question 
whether video recordings of interviews conducted with child victims should be admissible in criminal trials (Home 
Office 1989: i). 
The Pigot ConIDlittee, so called because it was chaired by Judge Thomas Pigot QC, had access to all the available 
tesearch in England as well as the procedures and refonns adopted in other countries. The advisory group viewed 
video-recorded interviews, considered written and oral evidence submitted by various bodies, including police, 
judiciary, social workers, doctors, psychiattists and academics and made certain proposals and recommendations. 
2.4.5.4.2 Pi got Committee Proposals 
TIle following proposals and recollUnendat ions were forwarded by the Committee: 
i. The ConIDlirree was overwhelmingly in favour of making videotaped recordings of interviews witb child 
witnesses more widely admissible (Spencer 1992: 122). 
11. Once a video recorded imerview with a child witness had been made, it would have to be made available 
to the defence as soon as possible (Home Office 1989:21). 
iii. Children should only give evidence if they want to, whether in open court or via closed circuit television. 
This is important , hotb for the child's welfare as well as a means to overcome the reluctance of parents 
to assist the autborities . Parellls are often not prepared to become involved because tbey do not wam their 
child to be forced into giving evidence (Home Office 1989:22). 
IV. Where a video recorded interview was to be put in evidence, a pre-trial application would bave to be made 
so that dIe judge could rule upon its admissibility since the video-recorded interview would replace 
examination-in-chief. Tltis application would take place in the child's absence, either in tbe judge's 
chamber or another suitable place. Bodl parties would be afforded an opportunity to put forward 
arguments as to the admissibility of the recording. The judge, applying the ordinary rules of evidence, 
would determine whetber the recording was admissible or not (Home Office 1989:22). 
v. At dIe preliminary hearing the examination and cross-exantination of the child witness would take place 
in an informal serring and thi s would be videotaped and shown at the trial. The arrangements would be 
at the discretion of the judge, but the Pigot COlllmittee suggested tllat wigs and gowns should always be 
removed and the judge sbould "control cross-examination witll special care" . This hearing could take place 
in a suitabl y equipped room in d,e court building or an interview suite at a hospital. The proceedings 
should be kept as infomlal as possible. and only the judge, advocates and a parent or supporter should be 
present in Ole room with the child. The accused should be able to watch Ole proceedings via closed circuit 
television and be linked to his representative via an audiolink (Home Office 1989:23). 
VI. The Conmlittee was strongly of the opinion that the accused should be "proltibited by statute" from 
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examining child witnesses in person or through a sound or videoIink. As far as the Conunittee was 
concerned, SIT/eWe's case (supra) was authority for dIe proposition that there is no right of confrontation 
in English law. They were of dIe opinion that the damage to the child and the interests of justice far 
exceeded the limitation on the accused's rights: 
"The limitation which this places upon the defence is, in our view, far less 
significant than dIe damage which can be inflicted upon the child and the 
interests of justice if, in certain circumstances, such an exercise is allowed to 
take place." (Home Office 1989:23). 
vii. The videotaped interview would be shown to the child at the preliminary hearing and the child would be 
required to confiml it. The prosecution could then focus on any aspect it might wish to before cross-
examination took place (Home Office 1989:23). 
vnl. Although the Connnittee disagreed on dle more radical idea of making the defence put their questions to 
the child dlroUgh a neutral person (interlocutor), dIe majority did propose that special arrangements be 
made when examining young or very disturbed children at the preliminary hearing. The judge should have 
the discretion to allow the questions to be relayed dlroUgh a paediatrician, child psychiatrist, social worker 
or a person who enjoys the child's confidence (Home Office 1989:24). 
lX. It was reconmlended that at the trial the video-recorded interview be shown when the child would give 
evidence-in-chief and that the video recording of the preliminary hearing should be shown where the cross-
examination would take place (Home Office 1989:25). 
x. It was reconmlended that dlese procedures be available to children under 14 in respect of violent offences, 
and to children under 17 in respect of sexual offences (Home Office 1989:25). 
xi. The Committee further proposed that these procedures should apply at trials on indicttnent for violent and 
sexual offences and would include offences of child cruelty and neglect. The procedure would therefore 
only be used in the Crown Court and not in the Magistrate's Court. The Committee added that dlis 
procedure should be available to all child witnesses and should not be restricted to victims only since 
children who witnessed some of dIe worst violent and sexual assaults were as badly affected by the 
experience as some of the victims. Children are themselves often witnesses of sexual offences against 
odler children (Home Office 1989:25-6). 
Xll. The Committee endorsed the Home Office reconnnendations, emanating from the Bexley Experiment, that 
there be early consultation and co-ordination between the police and the social services . This would 
include the sharing of infonllatioll, joiut investigations and joint interviews (Home Office 1989:34). 
XUI. It was furdler reconmlended that there should be joint training and specialist joint investigation teams. The 
training should include aspects of child psychology, cognitive development and the law relating to children, 
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especially the law of evidence as regards examination and cross-examination (Home Office 1989:36). 
xiv. The Pigot Conmlittee reconmlended tilat a code of practice be drawn up which contained general guidance 
as to the conducting of the video-recorded interview and the rights of the accused. The Committee went 
so far as to discuss what the contents of the code should deal with. For instance, they suggested that the 
video interview he recorded as soon as possihle after the offence was cOImuitted, although sufficient time 
should be allowed for consultation to take place between the various agencies so that they can consider the 
legal context and implications of the interview (Home Office 1989:37). Tbe interview, it was said, could 
take place at video suites where avai lable or even at police stations if suitable facilities were available. 
If the witness was badly il~ured or traulllatised, tilere was no reason why the interview could not be done 
in the witness's own home (Home Office 1989:38). 
In addition. the Conuui ttee specifically wished to record tileir endorsement of the 'step-wise' approach to 
interviewing proposed by Professor Yuille of the University of British Columbia. The 's tep-wise' approach requires 
the interviewer to proceed from the IllOSt general to the Illore specific. The interview will begin with the building 
of rapport between tile child and the interviewer and setting the boundaries for tile interview, namely the seriousness 
of the context of the interview and the importance of telling dle truth. Thereafter the child wi ll be given an 
opportunity to relate his experience freely. Furtiler questions can be asked afterwards where it is necessary for 
clarity (Home Office 1989: 41 ). 
Since the video recorded ilHerview would replace the examination-in-chief of witnesses, the interview would have 
to be conducted in accordance with the rules which govem evidence. This bas tile implication that leading questions 
should be avoided. The Conmlittee detined leading questions as "questions which suggest the answer and ... assume 
that facts are established which are likely to be in dispute" (Home Office 1989:42). 
2.4.5.5 Reaction to the Pigot Committee Report 
TIle Govenllllent's reaction to tbe Pigot Conuuittee Report was embodied in the Criminal Justice Act 1991 , which 
introduced s32A into the Criminal Justice Act 1988. [n temlS of this section , video recorded interviews widl 
children may be admitted in a criminal trial at U,e Crown Court or a YOUdl Court. The section provides as fo llows: 
"(I) This section applies in relation to Ule following proceedings, na.mely -
(a)trials on indictment for any offence to which section 32(2) above applies; 
(b)appeals to tlte criminal division of dle Court of Appeal and hearings of references 
under section 17 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 in respect of any such offence; and 
(c)proceedings in youth courts for any such offence and appeals to Ule crown court 
arising out of such proceedings. 
(2) In any such proceedings a video recording of an interview which -
(a)is conducted hetween all adult and a child who is nOt tbe accused C Ule child witness"); 
and 
(b)rela tes to any matter in issue in Ule proceedings, may, WiUI dle leave of the court, be 
given in evidence in so far as it is not excluded by dle court under snbsection (3) below. 
(3) Where a video recording is tendered in evi dence under tllis section, the court shall 
(subject to the exercise of any power of the court to exclude evidence which is othervvise 
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admissible) give leave under subsection (2) above unless -
(a) it appears that the child witness will not be available for cross-examination; 
(b)auy rules of court requiring disclosure of We circumstances in which the video was 
made have not been complied with to dle satisfaction of dle court; or 
(c) the court is of dle opinion, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, that in 
the interests of justice dle recording ought not to be admitted; and wbere the court gives 
such leave it may, if it is in the opinion d,at in dle interests of justice any part of the 
recording ought not to he athnitted, direct tbat that part shall be excluded, 
(4) In considering whether any part of a recording ought to be excluded under subsection (3) 
above, the court shall consider whether any prejudice to dle accused, or one of the 
accused, which might result from the admission of tllat part is outweighed by dle whole, 
or substantially the whole, of the recorded interview, 
(5) Where a video recording is admitted under this section -
(a) the child witness shall be called by the party who tendered it in evidence; 
(b)Olat witness shall not he examined in chief on any matter which, in the opinion of the 
court, has been dealt with in Ilis recorded testimony. 
(6) Where a video recording is given in evidence under this section, any statement made by 
the child witness which is disclosed by the recording shall be treated as if given by that 
wi mess in direct oral testimony; and accordingly -
(a) any sllch statemellt shall he admissible evidence of any fact of which such testimony 
from him would be admi ssible; 
(b)no such statement shall be capable of corroborating any other evidence given by him; 
and in estimating dle weight, if any, to be attached to such a statement, regard shall be 
had to all the circumstances from which any inference can reasonably be drawn (as to 
its accuracy or otherwise). 
(7) In this section" child " means a person who-
(a)i n dle case of an offence falling within sec tion 32(2)(a) or (b) above, is under fourteen 
years of age or, if he was under Olat age when the video recording was made, is under 
fifteen years of age; or 
(b)in the case of an offence falling within section 32(2)(c) above, is under seventeen 
years of age Of. if he was under that age when the video recording was made, is under 
eighteeIl years of age." 
There are a number of limitations on dle availability of s32A. It camlOt be used in all the courts, only the Crown 
Court, the Youth Coun and the Court of Appeal. The procedure can only be used in the Youth Court where dle 
offence would have been one heard in the Crown Coun but for the age of the accused. The availability of Ole 
videotape procedure is further limited in that it is onl y available for crimes of sex, violence and cruelty against 
children. A third limi tation relates to dle age of the child. In cases of violence and cruelty tlle witness must have 
been under the age of 14 when the tape was made and under the age of 15 by the time of tlle trial. In cases of a 
sexual offence O,e witness must have heen under d,e age of 17 when the tape was made and under dle age of 18 
at the date of d,e trial. The restriction on dle age limit of the witness at the date of the trial does not seem to be 
sensible. Since one of the justifications for using the videotape of an early interview is tllat a more comprehensive 
and accurate record is obtained , it does not matter how old the witness is by the time the matter comes to trial. 
In fact. the longer tlle trial is delayed, the more necessary it becomes to see the original videotape (Spencer and 
Flin 1993: 177). 
Subsection 2 is phrased very widely and refers to a video recording of an interview between an adult and a child 
witness which relates to the proceedings. The video recording is not limited to interviews between the police and 
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a child witness, but would include diagnostic interviews and even, as Spencer and Flin (1993: 178) indicate, home 
videos conducted by an adult or parent. The only limitation is the fact that the court has a very wide discretion to 
admit the recording, 
Any party who wishes to introduce a videotape into evidence must make an application to the judge in terms of the 
Crown Court Rules, If the other party objects to the admission of the videotape, then there will be a hearing before 
the judge, The admissibility is governed by s32A(3) which requires that the child must be available for cross-
examination in court, the court must be provided with enough infomlation about how the video was made and, 
finally. the court has the discretion not to admit a video recording if it would not be in the interests of justice to 
do so. 
The party who wants to introduce the video recording must supply the court with certain details as set out in Crown 
Court Rule 23C(4). Infonnation must be provided regarding the times when the recording was started and finished 
as well as derails regarding any illtt:rmptions: the place where the recording was made and the usual function for 
which the premises are used: personal details of any person present and his relationship. if any, to the witness; a 
description of the equipment used; and the location of the mastertape if the video recording is a copy. 
Section 32(3)(c) is phrased very widely and gives the court the discretion not to admit a recording in the interests 
of justice. What factors would be taken into account in coming to such a decision? Spencer and Flin (1993: 180) 
suggest that the most obvious reason would be if an interview was conducted in a marmer that did not comply with 
the rules of evidence. for instance if leading questions were asked or the witness was pressured into answering 
questions. Birch (! 992: 271-3) suggests that the most likely possibilities would involve the inclusion in the 
videotaped interview of inadmissible material such as hearsay evidence or allegations of similar offences i.e. 
character evidence. She further urges the court not to declare video-taped interviews'l(dmissible simply because 
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there has been some pressure placed on the child to disclose. Since children may be embarrassed or afraid to offer 
intimate details or may he shielding a parent, a certain amount of encouragement may be needed to get the child 
to speak. It would seem wrong in dlese situations to regard dIe videotaped interview as inadmissible since the 
abuser would be profiting from his own wrong in the sense that abusers often use mental or physical intimidation 
as a means of compelling silence. It would be preferable to admit the videotaped interview and to allow the nature 
of the qoestion to affect the weight of the evidence and not its admissibility. 
Butler (1993:4) refers to a letter written by a Crown Court on behalf of a judge in which he sets out the broad 
criteria under which be would allow a video recording to be used in court. The letter states the following: 
..... where a child is aged under 10 years be would normally grant the application on the grounds 
of the age alone. From the ages of 10 to 12 years, the maturity of the individual child would 
become a relevant factor and you would not always be prepared to grant an application because 
of dIe child's age. From the age of 13 years upwards, we would nornlally refuse any application 
based on the child's age unless additional reasons were set out in the application" 
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This judge clearly did not take into account the vulnerability of the child or any trauma created by the court 
appearance. This serves to highlight the inconsistencies between different judges and the problems created when 
dlere are no specific guidelines. This was in fact. one of the dangers highlighted by the Scottish Law Commission 
(1990:24) when dley dealt widl dIe use of screens and live link. They recommended that dlere should be some 
statutory guidance as to when the above could be used. 
Where a video recording has been found to be admissible, dIe videotape will then replace the child's evidence-in-
chief. The witness will not be allowed to be examined in chief on any matter which has been dealt with in the 
video. This provision is qualified by the phrase "in the opinion of the court" which would appear to give the court 
dIe discretion to allow such examination if, in its opinion, a matter has not been dealt with properly in the 
videotaped interview. 
One of the reasons submitted for requiring dlat dIe videotape replace the child's evidence and not supplement it, 
was 10 prevelll the situation where the child is exposed to cross-examination on discrepancies between the videotape 
interview and the ev idence given in court. Spencer and Flin (1993: 182) adntit that this is true since "where there 
is no examination in chief, there is no second telling of the story with which dIe earlier one can be microscopically 
compared". 
However, despite dlis Spencer and Flin (1993: 182) argue that there is a difficulty in the way the subsection bas been 
drafted. No difficulties will arise if dIe videotaped interview has been conducted well , but if the videotaped 
interview has not provided very clear and distinct evidence, counsel will not be allowed to put any supplementary 
questions. Although, in terms of the section, the judge is given a discretion, Spencer and Flin refer to cases where 
counsel have requested to add supplementary questions and the judge, interpreting the section literally , refused to 
allow them to do so. There are also instances where other judges have been prepared to interpret the section in 
such a way as to allow dIe questions to be asked. In fact, this matter was raised in Parliament where it was 
proposed that the section be amended to read "has been adequately dealt with". This amendment was resisted since 
the government argued thal the phrase used in the section "dealt with" implies "adequately dealt with". 
From dIe above it can be seen dlat dIe central recommendation of the Pigot Committee (i.e . using video-technology 
10 relieve child witnesses from giving evidence in court) "proved too radical for the Govermnent" (Spencer 
1992:126). Instead, the Act cOlllained only the provision that videotapes of earlier interviews with children be 
admissible, provided that the child appears in court in order 10 undergo cross-examination personally. 
The Pigot Committee had proposed a system whereby the child witness would give evidence in two stages: firstly, 
tile interview by a trained interviewer operating under an official Code of Practice and, secondly, a cross-
examination of the child in tile presence of the judge in chambers. Although s32A of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 
did make the videotape of the initial interview admissible, it was only a watered down version of stage one of dIe 
Pigot reconilllendations . The Act did not make the video recording of an initial interview with tile child a routine 
procedure in a child abuse case or provide for an official Code of Practice. The Act did not provide for stage two 
of the Pigot Committee' s proposals at all (Spencer 1992: 127). 
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The Government did not, however, completely abandon stage one of the Pigot proposals. The Home Office, in 
response, initiated the drawing up of an offi cial set of instructions for conducting interviews with children, which 
became The Memorandum of Good Practice. The idea here was to introduce such a Code of Practice informally 
by issuing an administrative direction ratiler than have it promulgated by statutory powers. The reason to proceed 
via the informal path is seen to be twofold: it is more flexibl e in tilat unworkable provisions can be amended by 
a circular rather tilan tile complicated procedure used to amend statutes; and the infonnalmanner is also a way of 
not giving the accused toO much ammunition since tile courts would readily exclude evidence because of fairly 
minor breacbes of the Code (Spencer 1992: 127). 
The second stage of tile Pigot ConUllittee' s proposal, namely tilat children undergo cross-examimtion in the judge's 
chambers before the acmal trial. was obviously controversial , but the reason given by the Government for not 
implementing it was, as Spencer described it, "depressingly defeatist" (Spencer 1992: 128). They argued dlat if 
the cross-examimtion was to take place at a prelimimry hearing, there would have to be a supplementary hearing 
so tbat dIe defence could have an opportunity to put any new matters to the child, and this could give rise to a 
number of supplementary hearings which would be more Stressful for the child than a single opportunity to be cross-
examined (Spencer 1992: 128). But Birch (1992:270) argues dlat the main fear was that tbe pre-recording of cross-
examimtion may detract too greatly from the rights of tbe accused. 
Spencer (1992: 128) sununarised the position as follows: 
" ... the Govenmlent has pressed ahead wi til tbose parts of the Pigot scheme which make it easier 
to prosecute and punish child molesters but ditched tilOse parts that would make it easier for the 
child. " 
The way in which only part of the Pigot proposals were introduced has resulted in the child still having to deal with 
two particularly stressful tilings: firstly , the cltild still has to wait montils for the case to come to court and, 
secondly, he will still have to undergo cross-examimtion when he gets tilere (Spencer and Flin 1993: 184). 
2.4.5.6 Memorandum of Good Practice 
The Deparonent of Healtb and tbe Home Office worked together to develop the Memorandum of Good Practice, 
which was published in 1992. The pllrpose of the Memorandum was to assist tilOse professiomls who have to make 
a video recording of an interview with a child witness for the purpose of court proceedings . The primary focus 
of the Memorandwll is on videotaped interviews conducted for criminal proceedings and purports only to be a 
guide. This means that if an interview does not comply strictly with dIe Memorandum, it does not necessarily mean 
that the interview will automatically be inadmissible. According to s32 (supra) the video recording will be 
admissible unless the judge is of the opinion that it would not be in the interests of justice to allow it. The 
Memorandum therefore functions as a guide to ensure that a video recording will be acceptable in court (Home 
Office 1992: 1). 
) 
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The Memorandum gives guidance as to where dIe interview should be conducted . Police stations are not regarded 
as desirable locations for interviewing children. especially not suspect interview rooms. Purpose built interview 
suites at hospitals and family ceIllres wi ll probably provide Ule best results, although any location could be used that 
was "private . quiet, reasonahly cOl1lt()[[able and adequately equipped for the interview" (Home Office 1992:7). 
Part 2 and 3 of the Memorandum set out the preparation dlat needs to be done before Ule interview can take place. 
An assessment of dIe child 's development is necessary in order to proceed with the interview. The interviewer will 
require a basic knowledge of ule child 's linguistic development to adjust his language usage and vocabulary to that 
of the child , as well as infonnation about the child's knowledge of sexuality, concepts of time, cultural background 
etc (Home Office 1992:9-10). From dlis information, decisions will have to be made as to whether ule child will 
be able to give a coherent account of the events. Since the child is no longer presumed to be incompetent, there 
is no duty on the court to examine the child' s competency, but if a child does not appear to be able to give an 
understandable aCCount of dIe event, dlen Ule child may be declared incompetent (Home Office 1992: 11). From 
personal observation during a practical research period wiul the Child Protection Units in the United Kingdom 
during 1995 and 1996, it was noted that interviewers nevertheless questioned children as to their understanding of 
ule concepts of tmdl and lies. This was done, I was told. to make it clear to Ule court dlat the child was able to 
give an understandable account of dIe event. 
The Memorandunl has endorsed Ule phased approach of interviewing. Firstly, rapport must be built up between 
the interviewer and dIe child to help the latter relax. Phase twO allows the child to give a free narrative account 
and he is encouraged to give in his own words an account of the relevant events. During the third phase of the 
interview, the interviewer will be given an opportunity to pose questions to clear up any confusion or uncertainty. 
The interviewer should begin with open-ended questions and only then employ specific yet non-leading questions. 
Phase four is dIe closing phase and is esselllial in the interests of the child to ensure that the child is not distressed 
and is in a posi tive franle of mind (Home Office 1992: 15-2 1). 
All interviews should begin with the interviewer stating the date and time, the place of the recording and who is 
preseut in tbe room. Tilis is very important for reasons of authenticity of the videotape (Aldridge and Lewis 
1993:9). Also of importance is the switching on and off of videotapes while the interview is taking place. Again, 
this relates to Ule authenticity of the document i.e. dlat nobody has tampered with the recording. If a short break 
is to be taken. as in the case where the child is upset or wants to go the toilet , then the recording can continue. 
The illlerviewer simply announces that a break will he taken and then confimls the time and any changes that might 
have taken place when the interview resumes. If a long break is to be taken, the interviewer must announce dlis 
as well as Ule reasons. He must give the time and the tape must be stopped. When the interview resumes, the 
interviewer must again announce the date. time, place and presence of any person and explain that it is a 
continuation of the previous interview (A ldridge and Lewis 1993: 10-11). 
Since the video recorded interview is meant to replace the child's evidence-in-chief, the rules which govern the 
giving of evidence in court will have to be appl ied to dIe video recorded interview as well. The most pertinent mles 
of evidence applicable to the interview would he the fo llowing: 
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i. Leading questions are generally inadmissible. and should therefore be avoided. The court may edit out 
any improper leading questions asked during tlle interview or disallow the whole interview (Home Office 
1992:26). 
ii. The courtS will not usually allow witnesses to talk about their previous statements unless certain specific 
requirements are complied with (Home Office 1992:27). 
iii. Hearsay is generall y inadmissible in court. To this end, interviewers are cautioned not to ask the child 
to talk about what somebody else said (Home Office 1992:28). 
IV. It is not generally permissihle to lead evidence of the accused's bad character or criminal record. The 
interviewer must avoid mentioning such matters and steer the child away from the accused's character 
(Home Office 1992:29). 
The Memorandum also gives advice about the storage, custody and destruction of the video recording as well as 
access to the recording by other professions. It is clearly stated that the guidance provided under this section should 
be strictly adhered to in all cases (Home Office 1992:4). The video recording must be kept strictly confidential 
since it is a piece of evidence and also contains intimate details regarding the child. For this reason it must be 
securely stored and access nlUst he restricted to those who are authorised to view the recording (Home Office 
1992:31). 
There were two important shortcomings in tlle Memorandum, which were highlighted by the compilers themselves. 
Professor Bull, one of the professionals asked to produce a working draft Memorandum, has often described the 
Memorandum as a guide "on how to do the easy ones". It is based on research widl children who have been 
prepared to tell the interviewer what happened. There is very little research available on dIe interviewing of 
children who do not want to give an account of what happened (Bull and Davies 1994:9). Children who are ready 
to speak about dleir abuse are regarded as a minority, according to Davies and Wilson (1994:69), and many 
complainants initially provide only fragmentary accounts or minimise the degree of abuse that has occurred. 
2.4.5.7 Access to the Videotape 
The Memorandum of Good Practice advises that the copying of and access to the videotape should be kept to the 
minimum. Although tile accused lllay be allowed to view dIe videotape. he may not have custody or unsupervised 
access to the (ape. The investigating team and the Crown Prosecution Services may require a copy as will the 
Court. If the accused is defended, his legal representative will also require a copy. Written undertakings must be 
made regarding the custody of the tape by any of the above who wish to have a copy and they must confiml that 
the tape will be returned to the police at tile end of dIe proceedings . All video recordings must be destroyed when 
they are no longer required. The master copy will have to be kept for a nWllber of years in the event of any appeal 
proceedings (Hollle Office 1992:32-33). 
In practice there has been some confusion as to who is entitled to see the videotape. For instance, in 1995 the 
Gloucestershire Constabulary were dealing with a case in which a videotape had been made of a child's interview 
where she alleged that her father had ahused her. No criminal proceedings followed but a battle between the 
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parents as to custody did follow. Advocates for both sides wanted to see the video in advance as well as the father. 
The Gloucestershire Constabulary approaciled the County Legal Services for advice as they felt that it might be 
damaging to the child if her father saw the video of her interview. In personal correspondence between the County 
Legal Services and the Gloucestershire Constabulary, dated 15 April 1995, which I managed to acquire in my 
research in the United Kingdom, the legal position was described as follows: there was no legal requirement on 
the police to show the video to anyone before the court hearing in these circumstances. The video would only be 
handed over where such an order had been made by the court. 
The Metropolitan Police Solicitors Department issued the following advice for police when a party in civil 
proceedings involving children ask.5 to see or be supplied with copies of video recordings. The police officer 
concerned should firstly establish dlat the party has a genuine reason for requesting to see the video recording. In 
cases where a prosecution has started or is under consideration or investigations are still being conducted, the police 
officer should approach the Crown Prosecution Service. If the Crown Prosecution Service have no objection, then 
the person making the request must be noti fied dlat he can make an appointment to view tlle recording at a police 
station. They should not be allowed to remove a copy. the police officer will attend court and produce the 
recording if served with a subpoena or witness sunnllons (Butler 1994:2). 
This is in line with the decision in D v D The Times, Law Reports, July 29 1993, 32 where it was held that the 
High Court or County Court may not order police to disclose documents or tape recordings except by witness 
summons or subpoena. In this particular case tile father had left dIe matrimonial home but continued to have 
contact witll his children, a boy and two girls. The mother had applied for a residence order in her favour and for 
contact between the father and the children to be strictly confined. Subsequently, on a visit to the father, the son 
alleged that his mother had kicked him and slapped his sisters. The police were contacted and they, together with 
social services. investigated the matter. At a hearing on dIe 13 April 1993 dIe judge had ordered that neidler tile 
social services nor the police, who were not parties to the action, should take any further steps relating to the 
children without approaching the court. He ordered that all documents in possession of bodl the social services and 
the police concenting the investigations into the fanlily should be disclosed to the court as well as the solicitors 
acting for the parents. The Chief Constable of North York.5hire appealed against this decision and dIe Court of 
Appeal on 21 July 1993 held at 32 that" ... dlat court had no general power to garner documentary evidence of its 
own motion, nor jurisdiction in sllch a case to order discovery by a nOll-party .. " . 
The Appeal Court held furtller at 32 that if a party wished to adduce in evidence documents that were in the 
possession of a non-party, then the procedure was by subpoena duces tecum in the High Court, or by a witness 
summons in the County Court. 
In a number of cases, judges in the Family Division have been aware of the possible dangers involved in allowing 
unrestricted access to such sensitive material. In Re A 1990 Family Law, July, 259 Judge Butler-Sloss refused to 
disclose social work records to a fadler who had been acquitted of rape. In R v H (1987) The Law Magazine, May 
29, a diagnostic video interview was prepared. The judge in Bedford County Court decided that he had the power 
to limit who saw the video and ordered that a written transcript should be made available to the mother and her 
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solicitors but not the viewing of the video itself. Also in B v B Famil y Law, December 1991 , 518 , the judge 
refused to allow either transcripts or videos to be seeu by the parents. 
Another problem has arisen with the introduction of Code E of the Codes of Practice, Police & Criminal Evidence 
Act 1984 which came into effect on 9 April 1995 and re lates to tile tape recording of interviews with suspects. 
Paragraph 4.16 provides: 
"The suspect shall be handed a notice which explains the use which will be made of the tape 
recording and the arrangemems for access to it and titat a copy of the tape shall be supplied as 
soon as practicahle if the person is charged or infonlled that he will be prosecuted. " 
This section was introduced to protect police officers against allegations of intimidation during interviews with 
suspects, especially those which gave rise to admissions or confessions. However, this section created another 
problem for police dealing with Child Protection matters. During the course of the interview, allegations made by 
the child will be put to the suspect, the ltames and addresses of tile victims are likely to be mentioned and the 
feelings of the child and tile child's fanlily may also be put to the suspect during the interview. The allegations will 
usually be described in graphic detail. It may also happen that the pertinent part of the child's video interview be 
played during the interview with the suspect and in this way tile child's voice will be recorded on tile suspect 
interview audiotape. The concern here is that this detail is handed to the suspect and the police have no control 
over what he may do with such infomtation. Since tile police are aware that paedophile networks have sold such 
videotapes and used such information for their own sexual purposes, there is the danger that the information given 
during a full interview wi til a suspect Illay also he used for these purposes by those who have a sexual interest in 
cltildren (Miller 1995). 
2.4.5.8 An Evaluation of the Videotaping of Children's Evidence 
The Home Office cOlllmissioned a research team, based at dIe University of Leicester, to undertake a 27 month 
investigation into how effective tile videotaping of children's evidence in terms of s32A of the Criminal Justice Act 
1988 was proving to be in practice. The ambit of the research covered the following issues: the views of court 
and child protection professional s with respeL:t to the new provisions; whether the guidelines set out in the 
Memorandum of Good Practice were followed when child witnesses were interviewed; and the impact of the new 
procedure on the courts and dIe children themselves (Davies et al 1995: i) . 
In the surveys conducted wi th social workers and police. both groups were favourably disposed towards the 
videotaped interviews, bur interestingly hOtil were not confident that Ule provisions of the Act would serve either 
the interests of justice or dIe child. TIley were asked to comment on what advantages they ulOught the new Act 
provided, and bodl professions felt that the primary advantage was the reduction in stress for the witness. Other 
advantages were believed to he the fact that witnesses did not have to see the accused; that the evidence was 
obtained while it was still fresh; dlat the witness did not have to repeat his statement; that dIe account produced by 
the interview was more comprehensive and more coherent; that it was possible to observe the witness's demeanour 
when he made his statement; and Utat more cases would lead to prosecutions (Davis et al 1995: 6-9). 
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These findings support those of Williams (1995:2) who carried out a similar survey amongst police, barristers and 
circuit judges. The most popularly reported advantages of video testimony were the following : the giving of 
evidence would be less traumatic for witnesses; it would enable tile child to be more confident, relaxed and more 
forthcoming; tile child would not have to confront tile alleged abuser and the child would be protected from an 
alien, intimidating courtrOOIll. 
In their evaluation of s32 supra police and social workers believed that the primary disadvantage of tllis procedure 
would be the fact that cross-examination still had to take place and that tbe witness would be unprepared to deal 
with it. Without first undergoing initial questioning by tile party calling them, tile children would be plunged 
straight into cross-examination. Further disadvantages forwarded were: tile evidential requirements tllat had to be 
complied with for court conflicted with therapy; interviewers were not trained sufficiently; it was felt that the 
provisions of tbe act did not go far enough; and it was anticipated that problems might arise from poor interviewing 
teChniques as well as from tbe restrictions imposed by the Memorandum. Both police and social workers felt that 
the evidence given in open court had lUore impact than the evidence given Oil the videotape, but agreed that giving 
evidence in open court was more stressful . When interviewed again at a later stage the following new disadvantages 
were reported: the Crown Prosecution Service was unwilling to prosecute cases ~ the courts were reluctant to use 
the new provisions and it was felt that barristers required special training to prosecute child abuse cases (Davies 
et al 1995:7-10) . 
"Several respondents . .. also conuuented specifically that it would have been better to implement 
the full Pigot proposals and that the current situation represented an unsatisfactory half way 
house." (Davies et al 1995:8) 
Many of the social workers and prosecutors in Davies's (1995: II ) study stated that their opinion of the new 
provisions had changed for ule worse with experience. The main reason given for the negativity was that the court 
and the barristers were not keen to take 011 the new provisions. 
Again, the disadvantages reported in Williams' (1995:2) survey were similar to those reported by Davies. A large 
nnmber of participants were concerned that video evidence had less impact all the jury and that communication via 
Ule live link was seen as artificial which made it difficult for ule j ury to assess tbe evidence. TIley were also 
concerned that the videotaped interview did not prepare children for ule ordeal of attending court and of being 
subjected to hostile questioning by the defence. 
TIle majority of tile judges (93 %) interviewed were itutially in favour of videotaped interviews as opposed to 41 % 
of the barristers. When interviewed again at a later stage, only 88 % of tile judges were in favour of tile videotaped 
interviews. Originally 53 % of tile judges felt that the new provisions were in the interest of justice, wbereas only 
17 % of Ule barristers felt likewise . These numbers decreased dranlatically by the time the second interviews were 
conducted eighteen months later: 40 % of the judges now believed the new provisions were in the interest of justice 
while none of the barristers for the defence (0%) and only 18% of tile barristers for the prosecution believed so 
(Davies et al 1995:11-13). 
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Both barristers and judges also agreed dlat the child giving evidence in open court carried much more impact, 
a1dlOugh they all accepted that it was lllore stressful for the child involved. The results of dIe surveys indicate that 
both the judges and the barristers have lower opinions of the new provisions than the child protection professionals 
(Davies et al 1995: 13). 
Judges and barristers listed the following as di sadvantages of videotaping a child's evidence in terms of s32 supra: 
the possibility dlat fal se allegations were less likely to be detected on the videotaped interview; they were concerned 
about poor interviewing techniques on the part of the interviewers; and felt dlat the videotape had less impact than 
a live court appearance. In addition, barri sters added dlat dley experienced a loss of ability to influence how dIe 
account was given and found that cross-examination was difficult after a videotaped examination-in-chjef. Tbe main 
complaints from court persoIlllei about the videotaped interviews was the use of leading questions, hearsay and 
improper comforting by the interviewer (Davies et al 1995:13-16). 
The second part of the research involved an evaluation of a sample of videotaped interviews which had been 
conducted in tenns of thi s section. Between October 1992 and April 1994 1199 trials involving child witnesses took 
place. Of dlese dlere were 640 applications to have a videotaped interview admitted into evidence and replace the 
evidence-in-chief. 470 applications were successful. Only 25 applications were unsuccessful with the rest rendered 
uIlllecessary because the accused pleaded gui lty at a late stage. Although 470 applications were successful. only 
202 were definitely shown in court. In the other cases the prosecution may have decided against using the 
videotape. In the latter cases dIe children gave evidence using the live link. One of the more interesting results 
discovered was dlat in 12 % of the cases where the prosecution barrister decided to conduct dIe examination- in-chief 
himself, dIe case collapsed within minutes of the opening because dIe child was unable to follow the barrister's 
questioning, despite the fact that in each of these cases a successful videotaped interview had been conducted 
(Davies et al 1995:25-3 1). 
In comparing the evidence that was given 0 11 videotape with the evidence given on live link. the following data 
emerged: dIe interviewer on the videotape was able to accommodate dIe linguistic ability of dIe child more 
frequently than the prosecution, and defence barristers were significantly less able to accommodate the linguistic 
style of dIe child than the prosecution (Davies et al 1995:31-32). 
The main purpose of tlle interview is to find out as much detail as possible about the alleged offence. From the 
observations of the videotaped interviews and tlle leading of evidence via the video link, it was found that both 
barristers and videotape interviewers used leading questions with equal frequency. Anodler important difference 
highlighted was that 83 % of the questions of videotape intelviewers focused on central infornlation as opposed to 
70 % of the questions asked by he prosecution. The defence, on the other hand, were mainly concerned with 
peripheral infornJation. 60 % of the defence barristers questioned predominantly about peripheral matters. 
Peripheral here refers to material that is not directly related to dIe central allegation (Davies et al 1995: 31 -33). 
Videotape interviewers were rated as being significantly more supportive of the child witnesses than dIe prosecution 
barristers. The children on the videotape interviews were less anxious tllan tlle children who gave evidence via the 
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live link. 37 % of ule children giving evidence on Ule live link were rated as being unbappy as opposed to 19 % 
on the videotape. Half of the defence barristers were found to be unsupportive during cross-examination and more 
children (54 %) appeared anxious during cross-examination (Davies et al 1995:32-33). 
It emerged from observing the children giving evidence via the live link that defence barristers used behaviour that 
could only serve to intimidate ule children. In two cases defence barristers were observed lining their cameras up 
so that when they addressed the child witness, the accused was visible in ule background. Another tactic adopted 
by a defence barrister was to lean forward towards the camera so that only his eyes appeared on the screen Ulat the 
child was watching (Davies et al 1995:43) . 
2.4.5.9 Refreshing Memory 
In practice it happens Ulat the initial interview conducted with the child witness takes place months before the 
matter comes to trial. The general rul e is that a witness who does not have full recall of all the material facts may 
be allowed to refresh his memory from his statement. The Lord Chancellor directed that children be allowed to 
refresh their memory by watching the video recording of their interview when it is shown to Ule court (Butler 
1994a), 
However, a video recording does nOt automatically hecome admissible. In terms of s32A of the Criminal Justice 
Act 1988 the Court has to decide whether the video will be admissible or not. It also has the discretion to exclude 
part or parts of dIe recording which, in the interests of justice, should not be admitted (s32A(3)(c» . 
The question dlen arises as to what happens if the videotape is found to be inadmissible? Is the child still allowed 
to refresh his memory from Ule video . If Ule child will not be allowed to refresh his memory from the video, then 
the child will be placed at a great disadvantage since he will be cross-examined in great detail on what is in effect 
his examination-in-chief which he gave months before. And since the defence has had access to ule videotape and 
had the opportUIllty to watch it as often as deemed necessary , Ule cross-examination will in the majority of cases 
be very detailed. 
The Crown Prosecution was of Ihe opinion thaI it would depend on dIe circUlllstances under which the judge ruled 
dIe video recording to be inadmissible. If, for instance, the video is ruled inadmissible because the judge feels that 
the child is mature enough to give evidence in court and there are no obj ections to the video itself, then it would 
seem that the child would he allowed to refresh his memory from the video. However, if the reason for ruling the 
video inadmissible is hecause it is regarded as unreliable due to the use of leading questions. dlen it will 
substantially reduce ule weight of the child 's evidence to allow ule child to view the video before giving evidence 
and to bear once again tile possible suggestion (Butler 1 994a). 
Another aspect of refreshing memory that gives rise to problems is dIe question of how often a child should be 
allowed to view ule tape. Lawyers and judges are of the opilllon that children should only see the tape once when 
it is played at the trial . Social workers and police argue that children should be allowed to see the tape as many 
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times as is necessary to refamiliarise themselves with infonnation they have given months, perhaps even a year, 
before (Davies and Wilson 1994:69). 
Adult witnesses are allowed to refresh their memories before entering the witness box as many times as tbey 
require. It is difficult not to concede dle same right to dle child witness, especially in view of the fact that tbe 
defence has had access to the videOtape. 
2.4.5.10 Videotapes of Prior Consistent Statements 
What is envisaged here, is a proposal to make dle videotaped interview of a child witness, conducted by a social 
worker or police officer shortly after the evelll happened, admissible as evidence at the trial even though the child 
gives evidence in chief in court. The purpose of admitting dle videotaped interview is to allow it to supplement 
the evidence given at dle trial. rather dlan to replace dle child's evidence-in-chief. In terms of the rule against prior 
consistent statements, this videotape will he inadmissible. 
2.4.5.10.1 The Law Relating to Prior Consistent Statements 
A prior consistent statemelH is a statemeJlt. whether oral or in writing, made by a witness 011 a previous occasion 
which confinns dle evidence given in court (Hoffmaml and Zeffertt 1988: 117). These statements have been held 
to be inadmissible. TIle leading case is Corke v Corke and Cook (1958)1 All ER 224, where the Appeal Conn held 
that prior consistent statements an~ inadmissible. 
The reason for holding prior consistent statements inadmissi ble is that they are insufficiently relevant and can easily 
be manufactured. The fact that somebody said something on a previous occasion does not mean that it is true 
(Hoffmann and Zeffertt 1988: 117). 
A number of exceptions to this rule have been created by the common law, each exception having to comply with 
certain requirements before the statement can be admitted. The exceptions are as follows: complaints made in 
sexnal cases, statements to rebut an allegation of recent fabrication, identification of the accused on a previous 
occasion and statements made hy the accused when he is confronted with incriminating facts (Hoffmann and Zeffertt 
1988: 118-123). 
2.4.5.10.2 Criticisms of the Rule 
According to the psychology of human memory, a memory, for an event fades gradually widl time and stress 
impairs the power of recall (Spencer and Flin 1993:268). TIlese problems apply to both adults and ch.ildren, but 
in the case of the latter they are so much worse. Children are more easily fri ghtened than adults and it has been 
proved that they forget more quickly than adults (Spencer and Flin 1993:268). In view of the above, it would 
appear that a statement made by the child as soon after the evem as possible would therefore be more accurate since 
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it would be made when ule event was still fresh in the child's mind. This is one of the advantages of videotaped 
interviews Ulat was mentioned by the Pigot Committee (supra) and also found to be so by Davies et al in the 
evaluation they conducted (supra) of videotaped illtelviews. 
This was accepted by the Scottish Law Conullission (1990:25-26) in uleir Report, where uley pointed out the 
following: 
"It is probably fair to say that , in many installces, a witness's recollection of events is likely to 
be more accurate and reliable shonly after the events in question than will be Ule case many 
months later. It appears that this may be panicularly so in ule case of children, and especially 
young childreu. Moreover. .. it may be that some children will recount their experiences not only 
more accurately but also more readily if dley are able to do so in circumstances which are less 
stressful and less threatening than appearing in court." 
If the prior statemelll of the child was admissible at the trial it could be used to supplement ule evidence, especially 
if the child has forgotten some of the details (Spencer and Flin 1993:268). The Pigot Committee were strongly of 
the opinion um a coun which heard the evidence of a child who was "nervous, hesitant and perhaps confused" 
should not be prevented frum drawing conclusions about its truthfulness from a prior consistent statement (Home 
Office 1989: 14). 
The Criminal Law Revision Committee in England recommended in its Ildl Repon in 1972 that the rule against 
previous consistent statemelllS he abolished, hut this was met with vigorous opposition. It was argued that such 
a proposal was Ulmecessary si nce Ule admission of previous consistent statements would eiuler be a repetition of 
the evidence already given in coun and would tllerefore be redundant or it would be different and would then 
operate to cancel out what the witnesses said in coun (Spencer and Flin 1993 :269). 
These arguments do not appear to be based on logic. Firstly, if the contents of the videotaped interview are going 
to be identical to what the child says in coun in the course of evidence given in chief, then the prosecuting counsel 
will not ask for the videotaped interview to be admitted. They will obviously only do so if it is required to 
supplement the child' s evidence . Secondly, if the original videotaped interview differs from the child 's evidence 
in COUft, this would be admissible in tenns of the nonnal rules relating to previous inconsistent statements anyway 
since the defence would have access to these statements. 
A furtller argument raised against the Criminal Law Revisioll Connnittee's proposal to abolish ule rule against 
previous consistent statements was that it was dangerous because it would be easy for a third party to allege Olat 
a witness had said certain Olings on a previous occasion which, in fact, tlle witness had not (Spencer and Flin 
1993:260). Again, this is not a very good argument. Any dishonest ulird pany can give false evidence in coun 
to corroborate wbat a witness has said. This, supposedly, is the purpose of cross-examination, mmely to expose 
any lies Olat a witness might he telling. If a third parry were to give evidence of a prior consistent statement, the 
defence would bave an opportunity to cross-examine him. Also, in view of tlle above proposal , namely that a 
videotape of Ole prior cOl1)istent statement he admissible, this problem would nOt occur as Ole court will be able 
to view Ole initial statemem itself. 
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A further criticism raised by tile Scottish Law COlllmission (1990:25) was the fact tllat prior inconsistent statements 
were admissible to challenge the witness 's credibility. This seemed to be extremely unfair, in view of tile fact that 
the same arguments used against allowing prior consistent statements to be admissible could be levelled at prior 
inconsistent statements. The effect of tllis law, as Spencer and Flin (1993: 139) point out, is that the child' s one 
inconsistent story may be used to destroy him as a witness, but the other consistent ones may not be put in evidence 
to rehabilitate him. In R v Beattie (1990)89 Cr App R 303 a girl made twO statements. In the first she gave a 
toned-down account of sex ual abuse by her father. Three days later she made a full and detailed account of incest. 
The latter s(atemt::1ll was a prior t:o llsistelll Slatemt::lH of the evidence she gave in court. Both statements were 
admitted in court. The Court of Appeal set aside tile conviction because, although the first statement was admissible 
as a prior inconsistent statement and was correctly used to attack her credibility since it conflicted with her evidence 
in court, the later statement amounted LO a prior consistent statement and was therefore inadmissible. 
The Pigot Conmlittee felt tllat , altllOugh it did not fall within tile terms of tlleir appointment, there should be a more 
general change relating to prior statements and til at tllese criticisms raised wider questions about the rules of 
evidence than those relating particularly to children (Home Office 1989: 14). 
2.4.5.10.3 The Position in Scotland 
In tlleir Discussion Paper. the Scotti sh Law Commission (1990:25) proposed tllat the rule against prior consistent 
statemems be abolished and be replaced with a rule whereby a prior statement would be admissible "not only for 
or against tlJat witness's credibility but also as evidence of any facts contained in it". Although this proposal was 
made in relation to children, a few Ulonths later it was proposed tlJat tile matter be examined in a general context 
in relation to all witnesses. 
The Commission 's radical proposal, that all pri or statements be admissible as evidence of fact where the maker of 
the statement also gives evidence in court , was regarded as "going too far" by many of the consultees to the 
Discussion Papers. They were, however, prepared to depart from the rule in a more limited way. They would 
consider the admission of prior statements as evidence of fact, provided two requirements were complied with , 
namely, the accuracy of the prior statement had to be assured in some way and tile maker of the statement had to 
adopt its contents in tile witness box (Scottish Law Conmlission 1990:26). 
The Connnission, tllerefore. reconul1ended that a statutory provision be introduced whereby any wi tness giving 
evidence could introduce a prior statement if tile statement was in a written foml and signed by the witness or in 
the form of an audio or a video recording or in any OUler permanent form which accurately and completely records 
what was said. In addition, the willless must indicate by appropriate means tltat the statement was made by him 
and that the contents are true (ScottiSh Law Commission 1990:30). 
The Conmlission Report sunuuarise, lhe position succinctl y as follows: 
" ... we believe that the admissihil ity of a witnesses's prior statement or statements, as evidence 
j 
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of fact, would represellt a valuable rel()fIn of the law. It would enable a trial court to consider 
relevant evidence which might not otherwise be available; it might go some way towards relieving 
a witness from having to recount in court all the details of a distressing or unpleasant experience; 
but at the same time. since such prior statements would be admissible only where the maker of 
the staremem gave evidenct!, i[ would eIlsure that the witness could be subject to cross-
examination not only in respect of evidence given by him at tlle trial but also in respect of 
anything contained in the prior statement. " (Scottish Law Commission 1990:30). 
This proposal to admit prior statemellts has, however. not yet been enacted. 
2.5 Public Hearing 
2.5.1 Removal of the Public 
Witnesses in criminal trials must give evidence in open court on the day of the trial. TIlis rule applies to aU 
witnesses. including children. Judges and magistrates do have tlle di scretion to exclude the public when a child 
witness testifies. but tllere is no duty on them to do so. This is provided by s37 of the Children and Young Persons 
Act 1933 which reads: 
"(l) Where in any proceedings in re lation to an offence against, or any conduct contrary to, 
decency or morality. a person who. in the opinion of the court, is a child or young 
person is called as a witlless. the court may direct that all or any persons, not being 
members or officers of (he coun or parties to tbe case, their counselor solicitors. or 
persons otherwise directly concerned in the case, be excluded frotn the court during the 
taking of tlle evidence of that witness: Provided that notlling in this section shall 
autllOrise the exclusion of bona fide representatives of a newspaper or news agency." 
In terms of s107 of the Act a "young person" refers to anyone under the age of 17. A further limirationon the 
discretion of the court is the fact tllat this section can only be used where dIe offence is otle which is contrary to 
"decency or morality". As a matter of law these words limit the offences to ones of a sexual nature, according to 
Spencer and Flin (1990:93). They argue that there does not appear to be any sensible reason for this limiration. 
If a cllild is afraid to give evidence in the presence of a group of people. it seems inunaterial whether the offence 
is one which is contrary to decency or morality or not. 
Morgan and Plonukoff(1990:190), who were funded hy tlle Home Office to carry out research on how the legal 
system responded to child victims. found dlat the discretionary powers which presiding officers have to clear the 
coun are used very infrequently. They also found that magistrates were even more reluctant than judges to use this 
discretion granted to them. 
Spencer and Hin (1990:93) add that the reluctance of the presiding officers to clear the courtroom has been a 
subject of complaint by a nwnber of orgaIusations dating back to as early as 1925, where tlley have suggested that 
it ought to be compulsory for dIe puhlic to he cleared unless dIe court mles otherwise . 
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The Scottish Law Commission C 1990:5) in their report on the evidence of children dealt with the question whether 
this discretionary power of the judge to clear tile court should be made mandatory. This question was met with 
a mixed response, and the Commission decided that matters like the clearing of the court should remain in the 
discretion of the judge. They came to this conclusion after considering the dangers involved in creating mandatory 
provisions. They were of the opinion that, if mandatory rules were created for children below a certain age or for 
those who were victims or had witnessed certain crimes, the judges would be discouraged from using these practices 
if children did not fall within particular categories. 
Other methods are sometimes adopted which fall short of actually clearing the court. Morgan and Plotnikoff 
(1990:190) give exanlples where directions were given to the public not to enter or leave the courtroom while the 
child was giving evidence and instances where tile tront row of the gallery was roped off. 
2.5.2 Restrictions on Publicity 
There are also restrictions which limit what tile press may report about a child witness. This is governed by s39 
of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933, which provides: 
"In relation to any proceedings in any court, the court may direct that -
Ca) no newspaper report of the proceedings shall reveal the name, address, or school, or 
include any particulars calculated to lead to the identification, of any child or young 
person concerned in the proceedings, either as being the person by or against, or in 
respect of whom the proceedings are taken, or as being a witness therein; 
Cb) no picture shall be published in any newspaper as being or including a picture of any 
child or young person so concerned in the proceedings as aforesaid; except insofar (if 
at all) as lllay be pennitted hy the direction of the court." 
2.6 The Competency Reguirement relating to Child Witnesses 
2.6.1 The Common Law Position 
As early as 1778 children in England were regarded as competent witnesses. In R v Brasier (1779)1 Leach 199, 
the accused was convicted of assaulting a child under the age of seven years with the intent to rape. The judges 
were unanimOUSly of the opinion tirat no evidence could be received except under oath. Therefore, if a child, no 
matter how young, was capable of understanding the oath, he would be a competent witness. If he was incapable 
of understanding the nature of the oath, he would not be able to give evidence. TI,e court explained it as follows 
at 202: 
" . .. That an infant, though under age of seven years, may be sworn in a criminal prosecution, 
provided such infant appears, on strict examination by the Court, to possess a sufficient 
knowledge of tile nature and consequences of an oath .... for there is no precise or fixed rule as 
to the time within which infants are excluded from giving evidence; but their admissibility 
depends upon the sense and reason they entertain of the danger and impiety of falsehood, which 
is to be collected from their answers to questions propounded to them by the court; but if they 
are found incompetent to take an oath, their testimony cannot be received ... " 
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This competency requiremem was vigorously attacked by the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to 
Children in the nineteenth cemury and they managed . after a strenuous campaign, to persuade Parliament to 
introduce a provision into the Criminal Law Amendmem Act 1885 which would allow young girls to give unsworn 
evidence about certain sex ual offences (Spencer 1990: liS). nlis provision is now contained in s38 of the Children 
and Young Persons Act of 1933 which regulates the competency requirement as far as criminal matters are 
concerned. It provides: 
"(I) Where, in any proceedings against any person for any offence, allY child of tender years 
called as a witness does not in the opinion of the court understand the nature of the oath , 
hi s evidence may he received, though not given upon oath , if, in the opinion of the court, 
he is possessed of sufticiellt intelligence to justify the reception of the evidence, and 
understands tile duty of speaking tile truth." 
s96 of the Childrens Act of 1989 which governs civil matters has a similar provision: 
"(I) Subsection (2) applies where a child who is called as a witness in any civil proceedings 
does not, in the opinion of the court, understand the nature of an oath. 
(2) The child 's evidence may be heard by the court if, in its opinion -
(a) he understands that it is his duty to speak the truth; and 
(b) he has sufficient understanding to justify his evidence being heard." 
These sections have , tllerefore. changed the position adopted in Brasier's case supra. A child can give evidence 
witilOut taking the oaUl provided he understands the duty to speak the truth. If he does not understand tile duty to 
speak the trutil , tllen he would be incompetent and unable to give evidence (Temkin 1990:355). 
Section 38 (supra) gave rise to two questions: firstly, what was meant by tlte phrase "understand the nature of the 
oath" and, secondly, who was "a child of tender years "? 
2.6.1.1 The Nature of the Oath 
In order to give sworn evidence it was not sufficient for the child to "entertain the danger and impiety of falsehood" 
as set out in Brasier supra. The child had to believe in God and damnation as well. Spencer and Flin (1993:48) 
set out a competency examination of a thirteen year old boy by Judge Jeffreys in R v Braddon (1684)9 St Tr 1127 
at 1148-9 which conveys we emphasis that was placed on religious belief: 
"Judge Jeffre ys: 
Boy: 
Judge: 
Boy: 
Judge: 
Boy: 
Judge: 
Boy: 
Suppose you should tell a lie, do you know who is the father of liars? 
Yes. 
Who is it? 
The Devil. 
I f you should tell a lie, do you know what will become of you? 
Yes. 
What if you should swear to a lie? If you should call God to witness 
to tell a lie, what would become of you tllen? 
I should go to hellfire." 
In order to take the oath. a child had to show titat he understood what it meant in its original sense, namely "as a 
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conditional self-curse under which the swearer calls upon God to damn his soul for all eternity if he fails to tell the 
truth". During the course of tile 19th century this became watered down until it was deemed sufficient if the 
witness believed in some kind of di vine punishment . The oatil then became a solemn promise to tell the truth with 
a reference to God (Spencer and Flin 1993:51). 
In 1963 Parliament enacted s28 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1963 which provided that the form of the 
oath be cbanged from 'I swear by Almighty God' to ' I promise before Almighty God ' . Then followed the case of 
R v Hayes [1977]1 WLR 234 (AC) which was accepted , according to Jerrard (1984: 109), as introducing the view 
which represents the law in its present fomI. In this particular case the child witness was asked questions relating 
to her belief in God or the divine sanction of the oath to detemline her competency. An appeal was lodged, based 
on the child 's answers to the above questions which led to doubt about whetller the child had any belief in God. 
The Appeal Court held til at in order to be competent tile witness did not have to have a belief in divine sanction. 
Bridge LJ set out the judgement as follows: 
"It is unrealistic nOl to recognise that, in the present state of society, amongst tile adult population 
the divine sanction of an oath is probably not generally recognised. The important consideration, 
we think, when a judge has to decide whether a child should properly be sworn, is whether the 
child has a sufficient appreciation of the solenutity of the occasion and tile added responsibility 
to tell the truth which is involved in taking an oath, over and above the duty to tell the truth which 
is au ordinary duty of nonnal social conduct. II 
It would therefore seem tllat an understanding of dIe nature of the oadl involves an appreciation of the seriousness 
of tile occasion and of the duty to speak tile truth. This was supported by the Court of Appeal in R v Campbell 
The Times, Law Reports. 10 December 1982 where the COurt found that when deciding whether a child should take 
the oatil or not, two factors had to be considered. This involved, firstly, the question whether the child sufficiently 
appreciated the nature of tile case and, secondly. whether the child realised that taking the oath involved more than 
the ordinary duty of telling tile trutll (Jerrard 1984: 109). 
These decisions meant tllat tllere was very little difference between the test that had to be applied when a child gave 
sworn evidence and that llsed when he gave unsworn evidence. In order to give unsworn evidence dIe child, in 
temlS of s38 supra, must be of sufficient intelligence to justify the reception of his evidence and must understand 
the duty of speaking tile truth. The distinction then would be that the child had to understand the general 
importance of telling tile trulh to give unsworn evidence, hut would have to understand dIe particular importance 
of telling the truth in a court of law to give sworn evidence (Spencer and FIin 1993:52; Birch 1992:265). 
2.6.1.2 Child of Tender" Years 
There is no minimum age under which children automatically become incompetent to testify. In Brasier's case 
supra the court said tllal it was possible for a child under the age of seven years to be a competent witness. 
However, in practice thi s was very narrowly constmed and resulted in the introduction of an arbitrary age below 
which a child was regarded as nOI being Cll tllpetetlt to tes ti fy, following tile decision in WaLLwork (1958) 42 Cr App 
R 153 where tile court held lhat it was not proper for a child as young as five to give evidence. The accused was 
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charged and convicted of conmlitting incest widl his five year old daughter. At the trial the child did enter the 
witness box but was unable to give any evidence. As Goddard LCJ pointed out at 161: "The child had given no 
evidence because when the poor little th ing was put into the witness-box, she said nothing and could not remember 
anything." However, despite dlis , the grandmouler gave evidence regarding the complaint made to her by the child. 
On appeal the court found that there had been an irregularity in allowing the grandmother to give evidence 
regarding the complaill!, but the appeal was dismissed because ulere had been no substantial miscarriage of justice. 
The Court did have ule t(lliowing to say regarding the calling of a 5 year old as a witness at 160-161: 
"The child was called as a witness , but said nothing. The court deprecates the calling of a child 
of dlis age as a witness ... . and widl respect to the learned judge, I am surprised that he allowed 
her to be called . The jury could UOl attach any value to the evidence of a child of five: it is 
ridiculous to suppose that they could .. . but in any circumstances to call a child of dle age of five 
seems to us to be most undesirable. and I hope that it will not OCCUI again. II 
This gave rise to dle practice whereby children under the age of six were not regarded as being competent. Due 
to the Wallwork decision supra prosecutors did not adduce dle evidence of young children nor did the courts receive 
such evidence unless dle child had the understanding normally to be found in an eight year old (Home Office 
1989:47). In Hayes supra ule court accepted drat the dividing line between children who could and could not be 
considered too young to give sworn evidence fell somewhere between dle ages of eight and ten years (Jerrard 
1984: 109). In R v Campbell 1195612 All ER 272 Lord Goddard CJ said that there was no definition of the phrase 
"child of tender years" ill the Children alld Young Persons Act 1933, although the word "child" was defined in 
s107 as a person under the age of fourteen. In d,e more recent case of R v Wright and Omlerod (1990)90 Cr App 
R 91, the Court of Appeal followed the Wallwork decision. Mr Justice Ognall said that the validity and good sense 
of the judgement remained "untrammelled" and that "it must require quite exceptional circumstances to justify the 
reception of this kind of evidence ". 
In the latter case, the complainant. aged six , gave evidence on charges of kidnapping and indecent assault. One 
of the grounds of appeal was that the judge erred in finding dle complainant competent in view of the decision in 
Wallwork's case. The court held the following at 94-95: 
"That was nearly 30 years ago. So far as this court is aware, the validity of, and good seuse 
behind , that proposition has remained untranul1elled in the procedure of the crimirral COUItS . We 
entertain considerahle mi sgiving whether in the present case the learned judge indeed fell into 
error in ulis regard . It must of course always be a matter for the judge who sees the intended 
witness and questions him or her to make up his own mind. Patently, dle younger the 
complainant dle Illore anxiously will the court deliberate before deciding to admit the 
evidence ... The lesson of this trial lends especial force, in our judgement, to the observations of 
Lord Goddard CJ in Wallwork. It will, in our view, be a bold tribunal hereafter d!at does not 
heed the lesson." 
It would therefore appear that when a child under the age of fourteen has to give evidence in court, the judge will 
have to inquire into whether dle child understands dle nature of the oatil. This was accepted by the Court of Appeal 
in R v Khan (1981)73 Cr App R 190 which stated dlat as a general rule , an inquiry became necessary with a child 
under the age of fourteen years. alLilOugh there was nn direct authority on the point. The accused was charged with 
living on the prostitution earnings of dle II year old daughter of the woman widl whom he was living. The court 
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held further that where such an inquiry was held in ternlS of s38(1) the questions had to be recorded so that they 
appeared in the official transcript. 
In R v Reynolds [1950[ I KB 606 the complainant was an II year old girl, who was being educated at a school for 
children of retarded development. The trial court found the girl to be competent to give sworn evidence and the 
accused took the decision on appeal. The coun set out the procedure dlat has to be adopted as follows at 609: 
"So, when a Cllild is put imo the wi mess box, the chairnlan or presiding judge must first decide 
whether the child in his opinion uuderstands the nature of the oath . Then he may have to go on 
and consider whether, if dle child does not possess sufficient intelligence to understand the nature 
of an oath, he is possessed of suffici em intelligence to justify the reception of his unsworn 
evidence on the ground that he understands the duty of speaking the trud!. " 
It was only in 1990 dm dle Court of Appeal in R v Z [1990[3 WLR 113 held dlat it was wrong to have a fixed age 
below which a child will automatically be incompetent to give evidence. The judge will have to make a finding 
in each particular case by questioning dle child to determine whedler he is competent or not. The court at 116 held 
that " ... the statute lays down 110 minimulll age. and the matter accordingly remains in the discretion of the judge 
in each case. " 
2.6.1.3 Discretion of the Judge 
How young then must a child he before he can be precluded from giving evidence? The answer to dlis question 
would appear to be in dle discretion of tlle judge in each particular case. Tllis was clearly set out in the Hayes case 
supra where dle court held that the question of competency was "very much within the discretion of the trialjudge". 
There is no procedure avai lahle wherehy an expert can give evidence on the competency of the child, and dle 
decision of the judge is tillal (Flin, Davies and Stevenson 1987: 276). 
The Court of Appeal in Khan's case supra found that it would be necessary in all cases where the witness was 
under the age of 14 to conduct a competency examination. The judge will have to find out if the child understands 
the nature of the oath and then whether the chi ld understands what it means to tell the truth. 
There are no clear rules or questions that must be asked in order to detertlline, firstly, whether the child understands 
the nature of the oath or. secondly. whether he knows what it means to tell the trud!. There are no official rules, 
practice directions or practitioners' guidelines on the subject (Spencer and Flin 1990:53). Children are usually 
asked questions concerning the difference hetween the truth and a lie i.e. why is it wrong to tell lies, what age are 
you, where do you live? In fact. it seems [() he a matter of common sense and experience. For instance, in the 
unreported case of Campbell (1982) slIfira where a girl of 10 years alld four months was called to give evidence, 
she was asked wheuler she was aware dlat it was a serious matter to tell lies and whether she was aware that she 
ought to tell the truth. She was then asked the usual type of questions directed at ascertaining the extent of her 
knowledge of God. the c"mem and nature of dle Bible. die purpose for which people went to church etc. On the 
basis of these questions she was found to be compe(em to give evidence under oath. 
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Spencer and Flin ( 1990:53) set out tile competency examination of a six year old girl , which they regard as being 
a fairly typical example of the kind of questions which judges normally ask. l feel it necessary to set out a few 
examples of the competency examinations in hill here so that they can be evaluated and used to make comparisons 
with the procedures adopted in South Afri ca and the United States of America: 
"Judge: 
Child: 
Judge: 
Child: 
Judge: 
Child: 
Judge: 
Child: 
Judge: 
Child: 
Judge: 
Child: 
Judge: 
Child: 
Judge: 
Child: 
Judge: 
Judge: 
Child: 
Judge: 
Child : 
Judge: 
Child: 
Judge: 
Judge: 
Judge: 
Child: 
Judge: 
Child: 
Judge: 
Now, first of all , tell me what your name is? 
Sally. 
Sally what? Can you hear me? 
Yes. Sall y Smith. 
How long have you had this doll? \Indicating the doll Sally was holding] 
A long time. 
Have you got other dolls? You play with dolls a lot, do you? 
I play with my munullY 's nightdress case. 
You tell me this. will you. Where do you live? Have you forgotten? 
Acacia Avenue. 
Do you go to school'! 
Yes . 
Where? 
Forgotten. 
Don't you worry ahout that. You tell me this. Do you know what telling a lie is? Do 
you know the difference hetween telling a lie and telling tile truth? 
Yes. 
Do you tell the tmth? [The witness, Sally, did not answer, but nodded her head in the 
affirmative] 
Now tell me this. Do you know what an oath is? 
No . 
People talk about God. Do you know what dlat means? 
He went to heaven. 
Would you tell the tmdl if I asked you to tell the truth? Would you do your best? Even 
though it might be a bit difficult. If I asked you a question which was difficult and you 
did not know the answer would you say so? Would you say so? Would you say, 'l 
don't know',! 
Yes. No. 
What do you mean by that? IThe witness did not answer] 
You do not know? IThe witness shook her head I 
What do you want for Christnlas? 
[Inaudible] A Care Bear. 
Is it a lamp you have in your hedroom , something like that? 
Yes. it lights up. 
Very good. Would you just stay dlere for a minute. [To prosecuting counsell Mr 
Bloggin.'l, I think I should say I am certainly not going to have this child sworn. r have 
come to the conclusion dlat she is of sufficient intell igence to tell us what she 
remembers. l am satisfied, having looked at her, dlat she understands the duty of 
speaking the truth." 
An interesting comparison was set out in the unreported case of R v Russell 3 July 1992, No. 90/2468 /22 where 
tile Court of Appeal approved of the way in which a competency examination was conducted ill one case and 
condemned tile use in another case. The examination tiJat tile court approved of took place in the case of R v Z 
(1990) supra wbere the accused was convicted of committing incest with his 5 year old daughter. The accused 
appealed on the grounds that the j udge was wrong and mi sdirected himself in allowing the child to give evidence 
within s38(1) of dIe Children and Young Persons Act 1933. The little girl, now aged six, gave evidence via the 
live link and the judge questioned her (0 detenlline whelher she could give evidence. The questioning was set out 
.. 114: 
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" Q: 10], can you see and hear me'! 
A: Yes. 
Q: How old are you now'? 
A: Six. 
Q: How long have you been going to school? Roughly? 
A: A year. 
Q: A year? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Do you get taught about God at school, or not? 
A: No. 
Q: Do you know the di fference hetween telling the truth and lies? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And you realise how terrib ly important it is dlat you tell dle truth and no lies at all. 
A: I do not tell lies. 
Q: What? 
A: I do not tell lies. 
Q: And you are going to tell us what happened with Daddy? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And it must all he true. 
A: Yes." 
The judge then delivered the follow ing mling on the child's competence at 115C-D: 
"I have had the advantage of seeing a video-fi lm of Ithe childl in conversation with a woman 
police officer and a social worker, and I have also seen [the child] through the video-link this 
morning and I asked her some questions. I have come to the easy conclusion that it would not 
be appropriate for her to take tlle oatil. However, sbe seems to me to be a perfectly intelligent 
girl and able to give her account of events and she seems to me to be sufficiently intelligent to 
justify receiving her evidence unsworn." 
The examination which tlle court condemned in Russell's case (supra) was conducted as follows : 
"Judge: Hello Amy ... 
Child: Yeah . 
Judge: 
Judge: 
Child: 
That's hetter. We can see a hit more of you now . 
(Child laughs.) 
Can you hear me as well? 
Yeah. 
You can see me all right, can you? 
Judge: In a minute. Amy, somebody is going to ask you some questions. 
Child : 
Judge: 
Child: 
Judge: 
Child: 
Judge: 
Child : 
Judge: 
Child : 
Yep. 
Will you li sten very carefully? 
Yep. 
And try and tell us dle answers, and try and get the answers right. How o ld are you? 
You disappear when you bob down like tbat. That is better. How old are you? 
Six. [In fact, she was fi ve. 1 
When were you six? Long ago? When was your birthday? Do you know? 
My hirthday is in April. 
You are nearly seven. or are you just six? 
Just six. 
Judge: All right. Do not keep bobbing away, we lose you. Somebody is going to ask you some 
questions, and I will leave it to tllem. 
Child: Thanks. 
Judge: All right. Good girl." 
(Spencer and Flin 1993:60-61) 
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2.6.2 Distinction between Sworn and Unsworn Evidence 
The distinction between dle evidence of a child given under oath and evidence given without the oath in terms of 
s38(1 ) of dle Children and Young Persons Act of 1933 was very important in English law. At the time the Act 
was passed there was a proviso w this section whi ch read as follows: 
"Provided that where evidence has been admitted by virtue of this section is given on behalf of 
the prosecution the accused shall not be liable to be convicted of the offence unless that evidence 
is corroborated hy some other material evidence ill support thereof implicating him." 
In tenus of this proviso. where a child was !lOt competent to give sworn evidence. the accused could not be 
convicted of the offence unless the child 's evidence was corroborated. This corroboration had to include some 
material evidence that implicated the accused. Therefore, where a child was considered competent to take dle oath, 
no corroboration was requirod. hut where the child was not competent to take the oadl, corroboration implicating 
the accused was required. 
In 1988 the Govenmlent introduced s34 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 which effectively abolished the distinction 
between evidence given under oath alld withollt the oatil. An accused could now be convicted on the basis of a 
child 's unsworn evidence alone. Corroboration was no longer required. 
2.6.3 Dissatisfaction with the Competency Requirement 
The approach of the couns to the question of a child ' s competency to give evidence came under severe criticism 
from a number of quarters. A few of these criticisms will be mentioned here as they explain the reason why the 
issue of competency came to he addressed hy the Pigot Committee. 
It has been argued that dle fact that a child is too immature to distinguish between tbe truth and a lie means that 
the evidence should be approached with caution and not rejected completely (Spencer and Flin 1990:58). The child 
may be able to give a very good accoum of an event but not be able to understand abstract concepts such as ' truth' 
and 'lies'. As Spencer and Flin ( 1993:54) point Ollt , no sane parent or doctor would treat a child ' s injury widlOut 
first asking the child what happened and no policeman would investigate an offence against a child without first 
trying to talk to the child, yet the court will not speak to dIe child unless the child has passed dle competency test. 
The competency requirement further implies that although a child may be able to describe what he has seen or what 
he has experienced. he will nevertheless he an incompetent wirness unless he can underhand concepts such as ' truth ' 
and 'falsehood'. 
This view is supportod hy Wigmore (1940:s509), who believes that the evidence should be put before the court so 
that the court can detenuine whether there is any value in the evidence: 
"Recognising on the one hand the childish disposition to weave romances and to treat imagination 
for verity, and on dle other hand dle rooted ingenuousness of children and their tendency to speak 
straight-forwardly what is in their minds, it must he concluded that tile sensible way is to put dle 
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child upon the stand (0 give testimony for what it may seem to be worth." 
For these reasons it has been very strongly advocated that the competency requirement should be dispensed with. 
The couns should be willillg to listen to any child who is old enough to talk. The age and maturity of the child, 
and his ability to distinguish hetween the tnlth and a lie are matters which relate to the weight that should be 
accorded to the evidence. As Spencer (1989: 123-4) points out, dle courts on the Continent do not have a 
competency requirement, so why is it so essential to dle accusatorial system? A major criticism levelled against 
the competency requirement for children is that it has been devised by legal practitioners and does not bear any 
relation to dIe findings of modern psychologists. Children are now regarded as much more reliable witnesses than 
dley were previously thought to he (Spencer and Flin 1990:237). 
Children were regarded as dangerous wi messes for a nwnber of reasons, the three most imponant being: the 
child's tendency to lie (imagine); their limited ability to store and recall information; and the fact that children are 
very suggestible. These dangers attrihuted to child witnesses are no longer supported by modern research. 
Witnesses of all ages may be prone to lying, and it has been shown that the maturity of adults enables them to 
sound more credible dIan children when giving evidence that contains inaccuracies. Research has also shown that 
children have bet!ll foulld to he no less accurate witnesses than adults and may even in certain cases be better 
witnesses. In fact, adults aft:: far mOfe likel y to interpret infonllation in a way that makes better sense and then 
"remember" dIe inaccurate facts. Recent research into dIe suggestibility of children has shown that adults and 
children alike are susceptible to suggestion, especially when the event is less well encoded and the suggestion comes 
from a person in authority (Birch 1992:264-265). The research referred to here will be discussed in greater depdl 
when evaluating the child witness infra , hut the conclusion is succinctly summarised by Birch (1992:265) as follows: 
..... the couns ' time would be better taken up in sifting the testimony of all witnesses in the light 
of what is now Imown ahout mendacity , faulty memory and suggestibility, rather than removing 
young witnesst!s from tlIt! courtroom aitogt!ther. " 
Because children are perceived iu this way by the courts, the courts have inappropriate expectations of how they 
should behave. Pynoos and Eth ( 1984: 100) provide an example of how inappropriate expectations can obstruct 
Ille child's ability to comply with the judicial process . In this case the defendant was charged with murdering his 
wife, and their daughter was the only wi wess to the incident: 
"Four year-old Julie was not prepared for the sight of her father, the defendant, whom she had 
not seen in over six months, dressed in prison garb. On her way to the stand, she walked over 
and gave him a hig hug. Without explanation to the child , the judge suddenly excused the jury 
w~o got up and left. He would not allow a trusted adult to sit with the child on the witness stand, 
but left her to sit in a witness chair ohviously oversized for her. Once seated, she placed both 
hands over her mmuh. The district attorney began the examination by showing her a colouring 
book; she shrugged silently, and the judge looked annoyed. The district attorney then asked her 
if s~e was a girl or a hoy, and she tidgeted shyly. The judge interrupted by stating, "It doesn' t 
appear to the court that she can qualify." He then abruptly dismissed her. Without her 
testimony. the father was acquitted and Julie was fetumed to his care." (Pynoos and Eth 
1984: 100) 
Here the child's shyness and fidgeting was perceived by the court as affecting her competency, and she was 
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therefore not given an opportunity to tell tbe court what she knew which resulted in a serious miscarriage of justice. 
A further criticism of the competency requiremellt is that its practical consequeuces make it very difficult, if not 
impossible, to prosecute offenders. In tbe majority of cases involving the physical and sexual abuse of children, 
the child is the only witness to the assault. If Ole chi ld is going to be considered to be an incompetent witness by 
the court. this will inmost cases deprive the prosecution of their only evidence (Spencer and Flin 1990:59). 
Not only does tbe competency requirement deprive the prosecution of their case in many instances, but it can also 
contribute to a wrongful conviction. A very good example of Ulis is Ule case of Sparks v R [1964] AC 964 (PC) 
where Ule accused was charged witb indecently assaulting a Olree year old girl. The child was regarded as 
incompetent and , therefore. unable to give ev idence. The mother gave evidence of what the little girl had told her 
when she questioned Ule latter: "Then I asked her who took her out of the car. I asked this and she said that she 
did not know. I Olen asked her what did the person look like , and she said that it was a coloured boy. She did 
not say anything more after that." (at 967) The accused was a 27 year old white man. At the trial the evidence 
as to what the child said, namely "it was a coloured boy". was held to be hearsay evidence and inadmissible. It 
was argued on appeal that the child' s statement should have been admissible. Ironically, Ule defence 's argument 
would have been exactl y the opposite if the child's statement had not been in the accused's favour but, nevertheless, 
it does highlight the tact that very important evidence is heing excluded. The Pri vy Council held at 965 that the 
moUler' s evidence of what her child had said to her was hearsay and since the child did not give evidence, there 
was no basis 011 which her statement could be admitted. 
The purpose of the competency examination in its present fonn also came under fire. Spencer and Flin (1993:61) 
put it as follows: "Something that has never been clearly explained. however, is what such an examination is really 
supposed to be testing". Firstly. an objection Olat has often been raised is how Ole courts can come to a decision 
on wheUler a child can give evidence or not before they have actually heard what the child has to say . How do 
the courts come to Ole conclusion that one child should be helieved whereas another sbould not before they have 
beard the children testify? 
Secondly, Ole competency examination is designed to see if the child will undertake to tell the truth and does not 
ensure that ule child wi ll in fact tell the truth. It also does not assist in the question of reliability of the witness. 
A young child may not be ahle to dist inguish between the abstract concepts of truth and falsehood , but may be able 
to give a very reliable account of what he saw or heard. The test itself does not assist in any way in determining 
which children can give accurate accounts and which canllot. 
Flin et al (1987:278) mentions that the 11th Report of the Criminal Law Revision COlllmittee (para. 204-208) 
regarded the inquiry into whether a child understands the nature of Ole oath to be unrealistic and farcical, and 
recommended that all evidence given hy children who are under the age of 14 should be unsworn and all evidence 
given by children aged 14 and over should he given under oatil. 
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2.6.4 The Pigot Committee and its Proposals 
According to tile findings of the advisory group, tile police were very dissatisfied with the decision in Wallwork 
supra since they felt that it was almost impossible to convict offenders who molest very young children. Social 
workers were also confused by the system since children who gave perfectly good accounts of offences committed 
against them, were unable to give evidence in court as a result of the Wallwork decision (Home Office 1989:47). 
The Pigot Committee found that Wallwork's interpretation of the competency requirement did lead to prosecutions 
being abandoned in a large numher of cases where serious offences were conunitted against young children. They 
concluded " .. tilat in view of these considerations the present requirement is only justifiable if it operates to exclude 
particularly umeliable evidence and tilerefore to prevent an unusual danger of miscarriages of justice. " (Home 
Office 1989:48) The Pigot Committee was of dIe opinion that the decision in Wallwork was no longer in keeping 
with more recent research and could nor be justified: 
"We do not think tilat the influence of Wallwork can be justified in principle at all since its effect 
has been to substitute a sort of age limit for witnesses where Parliament plainly intended there to 
be a test of understanding in each case. It has persisted despite modem thought about the rights 
and psychology of children. we suggest, because tile traditional courtroom experience is so 
obviously an inappropriate one for the very young. Legal conservatism about practices and 
procedures and concern about the inunediate welfare of child witnesses have both helped to ensure 
that our courtS do not hear evideuce which would be heard in oUler jurisdictions. " (Home Office 
1989:48) 
In R v Z supra the court referred to Wallwork's case and held til at tile latter decision had been overtaken by events 
since one of the concerns expressed by the judge was Ule physical enviromnent in which the child had to give 
evidence, as he had cleared the court as far as it was possible to do. Since screens and the live link are now 
available, tilOse concerns have been addressed to a certain extent. A furdler event dlat has overtaken dIe Wallwork 
decision is the fact that the prov iso to s38( 1) of the Children and Young Person's Act 1933 was repealed by the 
Act of 1988. By repealing this proviso Parliament was indicating a change of attitude to the acceptability of the 
evidence of children (R v Z supra at 117D-G). 
As the CODllnittee felt that a competency requirement was only useful if it could be used to ascertain whether a child 
was able to give a trudlfu l and an accurate aCCQUIll. dley were of dIe opinion tilat the present competency test in 
England did not achieve this. The present test was founded "upon dIe archaic belief that children below a certain 
age or level of understanding are either toO senseless or toO morally delinquent to be worth listening to at all". As 
far as they were concerned, a Clli ld who could nOt understand dIe meaning of the oath or concepts like truth and 
duty would not be sophis ticated enough to invent and "consistently and successfully sustain falsehoods" (Home 
Office 1989:49-50). 
The weigbt of modern research has shown that chi ldren are no less accurate Ulan other witnesses. In fact, the 
Govemrnent actually accepted dlis argullleill during the passage of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 when they 
abolished dIe requirement dlat dIe unsworn evidence of children should be corroborated before it could be accepted. 
When this section was proposed in dle Bill, the Ministers accepted dIe findings of available research that children 
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as young as fi ve could gi ve re liahl e evidence (Horne Omce 1989:48-49). 
The Conunittee felt that the courtS should consider any relevant understandable evidence. If a child witness could 
provide an understandable accoullt , Olen the child 's evidence should be heard by the court. Once the child has 
given evidence, the jury will be ahle to weigh up the evidence from their observations of Ole child 's demeanour, 
maturity and abili ty to understand , his coberence and consistency. Once the jury have weighed up all the factors, 
they will Olen have to decide how much reliance can be placed upon Ole child 's evidence (Home Office 1989:49). 
As a resul t of their findings the Piglll Committee proposed that the competency requirement applying to children 
be dispensed with and om it should not be replaced wi th any oOler specific requirement. When any witness testifies 
in court the judge has the discretion in temlS of Ole common law to declare that witness incompetent if it becomes 
clear that the witness is unable to give evidence either due to intoxication or mental defect. The Pigot Conunittee 
felt that ulis power which the judge has is sufticient, although uley did add that "it is a power which should only 
be exercised after considerable ulOught and perseverance and that this is especially important in the case of young 
children" (Home Office 1989:50). 
The PigOI Committee also dealt wi th the issue of whether the evidence of the child should be given sworn or 
unsworn. Since there was no longer a legal distinction between sworn or unsworn evidence, they proposed that 
all witnesses under the age of 14 should give evidence unsworn and tbat children over that age be allowed to give 
evidence under oath . This, otey felt, would prevent the jury from making any inferences between the two, since 
they felt that the jury might g iv~ more wt: ight to evidence that was given under oath . They did not believe that 
there should be any fo rmal requirement, but did fee l that judges could find it helpful to admonish children to give 
a full and truthful account of what happened (Home Office 1989:51) . 
2.6.5 Statutory Flefornl 
As a result of the proposals put forward by ule PigOI Committee, s52 of Ole Criminal Iustice Act 1991 was 
introduced by the legislaulre. It provides: 
"52. (1) After section 33 of the 1988 Act there shall be inserted Ole following section -
Evidence given by children 
33A. (1) A child 's evidence in criminal proceedings shall be given unsworn. 
(2) A depositi on of a child' s unsworn evidence may be taken for the 
purposes of criminal proceedings as if that evidence had been given on 
oath. 
(3) In this section 'child' means a person under fourteen years of age. 
(2) Subsection ( I) of section 38 of ole 1933 Act (evidence of a child of tender years 
to be given on oadl or in certain circumstances unsworn) shall cease to have 
effect: and accordingly Ole power of the court in any criminal proceedings to 
detennine that a particular person is not competent to give evidence shall apply 
to childn::n of tender years as it applies to other persons. " 
This section now dispenses WiOl the need for an inquiry into whether the child understands the oath , since all 
children under the age of fourteen are to give their evidence unsworn. It also repeals s38(1 ) of the Children and 
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Young Persons Act 1933, which means that the judge no longer has to be satisfied that the child has sufficient 
intelligence to give evidence and understands the duty to speak dIe truth before he can allow the child to give 
evidence. Children, therefore, are in dIe sanle position as adults. They no longer have to undergo a competency 
examination, but if at any stage the court becomes aware that the witness carUlot conununicate intelligibly, then a 
competency examination will hecome necessary. 
The interpretation of the phrase "as it applies to odler persons" in s52(2) has given rise to some debate. Spencer 
and Flin (1993: 63) argue tllat the ordinary common law power of a judge to detennine the competency of an adult 
includes an examinati on of the person's ability to communicate intelligibly as well as tlleir understanding of an oath. 
This would, tllerefore, be a re-introduction of the competency requirement ' through the back door' , and would 
defeat the whole purpose of a cllild having to give unswom evidence. 
Birch (1992:267-8) disagrees with this argument, pointing out tllat competency involves bOtll an understanding of 
the oath and an ability to conUllUtU Cate. The examination referred to in "the power of the court . .. to detemune tllat 
a particular person is not competent" ill s52(2) does not refer to the issue of understanding tlle oath, since it would 
have no relevance to a child who gives unsworn evidence. It must therefore refer to an inquiry into the child' s 
ability to conUllUlucate intelligibl y. In support of her argument, she refers to proposals of the Pigot Conunittee. 
They proposed tllat dIe fonner s 38 test he dispensed with . The only difficulty dley foresaw was that the child 
might become incoherent or fail to conmllnucate intelligibly, in which case they said tllat this could be dealt with 
under the judge' s existing conmlon law powers to rule a witness incontpetent. It is suggested tllat s52(2) should 
be interpreted in ulis light. The court does not have a duty to inquire into the competency of a child witoess, but 
does have the power to declare an individual child incompetent where tlle latter cannot conmlUrucate effectively . 
Now that the competency requirement has been abolished, the issue arises whether children can still be asked 
questions to determine their understanding of ule duty to speak the truth , and questions to detennine their 
intelligence. Spencer and Flin (1993:64) answer this question in Ule affirmati ve, saying that it is a matter of 
conunon sense. The questions will no longer be used to determine whedler the child will be allowed to give 
evidence, but rather will be relevant to the weight which the court will have to attach to it. 
Birch (1992:268) refers again 10 the Pigot ConuBittee proposals, which reconunended that , a1tllough there be no 
formal requirement, the child be admOlushed to tell the truth in age-appropriate language. This does not mean that 
there is a judicial duty to test whedler ule child understands the obligation to tell the truth before this admorution 
is given. 
2,6,6 The Position in Scotland 
Up until the 19t1l century all witnesses had to give evidence under oath , and children under 14 were disqualified 
from giving evidence. This rule was abolished by the Evidence (Scotland) Act of 1840. The modern rule is that 
all witnesses are competent to give evidence if they can conmlUnicate intelligibly (Spencer and Flin 1993:66). 
Children under 12 do not have to give evidence under oath but are admonished to tell tile truth. Children between 
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the ages of 12 and 14 will give evidence sworn or unsworn depending on their level of understanding, while 
children over dIe age of 14 are presllmed to be ahle to give evidence under oadl unless it appears that tlley do not 
nnderstand the oath (McEwan 1988:814). These age groups are not strictly adhered 10, because in each case the 
child's competence will depend on the ability to conunun.icate intelligibly and to distinguish between truth and lies. 
Flin et al (1993:3 17) carried out a survey of 89 children, varying in age from 4 to 15 years, who gave evidence 
in criminal trials in Scotland. The resul ts of the competency assessments indicated dlat children under the age of 
nine are nOt asked to give evidence under oatil. The group of children aged between 9 and 13 showed the widest 
divergence with some giving evidence wi thout the oadl (16), others giving evidence under oath after being found 
competent (7) and others automatically giving evidence under oath without any competency assessment (2). The 
majority of children aged 14-1:; gave evidence automatically under oath without having their competency tested (44) , 
while a few were first tested before being allowed to give evidence under oath (6), and four children actually gave 
evidence without taking the oath. 
There is therefore a competence requirement in the sense that the child will only be able 10 give evidence if the 
child can understand what it is to tell the trudl. and once the child has been admonished to tell the truth. This was 
upheld by the court in Rees v Lowe High Coun of Judiciary, 7 November 1989 (unreported) where a girl of three 
years was called as a witness in a summary trial. The accused appealed against the conviction on the ground tllat 
the sheriff had not detennined whedler the child understood the difference between the truth and lies, and had not 
admonished tile child to speak the truth. The High Coun allowed the appeal on dIe grounds that dIe proper 
procedure was for tbe presiding judge 10 sa tisfy himself dlat a child of tender years knows the difference between 
telling the lIuth and telling lies and. if he is satisfied , then he must admonish the child 10 tell the truth (Scottish Law 
Commission 1990: II ). 
In Scotland , uulike dIe position d,at used 10 be in England, there is no arbitrary age beneath which a child will 
automatically be incompetent. There are examples of witnesses as yonng as two who have given evidence in 
Scottish courts (Nicholson and Murray 1992: 132). There is no set of prescribed questions which have to be asked. 
The judge has dle discretion in each case lO delenlline how the child 's competency will be tested. Theoretically 
the requirement is the same as in England, although it would appear lO Spencer and Flin (1993:68) that it has been 
interpreted more liberally in Scotland. 
The following competency examination conducted in P v H.M. Advocate 1991 SCCR 933 with a five year old boy 
was held to have been correctly carried OUl: 
"Judge: 
J: 
Judge: 
J: 
Judge: 
J: 
Judge: 
J: 
Judge: 
Hello. 
Hello . 
Do you go to school? 
Yes. 
Which school do you go to? 
(Named school) 
Tht! same as your sister. is it'! 
Yes. 
How long have you been at school for? 
J: 
Judge: 
J: 
Judge: 
J: 
Judge: 
J: 
Judge : 
J: 
Judge: 
J: 
Judge: 
J: 
Judge: 
J: 
Judge: 
J: 
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Hundreds of times. 
Pardon? 
H ulldrt:!ds of rimes. 
Now. J. do you know what it is to tell the tmth? 
Yes. 
Do you know what it is to tell fibs? 
Yes. 
Do you know you musn't tell fibs? 
Yes. 
You l<JloW tilal. yes. Well, J, these gentlemen are going to be asking you some 
questions. 
Right. 
And when you answer the questions do you promise to tell the truth? 
Yes. 
And you Ulusn' t tell any libs. all right? 
Yes. 
Promise (hat'! 
Yes." 
There is some doubt as to whether tile presumption in Scotland is for or against competency. The Scottish Law 
Conmlission in their Discussion Paper in 1988 were of the opinion titat judges tend to approach the competency 
question by assuming that the child was prill/a facie a competent witness. They would then, by holding a 
preliminary conversation wi th the child, be able to come to a conclusion whether dIe child is not able to give 
evidence intelligibly or is not ahle to underSland the difference between the truth and lies (Spencer and Flin 
1993:69). 
The Scottish attitude towards the competency requiremenl has been much more liberal than that of the English, and 
reflects a more favourable approach to the reliahility of children among dIe legal profession. As early as 1881 Lord 
President Inglis in Auld v Mc8ey ( 1881) 18 SLR 312 had the following to say about child witnesses: 
"I have found that when the question is as to what happened on a particular occasion dIe best 
witnesses are boys and girls. Their eyes are generally open and dtey are not dlinking of other 
things and they are no( talking to their neighbours. Everyone who has had an experience in the 
criminal courts illust know that when the question is as to what occurred at a particular place the 
best evidence is often given by boys and girls." 
It is this liberal application of we competency requirement tllat meant it was "a virtual non-issue" in Scotland when 
the Scottish Law COlluuissioll examined the law. Hence they did nOt propose its abolition, and you now have the 
situation where the competency requiremem still exists in Scotland, but has been abolished by the Criminal Justice 
Act 1991 in England (Spencer and Flin 1993:70). 
2.7 The Cautionary Rules and COlTohoration 
In law there have traditiollally been specific groups of witnesses who have been regarded as untrustworthy or 
unreliable. and. where these witnesses have given evidence, corroboration of their evidence has been required 
(Spencer 1988: 13). In English legal history Ihe cautionary mle arose in tllree circumstances: when dealing with 
the evidence of accomplices, complainants ill sexual matters and children. In tenns of the rule, the court was 
obliged to warn itself of the dangers inherem in accepting the evidence of tile particular witness before the court. 
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If the court was satisfied widl the witness's evidence, it would be entitled to convict. If the court was not satisfied 
with the witness's evidence . it would require corroboration of the evidence. 
The cautionary rule, consists of twO aspects: first ly, dIe duty of tIle court to warn itself and, secondly, the 
requirement of corroboration. Two groups of wi tnesses, who have traditionally been regarded as untrustworthy 
and who are of specific relevance to this study, are witnesses who are children and witnesses who are complainants 
in sexual matters. 
Originally in England there was no specific duty to warn in tIle case of children. In R v Brown (1910)6 Cr App 
R 24 the court , in referring to the evidence of a fifteen year old girl, said that "it was not a case in which 
corroboration is necessaril y required" (at 25) but that lhe jury should have been warned that the girl was a single 
witness and au accomplice in a sexual offence. The warning appears to have been applicable only to childben who 
were the victims of sexual assaults, but in tIle early 20tIl century some cases based the warning on the fact that the 
witness was a child rather than the fact that the matter was a sexual case. As a result of this, the practice arose 
within the courts of requiring that the warning be given even in complai nts that were not of a sexual nature. and 
even where the cillld was not a victim , as in R v Buck 119811 Crim.L.R. 108 where tIle child gave evidence that 
she had seen the accused steal somebody else's watch. Here the Court of Appeal explained at 108 that "the practice 
was tIlat the jury should be warned of the danger of acting on such uncorroborated evidence". 
2.7.1 Duty to Warn 
When a child or a cOlllplainam in a sex ual offence gives evidence, tJlere is a duty on the judge to warn the jury . 
The judge mus( warn lhe jury lhat it is dangerous (0 cOllvict on the evidence before them unless they are very 
satisfied with tIle witness. Where the matter is presided over by magistrates, they have to warn themselves of the 
dangers involved in convicting on the uncorroborated evidence of the witness (Spencer and Plin 1990: 171). In most 
cases the warning should he given when the judge gives his directions to the jury, and it will be regarded as an 
irregularity if he does not do so . as was demonstrated io R v Hattoll (1925) 19 Cr App R 29 the complainant was 
a twelve year old girl. In the sunmung up of the case to dle jury , dIe judge gave dIe following direction at 31: 
"The prisoner is charged with assaulting this little girl in a manner likely to cause her unnecessary 
suffering. There is, and can he no dispute, if the facts are anything like what are sworn to by 
that little girl. that the prisoner did assault her in a maImer likely to cause her unnecessary 
suffering. Theret{lfe dIe only question you need seriously to consider is whether the offence has 
been proved. " 
The appeal was allowed and the conviction was quashed hecause "tIlis was pre-eminently a case in willch a clear 
and umuistakable direction should have been given upon the necessity of corroboration of the evidence given by 
a child of tIlis tender age" (at 32). 
Although dlere is a duty on the judge to warn the jury (or himself in dIe case of a magistrate), the content of this 
warning remains widlin his discretion. In DPP v Hester 119731 AC 296 Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest said at 309E 
that "there are no set words which must he adopted to express tIle wanung. Rather must the good sense of dIe 
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matter be expounded with clarity and in the setting of a particular case". 
In R v Z supra one of the grounds of appeal related to the content of the judge's warning. TIle judge's warning 
was as follows at 118G-H: 
"As I have said, it is you who will decide whether the little girl you saw on video link firstly may 
have been a very wicked child, which she would be if she deliberately made a false allegation 
either at her mother's instigation or off her own bat. or secondly. she may have been living in 
a little child' s world of make helieve, helievi ng that her allegation was true when it really was 
not, or believing it was tme hecause her mOlher had implanted the thought in her mind when truly 
it was not , or dlirdly, was a perfectly nomlal decent little child, telling us in her own way and 
using her own language what Daddy did to her . Those are your decisions and yours alone. " 
TIle Appeal Court was sat is tied with the contents of this warning and felt that " .. the judge was directing the jury 
quite clearly as to dleir decision and how it was to be reached of the little girl's reliability " (at 119A). 
Originally it was sufficient that a warning he given, widlout any emphasis on the particular wording of the warning. 
In R v Cra/chley (191 3)9 Cr App R 232 Lord Chief Justice Isaacs explained it as follows at 235: 
"In such case it is generally desirable, apart from any rule of law ... that a warning should be given 
to the jury as to acting on the evidence of boys of this age - twelve and under ten - who are 
cOllcerned in such an offence. It is not necessary that the judge should use the actual words 
"warn" or "caution" , if from his conduct of the case this Court is of the opinion that tbejury were 
in fact warned or cautioned , it would not interfere." 
However, with time it became a requirement d,at the warning had to include the word 'dangerous' or some other 
word which was equally strong. It was not sufficient simply to say that dIe evidence had to be approached with 
caution (Temkin 1990:255). In Davies v Direc/or of Public Prosecutions [19541 AC 378 dIe court at 382 
summarised the position relating to dIe cautionary mle. Although dIe facts of this particular case relate to the 
warning given when dIe witness is an accomplice, the duty remains the same in dIe case of child witnesses and 
victims of sexual assaults . In tenus of this case, it is the duty of the judge to warn the jury that, aldlOugh they may 
convict 011 tile witness's evidence, " it is dangerous to do so unless it is corroborated", At 382 it was argued tbat 
although tbe duty to warn is a rule of practice, it now has the force of a rule of law. Where dIe judge fail s to warn 
the jury in accordance widl dlis rule. the conviction will be set aside urtless the court is convinced that no 
"substantial miscarriage of justice" has occurred. 
2.7.1.1 Basis of the Duty to Warn 
TIle cautionary rule requires that the presiding officer warn the court of the dangers inherent in the evidence of 
children and compiainams in sexual cases. In order to exami ne the rationale upon which tills rule is based, the 
dangers involved in accepting a child's evidence will be dealt widl separately from dlat of a victim of a sexual 
offence. 
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2.7.1.1.1 Dangel-s inherent in a Child's Evidence 
There is a widespread helief among lawyers that chi ldren are unreliable witnesses, especially when they are 
testifying about a sexual offence. Spencer ( 1987c:240) refers to a quote of George Carmen QC which summarises 
the position succinctly. 
"The experience of the courts has heen. over a long period of time, that sexual allegations are 
very easy to make and very hard 10 refute and, in the case of children, there are additional 
dangers - of exaggeration, of outside intluence, or collusion or of fantasy." 
The Criminal Law Revision Conlllittee in their Eleventh Report at para.208 felt that the warning was not necessary 
in all cases: 
" ... children are often very observant and, at least in nOll-sexual cases, often give very good 
evidence. More important, perhaps, is the fact that very young children are seldom required to 
give evidence except in sexual cases. We have come to the conclusion that in non-sexual cases 
there is no such danger in convicting Oil the ullcorrohorated evidence of children as to make it 
necessary to n:quire corrohoration or a warning aboU( cOllvicting on uncorroborated evidence. " 
This is supported by the decision in DPP v Hesler supra where the cautionary rule reiating to children was justified 
on the grounds dme "[sjollletillles it Illay he that owing to immaturity or perhaps to lively imaginative gifts there 
is no true appreciation of the gul I' that separates truth frolll fal sehood" (309C) . And further, at 325E, Lord Diplock 
added that it was because children were "so young that their comprehension of events and of questions put to them 
or their own powers of expression may he imperfec(". 
According to Hall and Martin (1993: 195). children are less likely tn act out of improper motives than adults, · but 
"they are more susceptible to the intluence of third persons, and may allow their imaginations to run away with 
diem". They , therefore , believe urat a chi ld 's evidence should be corroborated. 
It is, as seen above, frequeml y alleged that children are not able to distinguish between fantasy and reality. Young 
children do spontaneously make up stories and, according to Glaser (1989:488), can become confused as to their 
actual involvement as opposed to imagined involvement. However, they do not have difficulty in distinguishing 
their own involvemtm from that of somehody t:lse. 
There is the furuler allegation that children are suggestible and easily intluenced. The latest scientific research has 
shown that young children are suggestible but no more so uran adults, and uleir suggestibility is confined to 
peripheral facts(G laser 1989:488) . Psychological research suggests urat vety young children, from the age of three 
or four, are capable of providing accurate and tnLlhful accounts when questioned objectively (Cobley 1995: 132). 
These factors will be dealt with in greater detail at a later stage when evaluating a child 's ability to give evidence 
as a witness. 
82 
Children are also charged with providing false accounts deliberately. These motivations would obviously have to 
be considered in the context of the child 's family relationships. Glaser (1989:489) admits that false allegations do 
occur in approximately 5 % of cases and these are usually at the instigation of others and in the context of disturbed 
family relationships. 
Jones and McGraw, two child psychiatrists in ule United States of America, carried out studies on the extent to 
which allegations of child abuse are false. They studied 576 reports of suspected child abuse in Denver during the 
period of 1983 and found that only 2 percent of the children had made false allegations, namely five chiJdren. Of 
particular interest was the fact that one of these children, a four year old boy , produced the false account with the 
aid of his mother while the other four were disturbed female teenagers who had previously been sexually victimised 
by adults. A further 26 cases (6%) were classified as false, but in these cases an adult had made the complaint 
on behalf of the child. These adultS included parents suffering from psychiatric disturbances and parentS involved 
in custody disputes. Jones et al concluded that false allegations of child sexual abuse are rare, and those false 
allegations which originate from children are even rarer (Spencer and Flin 1989:1601-2). 
A detailed evaluation of the relevant research conducted on children will be analysed once the procedures in various 
countries have been smdied. 
Davies and Flin (1988:22) argue that the basis for discriminating against children has been based on anecdote and 
case law. Widl increased research into applied experimental psychology there is now an opportunity to evaluate 
the reasons which have over We years been forwarded by lawyers. 
2.7.1,1,2 Dangers inherent in the Evidence of Complainants in Sexual Matters 
The evidence of a complainant in a sex ual offence must be treated with caution. This was enunciated as early as 
the seventeenth century by Lord Chief Justice Matthew Hale . who wrote: 
"Rape is an accusation easily to he made and hard to be proved, and harder to be defended by 
the party accused, tho' never so illllocen!. " (Brownmiller 1975:369) 
This he justified by referring to the famous example of a woman who accused a man of rape. The latter, when 
undergoing a medical examination, was found to have a hernia "full as big as the crown of a hat" which had made 
him incapable of having sexual intercourse I'll" seven years (Spencer 1988: 13). 
In a number of cases judges have elucidated the reasons for caution when dealing with complainants in sexual cases. 
In R v Graham (1910)4 Cr App R 218 the reason was given at 221 Ulat women will lie in defence of their 
character: 
"If she had connection WiUl the prisoner she was not an entirely truthful girl, but her 
untruulfulness was in defence of her own character, and women will lie on that point often when 
the rest of thei r srory is tme. " 
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Tllis position was further explained hy Lord Justice Salmon in R v Henry (1969) 53 Cr App R at 150: 
"What the judge has to do is to use clear and simple language that will without any doubt convey 
to the jury that in cases of aUeged sexual offences it is really dangerous to convict on the evidence 
of the woman or girl alone. This is dangerous because human experience has shown that in these 
courtS girls and women do sometimes tell an entirely false story which is very easy to fabricate 
and very difficult to refute. Such srories are fahricated for all SOrtS of reasons, which I need not 
now enumerate, and sometimes for no reason at all." 
These specific dangers were identified in the Eleventil Report of the Criminal Law Revision Committee: 
" ... the complainant may have made a false accusation owing to sexual neurosis , jealousy, fantasy, 
spite or a girl's refusal 10 admit tilat she consented to an act of which she is now ashamed." 
(Home Office 1989:52) 
These dangers are reiterated by Glanville Williams (1962:662) who justifies the cautionary rule on the following 
grounds: 
"Sexual cases are peculiarly subject to dIe danger of deliberately laying false charges resulting 
from sexual neurosis. fantasy, jealousy, spite or simply a girl's refusal to admit that she consented 
to an act of which she is now asharned. " 
In DPP v Hesler supra the cautionary rule was justified at 309 C-D as follows: 
"There are some suggestions which can readily be made but which are only widl more difficulty 
rebutted. There may in some cases be motives of self-interest, or of self-exculpation, or of 
vindictiveness. In some si tuations the straight line of truth is diverted by the influences of 
emotion or of hysteria or of alann or of remorse. " 
It would appear then that the cautionary rule is based upon dIe belief that women tell lies about sexual assaults for 
a wide variety of reasons ranging from spite to shame: that complaints are based on fantasy and that charges are 
falsely laid. The accuracy of these heliefs will be addressed later when dIe various systems are evaluated. 
2.7.1.2 Criticisms of the Duty to Warn 
According to Spencer and Flin (1990: 172). such a warning might be regarded as sensible where the evidence of 
the prosecution is based solely on dIe evidence of a single child . But, where the prosecution has presented a great 
deal of corroboration in addition to tile child's evidence, the warning seems umlecessary. It may confuse the jury 
who might think that the judge knows llIore than they do and is giving them a hint that they should acquit. 
The Repon of the Advisory Group on Video Evidence found that the warning was eidler disregarded in practice 
or that it actually led to dIe acquittal of an accused, who may very well have been convicted if the evidence had 
been approached, adopting the ordinary procedures (Home Office 1989:55). 
Williams (1963: 152) picks up the argument by declaring the warning to be self-defeating. If it is given where there 
really is no danger, as in the case where there is sufficient corroboration, dlen it can cause a miscarriage of justice 
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by making the jury aware that it is "dangerous" to convict. On the other hand, where there really is a danger, a 
warning to the jury would seem to he insufticient. The jury are warned that it is dangerous to proceed in a 
particular way, but UIat they may do so if uley are satisfied. 
"What [the judgeJ is entitled to tell them, according to the standard fOrtlmlation, is that it is 
dangerous to cOllvict on 1Il1corrohorated evidence. but that the jury are entitled to convict on 
uncorroborated ev idence if they think tit. As it stands. a direction of this kind seems self-
defeating; it appears to tell the jury that they are entitled to do what experience of generations 
shows to be dangerous. " (Williams 1963: 152-3). 
The Advisory Group questioned the rationale behind the rule to warn. They acknowledged that complainants in 
sexual cases do sometimes li e. hllt that this was to he found in other cases as well and that there was no evidence 
to show that false complaims were made lIlore frequently in sexual matters than in other cases. Instead, the 
evidence that is available seems to suggest tllat the stress, trauma and public humiliation experienced by 
complainantS in sexual cases deters dIem from testi fy ing at all . The Group found tlIat the rule was not only "highly 
questionable in itself" hut it was also "sexually discriminatory" (Home Office 1989:55-56) . 
As far as tlle warning against evidence of children is concerned, it does not accord with modern scientific thinking 
on tllis matter (Spencer I 987c: 24 I ). 
2.7.1.3 The Pl-esent Position in England 
As a result of the criticisms which wert: levelled against the duty (0 wam, these warnings were either modified or 
completely abandoned in other jurisdictions. The rules relating to corroboration were abolished in the U.S.A. in 
tlle 1970s and Australia abolished thelll in the 1980s. New Zealand has prohibited judges from giving warnings, 
as has the state of Victoria in Australia. [n 1987 the Canadian Criminal Code abolished tlle corroboration 
requirement relating to children and forhade any warning to be given (Spencer and Flin 1993:214). 
In the course of its passage through Parliament the Criminal Justice Bill (1988) contained a proposal tllat the 
corroboration rules relating to child witnesses be ameuded . The Home Secretary ordered that a review be made 
of recent psychological research to determine whether children could be reliable witnesses. The outcome of this 
review was that the corrohoration requiremellt was ullllecessary, at least for children over the age of five (Spencer 
and Flin 1993 :215). The Advisory Group in dleir Report also recommended that the corroboration requirement 
and the warning be abolished since "[ejxisting safeguards which apply in all criminal cases are ... sufficient". They 
felt that any additional mlt:s relating to this panicular class of persons were "neither necessary nor desirable" (Home 
Office 1989:57). 
On the basis of tllese reconuuendatillns, s34 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 was introduced. It abolished the 
common law rule that a judge must warn ahout the danger of acting on the evidence of children, whether sworn 
or unsworn. s34(2) of tlle Criminal Justice Act 1988 provides: 
"Any requirement whereby at a trial on indictment it is obligatory for the court to give the jury 
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a warning about convicting the accused on the uncorroborated evidence of a child is abrogated 
in relat ion to cases wht:re such a warning is required by reason only that the evidence is the 
evidence of a child." 
However, a major problem with the abolisillnent of the judicial warning insofar as children were concerned, has 
that the change was mainly cosmetic. Although the presiding officer no longer had a duty to warn against the 
evidence of childrell. tllen: was still a duty ()llilinl to warn against rhe evidence of a complainant in a sexual matter. 
Since the majority of children giving evidence were victims of sexual offences, the judge would nevertheless have 
to give the warning that it was dangerous to convict on the evidence of a complainant in a sexual matter (Spencer 
and Flin 1993:215). As a result dIe Advisory Group on Video Evidence recommended dlat the warning in sexual 
offences be abolished. Tilis has now heen enacted in s32 of the Crinntlal lustice and Public Order Act of 1994 
which carne into force on 3 Febt1lary 1995. 
2.7,2 Corroboration 
2.7.2.1 Background 
An important distinction was drawn ht:lween children who gave sworn evidence and those who were pennitted in 
terms of s38 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 to give unsworn evidence. Wilere dIe child gave sworn 
evidence the accused could be convicted on the uncorroborated evidence of dIe child, but the judge first had to warn 
dIe jury of dIe dangers iItlIerem in doing so and magistrates had to administer the wanting to themselves. Wilere 
dIe child gave unsworn evidence. the accused could not he convicted unless the evidence of the child was 
corroborated (Spencer 1988: 13). This requirement origimlly made its appearance in the CrimiIw Law Amendment 
Act 1885 which embled children for dIe first time to give unsworn evidence in a trial, but insisted that the evidence 
had to be corroborated. 
This section changed the ordinary COIllmon law interpretation of the concept of corroboration. According to the 
corumon law, corroboration was simply confirmation that the witness was telling the truth. But, according to Lord 
Diplock in DPP v Hester .,upra at 325G-H, s38 supra differed from dIe conunon law in two respects. Firstly, at 
COllllllon law the jury were entitled to convict upon the uncorrohorated evidence of witnesses once they were given 
adequate waruing, but s38 imposed an absolute prohihition upon convicting on the uncorroborated evidence of an 
unsworn child. Secondly, the evidence of any other unsworn child is expressly excluded as corroboration. 
This was accepted by the Appeal Court in as early as 1915 in the case of R v Davies (1915)11 Cr App R 272 where 
two little boys had witnessed the rape of their Illother. One of the boys was 8 years old and he gave WlSworn 
evidence. Lord Reading CJ had dIe following to say regarding dIe necessity of the corroboration requirement at 
274: 
86 
"Where evidence is given by a child nOt on oadl... it is necessary that dle judge should direct the 
jury not to convict dlt: prisoner OJ} that evidence unless it is corroborated by some other material 
evidence ill support thert::of implicating Ul t: accused. " 
The provision became even more restrictive in that the courts interpreted it in such a way that the evidence of ODe 
unsworn child could not be used to corroborate another. This was decided in the case of R v Manser (1934)25 Cr 
App R 18 where the accused was charged with having carnal knowledge with a twelve year old girl, Barbara. 
Although Barbara's evidence was given under oath , the Crown used the unsworn evidence of her lune year old 
sister as corroboration. Lord Hewart CJ at 20 held that "dle evidence of dle li ttle child who had not been sworn 
was not to be accepted as evidence at all. unless it was corroborated". In R v E \1964]1 WLR 671 Brabin J also 
refused to allow dle unsworn evidence of a chi ld 10 be treated as corroboration of the sworn evidence of another 
child. 
In DPP v Hester supra the accused was convicted of indecent assault on a twelve year old girl. The complainant 
gave evidence under oath. Her nine yt:ar old sister gave ullsworn evidence. The jury was directed that the unsworn 
evidence of dle younger child could be used to corroborate the complainant's sworn evidence. On appeal the court 
held that d,e unsworn evidence of the nine year old could only amount to corroboration provided iliat the unsworn 
evidence was itself corrohorated. 
The restrictive interpretation of dlese requirements had very serious implications for children in that an offender 
could abuse a number of young children and they would not be able to corroborate each adler if they were giving 
unsworn evidence (Spencer and Flin 1993:2 12). 
Wiili ilie introduction of 534 of dle Criminal Justice Act 1988, dle statutory rule which said that a court could not 
convict on ilie unsworn evidence of childreu if there was no corroboration was repealed. Section 34 enables one 
child giving unsworn tvidence lO c()lTohorate another. This section was in all likelihood influenced by the Home 
Office's review of children's evidence in 1987 . The review came to ilie conclusion that, in view of modern 
research, a requiremem that children's evidence be corroborated did not appear to be necessary (Cobley 1995: 135). 
This section came into effect on 12 Octoher 1988 and provides: 
"(1) The proviso to suhsection ( I) of section 38 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 
(under which, where dIe unswom evidence of a child of tender years admitted by virtue 
of that section is given on behalf of d>e prosecution, dle accused is not liable to be 
convicted uuless that evidence is corroborated by some odler material evidence in support 
dlereof implicating him) shall cease to have effect. 
(2) 
(3) Unsworn evidence admitted by vinue of s38 of the Children and Young Persons 
Act 1933 may corroborate evidence (sworn or unsworn) given by any other 
persoll. " 
This section now makts it possihle for the court to cOllvicl on the unsworn evidence of children, and for one 
unsworn child 10 corroborate another. Spencer and Fli n (1993:2 15) describe this section as "a major step in dle 
direction of rationality", aldlllugh they do express reservations about its applicatiou. 
2.7.2.2 
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"Indeed, it is now in theory possible for an English court to convict an adult on the word of one 
unsworn child and nothing else hesides - although it is perhaps difficult to imagine one doing so. " 
(Spencer and Flin 1990: 174) 
Present Position 
Although the law requiring a child's evidence to he corrohorated was repealed by Ule introduction of s34 supra, 
there was still a parallel rule that a judge ilad to warn the jury of ule danger of accepting the evidence of a 
complainant in a sexual mauer without corroboration. If the court was not satisfied with the evidence of such a 
complainant, then corroboration was necessary before a conviction (Spencer 1990: 119). If the court is satisfied 
with the complainant'S evidence despite tht! warning. then they may convict without corroboration. This was 
accepted by the court in R v Graham supra wilere tile judge explained at 221 that "strictly speaking the law did 
not require that her evidence should be corrohorated, and that if they believed the girl 's evidence they could act 
upon it". In this way, the law relating to corrohoration was still applicable to child witnesses since children were 
very often the complainants ill sexual cases. 
The term 'corroboration' is simply used in the sense of 'confirulation', according to Lord Diplock in DPP v Hester 
supra at 325C: 
"What is looked for unuer (he comlllon law mle is continuation from some other source that the 
suspect witness is telling the [nlIlt in sOllle pan of his story which goes to show that the accused 
committed the offeuct! with which he is charged." 
Where corroboration is necessary, it must implicate the acclised and come from a source other than the complainant. 
In R v Christie 1914 AC 545 (HL) the accu,ed was alleged to have indecently assaulted a five year old boy. The 
boy gave uusworn evidt!llce. His mother gave evidence aud mentioned a statement made by the boy where he 
identified the accused shortly after the assault. In directing ule jury, ule judge explained d,at the statement made 
by ule boy to his mother regarding the idemity of his assailant could supply the material evidence implicating the 
accused that was necessary [() corrohorate (he hoy's evidence. The conviction was quashed au appeal on the ground 
that the corroboration had to come from a source aliunde and Ule boy "could not be his own corroborator" (at 557). 
AJulOugh Ule common law po,ition appears at face value to be fairly simple, there are a number of technicalities 
which have given rise (() prohlems. The tirst. which hecame known as the 'Baskerville test'. was set out in the case 
R v Baskerville 1191612 KB 658. In tenns of thi, test, in order to amount to corroboration evidence must come 
from a source independem of the witness who needs to be corroborated, and must confirul the truth of that part of 
evidence which implicates the accused. This means that potentially strong evidence would not be able to amount 
to corroboration. For instance. if there was medical evidence that the child had been sexually assaulted in the way 
described, this would nOt be ahle to amoum to corroboration as it does not comply widl the Baskerville test i.e. it 
does not implicate the accused (Spencer 1987c:243). Spencer argues that the rule is "absurdly rigid and causes 
cases which ought to succeed to fai l" (Spencer 1988: 15). 
Even more restrictive than this was the so-called rule against cmllulative corroboration which was interpreted in 
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Thomas v Jones 1192111 KB 22 to mean that corroboration had to consist of one single piece of evidence. This 
meant that corroboration could not consist of two different pieces of evidence, one confirming the complainant'S 
evidence and the odler confirming the accused's implication in dle offence (Spencer and Flin 1993:216). In 1987 
the court moved away from dlis approach in R v Hills (1987)86 Cr App R 26, where the court found that it was 
possible 10 find corroboration in different pieces of evidence. Lord Lane CJ explained it as follows at 26: 
"Corroboration is not infrequentl y provided by a combination of pieces of circumstantial evidence, 
each innocuous on its own, which together tend to show that the defendant committed the crime. 
For example, ill a rape cast!. where the defelldant denies he ever had sexual intercourse with the 
complainant, it may be possible to prove (I) by medical evidence that she had had sexual 
intercourse within an hour or so prior to the medical examination, (2) by od,er independent 
evidence that dle defendant and no other man had been with her during that time, (3) that her 
underclothing was tom and that she had injuries to her private pans. None of those items of 
evidence all their OWIl would he: sufticient to provide the necessary corroboration, but the judge 
would be entitled to direct the jury that if they were satisfied so as to feel sure that each of those 
three items had been proved, the combined effect of the three items would be capable of 
corroborating the girl 's evidence. " 
This decision was reaftirmed hy the Appeal Coun in R v McInnes (1990)90 Cr App R 99 . 
The rules relating to corroboration are over-restrictive and , as Spencer argues, "100 inflexible 10 enable justice 10 
be done " (Spencer 1987c:242). This has resulted in a nWHber of dle technical rules being abolished, and in practice 
judges also attempted to limit the situatinns where the warning had to be given by contriving not to classify 
complaints as 'sexual complai nts'. For instance. in the case of R v Simmons [1987] Crim LR 630 the complainant 
alleged dlat the accused had locked her in her flat widl the intention of raping her or indecently assaulting her. The 
Court of Appeal found that the complainant was not a complainant in a sexual case and, therefore, she was not 
subject to the corrohoratioll warni ng. 
A further limitation was illlroduced in R v Chance (1988) 87 Cr App R 398 where dle Court of Appeal found that 
the wanling in the case of sexual complainants was only necessary where the disputed issue was whether an offence 
took place at all. There was 110 need to give the warning where someone had in fact committed the offence , and 
the only issue was whether that person was the defendant. However, the Court of Appeal added the qualification 
that there is still a need to give dIe 'sexual complainant' wanling even where dlere is no dispute as to whether the 
offence took place. if tile vict im is a child . This is further supported by the decision in R v Willoughby (1989)88 
Cr App R 91 where a nine year old gir l was indecently assaulted. There was no question dlat the assault had taken 
place, the only issue was the identity of the assailant. The court decided that the usual corroboration warning had 
10 be given. 
11lere is SOllle uncertainty as to the position now in relation to children who are complainants in sexual matters. 
[t has been argued that the judge's insis tence in Chance's case supra that the wanling be given where the 
complainant is a child may only have been because the general duty at d,at time 10 give a corroboration warning 
whenever there was a child wililess was still in ex istence. And if dlis is so, since s34 of the Criminal Justice Act 
1988 has abolished this duty. this part of the Chance decision should no longer apply (Spencer and Flin 1993:217). 
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A further limitation relating to the warning itsdfwas imroduced by the Court of Appeal in R v Feltrin, The Times , 
Law Report. 5 December 1991. The court held that it was not necessary for the judge to mention the "supposed 
tendency of women and children !() make fal se allegations of sex ual assault" but that it was sufficient simply to 
mention the dangers illherelH in accepting llnt: person's word against another's when giving his wanting (Spencer 
and Flin 1993:2 17). 
However, as Spencer and Flin (1993:217) point out. judges are still likely "to err on the side of safety" and give 
the corroboration warning in any case involving a sexual assault where the complainant is a child , even where the 
only issue is identity. To support this. they refer {() some decisions of the Appeal Court. In Selby (unreported, 
24 May 1991) the Court of Appeal held tl,at medical evidence of assault, fibres from the defendant's clothes found 
on the child' s clodles as well as ev idence that the defendant had been with the child did not corroborate the evidence 
ofa four year old (Spencer and Fli n 1993 :218) . And in R v Izard (1993)157 JP 58 the Court of Appeal held that 
a trial judge had to mention the specitic risk of fabrication when giving the corroboration warning in a sex case, 
even though tllis appears to be inconsistem Witll the decision in Feltrin supra. 
2.7.2.3 Criticisms of the Corroboration Rules 
The Pigot Conunittee in their Report came to the conclusion that tlle elaborate technical approach to corroboration 
is confusing. coumerprodw.:tive and leads to injustice. A crucial function of the law was to protect the community 
and it had to be noted [hat then:: was a suhstalHial ri se ill the numher of sexual crimes whicb were being committed 
against women and children. The Advisory Group therefore felt that any rules or practices which deflect the course 
of justice in these cases should be abandoned . They were of the opinion that tlle posi tion in Canada should be 
followed where the corrohoration warning in c as~s involving sexual offences has been abolished . As far as they 
were concerned the existing safeguards which app ly in all criminal cases would be suffi cient to deal with sexual 
offences (Home Office 1989:55-7). 
Spencer also argues that the mles relating to corrohoralion are "over-restrictive and wildly irrational" (Spencer 
1987c:242). They are so fraugh t with tecllllicalities tha t it is very difficult, if nO! impossible, to know exactly what 
amounts to corroboration in each case. Spencer and Flin (1993:234) support the suggesrion of Glanville Williams 
that all rules relating to corroboration should he scrapped and replaced with a rule that requires the trial judge to 
review all tlle evidence at the close of the defence case and direct an acquittal if he believes a conviction would be 
unsafe. This proposal is not wi thout preccdem since this approach has already been suggested by the Court of 
Appeal when dealing widl idenrificationevidence (Turnbull [1977] QB 224). It also often happens in practice when 
"strong-minded judges do sometimes stop a case where they tllin.k no reasonable jury would convict on the evidence 
heard " as in Shippey [1988[ Crim LR 767. 
2.7.3 Conclusion 
The cautionary rule against the ev idence of ch ildren has heen aholished widl the introduction of 534 of tlle Criminal 
90 
Justice Act 1988 and so [00 rhe. need for malldawry corroboration. For a time the cautionary rule was still 
applicable to children insofar as they were complainants in sexual offences, but the recommendations of the 
Advisory Group on Video Evidence that the corroboration waruing in sexual offences be abolished has now been 
enacted in s32 of dIe Criminal Justice and Puhlic Order Act of 1994 which came into force on 3 February 1995. 
In effect this means that dIe cautionary rule against the evidence of children and complainants in sexual cases has 
now been abolished. There is no longer a duty on dIe presiding officer to warn himself or the jury of the dangers 
of convicting on the ahove evidence. But. as Cohley (1995: 136) points out, a judge has always had the discretion 
to point out to the jury that certain evidence from a panicular source has previously been shown to be unreliable. 
Since judges have for many years regarded children as unreliable, Cobley feels dlat "old habits die hard" and that 
judges will prohahly continue to use their discretion to emphasise that children's evidence is unreliable. 
2.8 The Rule against Hearsay and Child Witnesses 
2.8.1 Introduction 
Hearsay is defined as oral or written statements made by a person not called as a witness widl the purpose of 
introducing dlese statements at the trial to prove the truth of their contents. The general rule is that hearsay 
evidence is inadmissible ill tenllS of English COllllllon law (Carter 1990:282). 
The principle reason for excluding hearsay evidence is that il is unreliable. It is regarded as untrustworthy because 
it cannot be tested by cross-examination. There is the danger that the maker of the statement may be lying, or may 
have made a mistake or may even have heenmisunderswod (Hoffmann and Zeffertt 1988:125). There is also the 
danger that hearsay evidence may confuse the jury and they may accord too much weight to this type of evidence. 
The reasons for excluding hearsay evidence were explained as follows by the court in R v Sharp [1988)86 Cr App 
R 274 at 278: 
"The rule is so finllly entrenched that the reasons for its adoption are of little more than historical 
interest hut I suspect that the principal reason that led the judges to adopt it many years ago was 
tlle fear tllat juries may give undue weight to evidence the truth of which could not be tested by 
cross-examination, and possihly also the risk of an account becoming distorted as it was passed 
from Olle person to another. " 
Critics have frequently argued that hearsay ought not ro affect tile admissibility of the evidence, but should rather 
be taken into account when detennilling the weight to be attributed to that evidence. The rule against hearsay 
evidence is rigid. If dIe hearsay Slatement does not fall within a clearly defined exception, then it must be excluded, 
irrespective of how reliahle the evidence may hc (Hoffmann and Zeffertt 1988: 126). For this reason a nlllllber 
of exception, have heen created in criminal law and the Civil Evidence Act 1968 enables a lot of hearsay evidence 
to be admitted in civil proceedings in England. In Scotland the Civil Evidence (Scotland) Act 1988 has abolished 
the rule comp,Ietely in civil proceedings. In effect, the hearsay rule is now largely confined to criminal proceedings 
(Spencer and Flin 1993: 127). 
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2.8.2 Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule in Criminal Proceedings 
Only those exceptions which would be most relevant to the evidence of children will be discussed here. 
Statements admitted by Consent 
Section 9 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 allows a written statement to be read in lieu of live evidence. If a party 
wishes to make use of the provision, advance notice of the intention to do so must be given and neither the opposing 
party nor the coun mllst have allY ohjections to this. The sectio1l funher provides that Ole statement must be signed 
by dle maker who declares that he helieves the contents to be true. Where the maker is over the age of 14 he must 
also state dlat he is aware that he can be prosecuted if the statement is fal se. If he is under the age of 14 he only 
has to state that he understands that it is important to tell dle trudl (Spencer and Flin 1993:130). Although this 
provision does tllahle children (0 avoid appeari ng ill court, i( can only be used when the opposing party does not 
object. Since this occurs very rarely in practice, dlis provision does not assist child witnesses in particular. 
Res Gestae 
Also sometimes referred was 'excited utterances'. statements made in response to a startling event are admissible 
as an exception to dle hearsay rule. Originally to be admissible these statements had to be made at the time when 
the crime was being collllllitted. as decided hy the court in R v Bedingfield (1879)14 Cox CC 341. This 
interpretation was later ex tended to include statelllt! lIts iliad\: soon after the event, provided that the speaker was stilI 
under the stress of the event as in the case of R v Andrews 11987] AC 281 where a statement made by a man a few 
minutes after he was attacked was held to he admissible. Lord Ackner explained here that "[i]n order for the 
statemem to be sufficie lHly 'spontaneous' it mUSt he so closely associated with the event which has excited the 
statement , that it can fairl y he sta ted that the mind of the declarallt was still dominated by the event". If a child 
made a statement while under the intluence of a startling event, the statement would be admissible in terms of this 
exception if the child was unable to g ive evidence at the trial. 
Although certain states in the United States of America have ex tended this exception to admit statements which have 
been made several hours after the event. dIe British courts have limited this exception to the actual event or to 
iJll1llediately tllereafter (Myers 1987:329). 
Statements regarding a Person's Physical or Mental Condition 
A statement made by a person descrihing what he is experiencing eitller physically or emotionally is admissible as 
an exception lO the hearsay rule to prove that he was experielJcing that sensation at that time . It cannot be used 
to prove the cause of the sensation (Wilki nso n 1986:41). An example of such a case is R v Conde (1868)10 Cox 
CC 546 where dle statement 'I am hungry' by a hoy was held to be admissible to prove that he was feeling hungry. 
The hoy died as a result of starvation and neglect and his parents were charged witll manslaughter. 
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Dying Declarations 
In order for a statement to be admissible in tenus of this exception, tbe maker of the statement must have died and 
tbe statement must have heen made under a settled, bopeless expectation of deatb (Carter 1990: 312). This exception 
very rarely becomes applicahl e in the case of children si nce. as Spencer and Flin (1993: 133) point out, "[a1s child 
deaths are fortunately rare these days. and dying ch ildren are not usually told tbey are dying even if dley are, no 
more need be said bere about dying declarations ". 
Statutory Exceptions 
In England dlere are two statutory exceptions wbich enable dIe statements of certain witnesses, who are unavailable 
for reasons other than death, to be admitted . In the first instance, s13 of tbe Criminal Justice Act 1925 admits the 
deposition of a person who, in lerms of the section, "is proved at the trial by tbe oadl of a credible witness to be 
dead or insane, or so ill as not to he ahle to travd. or to he kept out of dIe way by means of the procurement of 
the accused or on bis behalf". This deposi tion, in temlS of tbe Criminal Justice Act 1967, includes witness 
statements. Witness statements are the statelllenlS made to the police in the course of an investigation, and are 
tberefore not made under oath and the defence is not afforded an Opporturllty to cross-examine the maker of tbe 
statement (Spencer and Flin 1993: 134). 
The courts approach tbese provisions very warily and in R v Blithillg (1983)77 Cr App R 86 the Court of Appeal 
urged judges to use their di scretion to reject any statements tendered under these provisions except where they 
contained evidence that was fo rmal and nOI1-comroversiai. 
The second statutory exception. more cOl1ullonly known as the documentary hearsay provision, is found in 5523-26 
of the Criminal lust ice Act 1988. Originall y. thtst provisions were introduced as an exception to the hearsay rule 
in order to make it easier ro admit company reco rds. letters etc. as evidence in fraud trials. However, in 
fonnulating the section, dIe Home Offi ce included provi sions which made it possible to admit the statements which 
witnesses, unable to appear trials, had made to the police. This did not meet with the approval of the Bar and the 
section had to he redesignt:!d maki ng "lht saw-marks of hasty Parliamentary carpentry . .. all too obvious" (Spencer 
and Flin 1993: 134). 
In order for hearsay to he admitted in tenns of these provisions, dIe statement must be in the fonn of a document. 
If the statemt! 1H is first-hand htarsay. {hen the court caJl proceed in tenus of 523 provided certain requirements are 
complied wid!. The maker must have heen a competent wi tness when the statement was made but is unable to 
attend the trial because he is dead , very ill , mentally unfit, outside dIe United Kingdom and it is impracticable to 
make him availahle at the trial or he is umraceahle. Included here as well is the situation wbere a witness has made 
a statement to a police officer or all investigator and the witness does not give evidence because he is afraid or 
because he is being kept out of the way . 
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If the above requirements are complied with, the next question is whether the statement was made before the crime 
was conullitted . If so. lhe sLat e:lllclll will he admissihlt: subject to the discretion which a judge has to exclude in 
temlS of s25. If tile statement was made after the crime was conlillitted and for tile purpose of ilie proceedings, 
ilien it will be admissible if the judge gives pennission in temlS of s26 iliat ilie statement be admitted in tile interests 
of justice. 
The other route by which sratemelHs can he imroduced is via s24. Section 24 refers to statements contained in 
documents "created or received hy a person ill the course of a trade, business, profession or other occupation, or 
as the holder of a paid or unpaid office". Although this section is primarily concerned with business documents, 
it would also include a doclIlllt:1H recording a child's description of a criminal offence to a policeman or a social 
worker (Spencer and Flin 1993: 135). 
The important question regarding these statutory exceptiOiLs is wiletiler they could be used in ilie case of a child who 
was too scared to give evidence in court. According to Spencer and Flin (1993: 135-6) tile answer is 'yes, in 
principle'. Section 23 (as discussed .I'llpra) can be invoked where tile witness has made a statement to a police 
officer but is afraid to give evidence. Therefore. a child who is too frightened to come to court or to give evidence 
would be covered by this provision. Furtiler s23 can be invoked where the witness is very ill or mentally unfit to 
testify and can he used in rhe case of a child willlt:ss where lhe court appearance would involve real danger to his 
mental healtil. Spencer and Flin ( 1993: 136) suggest that this would cover the case of a child who suffers from 
severe communication problems as a result of which he is unable to testify. The reason this section is said to apply 
to children ' in principle' is [hal. even when all rhe requirements have been complied with, the admissibility of the 
statement is still suhjec( [0 rhe judge's d iscrerioll. To date (he case law relating to this section has not involved 
children, but there have heen st:veral cases iHvolving wi messes who have been considered fragile on the basis of 
old age ratiler than youth. 
2,8.3 Exceptions to the Hearsav Rule in Civil Proceedings 
Generally speaking, any civil court concerned witil the welfare of a child may admit hearsay evidence. The fact 
tiull tile evidence is hearsay will onl y be relevant 10 its weight and not its admissibility (Spencer and Flin 1993: 146). 
Cases concerned with Wardship Proceedings 
Hearsay evidence has always been adlllissible in wardship proceedings, as was confinned in tile decision Re K 
[19651 AC 201. In this panicular case two children had heen made wards of court in a dispute between tileir 
separated parents regarding custody. The Official Solicitor. who had been appointed as tile children'S guardian ad 
litem, handed in a repon to the coun which contained evidence that appeared to cast doubt on tile mother's fitness 
to take care of the children. The motiler appealed against this decision on the grounds that the report , which 
contained hearsay . had het:1l admitted into evidt:llc~ and had het:1l laken into account by tbe judge when making his 
decision. The House of Lords accepted tilat the report contained hearsay , even going so far as to say that the entire 
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report was hearsay since Ihe Official Solicitor had written his findings in the report instead of giving evidence and 
being cross-examined. The House of Lords, however, held thaI the report and its contents had rightly been 
admitted, since in wardship l:ases the cnun has a duty [() act in the child 's best interests and these can only be 
discovered by listening to all Ihe evidence available, including hearsay. 
Cases concerned with the upbringing, maintenance or welfare of children 
Civil couns dealing with the upbringing, mainlenance and welfare of children followed the lead of wardship 
proceedings, and began to admit hearsay evidence (Spencer 1990: 120). However, the Court of Appeal in H v H; 
K v K [19901 Fam 86 held that Ihe right to admil hearsay was the exclusive prerogative of the High Court in 
wardship cases. On these grounds the COLIn of Appeal reversed decisions denying fathers access to their children, 
because they were based on hearsay evidence from social workers, who reponed aliegatiOlts of sexual abuse made 
to them by the children. As a result of the criticisms levelled against these decisions, s96 was introduced into the 
Children Act 1989. In lerms of Ihis sec [ion [he Lord Chancellor was given the autl10rity to make orders allowing 
bearsay evidence (0 he admit ted ill civi l proceedings concerned with the upbringing, maintenance or welfare of 
cmldren (Spencer and Flin 1993 : 147). 
The Lord Chancellor [hen made an order, [he Children (Admissihility of Hearsay) Order 1990 (SI 1990 No.143), 
which allowed hearsay evidence to he adl1lissi hle in some proceedings but not others. This resulted in a nwnber 
of inconsistencies, for instance hearsay was admissible in juvenile court when dealing with care proceedings but 
not ill the domestic court where the same allegations would be heard in the context of a dispute over custody or 
access. This order caused difticulty in the courts and auracted a greal deal of criticism. As a result the Lord 
Chancellor issued anOther order, the Ch ildren (Admissihili tyof Hearsay Evidence) Order 1991 (SI 1991 No. 1 115), 
Tllis order revoked tlle earlier one and permined hearsay evidence to be admissible in all family proceedings in a 
Magistrates' Coun (Spencer and Flin 1993: 147). 
Tms order was replaced hy all evell wider provision ill 1993, the Children (Admissibility of Hearsay Evidence) 
Order 1993 which provides: 
"In (a) civil proceedi ngs before [he High Court or a county court; and (b)(i) in fWlily 
proceedings, and (ii) civil proceedings under [he Child Support Act 1991 in a magistrates' court, 
evidence given in cOllnectioll with (he upbringing. Illaimellance or welfare of a child shall be 
admissible notwichstanding any mle of law relating (() hearsay." 
The effect of this Order is to make hearsay evidence admissihle in nearly all civil cases involving children, 
Other Statutory Exceptions 
There are a few other statutory provisions which enahle hearsay evidence to be admitted in certain specific 
cirCUlllSlaIlCeS in civil proceedings. 
95 
Section 7(4) of the Children Act 1988 makes hearsay evidence in a court welfare officer's report admissible. 
Sections 41(11) and 42(2) of the Children Act 1988 deal with the repon compiled and submitted by a guardian ad 
litem and make any hearsay contained in this repon admissihle. Section 45 of the Children Act 1988 gives the court 
the power to receive ami act on any kind of evid~l1ce when (kaling wiLlI an emergency protection order (Spencer 
and Flin 1993: 148). These specific provisions are much narrower tilan the Lord Chancellor's 1993 Order, and are 
therefore no longer of major significance since hearsay is in principle admissible in civil cases involving children. 
The general exception in terms of which hearsay evidence is admissible is contained in s2(1 ) of the Civil Evidence 
Act 1968, which provides: 
"In any civil proceedings a statellient made. whether orally or in a document or otherwise, by any 
persoll. whether called as a wirness ill [host:. proct:edings or not, shall. subject to this section and 
to rules of coun, be admissibk as evidence of any fact stated therein of which direct oral evidence 
by him would be admissihle. " 
This would cover a child' s hearsay evidence in circuIllsrances other than tbose covered by the above provisions, 
for installce personal injury claims. Thc:re art: ct::na in reqllir~lllents tbat would have to be complied with to admit 
a hearsay statemellt in tenllS of tili s section. The witness would have to be competent. Admissibility is limited to 
fIrst-hand hearsay ouJy, and section 2(1) is subject to s8 of the Act which requires that the section operate subject 
to tile rules of court . The relevam ntles require that a party who wishes to introduce hearsay in terms of tillS 
section must give advaJlce IHHict: (0 rhe other pany who then has the right to insist on calling the original maker 
of the statement, unJess the laller is dead. out of the coumry. bodily or mentally unfit , cannot be identified or camlOt 
be expected to remember the relevant details. This would presumably, according to Spencer and Flin (1993: 151-2), 
include a child who has heen seriously rraumalised by the event or who can no longer remember the details. These 
provisions, however, are very rarely resoned 10 ill praclic~. 
2,8.4 Weight to be accorded to Hearsay Evidence 
Since hearsay evidence is in principle admi ssihle ill civi l proceedings, it is important to address the issue of what 
weight is to be attached to the evidence. In Re K supra tlle court was of the opinion that in practice judges would 
be reluctant to act on hearsay evidence alone if serious mishehaviour was alleged. This view has, however, given 
rise to a dilemma, since (ile more s~ri olls (h~ allegations in civil proceedings, the greater the risk to the child if the 
court refuses to act upon it (Spence r and Flill 1993: 149). 
This dilenulla has beell highlighted by Waite J in Re W (Minors) 119871 1 FLR 297 which dealt with allegations of 
child abuse: 
"IThesel are all cases of exceptional difticlilty, because tiley bring into stark contrast two 
principles tilat everyone would acknowledge as fundamental to our society . One is the basic 
requirement of justice that nobody should have to face a finding by any court of serious parental 
misconduct wirhoU[ the oppurtunity of havi ng the allegations against him clearly specified and 
cogeml y prov~d. Th~ other is tltt: puhlic intt::rt::s( in the detection and prevention of parental child 
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abuse as conduct which is liahle, if persisted in, to do serious damage to the emotional 
development of the victim and to hi s or her capacity to form stable and satisfying relationships 
in adul t life." 
The court CQuld , and has. rherefore come to rhe concl usion [bat a tinding. based 0 11 hearsay evidence, can be made 
that a particular person has abused a child. This was explained by Neil U in Re W (Minors)[1990] FCR 286: 
" ... dle court will he very slow indeed to make a finding of fact adverse to a parent if the only 
material hefon:: it has heen untested by cross-examination. Moreover, it will examine with 
particular care the evidence: of til t: person who conullunicates the hearsay material to it. But as 
the welfare of the child is the paramount consideration I see no escape from the conclusion that 
in some cases a court , in assessing the risks to which a child may be exposed, may be obliged to 
reach concius iOlt~ of fact which in other circumstances and in other proceedings it would not be 
free to do . " 
Despite tillS, the couns aft: very camious abol1l acting on hearsay evidence, because it gives rise to two difficulties, 
according to Spencer and Flin (1993: 150). Firstly, the question arises whetller the child really did say that and 
whether tllere are any errors of transmi ssion, and whether the child actually meant it. These problems arise because 
the child is not availahh:: (0 he cross-t:x31l1il1ed. III decid ing whether to act on hearsay evidence, the courts take a 
number of factors into account: the age of the child , the lengtll of time that has elapsed between the event and the 
making of the statement, if the statement was made under pressure or as a result of suggestive questioning. All 
these factors are taken into account wht:1l determining tht: weight that has to be attributed to the hearsay evidence. 
This perhaps explains why judges are prepan::d to give more weight to a hearsay statement that has been tape-
recorded or video-recorded by a trained illterviewer. In Re M (Minors) [1 993)1 FCR 253 a judge found that a 
father had sexually ahused his daughters. This decision was hased partly on what one of the children. a four year 
old, had told a psychiatri st in an interview which took place six months after the incident. There was also evidence 
that tlle child had already heen exposed", ques tioning and the possibili ty of coaching. Despite this, the Court of 
Appeal upheld the trial judge ·s decision. Al though the above factors had weakened tlle evidence, the Appeal Court 
was satisfied Ulat ule interview of the child had been competently conducted and video-recorded. There was also 
other circwm:itantial evidence which corrohorated (he chi ld's statement. 
An interesting paim that should pe.rhaps he mentioned here is Ihe fact that in civil proceedings the COurts are 
reluctant for children to give direct evidence in court. This attitude can be seen in tlle judgement of Ward J in 
Nottillghamshire County Council v P [199311 FCR 180 at 188: 
"When thi s trial began a ll inoication was given to me that M wished to give evidence. I confess 
to sbowing my anxiety ahout that COllrse of conduct to be adopted by tlle local autllOrity. I took 
the view that I had IlO real power to prevent them calling evidence in support of their case. this 
evidence being tendered hy a girl nearly 17, suffering tbough she may be from the disability of 
her learning difticullies. hut J did tl( ){ like: the course propnsed .. . ln this Divisioll or elsewhere one 
has hmh to grapple \vi th (he necessary process of ascertainment of truth , but here one is always 
milldfuJ of the cOllsc:quellL:es that tlow from [he tindings (hat are made and from the manner and 
the conduct of lhe forensic process of exami nation. cross-examination and re-examination .. .In the 
ordinary course, their voice is usually heard properly and sufficiently through tlleir guardian and 
if there is a real need to see the judge. he call agree to set them in his room if that is necessary." 
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2.8.5 Position in Scotland 
Until 1988 the position in Scotland regarding the admissibility of hearsay evidence was the same as in England. 
In 1986 the Scottish Law Comm ission in its 100th repon reconulJended that the hearsay rule should be abolished 
in civil proceedings , which resulted in s2( I) of the Civil Evidence (Scotland) Act 1988 (Spencer and Flin 1993: 156). 
This section simply abolishes tile hearsay rule in civil proceedings, and provides as follows: 
"In civil proceedings -
(a) evidence shall not be excluded solely on the ground that it is hearsay; 
(b) a Statement made hy a person otherwise than in tile course of proof shall be admissible 
as evidence of allY matter conrained inlhe statement of which direct oral evidence by that 
ptrson would ht aUllJissihle: 
(c) the coun. or as the case may be tile jury. if satisfied tllat any fact has been established 
by evidence in those proceedings, shall be enti tled to find that fact proved by the 
evidence l\otwitllstamJing that (he evidence is hearsay." 
In Scotland the rule against hearsay has been completely aboli shed in civil proceedings except for referrals to 
children's hearings where it is alleged that the child has committed an offence. This would then in practice have 
the effect. according to Spencer and Flin ( 1993: 157). that evidence from a social worker about what a mother told 
her as to what the child said will he capahle of heing regarded as evidence as to tile truth of what the child is 
alleged to have said . III practice thi s Act has enabled the conrts in Scotland to receive as evidence accounts of 
interviews that police officers and social workers have had with children or to see and hear tapes, where tile 
interviews have been recorded. 
The only problem is that this section. like its English counterpart, requires that the hearsay statement be one that 
would be admissible in direct oral evidence by that person i.e. tllat the maker of tile statement be a competent 
witness. In the case of a Statemellt made hy a young child. the court would then need to know whether the child 
was in fact compt::tt::lH. This would Ilt:ct::ssi{att: tilt:: calling of rhe child even if it was only for the purpose of a 
competencyexanlillation. This question arose in F v Kennedy 119921 SCLR 139. In tllis case a six year old boy 
gave a social worker certain details of indecem assaults he had been forced to submit to. When the boy appeared 
before dIe sheriff he refused [(l talk and it was therefore not possible to carry out a competency examination. On 
appeal the cOlin held lhal the sheriff was nOI allowed (0 (rear tht:: child 's hearsay as evidence under the Act. 
The decision of M and M v Kennedy 11 993 J SCLR 69 followed and dealt with tile hearsay statements of a twelve 
year old girl who. although physically able to speak. refused to do so as a result of a psychological disturbance. 
The girl made an oral statement to a psychiatrist rhat she had heen sexually abused, but communicated very little 
to the sheriff and used only signs and drawings. The sheriff found tlte girl to be competent and on appeal the court 
upheld the sheriffs decision. hased on his rudimemary cOlllmunication with the girl. Of interest is a further 
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statement by the court that the chil d Clluld have heell fo und competellt all dIe basis of what the psychiatrists had 
told the sheriff and if tJley could furnish reasons why the child herself could not conmlUnicate with the sheriff. This 
decision would therefore allow a sheriffs decision of competency 10 be based on a psychiatrist's opinion. 
As far as criminal proceedings are com:erncd, the Scouish Law Commission (1990: 15) were of the opinion that no 
general hearsay exception in relatioll to statements by children should be introduced. They did, however, suggest 
that any existing exceptions to the hearsay mle. such as dying declarations for instance, should be retained. This 
question should nO(, however, be regarded as being closed forever. hecause the Commission is at present engaged 
in a general study of the hearsay ru le in criminal cases. 
2.8.6 Criticisms of the Hearsay Rule 
The mles regarding hearsay are very complicated. In civil proceedings dlere are different rules for different courts 
and different types of proceedings. In criminal proceedings dlere are a number of exceptions to the rule, and each 
exception has particular requirements that need to he complied with before a statement can be admitted in tenus 
of dlat exception. Spencer and Flin ( 1993: 160) explaill it as follows: 
"In criminal proceedings the hearsay mle has a mass of complicated exceptions, and the 
complications are often pointless, hecause they conflict with bodl the rules of human psychology, 
and the reasons why {he exceptions were originally created: the tiresome minutiae of dying 
declarations, and of 'receIH cOlllplaim' , are good examples." 
Spencer and Flin (1993: 160) argue further that the mles are complicated because they lack a coherent unifying 
principle, Some exceptions . such as dying declarations, have been created because there is a belief that that 
particular type of hearsay is reliahle . The rationale for this excepti on was set out in R v Woodcock (1789) 168 ER 
352: 
"The principle upon which th is species of evidence is admitted is, dlat they are declarations made 
in extremity , when the party is at the poillt of deatJI. and when every hope of tJlis world has gone, 
when every motive to fal sehood is silenced. and the mind is induced by the most powerful 
considerations to speak the trllth: a si tuat ion so solemll and so awful is considered by law as a 
creating an ohligarioll eq ual to that which is imposed by a positive oath administered in a court 
of justice . " 
On the other hand . other exceptions. such as spolHaneous exclamations, were created because in the circwnstances 
in which that particular t::xcep£io ll applies. [ile witness is unavailable alld highly relevant evidence would as a result 
be lost to tJle court. 
A further criticism levelled against the hearsay mle is that it does not make logical sense. For instance, Spencer 
and Flin (1993: 160) argue that it is ohvillusly sellsihle for the law to insist on hearing a story from a first-hand 
source when such is availahle. hut i{ is !l0{ sensible then to take the next step and say that if there is no fi rst-hand 
source available dlen in prillciple the story cannot be told at all. 
One of dIe reasons (supra) why hearsay evidellce has tradi tionall y been excluded was dlat dlere was tJle danger dlat 
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a jury would plat:e undue weight Oil rhe evidt:nce. This rationale falls away when a matter is being heard by a 
qualified judge , as was pointed out by Devlin U in Beanllans Ltd v Metropolitan Police District Receiver [196111 
ALL ER 384 at 392: 
"It is extremely diftl l,; ult for a jury w give the same attention to considerations of weight that a 
judge does. It cOl1les easily (0 a judge lO say - 'I must he careful about accepting this because 
after all the witness is not speakillg 011 oa(h~ he has not been cross-examined; I do not know the 
circulllstances in which the statement was taken' and so forth. Those considerations do not corne 
easily 10 a jury, and because of the difficulty dlat a jury has in distinguishing between various 
grades of weight, the common law thought it wiser to exclude much evidence, such as hearsay, 
altogether. I canllot set why rhese cOlJsi(krariolls should any longer apply to matters that are 
being detenuined hy a judgt alone." 
When used in comhination with other rules of criminal procedure and evidence, the bearsay rule can be very 
restrictive. t:specially ill the case of children. The competency requirements often prevent cbildren from giving 
evidence in court personally. ami the hearsay rule then makes it impossihle for other people to repeat what tbe child 
bas said (Spencer 1990: 121). To illust rate this puillt, Spencer and Flin (1993: 145) refer to the unreported case of 
R v Maille and McRobb, Press and Juurnal (Aherdeen), 27 June 1979 wbere a three year old torture victim was 
found to be incompetellt as a witness. The hearsay nile dlerefore prevented her father from telling the court what 
she had said had been done to her. 
Not only can the exclusion uf hearsay evidence result in an improper acquittal, it can also have dIe opposite effect 
as happened in Sparks v R slIflra where a white man was charged with indecently assaulting a dtree year old. The 
cmld had earlier made a hearsay statelllelH to her mother that the auacker had been black. 
Spencer and Flin (1993: 162-3) propose that the approach to the hearsay evidence of children should depend on dIe 
nature of the proceedings. III civil proceedings relating to the child's future. the main consideration is the welfare 
of the cllild. and the accuse<.l' s rights to confmmalion amI cross-examination will be of secondary importance. In 
criminal cases, on the other hand. the procedure is hased on the belief that it is unfair to allow a person to be 
convicted widlOut giving him tlte opportunity tll put his side of dIe case to his accuser. For tlhis reason Spencer and 
Flin (1993: 163) suggest that aholishing Ihe ht:arsay nile in criminal cases is not the solution, but rather hearsay 
should be dealt with in conj unction with other matters. For instance, it is suggested that the competency 
requirement be altered and the adversarial nature of proceedings be modified, which would then enable more 
children to give evidence and therehy remove the need (0 admit hearsay. Hearsay, they suggest, should be admitted 
whenever the originailllaker is genuinel y unavailahle. hut in these instances the convictions should not be based 
on the bearsay evidence: alolle . 
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3. PROCEDURES ADOPTED IN OTHER ACCUSATORIAL SYSTEMS 
WITH RESPECT TO CHILD WITNESSES: UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA 
3.1 Intwduction 
It is necessary at the onset to include a very brief introduction to dIe legal system in the United States of America, 
hereafter simply referred to as the USA. since dIe system differs in certain respects from the legal systems in dIe 
United Kingdom and South Africa. Such an introduction is also important for the purpose of understanding the 
provisions that relate to child wi messes. 
The legal system in dIe USA. like dlat of the UK. is hased on dIe accusatorial system with each side presenting 
evidence and a neutral judgt. often assisted by a jury. analysi ng the evidence and making a decision. TIle courts 
themselves are di vided imo ft:!dcral courts and state courts. The COUlmon thread underlying the two is the United 
States Constitution widl the final arbiter being the United States Supreme Court (Whitcomb 1990: 133). The federal 
courts include the US Magistrates Courts, the US District COurts, dIe US Circuit Courts of Appeal with the US 
Supreme Court being the appelia te court of last resort in the federal court system. The state courts include Courts 
of Limited Jurisdiction, Trial Courts of General Jurisdiction, Intermediate Courts of Appeal and dIe State Supreme 
Courts (Myers 1992:5). 
Although the US Supreme Court is the highest appeal court in the federal court system, its authority is not limited 
to federal courts. The US Supreme Court has the tinal say on the interpretation of dIe US Constitution and would 
therefore have dIe power 10 review any State Supreme Court decisions interpreting the US Constitution (Myers 
1992:4-5). This is what happened in the case Maryland v Craig, 110 S.Ct. 3157 (1990), which will be discussed 
in greater detail when evaluating (he COllstirulionaiityof certain provisions relating to child witnesses . The Craig 
case supra went froIll the Maryland Court of Appeal to [he State Supreme Court and was then reviewed by the US 
Supreme Court since dIe ma[(er was one [hat dealt willI the interpretation of certain sections of dIe Constitution. 
The criminal justice system is 110[ 'monolithic' across the various states. Laws vary in detail from state to state and, 
as Whitcomb (1990: 133) explains. what goes on in a trial courtroom [ends to reflect the "local legal culture". Since 
judges bave a great deal of discrelion, praclices even vary across courts in the same state. 
Generally, there are a llumher of ways ill which a proseclItion can be iltitiated. Once an acclIsed has been arrested, 
a preliminary hearing is scheduled. The preliminary hearing usually takes place shortly after the defendant has been 
arrested due to certain statutory time limitatiol1> dlat are applicable (Whitcomb 1990: 135). The function of the 
preliminary bearing is to see whether there is sufticient evidence to go to trial. Although dIe procedure is less 
fomlai at the preliminary hearing. rhe proceedings are sti ll adversarial in nature. At the hearing the prosecutor has 
to persuade dIe court that there is sufticient evidence that the accused probably committed the crime. If the 
magistrate finds that there is sufficienl evidence , he will dlen bind dle case over for trial. There are no juries at 
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such a preliminary hearing. In theory . the child witness could be called to give evidence at both the preliminary 
hearing and at the trial. although Ole prosecutor does have the discretion to spare the child where possible by calling 
other witnesses instead (Myers 1992: 12- 13) . 
In certain states prosecutions are iltitiated via grand jury indictment. The latter are private citizens who review 
cases and decide whether a charge should he tiled. They have both accusatory and investigative functions. Their 
function is very similar to that of rhe magistrate in the preliminary hearing. TIley also have to decide whether there 
is sufficient evidence to proceed. A grand jury indicunent differs from a preliminary bearing in that the proceedings 
are secret, Ilot adversarial in nature, and the defendant and his counsel are not present. The grand jury meets 
behind closed doors and the prosecutor presents the evidence. If the majority of the grand jury are bappy that there 
is sufficient evidence to go {O (rial. they will issue an indictment. If not, the charges will be dismissed (Myers 
1992: 14). Proceeding via the grand jury allows more time for investigation since the defendant has not yet been 
arrested. Usually Ole child will tes ti fy before the grand jury but the defendant is rarely allowed to testify on his 
own behalf. There is no cross-examinati on of the child witness at tbese proceedings (Whitcomb 1990:135). 
The advantage of proceeding via a preliminary hearing is perceived to be the opportUltity of testing the child in a 
less threatelting environment than the actual trial. If the child performs well at the preliminary hearing, then there 
is a good chance that the ch ild will he ahk to cope wi th the trial. There is also the hope Ulat the accused may plead 
guilty if he sees tile child perlimning well at the hearing. The disadvantage of proceeding via this route is that 
preliminary hearings occur at very short notice and as a result there is very little time to prepare the child. Using 
the route of ule grand jury allows more time for investigation and preparation (Whitcomb 1990:135-6) . 
The preliminary hearing can in certain circulllstances he wai ved, in which case the prosecutor will fil e the case 
directly . In these cases the prosecution will have to make all the infonnation at their disposal available to the 
defence. For instance, in Florida the chi ld will have to tes ti fy and be cross-examined at a formal deposition before 
the trial , whereas in Minnesota it wi ll onJy be the ti les that are exchanged (Whitcomb 1990: 136). 
The comerstone of the criminal justice system is the US Constitution, which is the fundamental source of law in 
tbe Urtited States . Amendments to the original Constitution are contained in Ule Bill of Rights. Each state has its 
own COJlStilUtion and hi ll of rights. However. fedt: ral constitutional and statutory law is supreme and will take 
precedence over any contlicting state laws. so if a state legislature passes a law which is inconsistent with the US 
Constitution or a federal statu te. the US Constitution and tile federal statute will prevail (Myers 1992:26-7). 
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3.2 The Constitutional Position 
3.2.1 Introduction 
Discussion here will be limited to dIOse aspects of dIe constitution which have specific relevance to matters relating 
to child witnesses . The two amendments of the US Constitution which are of particular importance to child 
witnesses will be analysed, namely the (,,;ollfrontatioll clause and the due process clause. 
Firstly. the Sixdl Amendment of the US Constitution provides as follows: 
"In all criminal prosecutions. the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the 
witnesses agaillSt him." 
This clause. generally referred to as the Confrontation Clause, includes a number of rights. In Coy v Iowa, 487 
U.S . 1012 (1987) at 1015 the Supreme Court explained that the Confrontation Clause requires dlat: 
i. the defendant be allowed to face his accuser; 
ii. witnesses testify under oath; 
iii. the defendant he allowed (0 cross-examine witnesses called against him; and 
iv. the jury be allowed to ()hserv~ the witnc:sses while rhey give evidence to determine their credibility. 
Gordon (1992:60) argues that this clause would also include the further requirement that hearsay statements be 
excluded. although it could he argued that [hi s requirement would fall within the e1ement of face-ta-face 
confrontation. If dIe defendant is entitled to tace hi s accuser. this would automatically exclude hearsay . 
The primary purpose of the confrontation right is. according to Tennessee v Street, 471 U.S. 409 (1985) at 415, 
the lleed (Q ensure accuracy ill criminal trial s by requiring that all evidence admitted be reliable. In Lee v Illinois, 
106 S.Ct. 2056 (1986) the court explained at 2062 that "[tllle right to confront and cross-examine witnesses is 
primarily a functional right that promotes reliability in criminal trials" . And in Ohio v Roberts , 448 U.S. 56 (1980) 
tbe U.S. Supreme Court at 65, in di scussing to the Confrontational Clause, stated dlat "its underlying purpose [is] 
to augment accuracy in the fact-tinuing process hy ensuring the defendant an effective means to test adverse 
evidence". Another school of thought sees the Confrontation Clause as a rule which lays down a minimwn standard 
of admissibility designed to prevent evidence which may reflect inaccuracies in perception. memory or narration 
(Myers 1987:300). 
The Sixdl AmendIllent right to confront witnesses has heen held ill Pointer v Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) by the 
U.S. Supreme court to be applicable to dIe individual states tltrough dIe Fourteenth Anlendment, wbich provides: 
"[NJor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty. or property, without due process of law ... ". The 
constitutions of individual states al so cOlHain confrontation provisions which are based on the Sixth Amendment. 
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For instance, t~e MiImesota Constitution also incorporates the right to confrontation. Article I , paragrap~ 6 
provides that "Itlbe accused shall enjoy the right .. . to be confronted with the witnesses against him" (Oseid 
1985: 1385-6). 
Secondly, the Fiftll Amendmem of the U.S. Constitution , which also has application to child witnesses, provides: 
"No person shall ... he deprived of life. liherty or propeny. without due process of law ... ". This is referred to as 
the due process clause anti has the purpose of ensuring fundameIHal fairness to every accused. In Betts v Easley, 
161 Kan. 459. 169 P.2d 831 ( 1946) the Kansas Supreme Court stated at 843: 
"The rule is finnly emhedded in American law that the guaranty of due process - whether under 
the fifth aI1H:!lldment, as a limitation upon the power of the federal government, or under the 
fourteenth amt:lldlllt: llt. as a limitation upon (he power of the states - is to be liberally construed 
to effectuate its purpose of protecting the ci li zen against arbitrary invasion of his rights of life, 
liberty and propen y". 
In State v Howard. 57 Ohio App. 2d I. 385 N.E. 2d 308 (1978) the court explained at 312 that "the supreme court 
bas recognized that (he rig ht I ro confrnnralion l lllay exist as a matter of due process of law" . In Snyder v 
Massachusetts. 291 U.S. 97 ( 1934) the U.S. Supreme Court held at 105-6 that due process allows a defendant to 
"be present in his own person whenever his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fullness of his 
opportunity to defend against the charge". 
In sununary. therefore, the confrontation clause gi ves th t! criminal defendant the right to confront witnesses in court 
who give evidence against him under oath in the presence of tile judge or jury and entitles him to subject such 
evidence to cross-examination (Myers 1987: 299). 
3.2.2 Proceedings to which the Confrontation Clause applies 
The Sixth Amendment itself uses tile phrase "criminal prosecutions" and therefore applies to criminal trials. These 
rights are also extended to certain preliminary hearings, although the latter instances the right may be more limited 
(Myers 1987:324). 
The confrontation ri ghts are also applicahle ill ju venile court proceedings according to the case of In re Dwayne 
M, 287 S.C. 41 3. 339 S. E. 2d 130 ( 1986) where the appellant was adjudged a juvenile delinquent for committing 
a lewd act on a minor and I,,, indecent exposure. The judge ordered the appellant to leave the room during the 
course of the hearing while a six year old witness gave evidence. TIle SOUdl Carolina Supreme Court held that it 
was wrong to exclude the appellant and stated that the "right to be present and to confront witnesses applies in 
juvenile court proceedings ill (he sallle manner as ill criminal court proceedings". Myers (1987:324) argues that 
juvenile delinquency proceedings are nominally civil and are tilerefore not based on the Sixth Amendment, whic~ 
is limited to criminal prosecutions. He believes that ill such an instance the confrontation rights are based on the 
principles of due process. Several states . however. have statutes which specifically confer a right to confrontation 
ill delinquency procc:edings. 
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Child abuse and neglecI proceedings in juvenile coun are civil in nature, and therefore the rights of confrontation 
in tenos of dIe Sixlh Amendmelll do nOI apply. This was supponed by the decision in In re M. W. , 374 N. W. 2d 
889 (S.D. 1985) where Ihe cOlin al 893 explained Ihal the "constitUlional implications of dIe confrontation clause ... 
are not present in a civil aclioll.. We recently held that dependency and neglect proceedings are civil in nature". 
The rights of confrolllatioll do apply 10 these proceedings. however. but in terms of dIe due process clause of the 
Founeenth Amendmenl. In civil and administrative proceedings dIe rights of confrontation apply through the 
principles of fundamental hlirness and due process of law (Myers 1987:326). 
3.3 Cross-Examination 
The opportunity to cross-examine is a right and nO[ a privilege because it is regarded as an essential safeguard of 
the accuracy and completeness of evidence (Cleary 1984:47). In Stevens v Bordellkircher, 746 F.2d 342 (6th Circ. 
1984) tbe coun at 346 remarked that "cross-examination is itself considered to be a fundamental right possessed 
by criminal defendants" . 
3.3.1 Right to Ct'oss-examination 
The right to cross-examine a wimtss is encompassed in the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment as the 
right to cross-examine the wimtss who gives evidence against YOll . This has been accepted by the courts as the 
most imponam componenl of {he co nrrumalion right (Myers 1987:300). In Pointer v Texas supra the U.S. 
Supreme Coun explained at 406-7 that "a major reason underlying dIe constitutional confrontation rule is to give 
a defendant charged with crime an opportunity (() cross-examine the witnesses against him", Also in Douglas v 
Alabama, 380 U.S. 41) ( 1965) the Supreme Coun found the right to cross·examine a witness as being more 
important than the right to confront the wimess when they wrote at 41 8 that in construing the Confrontation Clause 
"a primary interest secured hy it is the right of cross-examination; au adequate opportunity for cross-examination 
may satisfy dIe clause even in the ahsence of physical confrontation ". In Davis v Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974) the 
Supreme Coun exp lained al 3 15·6 thaI "[tlhe main and essential purpose of confrontation is to secure for the 
opponent the opportuluty of CH)SS-eXailliltati llll". 
Wigmore (I 974: 150) explains {hat confrontation is "merely anodler teml for the test of cross-examination". In fact , 
he regards confrontation (IS si mply heing the preliminary step to ensuring an opportunity for cross-examination. 
He explains his view as follows: 
"The main and essential purpose of confrontation is to secure for the opponent the opportnnity of 
cross-examination. The opponellt dl;!lllands confrontation. DOt for the idle purpose of gazing upon 
the wi {Jll;!ss. or of being gazed upon hy him. hut for the purpose of cross-examination, which 
calUlOt bl;! had except by the direct and personal pLHtillg of questions aud obtaining immediate 
answers" 
This approach has heen endorsed hy Ihe Supreme Court in a number of decisions. In People v Johnson, 146 
I1l.App.3d 640.497 N.E.2d 308 ( 1986) Ihe court explained at 312·13 Ihat "[o)ur supreme court, quoting Dean 
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Wigmore, has stated that cross-examination is the Illit's 'main and essential purpose' and that the advantage 
obtained by the personal appearance of the witness at trial is 'secondary'. a result ' accidentally' associated with the 
process of confrontation". In United States v Quick. 22 M.J. 722 (A.C.M.R. 1986) the court explained at 725 that 
"[t lbis 'opportuni ty' for cross-c!xamination ... may he adequate to sa tisfy the requirements of the confrontation 
clause" . Other writers believe that Wi gmore lOok too narrow a view of the Confrontation Clause, and that it is 
much broader than he assumed it to he (Myers 1987:301). 
The right to cross-examine is also regan.led as an esst:: lHial element of due process . The due process clause as found 
ill the Fourteenth Amendlllelll requires that all j udicial proceedings comply with the principles of fundamental 
fairness. This was explained hy the U.S. Supreme Court in Chambers v Mississippi , 410 U .S. 284 (1973) at 291: 
"The ri ghts to confront and cross-examine wiwesses and to call witnesses on one's own behalf 
have long beel} rec()gl liseu as esse ll [ial [0 due pnJCess . . . It is indeed 'an essential and fundamental 
requirement fo r the kind of fair trial which is this cOllntry's constitutional goal I " . 
Cross-examination is lauded as heing dIe hest availahle safeguard against dIe risks of ambiguity, lack of memory 
and misperception (Myers 1987 :296). Fun her. Myers ( 1987:299) explains that cross-examination is designed to 
reveal any "ddiciencies ill the wi(lless's abil ity (() observe. rememher. and relate, and to disclose lack of sincerity 
or outright fabrication ". Accuracy is ensured by snbjecting the evidence to cross-examination which "has long been 
regarded as die most effi cient lllethod of discerning tmth from falsehood" (Gembala and Serritella 1992: 16). In 
Chambers v Mississippi .Hlpra the coul'( exp lained at 29 I that cross-examination "helps assure the ' accuracy of the 
truth-detemlining process"'. 
3.3.2 Limitations on the right to Cross-examination 
Althougb cross-examination is regarded as the most importa lH o f [he confrontation rights I it is not absolute. In 
terms of Federal Rule of Evidence 61 1 the trial coun has a discretion to control dIe way in which witnesses are 
questioned. Rule 6 11 (a) provides: 
"The court shall exercise reasollahle co mrol over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses 
and preseming evidence so as to (l ) make the interrogation and presentation effective for the 
ascertailUllellt of dle tnJth. (2) av() id Ileedless consumption of time I and (3) protect witnesses from 
harassmeut or undue emharraSSlllcnt ". 
The presiding officer call lise this disc retioll Wilh which he is ves ted to place reasonable limits on the cross-
examination of witnesses. III Delaware v Vall Arsdall. 106 S. Ct. 143 1 (1986) the Supreme Court confirmed this 
approach at 1435: 
"[Tlrial judges rc tai n wide latitude insofar as {he Confro lHarion Clause is concerned to impose 
reasonable limits Oil cmss-examinatillll hased 0 11 concerns about. among other others, 
harassmem Isicl. prejudice. confusion of the issues. the witness 's safety, or interrogation that is 
repetitive or margi nally relevant". 
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A balance has to he struck hl!(wt:clI rh e::: accused' s right to cross-examination and dIe court's power to limit cross-
examination. In Stevetls v Bordetlkircher supra at 346 the court said dlat "a balance must be struck between 
permitting a trial court to exercise its sound discretion and affording a criminal defendant the opportunity to expose 
bias and prejudice". 
The accused's right to cross-c::xamination, however. can only be overcome where there are compelling reasons 
(Westen 1978:58 1). In Davis v Alaska supra the state called a juvenile as a witness. The latter had previously been 
declared a juvenile dclinqut:IH and was 0 11 probation. The defence wanted to question him about this to show that 
dlere was possihle hias on the rart of the juvenile to please the prosecution. The trial judge did not allow the 
defence to put these questions to the witness because Alaska had a statutory privilege which allowed such 
information [0 he withheld in order to protect juvenil e delinquents. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the decision 
on the ground that rhe defendant' s right of confrontation outweighed the state's interest. 
The court has the power to limit cross-examinatioJl in tile following instances: 
Embarrassing questions 
The court does have dIe power to limit questions which may be very embarrassing for the child . In State v Johll 
C .. 503 A.2d 1296 (Me. 1986) the COllrt held that it was proper to exclude embarrassing questions. Where a charge 
of sexual ahust! is involvc:d. lht! t:h ild lllay he askt:d questions which are very intimate and which the child may find 
very embarrassing . Sinet! the questiolls IIt:re wou ld be very relevant due to dle nature of the case, the accused 
would be entitled to cross-examine on these aspects (Myers 1987: 194). 
Irrelevant questions 
The court can limit questions which are irrelevant or marginally so (Myers 1987: 194). 
Undue consumption of lime 
Federal Rule of Evidence 611(a) expressly provides that the court has dIe power to curtail cross-examination "to 
avoid needless consumption of time" or (() limit the use of repetitive questioning (Myers 1987 : 194). 
Confusing or ambiguous questions 
The court can limit questions which are amhiguous or confusing. TIlt! court lUay ask council to rephrase questions 
in a manner which would he understandahle [0 the child . This power is especially important in the case of children 
who are easily confused by very long or ambiguous question.'; (Myers 1987: 194-5). 111e California Evidence Code 
5765(b) (West 1987 Supp.) provides specifically for this prohlem: 
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"With a witllt::ss under the age of 14, (he court shall take special care to protect him or her from 
undue harassment or embarrassment. and to restrict the ullllecessary repetition of questions. The 
court shall also take special care ro insure that questions are stated in a foon which is appropriate 
to the age of tile witness . The coun may in rhe interests of justice, Oil objection by a party, 
forbid the asking of a question which is in a t(lrnl that is not reasonably likely to be understood 
by a person of the age of the witness" . 
Questions aimed at harassing witnesses 
The court has the inherent power [0 limit Lluestions which are designed to harass or aIll10y a witness (Myers 
1987:195). 
Prejudicial questions 
Questions which are prejudicial 10 a wi",ess 's illleres" Illay be excluded by the court (Myers 1987:195), 
Questions which elicit inadmissible evidence 
The Court may exclude questions, the answers to whi ch would include inadmissible evidence (Myers 1987:195), 
Rape shield laws 
It is traumatic for a victim LO have [0 undergo a rape or sexual assault (rial and humiliating to reveal the intimate 
details of what was done to a roolll tilled with strangers. In addition to this, evidence could be led about dIe 
victim 'S previous sexual hi story which Itas the result of placing the victim on trial with the accused. As a result 
of this, cerrain states enacted Sla(lUes which are known as rape shield laws and which function to limit questions 
about dIe complainam 's prior sexual hehaviour (Myers 1987: 2 18) . 
Rule 412 of the Federal Rules of Evidence is a rape shield statute and provides that reputation or opinion evidence 
about dIe cOlllplainam's prior sex ual li fe will he inadmissible . Rule 412(a) provides: 
"Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in a criminal case in which a person is accused of 
rape or of assau\{ with intent to commit rape. reputation or opinion evidence of the past sexual 
behaviour of all alleged victim of such rape or assault is not admissible. " 
However, in Slale v Johns . 6 1) P.2d 1160 (Utah 1980) the court accepted at 1263-4 dlat "there are some cases 
in which the repuratioll of lhe prosecutrix and ... sper..:itic prior sexual activity may become relevant and its probative 
value outweigh che detrilllental impact of its introductillll". 
The rule provides three except illllS [0 til t:' iIHrmluclion of evidence of specific instances of prior sexual conduct. 
Firstly, tllis evidence may be iltlroduced III the extem required by the constitution, Secondly, it will become 
admissible where the evidence relates to the issue of whether dte defendant was tile source of semen or injury, The 
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purpose here is simply to give rile: dc:fellualH ail opportunity to explain that somebody else could be responsible for 
the semen or injury sUSlai ned hy [he w [J]plai nam (M yers 1987 :2 18-9). This question came before tbe court iu 
People v Mikula, 84 Mich.App. 108,269 N.W.2d 195 (1978) the state introduced tbe evidence of a doctor who 
had examined the child compiainallt and wlw gave evidence that tile complainant did not have an intact hymen and 
that her vaginal opening was ullusuall y large for a child of her age (at 197), The accused wanted to introduce 
evidence of the cOlllplainant 's pri or sex ual experiellce III show {hat he had not caused the broken hymen. On appeal 
tbe court held tbat the accused's evidence ought to have been admitted, and explained at 198 that: 
nIt is well settled thal where the proseclltion suhsrantiates its case by demonstrating a physical 
condition of the com plainant frolll which tilt: jury might infer the occurrence of a sexual act, the 
defelldam Illust h~ permitted to Illeet thal ev idence with proof of the complainant's prior sexual 
activity tending to show that another person might have been responsible for ber condition. " 
The third exceptioll (0 the rule against introducing evi dence of a victim's prior sexual activity, as set out in Rule 
412(b)(2)(B). is where [he accused lVishes [[) lead evidence [hat there was previous sexual COUlact between the 
complainant and himsei f, and [he question of consem is a[ issue in the present case (Myers 1987 :218). Tlus section 
will seldom be applicable where children are concerned, since they do not have the capacity to consent. 
Principles oj Fairness 
Despite the existence of Rule 412, there are circumstances in which certain prior conduct should be introduced. 
Myers (1987:22 1) gives [he example of it child cOlllplai nam who gives evidence that she had no sexual experience 
before the allegc:d assaulr. The: accused should . ill fairnc:ss. he entitled to introduce evidence that contradicts this. 
Here the court will have [[) halance [he imerests of [he child with that of the accused. 
In People v Rice. 709 P.2d 67 (COIO.CLApp. 1985) the accused argued that the state was trying to portray the 
complainant , a twdvl:! year old girl, as young and unsophisticated. The defence wanted to cross-examine the child 
about prior sexual conduct [0 show (hat she was mH, ill fact, so sexually unsophisticated. The trial court refused 
[0 allow tile defence [0 cross-examine on dlis point, and tile appeal court upheld tile decision, explaining their 
reasotung at 68 as t(,llows: 
"Defendant asserts that his constitutional rigilt to confrontation was violated because be was unable 
to cross-examine the victim concerning any prior sexual experience she might have had, thus 
refuting the prosecution' s implication that she was young and sexuall y unsophisticated. . .. the 
basic purpose of (he Irape shieldl statue is 'to protect rape and sexual assault victims from 
humiliating puhlic ti sh illg expeditions into thc: ir past sexual conduct without a showing that such 
evidence would he rc:l evaIH [0 some issue ill [he pellding case' ... " 
In order to be admissihle, [he evidence would have to he re levant, and in order to deternune this , the court would 
have to weigh lip the rrOl~ct i nn afforded the wi tness against [he interests of the defendant. 
( 
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3.4 Confrontation 
3.4.1 Introduction 
Although the rights emrenched in the Sixth Amendment are generally referred to as the Confrontation Clause, 
confrontation is onl y Olle: aspeci of these rights. Thi s righ t derivt!s from both the Sixth Amendment and the due 
process clause comained in the Fi fth Amendment (Oseid 1985: 1386). The state must, in temlS of this right, present 
its evidence against the accused in what is traditi ona ll y regarded as Ole most reliable fOm1, namely direct evidence 
in an open court. Westen ( 1978:578) argues that thi s may he viewed as a foml of the ' best evidence' rule. TItis 
duty to ensure lhe prl:!st:nce of will1esses in court is hased on twO elements: the witness must appear in court so 
Olat the presiding officer or the j ury can observe and evaluate his demeanour and credibility , and the defendant must 
be afforded an opportuni ty to face the person accusing him (Myers 1987:302). 
These two elements of the Co nfr!lluat ion Clause are cl early described in Mattes v Gagnon, 700 F.2d 1096 (701 
Circ.1983) where it was stated at 11 01 that the "Confro ntation Clause refl ects a preference for face-to-face 
confrontation at trial. enahling the trier of fact [0 di rec tl y observe the demeanour of the witness in evaluating Ius 
credibili ty and renderi ng less likely false accusations hy the witness due to the presence of the accused" . In Mattox 
v United States. 156 U.S . 237 (1895) the Supreme Court emphasised Olat it was important for witnesses to appear 
before the jury "in order that Ithe jurY I Illay look at him, and judge by his demeanour upon ule stand and the 
manner in which he gives his test imony whether ile is wortily of belief" (at 242-3) . 
From me above dicta . it hecolll t:s dear thai the framers of tht! ConfrolHalio)) Clause contemplated that confrontation 
at the trial be face-to-face. This was expressly stated by tile U.S. Supreme Court as early as 1899 in Kirby v 
United States , 174 U.S. 47 (1899) at 55 where a witness in tenus of tile Confrontation Clause was described as 
someone "UpOII whom I the: dc:fe lldallt I call look wiI i It heillg tried". 
This practice of confrontation devd opeu in response to the practice in England , since abandoned, of convicting an 
accused on Ule basis of affidavits. The U.S. Supreme Court explained the historical justi fication in California v 
Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970) as fo ll ows at 156: 
tithe particular vice [hat gave impelUs to the confro ntation claim was the practice of trying 
defendants on 'evidence' which consis ted solely of ex parte affidavits or depositions secured by 
the examining magistrare!'). lIlUS denying the defendant the opportunity to chal1enge his accuser in 
a face-tn-face encou mer ill fro nt of ti lt: [ritr of fac t. " 
The purpose. therefore. of insisti ng on hlce-w-face co nfrontation is the belief that it is difficult to lie about someone 
in their presence . In Ohio v Roberts supra the Supreme Court explained at 63 that insisting on the presence of a 
witness at a trial "undouhtedly makes it more di ffi cult to lie against someone, particularl y if that person is an 
accused and present at trial. " And in United States v Benfield supra at 821 the purpose was explained as being 
tbe belief that" ill sOllIe umldineLi but real way recollection. veracity, and conununlcation are influenced by face-to-
face challenge". 
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According to Hill and Hill ( 1987:826) this argument does not pertain to children who have to testify in court: 
"Since chilurell dill 11{)[ testify in rhe eigllletlHh century ill the United States, the draftsmen may 
have envisioned two mell facing OIle anoclu:!r in CDun. In this scenario the intuitive belief that 
facing the accused wou ld make the accuser more honest may have had some truth to it. 
However. psychological pressures are di fferelH when the witness is a child who does not 
understand why she must again face her auacker. By requiring a child to testify in court as to 
incidents surrounding sex Hal ahuse or allOlher traullla tising event, the criminal justice system treats 
children like adult lllen. " 
3.4.2 Limitations on the Right to Confrontation 
Although it is preferahle I'm a WiUlcSS giving evidence agains t an accused to be present in court so that the latter 
may confront him face-tn-face, [hi s righl is abo lIot ahsolute. There are. for instance, a number of COIlIDlon law 
exceptions where the statemems of a witl1~ss are admissihle although the witness does not face the accused in court, 
such as dying declarations or where the defendant waives the right to confront (Myers 1987:304). In Illinois v 
Allen, 397 U.S. ]37 ( 1970) the U.S. Supreme Coun explained that an accused could forfeit his right to be present 
at a trial if, after he has heen wamed hy [h~ judge. lhe accused continues to behave in a disruptive fashion , 
obstructs the dignity of the COtln , and imerferes with the proper administration of courtroom procedure. Also in 
United States v Carlsoll. 547 F.2d 1346 (8th Cire. 1976). cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977) the court held that 
an accused may wai vt:! his righl to C01l fro lllatioll where he intimidates or threatens a witness. 
The right to controntation will. therefore . yield to Cllmpeting interests that outweigh the rights of the accused. In 
Ohio v Roberts supra tht! Stiprelll t:! Court accepled that competing interests could give ri se to the confrontation right 
being dispensed with ill Ihe Irial. In Mallo.\' ,. UI/ited States .I'llI'm the coun at 243 said that "general rules of law 
of this kind, however, hendicem in [heir operalioll and valuable to the accused, must occasionally give way to 
considerations of puhlic policy and tht: Ilt:cessi ries of the case". 
The manner ill wllich children are (reared in court is a consideration which over recent years has received a great 
deal of public attention. T here is ample evidence that many children experience trauma when confronting tile 
accused in a courtroom. In fact. many psychologists believe that "confronta tion witll the legal system is a second 
and separate trauma, a process of revictimizatio n" (Dziech and Schudson 1989:12). This is even more so in the 
case of child victims of sex ual ahuse where Myers ( 1987:]83) alleges "the court process can be as difficult as the 
sexual abuse itself". In State v Bood/y. 96 Ariz. 259. 394 P.2d 196, cert. denied , 379 U.S. 949 (1964) the Arizona 
Supreme Court. in detennining the admissihility of hearsay statements of a young child, expressed the view that 
"a fiv e year old girl should he spared the necessity of test ifying against her father in a rape case if at all possible ... 
We do nOt agree.. thaI ti v~ year old girls should he dragged into COllrt to testify and to re-live the horrifying 
experience of heing raped." 
A further competing interes t <H':L:ept~d hy the couns ill Ohio v Roberts supra is the interest of the state in 
implementing "eff~ct i v~ law t: nfl )rcemelll ". This is "lSI) an interest which would be relevant to litigation involving 
children, since the Slate is Seen as carrying OUl the ro le of a pateifamilias insofar as the protection of children is 
1 11 
concerned (Myers 1987: 307). The policy here is regarded as an important one since child sex abuse is viewed as 
a steadily increasing prohlem wi th olll y a smail percentage of the cases ever getting to trial (Bjerregaard 1989: 167). 
The state, therefore. has all iIHcrest ill pmtt!crin,g children who give evidence in court, and this interest will compete 
with the rights which the dekndallt has [0 confrontation. Thi s is supported by the Mattox v United State's decision 
supra where the court at 243 exp lained that tile Confrontation Clause will in certain instances yield "to consideration 
of public policy and the necessities of the case". 
Since it has been acct!ptt:d that tht: right of confroillatioll Illay in certain circumstances yield to other competing 
interests, the question is whether there is 'a minimul1l suhstalltive standard' that has to be fulfilled before the right 
to confrontation is waived . Myers ( 1987:305) in hi s discussion of thi s "minimum standard argues that there is doubt 
regarding whether then~ is such a standard since:: the Supreme COlirt decisions have used the word 'may'. However, 
the lower courtS have inlt::rpreteu the Supreme: Court deci sions as meaning that there is such a minimum standard 
which has to he satisfied . 
Since the purpost of confro ntati on is (0 ellsure tllat t videnct: is accurate, the standard wilI focus on the reliability 
of the evidence. The evidellce Illust he re liahle ill order to be admissible (Myers 1987:305) . This standard has 
been referred to in a number or cases. III Ohio v Robelts (supra) Ule court explained the standard as follows at 
65: 
"Reflecting its lI11dt rlying purpose {O augment accuracy in the fact finding process by ensuring 
the defendant an effective Jlleans to tt:st advt:rse evidence. the Clause countenances only hearsay 
marked with such trustworthiness that 'there is no material departure from the reason of the 
general rule'. " 
Also in Mancusi v Stubbs. 408 U.S . 204 ( 1972) th" court . in discussing ule standard , stated at 213 that " [tJhe focus 
of the court's concern has heell to insure that (ilere are 'indicia of reliability which have been widely viewed as 
determinative of wheuler a statement may be placed hefore the jury ulOugh there is no confrontation of the 
declarant " , . 
In evaluating whether the accused's rights [() confrolllation should yield to a competing interest, the primary 
consideration is reliahility. This is, however. not the only consideration. Another factor is the importance of the 
evidence. The more crucia l (ile evidenct is for [ile statt' s case. tile greater the need for the evidence to be reliable, 
in the case , for instance. where (he principal wiwess is unavailable or his statement is the only evidence against 
the defendant (Myers· 1987 :306). 
In Dutton v Evans. 400 U.S. 74 ( 1970) [he coun was or the opinion that when hearsay evidence is crucial to the 
state' s case and potentially utvas ta tillg to tilt accliseu. tilt hurdel1 Ull the prosecution to produce tile witness 
increases. A further factor to he considered is whether there are any altematives to infringing the accused's rights. 
Any infringement must intrude as minimally as possihle (Bjerregaard 1989: 167). 
112 
3.4.2.1 Unavailability of a Witness 
Since it has bet::ll acceptt::d that the accused's rigilt (() confrontation is not absolute, and can give way to competing 
interests, the next lllleslioll [hac arises is how these intt:resls are to be halanced. The balancing of these interests 
arises where the wirness is not availahle to confront lhe defendant at tbe trial or is Dot available for cross-
examination. The tenn ' availahle' was disc llssed in State v Doe, 105 Wasil. 2d 889, 719 P.2d 554 (1986) at 557 
as denoting "a witness who can he c() llfrotHt:u and cross-examined". 
The competing interests have to he halanced once the witness is found to be unavailable . Tbe following is a 
sunmlarised version of the instances when a witness is considered to be unavailable, as listed by Myers (1985:308-
314): 
1. Where a wittless has a pri vilege availahle. the witness will be considered to be legally unavailable, for 
example where privilege against self-incrimination is claimed . This will very rarely be applicable to cases 
involving child witnesses. 
ii. A witness who refuses [() answer quc-:s li ons is considered to be unavailable. This is particularly applicable 
to children who sometimes "c lam up" when they are OIl the stand and refuse to testify. 
iii. Where a wimess has forgotten an event. til l:! wi mt!ss Illay be regarded as unavailable. This will depend 
on tbe amount of detail (ilat has bet:n forgo[te ll. The constitution grants the accused an opportunity for 
effective cross-examination. not necessarily perfect cross-examination. This was held by the court in 
Delaware v Fensterer. 106 S.Ct. 292 (1985) where they explained at 295 d,at "the Confrontation Clause 
guarantees an opporrll ni ty for dleu ivt: cross-examination. not cross-examination that is effective in 
whatevt!r way aml to whatever extellt [lie defense Illay wish." Children. especially those who are young, 
very often forget the details of an event. If the lack of memory is so great, the child may be considered 
to be unavailahle . 
IV . A witness Illay he rega rded as t1na\'ailahle if the wi(lless is physically ill or incapacitated. Here the court 
will bave to consider whether the person wi ll recover and wheo, and whether dlere will be any prejudice 
caused co the accused hy rhe delay. 
v. If a witness suffe rs from a mental illness. is mentally retarded. or bas a brain injury . the witness may be 
considered to he unavailahle . This will depend on whether the condition is pennanent or whether the 
witness will he ahle to overcome the impairment. In Walden v Sears, Roebuck & Co, 654 F.2d 443 (5th 
Circ. 1981) a six year old hoy fell off a hicycle and suffered a head injury. A civil case followed and the 
boy gave a deposirio nnim:teelll1loJl(lis aha {lie incident in which he described the accident in detail. The 
trial took place nine years after the accidem hy which stage ule child had forgotten the details of the event 
due to injuries sustained in the accidem. The trial court excluded the deposition, but the Fifth Circuit 
Coun reversed this decision 011 (ht; hasis ll!tlt (he loss of memory rendered the child unavailable. 
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vi. Witnesses who experiellce psychological trauma WhC!Il testifying lllay be considered psychologically 
unavailable. T hi s is especially applicahle in the case of cbildren, wbo find testifying in court traumatic 
and somelimes even terrify ing. Til support thi s. Myers (1987:310) quotes Parkers who says that 
"lclriminaJ procedu res that operate solely Hl vindicate a societal interest often fail to take into account the 
psychological damage (hal can he uone 10 a young child in the role of witness". 
Some commentators argue that in order to he psychologically unavailable, the court must detennine that 
it would he psychologically illlPossihle for the witlH::ss {() give evidence in court. McConnick argues that 
impossibility is an 1I1lrea li slic ami all lIJlllecessaril y high standard. Rather the coun should evaluate all the 
circumslances of tlle case in halancing the inleresls (Cleary 1984:754). [n People v Gomez , 26 Cal.App. 
3d 225. 103 Cal. Rptr. 80 ( I 972) the wi lIless was a rape victim. Two psychiatrists gave evidence that she 
was very vulnerah le (0 stress, had a tendency to se izures which were difficult to diagnose and treat and 
thal her melllal health would he atfeeled if she had [() give evidence. The conrt held at 83 -84 that in order 
to be psycholog ically unavailahle. the willless must have an illness or infirmity which is severe and should 
"render the WiUleSS'S ancnuam:e. or his test ifying. rdatively impossible and not merely inconvenient" In 
Warren v Vnited Slales. 43 A.2d 81 1 (D .c. 198 1) the coun accepled evidence by a psychialriSl that Ule 
victim would experience far grealt;r mt lHai anguish than nomlally accompanies a court appearance, and 
that if she were forced {() appear ill coun she would suffer severe psychosis and perhaps even suicide, and 
found the wi tm:ss 1I1lavailahk (at 828). 
The problem that arises ill rdalioll w chilt.lrell is tJelenuilling when a child's fear of giving evidence 
reaches the slage of psychological unavaiiahi li lY . The fear experienced by the child must be "substantially 
grealer" than the tear the child normally ex periences when giving evidence. (Myers 1987: 311). In 
detenllining whtthtr a c.: hilJ is psycholog icall y unava ilable. the COlIfl will take into account the following 
factors: the psychological hisrory of tht: child. the nature of the crime, the degree of violence involved, 
any psychological harm that migh t arise if the child has to give evidence in court and the importance of 
the evidt::llce for the prosecllt ion. 
The coun has lO decide as a preliminary quest ion whelher somebody is psychologically unavailable. [n 
coming lO lhis decision the judge is often assisled by tlle evidence of psychiatrists or psychologists. 
Evidence gi ven by lay persons or by part:llts will nO[ be sufficient to establish unavailability. In State v 
Gollon. I 15 Wis.2t! 592. 340 N. W.ld 9 I 2 (C l.App 1983) a mother testified that her six year old child was 
too frightened III test ify. The court stated the following at 9 16: 
"Test inl() IIY hy a parellt as til lilt: existence of the constitutional fact of unavailability does 
1l00 , ipso .!llCfO. eSlahlish the fact. J. L's IlHHher' s testimony that she was too afraid to 
h::s{i fy is illsu fti cit:1H {Il satisfy [he lI11availahil ity requirement. If a child is physically 
availahle. whether the chil d is ahIe [() lest ify should be judicially determined." 
There is some aUlhority lhal if the chi lt! is physically availahle, she slIou[d appear in court so that the judge 
can delerm ine unavailahility. HtI\veve r. in Ulliled Slales v Inadi . 106 S.Ct. 1[21 (1986) the court held 
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thaL any mle which requires th e: prost:culioll [0 call a wi mess to establish unavailability would be 
"indefensible" . 
A llumher of states have recognised rhal test ify ing in coun can give rise to trauma, and have enacted 
statutes whi ch authorise the courts [0 ueclarc: a wi(I}ess psychologically unavailable. The Californian 
Evidence Code 240(c) provides that a wi tness call be declared unavailable if "[e]xpert testimony ... 
establishes that. .. Illcmai trauma resulting from an alleged crime has caused hann to a witness of sufficient 
severity that th e: wi (lless .. is ullah le to testify wi thout suffering substantial trauma ". The Indiana Code 
declares a child to he ulUlVailahle if a psychiatrist has certified UIaI the chi ld would experience trauma if 
ule c~ild participated ill the trial. These statutes simply cOllfiml the common law position, Ulat t~e courts 
have to consider al l (he circulllstances of t.he case in the light of the accused's right to confrontation. 
vii. Recamatioll could lead (() a tilH.Jing of uililvai lahili ty. This often occurs in child abuse litigation where a 
child is ahle to tell his slOry to the police or a psychologist but at the trial recants and denies that the abuse 
ever took place. In such a simatiol1 the state may decide to hand in the child 's previous statement. If the 
child cannot he cross-examineu ahOlIl the details of the crime, then he will be unavailable. But if he can 
be CrOss-examinetl about the t:vt: n( anu his reasollS for recanting, then he will be available. 
viii If a child is incompetent to test ify as a wi tness . then he will be unavailable since he will be unable to be 
cross-examined. In Slale v Ryall. 103 Wasi l. 2d 165.691 P.2d 197 (1 984) Justice Dolliver explained at 
207 that "if ... a tintl illf! of incompete llcy is made hy (ile trial court, this then may be considered the legal 
equivalent of unavailahili ty". In Stale v Doe. supra the court explained it as follows at 557: 
"While the COllcep[s of availahili ty and competency do llot overlap entirely, it is quite 
clear that all illcoIllpt:telH child is IHl[ availahle. The tenn 'available' denotes a witness 
who call he cOIlfnlntt::u and cnlss-exall lilled .. . A child unable to take the stand obviously 
ca ll1lot respond to opposing counsel' s questions ". 
If the state argues that a child is incompetent 10 give ev idence. does tile Slate have to produce tile child so that tile 
court can decide Oil the COlll petency'! This quest ion callle he fore the court in State v Campbell, 299 Or. 633, 705 
P.2d 694 (1985) where hoth the state and defence decided that the ulree year old child witness was incompetent. 
The Oregon Supreme Cou rt disapproved of th is and held at 706 that "before any out-of-court declaration may be 
offered against a defendalH ill a crimina l trial. the wiwt!ss must he produced and declared incompetent by the 
court". Stale v Gollon IlIl'ra also hlund thaI if a child is physicall y available, ule child should appear in court to 
detennine psychological unavailahili ty. Howev!! !' . as mentioned supra in United States v Inadi , the Supreme Court 
regarded uli s procedure as "indefensihle". 
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3.4.2.2 Duty to demonstI'ate unavailability 
There is an obligation Oil the state to produce a witness or to demonstrate that the witness is not available. The 
purpose of this is to ell~ure accuracy in criminal trials hy maximising face-ta-face confrontation at the trial (Myers 
1987:315). 
The two leading cases on this POilll are Ohio v Roberts supra and United Slales v Inadi supra. In the Roberts case 
the admissibility of evidellct! which had heen given a[ a prdiminary hearing was at issue since the witness was not 
available at [he trial. At 6.') [he cOlin hdLl [hal {he prosecution must t:ither produce the witness or show that the 
wi tness is unavailable before {lie COlin can admit {he t:vidence of a witness from a prior court proceeding in lieu 
of the witness giving evidence personall y at the trial. In the Inadi case, on the other had, the court held that in the 
particular case of co-consp irators. rhe ('onfmIHarioll Clause did llot require the prosecution to show that the witness 
was unavailabk, since rhi s was all c:xception carereLl for hy (he federal rules. 
These two cases have caused some confusion since in the Roberts decision the Supreme Court imposed the 
unavailability requirements tilr the admissihilit), of previous statements whereas ill the [nodi case they beld it did 
not apply in the case of co-conspirators (Myers 19R7::l16). The Supreme Coun explained the reason for the 
difference between the (WO decisiolls ill the Jnadi case at 1126: 
"There are good reasons why the availahility nile developed in cases inVOlving fanner testimony 
is no t applicable to co-collspirator's out-of-coun statements. Unlike some other exceptions to the 
hearsay nIles. or the exemption from rhe hearsay definition involved in this case, fanner 
testimony often is onl y a weaker suhscitlHe fo r live testimony. It seldom bas independent 
evidentiary signiticance of its OWIl. hut is intended CO replace live testimony. If the declarant is 
available and the same information call he presented to the trier of fact in the form of live 
testimony. with full cross-examination and lhe opportunity to view the demeanour of the declarant, 
there is liltlejusriticarioll for relying Oil rlie weaker versioll. When two versions of the same 
evidence are availahle. hlllgstalluing principles of lhe law of hearsay, applicable as well to 
Confromation Clause analysis. favour Ihe beuer evidt:nce ... But if the declarant is unavailable , 
no "better" version of the evidellce: exists. and the fomler testimony may be admitted as a 
substitu te for live testilllony on the sallle point. The same principles do not apply to co-
cOIlspirawr statelllellts. Because they are made whil e the conspiracy is in progress, such 
statements provide evidence of the conspiracy's context that camlor be replicated, even if the 
declaram testi ti es [0 {he Sallie: Illa{{~rs in coun.. Even when tlIe declarant takes the stand, his in-
court testimony seldom will reproduce a significam portion of the evidentiary value of his 
statemems during (lie course of [he conspiracy ... co-conspirator statements derive mich of their 
value from the fact that they are made in a context vt!ry different from trial, and therefore are 
usually irreplace:ahle as suhsratHive evidence". 
The difference. therefore . wou ld St:ell1 tn ht: hased 011 the strength of the evidence. Prior out-of-court statements 
are a 'weaker version' of the evidence given at a trial, whereas the prior statements of co-conspirators are a 'better 
version' of the evidence g iven ar a tria l. 
Myers (1987:31 8-322) argues that in the casc nr hearsay exceptions relating to child witnesses, the availability rule 
as set out in the Roberts case should he applied. Rules of evidence, as well as tbe Confrontation Clause, favour 
the better evidence. which woulLl he persollCiI ev idelH':c in court subject to cross-examination. If the state wishes 
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to use the weaker evidence. Ihen the hurden will he OIl the state to establish tiJe unavailability of the witness. 
However. as Roberts itself cu.:kll(}wlt:dgt::d ill ,I lI()(e rtf 65. a "demonstration of unavailability ... is not always 
required", The wisest courSt!. Myers argues. is to stet:[ away from dogmatic rigidity. Rather, judges should 
consider the facts of each case. lookiIlg al the importallce and reliability of the hearsay as opposed to the witness 
giving evidence personally at the trial. 
Dziech and Schudson (1989: I 37) argue that judges have prevented tiJe prosecution of offences against children by 
misinterpreting the stalldards sel out ill Ihe Roberts case slIpra. Firstly, judges do not distinguish between a child 
being physically ullavailahle aod heing psychologicall y unavailahle. Judges frequently refuse to hear out-of-court 
statements made hy children (0 aduhs hecause {ht' child is 'available' to testify. Judges, therefore, seem to 
concentrate on the physical availahility of the child. In 1988 the Kansas Supreme Court admitted tile out-of-court 
statement of a child wi mess and distinguished hetween physical and testimonial unavailability in State v Kuone , 
Kan.SIIp.Ct .. no.60. 446. 613/88. The COll rt fOllnd Ihat testimonial unavailability may be based on potential 
psychological trauma whe n there is ex pert ""idence thaI psychological injury will probably ensue from further 
testimony; that the degree of prohable injury is Suhstalll ial: that the injury will continue for a substantial duration; 
and that the injury will he greater tilat normall y experienced by tile average witness giving evidence. Secondly, 
judges do not understand thill "intiiei" of rel iahility" du IHH have to be absolute. The judge does not have to be 
certain that the out-of-colln srarement is lIlll:!. all that is required is that it must be sufficiently reliable for tbe jury 
to be able to ass~ss whether it is tfue. 
Dziech and Schudson (1989: 137) use tile decisiun in tile Inadi case to support their argument. In this case the court 
did not use the questioll of 'availahility' as a prerc:quisi tt;: for admining out-of-court statements and, in fact, 
explained that judges were Illi si merpreting the Roberls decision and excluding evidence that should have been placed 
before the jury . The n:al hasis for the admission of out-of-court statements was dependent Oll the value of the 
statement. The coun ill /nodi cilalkngeu the pmpnsilioll that statements made 0 11 an earlier occasion and out-of-
court are less trustwonhy than rlHlst;' llIade hdol"t' the: COlirt. As mt mioned above, the court was of the opinion that 
some statements hecome more valuable hecause of the cOlltext in which they are made. At 399 the court said that 
some "statements derive much of (heir value from the tact they are made in a context very different from trial , and 
therefore are usually irrt::plaL:eablt: as subsrall(ive ev ide nce" . 
According to Dziech and Schudsoll (1989: 138) th is decisioll has enortnous implications for cases inVOlving child 
witnesses since out-of-court s(atemt!nts Illay carry greater weight because they were spoken at a time closer to the 
incident and would therefore he Jess "ffeCled hy memory loss or suggestion. Although the Inadi decision does not 
deal with child witllesses spec ilica lly. Dziec h illId Sehudsoll feel that it does establish "a solid basi s for admission 
of children'S statements". 
In fact, the principles expou nded in the fuadi case wen: applied to child witnesses in a number of subsequent cases. 
I n Slate v Robinson . 73) P. 2d XO I I A rit.. 1987) th" Ariwna Supreme Court admitted tile statement which a ten year 
old made to a psychologist alld said ill 814: 
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"An addirional factor of great weight ill this case is the unlikelihood that more trustworthy or 
probati ve evidence could have hee n produced hy Ithe child 's] in-court testimony. A young child's 
spontaneous stateme nts ahout so ullusual II personal ex perience. made soon after the event, are 
at least as rdiahk as tile child 's ill-cOUi"( testimony. given months later, after iIlllUmerable 
interviews and illlt!lTogatiolls llIay hay!: diswned the child' s memory. Indeed, [her] statements 
are valuable and tmstworthy in part hecause they exude tlle naIvete and curiosity of a small child, 
and were made in cin,:ulllstam.:es very diffen:nr from interrogation or a criminal trial ". 
On the other hand. the court did nOI admit the out-of-court statements of a child witness in State v Allen, 
Ariz.Sup.Ct. , no.CR-87-0087-PR. 6/2188 hecause they did not have tlle "ring of tmth" . The court distinguished 
this case from the facts in Robinson xupra hecause it was Ilot convinced of the reliability of the statements . The 
child's knowledge of sex ualllla£tt:rs. possibk lIIot ives 10 lie:. taken together wi th the lack of spontaneity at disclosure 
caused the court to come to the conclusio n th,1I [he chilo's ev idence had to be tested by cross-examination to ensure 
a fair trial. 
3.4.2.3 Waivel' and Forfeiture of Confrontation Rights 
The right to confrontation is a personal right which helongs to the accused himself, and he is therefore entitled to 
waive the right if he so chnnses . This is in line with the Uni ted States Supreme Court decision in United States 
v Carlson supra wllt.::re [he CO llrt had lil e fnllowing to say at 1357-8: 
"The Sixth Amendment right of confrontation is. hy its language and historical underpitmings, a 
personal right of the accused and is imended for his henefit. As such , this right, like other 
federally guaranteed cOllsr inuional rights. can he waived by the accused. To constitute a valid 
waiver there must he . an ilH t.'lHi llllal rc:[i 111luislimelll ()r ahandonment of a known right or privilege' 
by the acc llsed. " 
To amount to a valid waiver of the right to confromatioll , Lhe waiver must be "voluntary, knowing and intelligent" 
(Myers 1987:322). The accused could agree. lilr instance. to accept hearsay evidence or decide not to cross-
examlne a wi tness. An acclised can also for kit his rights (() confrontation through his own misconduct (Myers 
1987:323). An acclised who cOlltinues (0 he uisrup tive o r insulting after he has been warned to refrain from his 
behaviour, can be removed from the courtroom and would thus lose his right to confrontation. In State v BLack, 
291 N .W. 2d 208 (Minn. 1980 ) Ihe defendant inti lllidated an adult witness into silence and forfeited his right to 
confront. Silllilarl y in Ull iled Sialf-, I" Carlso ll .Hlpm the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a defendant 
cannot be protected by his l)Wll miscollllm.:[ whC:l1 (hey exp lailled at 1359 that he "cannot be heard to complain that 
he was denied the right of cross-examination and confrontation when he himself was the instrument of tlle denial". 
3.4.3 Child Witnesses and the Right to Confrontation 
A number of professional s helieve that the traullla induced hy appearing in court can be reduced for children by 
allowing tllem to test ify hy llIeans of audiovisual eq uiPlllent. Added to this is the further argument that the use of 
such equipmenr llIay in fact illCrc::tSc (he accuracy of the evidence (Myers 1987:385). These are the two major 
concerns about children as willlesses. according ({) Berliner (1985: 169): the "additional psycho logical trauma " which 
accompanies participat ion ill a crilllinal trial ami the issue: whether children can be effective witnesses in adversarial 
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proceedings. This was discussed ill Ihe case of State v Sheppard, 197 N.I. Super. 411 , 484 A.2d 1330 (1984) 
where a ten year old vic: lilll was [00 scared of her slc::phllht!f to give evidence because he had threatened to kill her 
if she wId anybody wital he had uOlle. The COllr! Slllllilwised Ihe evidence of a psychiatrisl, who had been called 
as an expert, as follows al 1332: 
"It was Ithe doctor' s] opinion, however , that avoidance of an in-court appearance through the use 
of video equiplIlt:llt would improve the accuracy of her testimony. He provided reasons: An 
adult wi tness. test ifyillg ill cou rt, SU 1TOUlllkd hy [he usual court atmosphere, aware of the black-
robed judge , a jury, attorneys. members of rhe puhlic. ulliformed attendants, a flag, and religious 
ovenones, is more likely", leSlify trulilfli lly. The opposite is true of a child, particularly when 
the setting illvolves a relalive accuseu hy her of sexual abuse. She becomes fearful, guilty, 
anxious. and traulllarised. In IlIOst cases, she will have heen exposed to both pleasant and abusive 
associations with the aCL' used. As a ({1I1Sellllellcc. sh~ has ambivalent feelings. Anger against the 
relative is opposed hy feel ings o f ca rc. no[ ollly for him hut also for other family members who 
may be hanlled hy a convic[iOll. Th~ re is guilt as well as satisfaction in the prospect of sending 
the abuser to prison. These mixed fed in£s. accompanied by the fear, guilt, and anxiety, mitigate 
the truth , producing inaccurate test imony. The video arrangement, because it avoids courtroom 
stress. re lieves chese feeli ngs . the rehy i11lproving the accuracy of the testimony." 
Ordway (1981: 137) argues tha I thc nawral disabilit ies which chi ldren have, for instance a limited ability to 
communicate in court and difticuhy in explain ing concepts of time, are intensified when the child is afraid or under 
emotional stress. Incest victims. ill particular. timl courtroom procedures especially traumatic. According to 
Meyers (1980:54) incest L'<I.'\..!S art' so Li ifticult CO prosecute that "prosecutors interested in a good conviction rate 
won ' t touch them ". 
There are a number of states whi ch authorise alternat ive methods of giving evidence where child witnesses are 
cODcemed. The follo wing alternati ves will he' d isc ussed: Tht! rearrangement of the courtroom, videotaped 
depositions, preliminary hearing tes tin HHl Y. Lhlsctl-circu it 1t!1t!vision. and videotaped interviews. 
3.4.3.1 ReaJTanging the COllliroom 
From as early as 1899 the courts were using (td linc Illt!thods to protect child witnesses against confrontation. In 
State v Mannion. 57. Pac. Rpl. :;42 ( 1899) the accused was charged with sexually assaulting his six year old 
daughter. After Ihe child had taken the oath. she said "I am afraid to teli , because I am afraid of my papa" (at 
544). The accused was sitring with his legal rep rcsell[ative in from of the child. The court then ordered the 
accused to sit in a comer of Ihe: coun mom whi1t! the: child gave evidence. He was unable to see the child , nor 
could he hear her evidence as she was seated wi th her hack to him . 
On appeal 10 Ihe Utah Supreme Court tite pri llcip le was sup po ned and the court explained at 545 that "where the 
witness is young , tht: court should have consiLierahle latitudt: ill protecting the witness" with the proviso that the 
defendant 's constitutional ri ghts illust he protected. The court acknowledged that the constitutional provision could 
be complied with "even though rhe prisoner he l10t perm itted to sit inmlediately in front of the witness, when such 
position would caust intimi da tion. and prt'vt:1H tilt: t'l icitillg of testimony" (at 545). However, the court found on 
the facts in this particu lar case that [ile arrallgtlllelH Liiu abriug~ lhe accused's right of confrontation. In Herbert 
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v Superior CoU/t, 117 Cal.App.3d 661, 172 Cal.Rpt ... 850 (1981) the court found that the defendant's right to 
confrontation was ahridgtd when he was seared so that he could hear but not see a five year old girl in a sexual 
assault prosecution. In Siale v SII'able, 31 3 N. W. 2d 497 (Iowa 1981) the witness testified behind a blackboard and 
the court held (hat. at most, it was a harmless t:rror under the circumstances of the case. 
Whitcomb et al (1985:55 ) explain that in practice many prosecutors use unohtrusive ways to shield the child from 
the accused, for instance. hy using [hei r own hmlies t() hlock the child's view of the accused while the child's 
evidence is being led, Others tell rile child to luok elsewhere when they give evidence. 
3.4.3.2 Videotaped Depositions 
A deposition, as detined hy Myers ( 1987: 388) . is an out-okourt statement which is admitted at the trial to prove 
tbe truth of its contents. The use of depositions at criminal trials is authorised by Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 15 which provides; 
!tea) When Takc:n. Whenever due 10 c: xceptional circlllllstances of the case it is in the interest 
of justice [hat [he testimony of a prospective witness of a party be taken and preserved 
far use at trial. Ihe COlln may upon motion of such party and notice ta the parties arder 
that testimony of such witness he taken hy deposition .. , 
(b) Usc. AI the trial or upon any hearing, a part or all of a deposition, sO far as otherwise 
admissi hle under Ihe ruit:s of evidellce, may he lIsed as substantive evidence if the 
witlless is unavailahle. as ullavailahili(y is defined ill Rule 804(a) of the Federal Rules 
of Evidence. or (he: witness gives testimony at the trial or hearing inconsistent with his 
depositi(lIl. " 
A growing lllUllber of stales have enacled provisiotls which enahle judges to authorise the video depositions of child 
witnesses. Usually the vioe:otapiIlg Ol,;curs ill lIi e: .iuuge's cham hers or a similar environment and the accused is 
given the opportunity to cross-examine the child. When ctlese procedures are followed the videotape will be 
admitted in lieu of the child test ifying at the trial. The majority of ct,e statutes require that the child must be 
unavailable (Hill and Hill 1987:81 9). Hn\\ "vc!'. the statules vary from state to state. Some provide that when a 
video deposition has heen matie:, the child llIay llOr he: calit:d (0 give evidence at the trial, even though the child may 
be available. Other statutes only permit Liepositioils when giving evidence personally in court is likely to hann the 
child psychologically. In Florida ami Wisconsin the court will allow the use of the videotape if there is substantial 
likelihood that the child will suffe r ' se: , 'c: re emolional Ill' mental' strain if the child has to give evidence in court, 
The Arkansas and New Mexico s {atllt ~~ re l]uir~ lht.: court ltl show 'good cause' before allowing the videotape, Not 
all the states have all unavailability requirement. The MOlltana statute states "the victim need not be physically 
present in the courtroom when the videolape is admitted into evidence" (Hill and Hill 1987:819). The Alaskan 
Code provides that the i.l eposi(ion takes til e: plac t: of the cllild's evidence at the trial unless the trial judge finds that 
the absence of persona! evidence wil! prejudice the accused. In Colorado the relevant statute provides that the court 
may admit a videotaped deposition of a victim's evidence if the court finds at the trial that the giving of evidence 
would cause the victim emoliooal trauma so that tile latter will he medically unavailable (Myers 1987:387-8). 
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Thus the deposition is admitted at the ttial in lieu of the child's evidence and is regarded as "the functional 
equivalent of testimony at trial" (Myers 1987:388). In McGuire v State, 706 S.W.2d 360 (Ark. 1986) the accused 
was charged with raping all eleven yea r old girl. The prosecutor applied to court that a videotaped deposition be 
used instead of ill-court te~£illlo!lY. E\"idence was presented at court that the child was under the care of a 
psychologist, that she refused to go allywhere. was easily upset and would feel humiliated if she had to appear 
before the jury. The judge granted the application. hasing his decision on an Arkansas statute which authorised the 
use of videotaped deposiriolls where good cause was shown. This decision was affinlled on appeal and the 
Arkansas Supreme Court concluded LilaL although the ge llt::ral rule is that evidence must be given personally at the 
trial, the videotaped deposition provides "the hest suhstitute" in child abuse cases (at 362). 
In United States v Binder. 769 F. 2d ,, 9:; 19th ('ire . 1985) the majority of the court described videotaped depositions 
as "unique" . At 601 Judge Skopil ex plailled that "1" lideotaped evidence is unique. It enables the jury to observe 
the demeanour and LO hear the testimony of the witness. It serves as the functional equivalent of a live witness ... II 
This case indicates the confusion {hat may ari se ill deciding whether it is in fact "the equivalent of live testimony". 
Here a child gave evidence hy mean;>; of a videotaped deposition. After the trial the jury requested to replay the 
videotape and the request was gra nted. The accLlsed appeakd 011 the ground that the request should not have been 
granted. The Federal COLIn of Appeals reversed the cO llviction in a twa-to-one decision, basing their decision on 
the fact that the videotaped depositioll was equivalellt to a live witness and, tlterefore, the replaying of the videotape 
gave an unfair emphasis to the child's evide llc e: , 
If the videotaped deposition was consiucrt!u to be t!videllce ill lhe sense of weapons or exhibits which are introduced 
in the course of the trial. then it would he availahle to the jury for furtl}er scrutiny during tl}eir deliberations. 
Dziech and Schudson ( 1989: 152) argue tliat the videotape is not the same as in-court testimony. They argue that 
it 'may reduce or enhance a jury's foclls Oil L1el\lt'a Jl()u r ... [sincel, .. it presents a child in an atmosphere different 
from that of a courtroom " and should therefore he allowed to he replayed by the jury if they so wish. Nevertheless, 
other courts have reversed cOllvictions because juries were allowed to replay videotaped depositions during their 
deliberations. following the dec isioll in Binder .I'II/JI'O. 
There are two approaches to videotaped deposit ions . Some states treat the videotape as fortIler testimony e.g. South 
Dakota, Colorado and Cali ti)rnia. Section 1346(d) of the California Penal Code provides: 
" .. ,court may aLlmit the vidcoLapl' or rill' victim's testimony at the preliminary hearing as former 
testimony under secrioll ! 29! of tile Evidence Code , " 
As discussed supra. these states allow videotapes when "fairness allows" and require that cross-examination must 
take place during the making of the depositioll I Hill alld Hill 1987:822) The second approach admits the videotaped 
evidence at the trial in lieu of thl:' ch ild'" direL'l (;'v iLiellL:e , for instance, Kentucky, New Mexico, Arkansas and 
Wisconsin. The Arkansas state itas tite t() llowillg proviso, as quoted by Whitcomb et al (1985:63): 
"AR 43-2036 .. neitht:r the presentatioll lIor the preparation of such videotaped deposition shall 
preclude the prosecutm\ (aIling rhe Illillor "kri ll1 rn testify at tria l if that is necessary to serve 
the interests of ju:-;t ice ," 
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This procedure enables (he uefelldalH to Cfoss-t.:xalllillt: tlit: child 011 two occasions, once when the videotape is made 
and again in court. Here the child is actually ill a worse position than he would have been if he just gave evidence 
in court. Kentucky and Texas have a different approach. The videotaped statement of the child will be admissible 
and the accused will thell have an opponuni[y 10 cross-examine the child at the trial. Cross-examination will not 
take place when the videotape is Illade (Hill and Hill 1987:823). The New Mexico statute dealing with the 
videotaped deposition. provides as follows: 
"In any prosecution for criminal sexual penetration or criminal sexual contact of a minor, upon 
motion of rhe district attonlcy aIld after 110rice {{l rile opposing counsel, the district court may, for 
a good cause shown, order {he taking of a videotaped deposition of any alleged victim under the 
age of sixteen years. The videotaped deposition shall he taken before the judge in chambers in 
the presence of the distric t atwrney, the defendant and his attorneys. Examination and cross-
examination of tht:: allegt::d victim shall proceed ... in the same maImer as pennitted at trial. .. Any 
videOtaped depositioll taken under tht: provision of th is act. .. shall be viewed and heard at the trial 
and elllereu ilHo the record ill lieu (l( [lie di rect testimony of tht: alleged victim." 
Since the videotaped deposition is prepared specitically Illr trials. tlle accused is allowed to be present at the taping 
and his counsel is penllitreJ {{l cross-examine the child. [n terills of the Arizona statute, the accused's presence 
is required at the videotaping of a llep()siti"n. Tile rekvam provision. as quoted by Hill and Hill (1987:819), 
provides: 
"Upon request of either party, the COLIrt may order all questioning of a minor witness to be 
videotaped in the judge's ciJalllhers in the presence of the defendant, defendant's counsel, the 
prosecuting auorney or plaitlliiTalKJ p[ailltiffs counsel as the case may be and the court may for 
presentation to [he jury as evideJ\ct: :H such tinle as the court determines is proper." 
The procedures differ from state to state with laws in Kentucky. OklallOma and Texas specifying that the child be 
placed in such a position that lhe child doe . .., lIot see or hear the defendant during the making of the deposition 
(Dziech and SdlUdsoll 1989: I:; I ). -"',,,"ding {O Whitcomh (1985:63) twelve states require the accused to be present 
at the trial while seven states illsi st that the accLlsed he given an opportunity to cross-examine the child. Wisconsin 
expressly provides that where the acclIsed is nm present at the videotaping, the child must testify at the trial. 
3.4.3.2.1 P.·oblems Encountered with Videotaped Depositions 
Whitcomb et al (1985:65) conducted research ill terms of which they visited a nwnber of jurisdictions, interviewing 
prosecutors and victim advocates. Many of [he professionals interviewed were of the opinion that a videotaped 
deposition can be Illore harrowing for a ch il d thall actually given evidence in court. Since the deposition is usually 
done in the judge's chambers or ill a room where t::veryone can he seated around a conference table, the child is 
then in effect hrought into closer proximity with the accused. Confronting the accused across a table is likely to 
be more stressful than confrontillg hilll across ,I L·OUIHoOIll. III fact. prosecutors believe that a videotaped deposition 
simply substitutes olle formal prOl.:edure: for alhHller. and a ch ild who is able to perform well at such a deposition 
will in all likelihood perform well at the trial. Si nct cross-examination is a harrowing experience for children, 
allowing the defence to cross-examine a child witJ1ess in a room where they are closer to each other and the child 
has no suppOrt person, actually r ell}()VeS tlie: ht:'ndit of using tht sIllaller rOOIll (Hill and Hill 1987:822). 
122 
For this reason , the lise of videotaped depositill1ls h:IS lost suppon. especially ill those states where the child is not 
separated from the accustd while the depositioll is heillg made. In State v Twist , 528 A.2d 1250 Me. 1987), a 
Maine Supreme Court case . and Siale v Cooper. 353 S.E . 2d 441 (S .C. 1986) , a South Carolina Supreme Court 
case, children gave ev idellce hy lIlea ns (If videotaped depositions. The accused were present but they were 
separated from rllt! chi ldn:n hy olle -\Va ~ lIli rml"s. The accused had contact with their counsel and could see the 
children, but the lautr could not set:: (ht::IlI. The respective Supreme Courts upheld the cOllvictions and approved 
the use of the videocaped depositions eve II though screens had been used. 
A further problem ari se:"> where a pan icular s/alule req uires (hat the child must be physically or testimonially 
unavailable. The child thell has to endure a hattery of medical and psychiatric tests to determine whether he is 
physically or restimoni all y capahk of giv ing ev idence. And, as mentioned above , if the child is able to cope with 
a videotaped deposition. he will ill all likelihood he ahle to cope with the trial (Whitcomb et al 1985:65). This 
raises the dilemma of showing [hal it child who \Va~ availahle to tes tify on videotape is unavailable to testify at the 
trial. This can create tht prohlem of hav illg to proVt that the child is psychologically unavailable to testify when 
the child has in fact testified successfull y at the prel iminary hearing. To avoid this problem the deposition may only 
be made after the trial has started allli the child is foulld to he unavailahle (Whitcomb et al 1985:64) . 
The advantage of recording rhe deposi tion at sHch a late stage is that it removes the possibility of the defence 
asserting that new information has cOllie [() light hetween the making of the videotape and the trial which 
necessitates calling (It t chi ld to undergo funher cross-ex aminatioll. However, if the deposi tion is made at sllch a 
late stage, it removes lllle of [he hC lldils of Iht: deposition ill that the child is not permitted to exit the system as 
early as possible (Whitcomh et al 1985 :64 ). 
Prosecutors are also conce:m e:u ahol1[ [he react iu ll whic h th t:: j ury ll1ay have towards the videotaped evidence. As 
Whitcomb et al (1985:66) ex plaill. the preferred tendency is to allow the jury to see the child , and they refer to an 
interview where a prost::cutor told them rilar "she: Illuch preferred • [() let the jury see the little angel' " . Prosecutors 
prefer a child to give evidence personall y at the trialun\ess they are convinced that the child will be harmed by the 
experience or that th e: case: w ill co llapse witilout the viueo({lpe:d e:v idence, since they believe that "a child's testimony 
on tape is rarely as COllv illcing as tile real thill~" tM aci-=a rl ant 1985:150) . 
3,4.3.3 Prelimina.-v Hearing Testimony 
A few states provide that the: ev iuence givcn hy young children during preliminary hearings and grand jury 
proceedings may be videotaped. One of the main purposes of videotaping this evidence is the potential that it may 
have to replace dle child· s evidence at the trial if the la tte r is unable to testify again (MacFarlane 1985: 149). 
Myers (1987:389) quotes fro m the California n Pe llal Code whi ch provides dlat "Ii]fat the time of the trial the court 
finds that further tes timo ny would cause the victim emot ional (rawna so that the victim is medically unavailable or 
otherwise unavailahle ... [he coun Jllay admit rile vidc:otapl! of the victim 's testimony at the preliminary hearing as 
[ornler testimony". III terms of {ilL' C:liiforn ian Pc- IIal Coue a request to videotape the child ' s evidence at the 
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preliminary hearing must hy ]ClW ht' grallted 11) {lie e(lUn. It is irrelevant whether it will be admissible later at the 
trial or not. 
The child will have [0 he physically or leSlilllonially unavailable before the videotape of the preliminary hearing 
call be admitted al the Irial. MacFarlane I l q~5:50) cxplains that children often become so traumatised by the 
intense questioning that takt.::s place 'iI tile prc:lill lillary hearillg or at the idea of having to face the accused again, 
that they become distraught or even physically ill whcn they hear that they have to appear in court again. 
Sometimes the child is physically availahle at thc lilllc of the trial. but the child's therapist is of the opinion that 
the child may expt:ri ellL'c psycho lo~ i cal dllllla~c' if the child ha:-; 10 appear in court agaio. This could be based on 
the child 's reaction 10 th e: tirst appt::a raIH':c iJl cou n. or [0 allY regression experienced after the initial appearance. 
In these cases the prosecution would [hen apply for [ile videotape of the child's evidence given at the preliminary 
hearing to be admitted at the trial. 
3.4.3.4 Closed-cil'Cuit Television 
More than half of (h ~ s(at ~s iII the USA have statutory provi sions which authorise the use of one-way or two-way 
closed-circuit televisio1l ill the case o( child \'iL:rillls wlio Ita v~ to giVe! evidence in sexual offence cases (Bjerregaard 
1989:168). All example of stich a Slaltllc is 5910. 14 of the Iowa Code which provides: 
"A court may, upon its OWll 1Ilotioll or upon lIlotioll of any pany , order that the testimony of a 
child as detinl!u ill sectioll 70~,:'i, he taken ill a roOlll other (han the courtroom and be televised 
by closed-circu it equ ipllleIH il1l11e (lllIlHtl(}lll III he viewed by (lie coun. Only the judge, parties, 
counsel, persons Ilecessary [() operate the equipIllt!IIl , alld any person whose presence, in the 
opinions of the coun, would cO lllrihute to the welfare and well-being of the child may be present 
ill the room with the child uming the child 's test imony. The coun may require a party to be 
confined to an adjact!nr room or hehind a screen or mirror that penuits the party to see and hear 
dle child du ri ng llie child' ..; lI:stilllllny, hut does lJ(l( allow the child to see or bear the party. 
However, if a pany is so (ouline-d, (he (OU n shall take measure to ensure dlat the party and 
counsel can cont't!r uuring (he ltst illlt lll), t1wJ shall illfortu the child that the party can see and hear 
the child during tt:stimollY, " 
In temlS of this procedure the ch ild \v ill teslify <II Ihe trial fmm a special room outside the courtroom. The child's 
image and voice are [hen transm itted [0 {lie' \ . .' UUl'lrtlO Ill when: the jury is able to observe and hear the child while 
tile latter is testifying (Myers 1989:395). Sta lules providing for closed-circuit television vary from state to state. 
Some allow only the pmst:cution anti uefem:c COLIIlSei to he pn:sent with dle child in the room, others require the 
accused to be presellt as wel L while others lllake provision for the presence of a support person. Some states 
provide for one-way closeti -cin:uil {elL'\ 'isil)11 \\hik llllic'rs insist Oil two-way c1osed-circuittelevisioll. III the fonner, 
the child can be seen hy Ihe judge and jury wilil" in the latter Ihe child can, in addition, see the judge, jury and 
defendant (Whitcomh el al 1985: 50: M yer, 1987:395), For instance. s9-102(a)(l)(ii) of tbe Maryland Courts and 
Judicial Proceedings Code proviues thai a ch ild Ilia), give ev iuence by closed-circuit television where testifying in 
court will result in [he child suffering serious !,'IlHHio llal dist ress such that [lie child cannot reasonably communicate. 
The section further provides that onl y the rnlst:cudllg atcorm:y. counsel for defence, the operators of the equipment 
and a support persoll may he present ill the mtml with {he child , The judge and the accused will remain in the 
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courtroom and cnmlllllllicate with thL' panics b~ L'1..:ctro ni c Illeans (Pershkow 1991:936) 
Another version of this system. referred to as the ' isolated child ' model, allows the child to be isolated from the 
other participants at the trial. She is someti mes allowed to he accompatued by a support person. The child's image 
is the projected onto llIonitors in rhe L'ourtroOlli <I lltl is viewed hy those present in court . The child would have 
either ODe monitor so she cou ld See tilL' proSCL'U[(ll' or defellce couIlst:! i, or she could have a number of monitors in 
front of her so that she is ahle to view the judge. defendant etc. as well . The nnmber of mortitors before the child 
depends, to a great extent . Oil wheth t!r the re an:! any spec ific legislative provisions stipulating that the child must 
see the accused nil [he llIonitor (MacFarlanL' 1985: 147). Courts ill other states have also made use of these 
techniques even though [hey do 1101 ha\ c.' statute's author ising slich procedures (Dziech and SchudsOll 1989: 154) , 
3.4.3.4.1 Advantages of Closed-circuit Television 
Confrontation: One of til e:: major ohslrlH.',illn ;-; [0 tile giving of d l ective evidence by a child witness is the fact that 
the child has to face the accllsed . as explai lled hy MacFaria lle ( 1985 : 149): 
"The physical prc::sence of a lk:li:nda!l( who is a threatening ti gure in a child' s life, or even a nOll-
threatening ddt:IllJam ahllll i WlJlllll :1 .. :Ililt! tL:cls hadly for having disclosed sexual secrets, along 
with the sti gmatizing and ~lIi1[-pr()\ IIkillg preSe1lce of the general public, often constitute the 
primary impedimelHs ro a chi ld's ahility (U testi fy ahout sexual abuse. II 
The advantage of giving evidence via closed-circlIil television is that the child is less likely to be intimidated by the 
presence of the acclI ;-;C::u close hy . :\ .... f:tr a ... [Ill' illlc'l"ests of Ihe .accused are concerned , the use of two-way closed-
circuit television would he the most t.Ie;-;irahk optiol) sillce ir is rhe nearest to physical confrontation, The accused 
would have an opportunity (0 cross-exall1 illt: the:: child as wdl as be ahle to be in constant communication with his 
legal representati ve. The accused (alld Ihe iu ry) will also he ahle to observe the demeanour of the witness as the 
latter gives evidence (Bje rregaard 19X<): I 7 ~ •. i I. 
Court atmosphere: Since the child will give evidence outside of the courtroom, he is less likely to be frightened 
by the strangers in coun as well as tile general atmosphere (MacFarlane 1985: 147). The child will also be 
protected from fac ing all open cour£roolll and havi ng (0 revc:a l. often emharrassing. details . 
Court objections: A further advamage is that the child call he spared the confusion of Objections, arguments and 
motions by counsel hy simply having the Jl1onitor switched nff during interruptions (MacFarlane 1985:147). 
3.4.3.4.2 Disadvantages of Closed-circuit Television 
Isolation: The chil d may ke l isolal C'o hy hL'i IIg ;-;epa rlUed fmlll the courtroom and from the person with whom the 
child is COllllllulllcarillg (M ac FarlallL' I ()K:'i : J.f71 . 
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Electronic equipment: The chi ld Illay he intimidated hy the presence of the video camera and the electronic 
equipment (MacFarlane 1985: 148). 
ConcenJration: The child may tinu it difticu! r to concentrate Oll a voice and face that he views on a monitor 
(MacFarlane 1985: 148). 
Demeanour: Some COllllllelltar(ll'S argll~ [liat rli e: lliediulll of [devised or videotaped evidence distorts images and 
makes it difficult to ohserve demeanour. 
"".inherenr properties of a [elev ist:d (Or viLit:u raped) trial - its limited perspective, distortion of 
images. and similarit y 10 tt'It:\ 'i.,joll as ,Ill L'lHenailll1lent medilUll - detract seriously from the 
viewer's ahility to grasp a L' lllllpktt: and accurate: picture of the witness's demeanour, thereby 
threatening the defendant's right to a fair trial." (Whitcomb 1992: ISS). 
Bjerregaard (1989: 174-5) refers to a numher nf research studies that have heen conducted to detemline whether 
televised evidence is rhe fUllct ional equi,"aleJlI (1j" live t.;srilllony, A study conducted by Purdy concluded that jurors 
viewing televised or videotaped evidellee did l\(l[ react differently from those viewing a live trial and they found 
no significant differences hetween the (Wo versions in assess ing credibility. Other studies carried out by Miller and 
Fontes also found 110 signiticant difti::ft'llces ill jurors' reactions to televised evidence as opposed to live evidence. 
Research, on the other halld. s u ~gl..·...,t..., thaI viLkutaped evidence improves the jurors' retention of trial-related 
infoffilation and enhances witlless cred ihility. III State v Hewitt. 545 P.2d 1201 (Wash.App. 1976) and Hutchins 
v State, 286 S.2d 244 (D.Ct.App. Fa. 1973) the cOll rts themselves acknowledged the superiority of using video-
technology Over other me[hods [0 prest' III a witness's evidence. 
3.4.3.5 Videotaped Interviews 
Many professionals who work with childrell have adopted the procedure of videotaping the interviews which they 
conduct with these child rell. The procL'llurl,.' oj", ide\llapi ng an i mt:fview is lIsed mainly by the police, social workers 
and psychologists (Whitcomb et al 1985:59). 
3.4.3.5.1 Advantages of Videotaping Interviews 
Reduction in number of illterviews: Olle of [he purposes of videotaping an interview is to reduce the number of 
interviews children have to undergo . Children have to undergo a lltllilber of interviews by a wide variety of 
professionals when th t::y ellfer the ..:riJllinal jusrice systt::JIl as a witness. Each interview, whether it is conducted by 
the police, doctor. psycholog ist 01" proseCllHll . n.::quires the child to retell what has happened. In many cases the 
details of these statements are emharrassing, frightening and even anxiety-producing (MacFarlane 1985: 136). If 
a videotape is made of the original illten'iew, tilt: psychnlogist, police and prosecutors can then review and evaluate 
the tape without having to put tht' dl ild {hr{lLl~h .'Ill !llany inrerviews. 
Another disadvantage of lllultiple interviews is [hat i[ eveIHually makes the evidence look so well-rehearsed that it 
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loses credibility (Whi,ctllllh el al 1985:60). As MacFarlane ( 1985:136) explains, each time a child is forced to 
repeat a story, the it!ss spolHam:olls it hcCOIllt:~. Also, as a defence to having to repeat sens itive infonnation again 
and again, children oftell mask tht: ir ~ tllo l iolls ;tIld thi s results in lhe situation "where they relate their experiences 
without any emotion which ft!SU\ts in sta(emc:nts ahoLl[ abuse: that may appear slick and rehearsed". 
A further disadvaIHage of Illuhiple im c: rvit::ws is the: danger of suggestion and contamination. The child's evidence 
may become conraminaled hy the l]Uesrilllls m input of {he interviewers. For instance, the child may begin to use 
lenninology which the child did nOI previousl y possess. and wh ich has been picked up from the interviewers where, 
for example, he says Ihal he was indecenlly assaulled or Illolesled rather than touched (MacFarlane 1985: 137). 
Children also do llO( unders talld Ihe reaso!! why Ih r:y han: [0 repeat the same story over and over again to different 
people, 111is can lead co the childrell hr;:co illing flUstrarc:d and angry and often results in them refusing to answer 
further questions or retracti ng their statements in ordtr [0 escape tbe harassment they experience (MacFarlane 
1985:1 37). 
Best evidence available: A major aJva]\[age of videutapi ng an initial interview is that the child 's statement is 
captured as early as possihk whell il is slill fresh in Ihe child 's milld. The child's memory may fade with time, 
and the best evidence III' whal happelled is Ihen illS! (Whilcomh el al 1985:60). Not only does the videotaped 
interview preserve the chilo' s iniria! , talelllCl1L hu! i! also preserves the child 's demeanour at the time when the 
statemeD! is made (Dziech and Schullsllil 1989: 14H). This is especially imponam in cases of sexual abuse, where 
il is difficult for childrell 10 discuss whal has happelled 10 Ihem. II is Iherefore advantageous to be able to see the 
child 's physical reactiull at the time lilt: stal t:llIe llt is made, the hody language, fear, anger and avoidance, As 
MacFarlane (1985: 136) ex plains, tl1l.:':-'::: art' '\'isua l rL'Clc tiulIS that mi ght otherwise never find their way into words", 
Pressure to retract: Pressure is oftell exen ed upon childn:!l1 to retract their stories , especially when the case is oue 
dealing with intrafallli lial ahuse' , This oft en resulfs in Ihe weakening of evidence as the case progresses, The 
videotaping of the initial intc:rview i:-, IWldc hefore pressun:: is placed 0 11 the child and could, therefore, be used to 
boost the child 's evidence (Whi,comh el al 1985:60). 
Children also ret ract th t!i r disclosure,,,; ur ahuse hl:cause of lht:! dislUptions that follow tlleir disclosures, namely the 
intervention of the police ano p]"()lL'd iu ll SL'ly iL'CS (MacFa rlane 1985: 141) , Retraction is also consistent with both 
Ihe battered child syndrome and Ihe chi ld sex ua l ahuse accommodation syndrome where the intimidating 
environment of the counronm ano confrolH3ti oll with the accused cause some children to retract their original 
stalement by Ihe lime of Ihe Irial I Dziech allli Schudson 1989: 150). 
Because the rate of retracrion by chilo victims ur sex ual i:lhuse is so high, the videotaped interviews afe used to 
refute later retractious made by Ihe child ill COUr!. Allhough. as MacFarlane (1985: 141) points out, impeaching 
their own witness is no! a step that 1ll0st PJ"Ost:'CU !O l'S enjoy. it can assist the judge and jury in determining which 
statement is tnle, Thi s is explained hy Slc\'\:' CllaJlt' y, tilt' distric t a ttorney of Tarrant County, Texas, as quoted by 
Dziech and Schudsoo ( 1989: 150): 
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"Recanting is a major pwhl t!il1 for rile: legal systclll. Recanting is an expected reaction of an 
abused child who has reported (he ahuse. al(hough (his is not well understood or accepted by the 
legaJ community. Onl y an enli ghtelled legal systt:llI. when confronted with a recanting child, asks 
the lIext qUc:stillll. 'Why j, tile L'hild rL'c:lllling.· and seeks an answer to that question. Most 
prosecutors helit:vc: that tlit' ': idc\)[apl' h<\s d Illajor hC:!ldit in (his area. If the child later recants, 
even at the lime: of [rial. [ile case call still he prost!cmed hy using a good tape and psychological 
experts to explain rhe reeami llg Sy lllpWIIlS." 
Guilty pleas: A furth er henefit uf vidc'otaping the ini tial statement observed by prosecutors is that there is an 
increase in guilty pleas. Dzic:ch alKl SL'lUl{ .. bIJll [ 19X9: 1-l- 9) quote Chall~y as saying that" [aJ tape of a communicative 
child professionall y ilHerviewed will conv ince HlOS( defendalHs and tileir [a(torneys] that a trial might not be in their 
best interests". It would seem (ha( (ile defence reason [ha( a child who performs well on videotape will perform 
well in court, although this asslllllptillll has IHH yet he-e ll (cS(cd empirically (Whitcomb et al 1985:60). 
3.4.3.5.2 Disadvantages of Videotaping Interviews 
Conflicting statements: III tile sallIe way that a \'ideo[apc of all injtial interview may cause an accused to plead 
guilty , it can also he used (() all acc lI"")' S ",h';lIna~e. as i II1Islnned hy Whi(comb e( al (1985: 61-2) in the following 
extract: 
"Second. chillJ rcl1 's ilHely iL' \\.'s .HL' seldom st raightforward, and the child may volunteer 
infonllatioll [i1'H is dc[ rilllclllal ttl the ..:asc and call1lO[ he excised. For example, we viewed a 
videotape of at tlirt::t' Yt'ar-llid who w.I\'.:rc:u Oil the quc:stion of whether she had a dog. An astute 
defense a((orllt~ Y cou ld t'xploil IIle chilcJ's uncertainty on this apparently simple matter to discredit 
her entire statement. " 
This problem arises espccially ill tht.' G1Se oj "exual ahuse where children often deny that abuse took place in their 
initial statements, This t.:ou id also hL' used hy thL' (kr~llC~ to discredit the child, by suggesting that the latter has 
made conflicting S{a(elllems or has lied . Tilis happened in (he case People v Buckey, No.A753005 (Los Angeles 
County Mun.Cc May 1985) wilere a Illllllher of chi ldren. all victims in tile case, had taken part in videotaped 
interviews, Parts of tll esl:' videl llapL',<.: "ho\\'il!~' tilt' L'hildrell's illitial denials of abuse were played back to the 
children on the witll~ss stand (0 di scrt'dil tllt.'1l1. 
Confidentiality: Whell a child hecolllcs illvolved in a crimi nal case as a witness, the accused and his counsel have 
the right to see, and somet imes oht;lil\ cop ies of, tht.' videlHaped evidence (MacFarlane 1985:150), Confidentiality 
of videotapes can then beC(lI\ le a pnlhlt:lll a!ld Whilc\Hllh et al ( 1985:62) argues that their "mere existence may pose 
a threat to the victim 's privacy" sillce contidt: lll ialilY call1lm be guaranteed. She mentions in support of her 
argument that excerpts frolll videmapc:s hClve allegedly heell hroadcast on the media, as a result of which a number 
of professionals have ahamloned (he idt'a of \ idell[<lpi ng ini tial statements, When there is a highly publicised trial, 
it is possible (and has I\Clppeneu) [ilat tapt::-. Gill [:11 1 in [(l the hanos of the media, A further consequence of having 
a videotaped interview is (ha( when (hese "'pcs arc played in an npen courtroom during the trial, the identity of the 
J 
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child is fully visible and dIe child and tbe interviewer's comments may be quoted. This, accordi ng to MacFarlane 
(1985: 152), can have a devastating effect on the child and the fami ly because of the very persollal natnre of these 
disclosures. 
MacFarlane (1985: 137-8) regards d1e number and diversity of systems which have an interest in a case as being 
a very obvious disadvantage. Child protection services, police, the courtS and the prosecution are agencies involved 
in a case. This list could also include doctors and therapists. AldlOugh these different agencies may have a 
common goal of protecting children, they do not agree as to what information is required and how it is to be 
obtained. TIley do nOt have authority or jurisdiction over each other and can therefore not co-ordinate d1eir 
activities officially . Although the idea of having a single videotaped interview which can be used by a number of 
agencies would be very useful, the logist ics of who will conduct the interview, who may have access to it and what 
information wi ll be gadlered is very difficult to co-ordinate between dIe various agencies . 
A furtl1 er difficulty tlJat arises as a result of so many agencies being involved , is the different kinds of infonnation 
required. Infofi1ation required by d1e police differs substantially from tlJat sought by social workers or therapists. 
MacFarlane (1985: 138-9) suggests that this problem could be resolved if the various agencies plalUled interviews 
with the purpose of developing a method that would be able to access all the necessary infonnation from a single 
interview. She agrees that many professionals would probably regard d1is as impossible since the different systems 
"appear to be mutually incompatible", and this is especially obvious when one looks at tile difference between 
(pol ice) investigative interviews and psychodiagnostic evaluations. But, she is nevertheless of the opinion that an 
investigative interview can be conducted in a manner which is sensitive to clinical considerations, and that it is in 
the interests of the child to do so . 
interviewing methods: A cri tical aspect of videotaped interviews that often manifests itself as a disadvantage is the 
expertise of the interviewer. It is often difficult , especially in cases of sexual abuse, to obtain full di sclosure from 
a child without some degree of prompting. The maimer in which tile questions are phrased is of crucial importance 
since they can result in videotapes being held inadmissible (Whitcomb et al 1985:62). According to Berliner 
(1985:174), "[tJaped interviewing by memal health profeSSionals, aldlOugh often legitimate by mental health 
standards, frequently appears to be leading or suggestive and might be used to discredit tile child ". The use of 
leading questions or any hint of suggestion can give tbe defence sufficient fuel to argue that the child's evidence 
has been tainted and is dJerefore unreliable. 
"Asking children to share forbidden secrets (for which they feel responsible) is not comparable 
to asking them what they had for lunch. TIley need to know Otat the interviewer is comfortable 
and fa.miliar with 01is subj ect and that they won't be blamed or rejected for talking about it. 
Interviewers who remain neutral, non-probing and detached, and who conduct evaluations as 
though they were in a courtroom or oOler legal arena, rarely succeed in breaking through to 
small , frightened children." (MacFarlane 1985: 153) 
If interviewers·do use non-t raditional interviewing methods, their techniques and professionalism will be challenged 
by the defence who will try to show that the interviewer led, coached or played upon the suggestibility of the child 
(MacFarlane 1985: 153). 
} 
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Confrontation: The Illost obvious disadvantage of the videotaped interview is that it does not protect the child from 
the trauma of having to appear in court face-ta-face with the accused and having to undergo cross-examination 
(Whitcomb et al 1985:61) . 
3.4.3.5.3 The Investigative Videotape in Court 
Since the accused and his counsel are not present wben the investigative videotaping is done, they do not have Ille 
opportunity to face the child witness nor to cross-examine him. These videotapes can therefore not be used in lieu 
of the child 's evidence at Ille trial (MacFarlane 1985 : 143). 
A number of states have introduced statutes which allow that Illese videotaped interviews of a child witness may 
be admitted as evidence at Ille trial , provided that ille child is available to testify at Ille trial (Myers 1987:389) . For 
instance, in ille states of Texas, Kentucky and Loui siana the relevant statute provides that the videotaped interview 
of a child 's statement may be admissible at the trial if the videotape was made at ille child 's first statement , the 
child was interviewed by anon-attorney, and bolll the person who conducted the interview and the child are 
available for cross-examination (Whitcomb et al 1985:60). Of interest is the fact Il,at Ille interview must be 
conducted by a non-attorney. The legislative view seems to be that "questioning by non-lawyers enhances the 
reliability of the interview" (Dziech and Schudson 1989: 149). 
Although these videotape statutes in Texas, Kentucky and Louisiana require that a child be available to testify, it 
does not necessarily require that ille child has to testify (Dziech and Schudson 1989: 150). Although the child must 
be available at the trial to testify , the state is not required to produce the cilild when it leads its evidence and it is 
usually left to Ille defence to call Ille child for cross-examination. In practi ce, what has happened is that the defence 
does not actually call the child to give evidence. According to interviews conducted with prosecutOrs by Whitcomb 
(1992: 158) the reason for ulis appears to be tbat the defence is afraid that the members of the jury will regard this 
action as being unnecessarily harmful for the child , or that the child will tell ule same story as on the videotape and 
this will simply selve to bolster Ule evidence against the accused. Although ule U.S. Supreme Court has not mled 
directly on this issue of videotaped evidence, the decision in Idaho v Wright , 110 S.Ct.31 39 (1990) seems to 
suggest that illese videotaped statements will be inadmissible unless the child gives evidence and is cross-examined. 
In Idaho v Wright supra the question to be decided by the U.S. Supreme Court was whether certain types of 
hearsay were admissible despite the Confrontation Clause. The trial court allowed a paediatrician to give evidence 
about certain statements which had been made to him by a two and a half year old complainant during Il,e cnurse 
of an interview (at 3141). The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, found the evidence to be inadmissible and set 
Out a two part test to deternline when hearsay would be admissible in a sexual abuse case: 
1. it will be admissible if it falls under a "finnly rooted " exception to ille hearsay mle (at 3147); 
n. it will be admissible if it does not fall under a "finnly rooted" exception but where it is supported hy 
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness (at 3 147). 
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In view of Ihi s leSl, il would appear thaI videotaped stalements will rarely, if ever, be admissible. The reasons for 
Ihis are explained hy Graham (1985:57) as follows: 
"lr is extremely doubtful dJat a child's stalemenl 10 a police officer, social worker, or someone 
specially !rained to interview children will be found 10 possess equivalent circumstantial 
guarantees of trustworthiness, whether or not the statement was videotaped or Otherwise recorded. 
The Ilomlal timing of such an interview, its investigative function , the frequent use of suggestive 
questions by a person in audlOrity , and dIe fact dJat dIe child will usually llave made several 
earlier statements, relating to the alleged sexual contact all miligate against admissibility." 
In the IwO pan tesl referred to above, dIe second exception requires that there muSI be 'particularised guaranlees 
of trustworthiness' . The Idaho Supreme Court suggested a number of guidelines which could provide dlese 
guarantees, such as videotaping dIe interview wilh the child (odler suggestions were that the interviewer have no 
prior knowledge of dIe matter and dlat no leading questions be asked). The U.S. Supreme Court held at 3148 drat 
a[{hough dlese procedural safeguards may enhance the reliability of the child's hearsay slatement , they rejected dlis 
approach and refused 10 lay down a 'preconceived and artificial liUlIUS teSl for Ihe procedural propriely of 
professional illlerviews in which children make hearsay SlalemenlS againsl a defendan! ' (al 3 148) . 
In states which do nOt have legislarion governing dIe admissibility of videotaped interviews, the latter have been 
introduced under existing rules of evidence. In Minnesota, for instance, where there is no videotape legislation, 
a videotape of a child 's stalement has been introduced as a prior consistent statemellllO rebut charges of recent 
fabrication in Hennepin Co v Sullivan, Min.Court of Appeals, Cx-84-807 , January 8, 1985 (Whitcomb et al 
1985:61) . The videotape of the initial interview has also been uscd as corroboration for expert opinions that are 
challenged in court. If the defence were to challenge the opinion of the expert or the evidence of the initial 
interviewer, the prosecution could introduce the videotape to support the expert or the interviewer. As MacFarlane 
(1985: 144) explains, "the tape serves as a vehicle for dispute resol ulioll by providing an objeclive way to counter 
the alleged bias or inaccuracy of the expert 's opinion of the witness" . It may be necessary in certain circumstances 
(0 obtain Ihe eonse", of bolll altorneys to admil 1I1e videotape and to ensure that 1l1e defence has access to it before 
it is introduced in coun. 
3.4.3.5.4 Admissibility of Videotaped Evidence 
The majority of dIe slalutes which endorse the use of videotapes provide thaI the videolapes will ollly be admissible 
where giving evidence in court wi ll be traumatic for the child. If dIe child is capable of giving evidence ill COUf{, 
there is no need for the videotape to be admitted (Myers 1987:390). 
In State v Warford, 223 Neb.368, 389 N.W.2d 575 ( 1986) the COUf{ held at 581 Ihat unless there was evidence of 
"a compelling need 10 protect Ihe child from further hartn " , Ihe videotape would infringe Ihe defendanl's 
constitutional righlS and could not be admitted. An attempt was Illade 10 lead Ihe child 's evidence in open court. 
but the four year old refused to co-operare. She was dlen permitted to give evidence by means of closed-cireuil 
television. The Nebraska Supreme Court reversed the conviction because the trial proceedings had not shown that 
"Ihe child would be further traumatised or was inrimidated by testifying in the courtroom in fro", of dIe defenda"," 
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(58 1-2). So . although the court acknowledged the constitutionality of giving evidence by closed-circuit television. 
even where tilere was no statutory authority to do , tile court was of the opi nion that there had to be a compell ing 
need before use could be made of such technology . 
How then must the court evaluate whether there is such a "compelling need" . Some of tile statutes set out the 
factOrs which the court should take into consideration wben coming to such a decision . Others are vaguer, an 
example being the video statute in Arkansas which simply says there muSt be a showing "of good cause" before 
the videotape can be admitted (Myers 1985:390). Generally. in the absence of any statutory criteria, tile courts 
simply evaluate all the circumstances of the particular case. 
Myers (1 987:391-2) sets out a summary of tile type of factors which tile courts take into account when detennining 
whether there will be any potential haml to the child in giving evidence in court: 
1. The comts look at the age of the child. The younger the child , the more likely it will be for the child to 
be tralUllatised by the proceedings. Admittedly these factors are broad generalisations. but Lbe court will 
take them into account in the light of each case. 
ii. The child 's level of development is considered as a factOr. 
iii. The court will look at Lbe child 's ability to understand the significance of what is happening and to di scuss 
it. 
iv . The fact tllat the child is afraid of the accused will be a consideration that tile court will take into account. 
In People. Henderson , 132 Misc.2d 51 , 503 N.Y.S. 2d 238 (County Ct. 1986) the six and seven year 
old victims of the accused had heen threatened hy him and were afraid of him. They feared that he would 
send monsters after them and there was evidence tlJat the children were having nightmares involving 
monsters. [n People v Johnsoll supra the child victim had been seriously injured by the accused and was 
too scared to give evidence in his presence at the trial. [n tile course of making the video deposition, the 
accused was asked to leave the room and the child was Lben able to testify. The court noted at 315 that 
"the five-year-old 's reticence in defendant' S presence and the improvement in her testimony upon his 
removal better demonstrates tile necessity of the procedure than could tile opinion of any expert". 
v. The court takes into account whether the child suffers from a handicap or disability. 
VI. If the child is particularly susceptible to psychological hartn as a result of giving evidence. this will be 
taken into account by the court in their detenninatiol1. 
vn. The fact tI,at tile child's reaction to the abuse is beyond what is nonnally encountered in such cases is an 
important factor to be considered. 
vnl. Another consideration is whether the child blames himself for tile abuse. 
lX. The court wi ll also look at the number of times the child has had to testify or the number of interviews 
the child has undergone, and how the child responded in these instances. 
x. Related to the factor of the child 's fear, is the consideration whether any threats have been made to dle 
child or the child 's family. These dlreats would include anyLbing from threats of bodily hann, 
incarceration, and removal of the child to the dissolution of the family. 
Xl. The court will look at the nature of Ole offence committed, wheOler any dangerous weapon was used. how 
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bad the acts were and whether any physical injury was infl icted on the chi ld. A fu rther facto r is whether 
the offence was one of an ongoi ng nature over an extended period of time. 
Xll . The accused's behaviour at the trial may be a fac tor which makes it diffi cult for the child to give evidence 
at the trial. 
X 111. The court will look at the relationship between dIe accused and the child and whedler the accused holds 
any position of authority over the child . In State v DanieLs , 484 So.2d 941 (La.Ct. App. 1986) the court 
held at 944 that the fact that the accused is a child witness's parent may increasc the need for giving 
evidence on videotape. In Commonwealth v Ludwig, Sup .Ct. Pa, nO.02883 (Philadelphia, 1987) a li ve 
year old had to give evidence against her fa ther in an alleged case of sexual assault. The child froze and 
was unable to give evidence in her father' s presence. She was allowed lO give evidence via closed-circuit 
television and the accused was subsequently convicted. On appeal dIe Pennylvallia Superior Court held 
at 13 dm the "right to confront does not confer upon an accused the right to int imidatc. The reliabili ty 
of an abused child 's testimony does not depend upon his or her abi lity to withstand the psychological 
trauma of testi fying in a courtroom under the unwavering gaze of a parent who, although a possible abuser, 
has also heen provider, pro tector and parent". 
XlV. The attitude of other members of the famil y towards dIe offence or towards the child is also a consideration 
that the court will take into accoum. 
xv. Further facto rs that are of importance are whether dIe accused was living in the same house as the r:hild 
when the offence was cOllullitted. whedler he has access to the chi ld and whether he financially supports 
the child. 
xv\. If dIe child has been ahused before, die COurt wi ll take th is into accoull! . 
XVI I. The coun will take into consideration whether the chi ld has shown any symptoms of post-traumatic stress 
disorder or any other mental disorder. The fo llowing are some of the more usual symptoms that are 
presented to court: withdrawal , regression, gui lt , anxiety, stress, nightmares, lack of self-esteem, mood 
changes . compulsive behaviours, phobias, problems at school. anti-social hehaviour and t!Jluresis. In 
ChappeL v State , 18 Ark. App . 26, 71 0 S. W. 2d 2 14 (1986) evidence was led that the child was suffe ring 
from enuresis due to the latter's fear of tes ti fy ing. 
The mOSt important consideration is going to be whether the child will experience any psychological harm from 
test ifyi ng, and the ex tem of this ham!. In llIany cases an expert witness will be called to give evidence as to the 
above fac tors, but it is not essential dlat an expert has to be called to give evidence. 
3.4.4 Videotaped Evidence and the Confrontation Clause 
As discussed earlier, the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides that the accused is entitled to be 
confronted with witnesses who give evidence against him. The question that has to be addressed is to what ex tem 
the use of technology interferes with tile accused 's rights. 
Some of the video statutes impose severe restrictions on the defendaIH 's right to face-ta-face confrontation in the 
case of child wi tnesses. The Arizona, Kentucky and Texas statutes provide that while tile child 's evidence is bei ng 
133 
videotaped "the coun shall pemlit the defendalll to observe and hear Ule testimony of the minor in person but shall 
ellsure that the minor calUlot hear or see the defendant". III terols of these statutes confrontation is eliminated in 
every case where videotaped evidence is used (Myers 1985:393). The Kentucky statute authorising videotapes came 
under attack in Commonwealth v Willis , 716 S.W. 2d 224 (Ky . 1986) on the grounds that it was ullconstitutional 
since it eliminated confrontation. The majority of the court held that the statute was not unconstitutional. However, 
three judges strongly dissented Ulat Ule statute was unconstitutional as it did deprive the accused of th is right to 
confront wi messes. 
OU,er statutes show a preference for face-to-face confrontation and they give the trial court the authority to modi fy 
this confrontation in appropriate cases or dispense with it , if necessary. This approach is to be found is the New 
York Criminal Procedure Law 565 .20 (12) which provides: 
"When the court has detennined that Ivideo testimony in a room outside the courtroom is needed 
because] a child witness is a vulnerabl e child witness, it shall make a specific funding as to 
wheUler placing the defendant and the child wi!Jtess in the same room during the tes timony of the 
child witness will cOlllribute to the li kelihood Ulat the child witness will suffe r severe mental or 
emotional hann. If the coun ftnds that placing the defendant and the child witness in the same 
room during the testimony of the chi ld witness will contribute to the likelillOod that U,e child 
witness will suffer severe mental or emotional haml , the [court shall order] that Ule defendant 
remain in dIe courtroom during the testimony of the vulnerable child witness". 
The Veml01ll Rule of Evidence 807 (I) provides: 
"During the recording of testimony ... the defendant shall be situated in such a way that the child 
can hear and see the defendant unless the coun finds that requiring ule child to hear and see the 
defendant presents a substantial risk of trawHa to the child which would substantially impair the 
ability of the child to testify , in which case the court may order that ule defendant be situated in 
such a way Utat the child calmot hear or see ule defendant ". 
Tlte relevant Florida Statute provides that "[tlhe defendant and Ule defendant' s counsel shall be present at the 
videotaping. unless the defendant has waived this right. The court may require the defendant to view tlte testimony 
from outside the presence of the child by means of a two-way mirror or anotJler similar method that will ensure 
that the defe ndant can observe and hear ule testimony of the child in person. but that the child cannot hear or see 
the defendant ". Myers (1987:394) argues dlat statutes which preserve confrontation where possible are to be 
preferred to those which automatically eliminate confrontation. 
A nwnber of statutes authorising videotaped evidence provide Utat a suppon person may be present to accompany 
the child during the taping (Myers 1987:394). 
In evaluating the use of videOlaped evidence in tem1S of the confrontation clause, it will have to be detennined 
whether the elements of confrontation are infringed at all. The three elements of confrontation, as discussed supra, 
are; cross-examination; the jury must be able co observe tile demeanour of the witness; and there must be face-tn-
face confro ntation between Ule witness and Ule defendant (Myers 1987:395). 
In some instances videotaped evidence will comply with all the requirements of confrontation. An example of this 
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is where a child gives evidence via closed-circuit television. The child will give evidence from a room outside the 
coun, but the child 's image will be transmitted to the courtroom as he gives evidence so the jury will be able to 
observe his demeanour as he testifies. The accused will be able to see the child on the monilOr and the child will 
be able 10 see Ihe accused, thus satisfying the requirement of face-to-face confrontalion. Cross-examination lakes 
place as usual, thereby complying widl the requisites of the confrontation clause (Myers 1987:395). In State v 
Sheppard supra the New Jersey Superior Coun held that , even though there was no eye contact between dle child 
and the defendant, there was no denial of the right to confrontation where the court could see and hear the child 
clearly all the videotape and the accused was given an opportunity to cross-examine the child. As far as (he 
demeanour of d,e witness is concerned, dle coun in California v Green supra held that the purpose of observing 
witnesses is to assess their credibili ty. In People v Moran, 39 Cal.App.3d 398, 114 Cal.Rptr. 413 (1974) the coun 
held at 420: "Videotape is sufficiently similar to live testimony 10 pernlit the jury to properly perfornl its funclion. " 
Some critics have argued that the confrontation clause actually contemplated that the face-to-face confrontation 
should take place in the same room. Myers (1987:396) discards this as "a hollow argument ", saying dlat simply 
because dIe present technology was not foreseen by the legislators at dle time that dley enacted the applicable 
legislation is not a good reason for excluding video evidence. This particular argumem was raised by dIe coun in 
Commonwealth v Willis supra al 230-31: 
"In the Eighteenth and Nineteendl Centuries, live testimony was dIe only way that a jury could 
observe the demeanour of a witness. The use of videotapes does not represent a significant 
deparrure from that tradition hecause the goal of providing a view of the wi tness's demeanour 1O 
the jury is still achieved. A witlless has never been disqualified by mere refusal or inability to 
look at the defendant. The testimony of a blind victim would not be invalid. The same is true 
for dIe testimony of a witness who refuses to look on the accused. By analogy a defendant would 
Ilot be denied the right of confrontation when a young victim is so intimidated by his mere 
presence that she cannot testify unless she is unable to see or hear him. 
The strength of dIe State and Federal Constitutions lies in the fact that they are flexihl e documents 
which are able to grow and develop as our society progresses. The purpose of a criminal or civil 
proceeding is to detemline the truth. [The new law I provides such a statutory plan while 
protecting the fundamental interests of the accused as well as the victim". 
However, certain fonns of video evidence do not comply with all three elements of the confrontation clause. In 
some, altllOugh the accused can see the child, dle child is not able to see the defendant. thereby elimillating face-lO-
face confrontation. in others, accused's counsel is not present in the room with the child when the lauer gives 
evidence, or accused's counsel is present ill the room but as the accused is nor present counsel is not ahle to he in 
the same room as his client. Where evidence is taken by means of video deposition , the jury is not given an 
opportunity to observe the demeanour of the child at the time that the latter gives evidence (Myers 1987: 396). In 
the majorilY of instances where use is made of videotaped evidence, there will be some infringement of the 
confrontation clause. The question that arises is bow great must the infringement be hefore it oversteps the 
constitutiollallimits. 
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3.4.5 Videotaped Evidence and face-to-face Confrontation 
In mOSt cases of videotaped evidence the infringemem relates to lack of face-to-face confrontation hetween the 
witness and dIe accused. This question arose in United States v Benfield supra where the accused was charged with 
ahducting an adult female. The trial court authorised the use of a pre-trial videotaped depositi on because the victim 
suffered from psychiatric problems related to her abduction and her dlerapist testified that she should not be allowed 
to face the accused. The trial court dlen adopted a procedure whereby the accused was excluded from the room 
in which the deposition wok place. The accused was allowed to see what was happening in the room via a monitOr, 
and he was linked [0 his counsel, who was present in the room where the deposition was beiIlg taken , hy means 
of a buzzer. Counsel was allowed 10 cross-examine the victim , aldlOugh tbe latter was unaware that dle accused 
was in the building. The Court of Appeal beld that this procedure had violated dle accused's right 10 confro m 
witnesses who gave evidence against him. At 821 the coun held that: 
"the right to confromation includes a face-ta-face meeting at trial at which time cross-examination 
takes place... Most believe dlat in some undefined but real way recollection, veracity, and 
conununication are influenced by fac e-to-face challenge. This feature is part of the sixth 
amendment right additional to the right of cold , logical cross-examination by one's counsel." 
This decision implies dJat the use of videotaped evidence of child witnesses will he severely limited since the 
accused has a right to face-tO-face confromation. There are a number of decisions which explicitly state dlat the 
confrontationl11ust he face-to-face in person. In Ohio v Roberls supra it was referred to at 63 as "[t[he requirement 
of personal presence" and in California v Green supra confrontat ion was defined at 146 as an "opponunity to 
challenge his accuser in a face-ta-face encounter in front of the trier of factn • In the earl y decision of Kirby v 
United States supra the right was described as being dle right to look upon dle witness while he was being tried 
(at 55) , and in Mattox v United States supra it was referred to at 244 as the advantage "of seeing the wiUless face-
to-face" . 
Two Californian decisions have followed the strict requirements for confrontation as set out in Benfield's case 
supra. In Hocll"eiser v Superior Courl supra the trial court authorised that the evidence of two child witnesses 
be videotaped with the children giving evidence from outside tbe courtroom, aldlOugh they could ohserve the 
defendam on a monitor. The California Court of Appeals beld that the trial court did not have the authority to 
allow the videotaped evidence since the Sixth Amendment guaranteed a right to "physical confro ntat ion" at 278. 
After this decision dIe California legislature enacted California Penal Code S 1 347 (West 1986) in 1985 which 
authorised the use of videotaped evidence in certain instances (Myers 1987:398). 
In Herberl v Superior Court supra d,e presiding officer directed d,at the accused be seated in such a way that he 
could hear hut not see tlle witness, who was a fiv e year old girl against whom the accused was alleged (0 have 
committed cenain sexual offences. The accused appealed against dIe decision on the grounds that his right to 
confrontation had indeed been violated. The California Coun of Appeal found that hi s right to confrontation had 
heen violated and at 855 explained dIe basis of their decision as follows: 
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"The historical concept of the right of conframation has included the right to see one's accusers 
face-to-face, thereby giving ule fact-finder the opportunity of weighing the demeanour of the 
witness when forced to make his or her accusation before the Olle person who knows if the 
witness is truthful. A witness's reluctance to face the accused may he a product of fabrication 
rather than fear or embarrassment. " 
There are two ways in which a move could be made away from the strict interpretation in Benfield supra. Firstly, 
the language used in the Benfield decision supra does allow cenain exceptions to the ru le that there mUSt be face-to-
face confrolllation. The court held that this right to face-to-face confrontation could be limited in certain 
circumstances although these exceptions "should be narrow in scope and based on necessity or waiver" (at 82 1). 
According to Myers (1987: 398-9), cases dealing with c1lild abuse litigation would fall within these exceptions. 
Many children find ule process of facing somebody who has hurt them as heing both illlimidating and traumati c. 
A child differs fram an adult in size, dependence, powerlessness and vulnerability, and this renders a child far more 
susceptible to threats and intimidation. In cases like these the standard of necessity as set out in Benfield's case 
would be satisfied. 
The other line of argument alleges dlat the Benfield decision simply over-emphasized the importance of the 
accused's right to face-to-face confrontation. Myers (1987:399) argues that the rights to confrontation include three 
elements and the IllOS t important of these. as accepted hy court decisions, is the right to cross-examination. Second 
ill order of imparlance is the requirement that the jury be able to observe the witness as the latter gives evidence 
ro evaluate his demeanour. The least important element from a constitutional perspective is the right of the accused 
to confront the witness face-to-face. 
In People v Tennant , 43 1 U.S. 91 8 (1977) the trial court admitted dIe preliminary hearing evidence of a state 
witness wito had died before the trial. The U.S. Supreme court held that the confrontation clause had not been 
violated, and endorsed the ohservation of Wigmore that "the advalltage obtained by the personal appearance of the 
witness at trial is secondary. however, and is as a resul t accidentally associated with the process of confrontation" . 
The basis of ule belief in confrontation, as melllioned earlier, is assumed to be that it is more difficult to lie about 
someone who is in the same room. There is, however, little empirical evidence (0 suppOrt this assumption. The 
Supreme Court has admitted that the right of confrontation can yield to competing interests in cerrain circumstances. 
The right of the accused to confrontation must he balanced against Ihe need for accurate evidence and the trauma 
experienced by dIe child in facing the accused. The basis of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure the accuracy 
of ule tntth-detenllining process, and "Idlispensing with face-to-face confrolllatioll in selected cases does not 
frustrate that objective" (Myers 1987:400). 
The accused's right to cOllfrolltation is not absolute and wi ll , in certain circumstances, yield to competi ng illterests. 
In Mattox v United States supra the Court first recoglllsed an exception to the accused' s right to full face-to-face 
confrontation, admittillg at 243 that the confrontation rights "must occasionall y give way to considerations of public 
policy and the necessities of the case". More recelltly th is was accepted by the U .S. Supreme Court in Ohio v 
Robens supra where at 64 it was stated that "Itlhe Coun , however, has recognized Ihat competing interes ts, if 
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'closely examined ', may warrant dispensing with confrontation at trial ". In State v larzbek , 529 A.2d 1245 (Conn. 
1987) the COlmecticut Supreme Court held that an accused may be removed from a complainant' s presence during 
videotaping when "the state has demonstrated a compelling need... The state must show that the minor victim 
would be so intimidated or otherwise inhibited , by tile physical presence for the defendant that the trustworthiness 
of the victim 's testimony would be seriously called into question" (at 1255). 
The State as parens patriae has a compelling interest to protect children, especially in the contex t of ahuse (Myers 
1987:401). This interest has been endorsed by the U.S. Supreme Court in New York v Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 
(1982) at 757 where the court explained that "[tlhe prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse of children 
constitutes a governmental objective of surpassing importance". Since videotaped evidence assists vulnerable 
children by removing the trauma of in-court testimouyand enables children, who would not he ahle to give evidence 
in court, to do so, tile legal system is being made available to this minority group which the state has an interest 
in protecting (Myers 1987:40 I) . In Maryland v Craig, 76 Md.App. 250, 544 A.2d 784 ( 1988) , 316 Md. 551, 560 
A.2d 1120 (1989), 110 S.C!. 3157 (1990) tile Court at 3 167 explained that "a State'S interest in tile physical and 
psychosocial well-being of child abuse victims may be sufficiently important to outweigh, at least in some cases, 
a defel1dam 's right to face his or her accusers in court" . 
A further compelling interest which tile state, as parens patriae has, is to ensure that tilere is effective law 
enforcement, as explained by the court in Ohio v Robelts supra at 64. Videotaped evidence is one way of ensuring 
tilis illlerest as it enables children, who would normally nOt be able to give evidence in court, to do so and thereby 
enables more children to give evidence, especially in cases where other evidence is rarely avai lable (Myers 
1987:401). 
The argwllent is, therefore , that any infringement of the accused's rights is not automatically unconstitutional. 
Rather, the Court has to baJance the state's interest in protecting children and ensuring effective law eoforcemenr 
agai nst any infringements of the accused' s constitutional rights. According to Myers ( 1987:401-2) when the Couf! 
attempts to balance these conflicting interests, it must determine which right is being infringed and to what extent, 
laking into account the scale of importance namely thal cross-examination is more important than the jury being 
allowed to observe the witness's demeanour which in turn is more important that tile right of the accused to face-to-
face confromatiotl widl the witness. 
These specific questions have come before the U.S . Supreme Court recently. In Coy v Iowa , supra the issue hefore 
the court was whether a screen, used to shield a child complainant from tile accused, had infringed tile lauer's right 
to confrontation. The accused was charged with sexually assaulting two tilirteen year old girls who had been 
camping in the backyard of a house adjacent to his. At the onset of tile trial , the state applied for the girls to give 
evidence via closed-circuit television or from behind a screen in tenus of a recentl y enacted section of the Iowa 
Code, which created a presumption that courtroom testimony of sexual abuse victims ill the presence of tbe accused 
was trawlIatic for tilese children and allowed the court to invoke procedures to shield the child from directly viewi ng 
the accused (Gordon 1992:62). The application was successful and the girls gave evidence from behind a SCreen 
which was set up in such a way that the jury could observe dtem as they testified. The j udge allowed dle use of 
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the screen without first detemlining whedler the two girls did in fact need the screen. The accused could diml y 
see dIe girls and was able to hear their ev idence, but the girls could not see him. 
The accused was convicted and subsequentl y appealed to the Supreme Court of Iowa on the ground that hi s right 
to confrontation had been violated. This court confinued the trial court 's decision, fi nding that the accused's right 
had not been violated since he had fully cross-examined the girlS who had given evidence under oath in open court. 
The appeal went to the U.S. Supreme Court where the main issue was whether the accused 's right to confrontation 
had been violated by dIe fact that the girls had nOt been able to view him while dley gave evidence. He furdler 
argued iliat any infringement of his rights could only be justified where dlere was a 'compelling' state interest and 
could not be justified by a blanket presumption of trauma. The Supreme Court , in overturning the decision, 
emphasized dbat the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation entails a strong preference that confrontation between 
the wi tness and dIe accused be "face-to-face" Cat 857) . Any exception to this presumption in favour of face -to-tilce 
confrontation would have to be based on a case-specific finding of trauma, instead of a general preswuption, as set 
out d,e Lowa Code, dlat facing dIe accused would be traumatic. 
Judge Scalia, in his majority judgement, explained at 1014 that the Confrontation C lause guaranteed dIe accused 
a face-to-face meeting with witnesses and he based this opilllon on the fact that" .. . there is something deep in human 
nature thal regards face-to-face confrontation between accused and accuser as 'essemial to a fa ir trial in a criminal 
prosecution'" (1015). He was of the opilllon dlat potential emotional upset of a wimess was not a sufficiem ground 
fo r making exceptions to the face- to-face confrontation clause, and wrote that "face-to-face presence may, 
unfortulJately , upset dIe truthful rape victim or abused child ; but by dbe same token it may confound and undo the 
fal se accuser, or reveal the child coached by a malevolent adult. It is a truism dlat constitutional protecti on have 
COSts ". Cat 2802). He concluded that dIe one-way screen had violated dIe accused's Sixth Amendmelll rights 
because there had been "no individualized findings dlat these particular wimesses needed special protection ". 
However, dIe decision does not imply that the use of screens or closed-circuit television will always be 
unconstitutiolJalor even dtat the statute itselfis unconstitutional. The decision implies that the error was the judge' s 
in that he applied dIe statute before a need to use it was proved. This can be seen from dbe judgement of Justice 
Sandra Day O'ConJlor at 1019: 
"While I agree wi dl the Court dtat the Confrontation Clause was violated in dlis case, I wish to 
make clear that nodling in today 's decision necessarily dooms such efforts by state legislatures to 
proleCt child witnesses ... I would pennit use of a particular trial procedure that called for 
something other than face-to-face confrontation if that procedure was necessary to further an 
important public policy. The protection of child witnesses is, in my view and in the view of a 
substantial majority of the States, just such a policy . . . if a court makes a case-specific finding of 
necessi ty, our cases suggest that dIe strictures of the Confrontation Clause may give way to dIe 
compelling state interest of protecting child witnesses. " 
Justice Blackmwll, in his dissenting OpilllOIl , argued dtat the Confrontation Clause establi shes only a preference for 
face-to- face confrontation, saying that" . .. the ability of a witness to see the defendant while the witness is testifying 
does nOl constitute an essential part of dIe protection afforded by dIe Confrontation Clause . .. " Cat 1021 ). He 
explained at 1019 that dIe essential elements of confrontation is "the right to be shown that the accuser is real and 
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Ihe righl 10 probe accuser and accusation [i. e. cross-examination by counsel! in front of the trier of facI [j udge or 
jury[. " 
Only one monul laler a Maryland Appeal Court became Ule firsl 10 apply tbe decision in Coy v Iowa. In 
Marylalld v Craig supra the accused , a day care operalOr, was charged with having committed cerlain sexual 
offences upon a six year old girl. This was based on certain disclosures made by Ihe little girl, Brooke, 10 a 
Iherapist and dIe results of a medical examinalion which revealed a scarred hymen (al 255). Brooke was allowed 
to lestify via closed circuil television in tenus of s9- 102(a)(I)(ii) of the Maryland Courts and ludicial Proceedings 
Code. The trial court heard evidence from professionals wbo had treated or interviewed Brooke and dlree adler 
child witnesses, and came to the conclusion that Ihe chi ldren would experience emotional trauma if they had to give 
evidence in Ihe presence of dIe accused and this would make it difficult for the children to conmlUnicate effectively. 
Brooke teslified from the judge's chambers in the presence of the prosecutor, dIe accused's counsel and a 
technician. The accused's. one of her attorneys , a prosecutor and the judge remained in the courtroom with the 
jury. The accused was linked to her counsel via a private telephone. The child was cross-examined by defence 
counsel. 
The accused was convicted and appealed 10 the Maryland Court of Special Appeals, arguing that her constilutional 
right to confront the witness had been violated by the use of closed circuit television. The court did not accepI these 
arguments and affinned the cOllviction, holding that the righl 10 confrontation is not absolule and that it was 
"necessary to further an important public policy" (a t 260). The accused then appealed 10 the Court of Appeals of 
Marylaud which reversed the convic tion and remanded for a new trial , finding that the Irial j udge did nOI meet Ihe 
standards laid down in Coy v Iowa supra since he had not made a particularised finding dlat the children would 
experience emotional distress in the presence of the accused. The Coun of Appeals rejected the accused's argument 
that Ihe Confrontation Clause required d,at there had to be a face-to-face courtroom encounter between dIe accuser 
and accused. but found that in the panicular case ule showing made by the state was insufficient to reach ule high 
Ihreshold required by s9-102(a)(I )(ii) which provides that ule judge must detemline "Ulat testimony by the child 
victim ill the CourtrOom will result in the child suffering serious emotional distress such that the child calUlot 
reasonably conununicate". They were of the opinion dlat the judge should have conducted a preliminary hearing 
with the children in the presence of the accused to detenuine whether they could give evidence in her presence. 
The constitutiolJali ty of the Maryland statute was then brought before the U.S. Supreme Coun. The la tter held , 
in a 5-4 decision, that dIe right to face-to-face confrontation is not absolute and may be ahridged upon a finding 
of an important state interes t. luslice O'COtulOr, for the majori ty, explained at 3163-4 that "although we reaffiml 
the importance of face-to-face confrontation with witnesses appearing at trial, we canuot say that such confro ntation 
is an indispensable element of the Sixdl Amendment'S guarantee of the right to confront one's accuser". At 3157 
she concluded as follows: 
"[thel confrontation clause did not categorically prohibit [al child witness in [a] child abuse case 
frOIll testifying against the defendant at a trial , outside [of the] defendant 's physical presence, by 
a ile-way closed circuit television; [the] finding of necessily ... had to be made on [a[ case specific 
basis; but. .. observation of [al child's behavior in [thel defendant 's presence and exploration of 
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less restrictive alternatives ... were not categorical prerequisites ... as a matter of federal 
cOllsti tutionallaw. " 
The Supreme Court held that the trial court must make a case-specific finding that the child needs to be protected. 
This determination must he based 0 11 three factors: 
I. a hearing must be held and evidence heard ill each case to detelTIline whether the use of closed-circuit 
television is necessary to protect the child; 
11 . the court must make a finding that dIe child will be traumatised specifi cally by bei ng in the presence of 
the accused and nOt by the courtroom generally; 
iii . there must also be a finding that the emotional trawna suffered by the child must be move than de minimis 
i.e. more that the nervousness or excitemem ordinarily present when testifying and not just a reluctance 
to testify (at 3169). 
However, the court refused to insist that the trial court observe the child 's demeanour in the presence of the accused 
before allowing dIe cltild to give evidence via closed-circuit television (at 3171). 
The U.S. Supreme Court sent the case back to the Maryland Court of Appeals to reconsider dIe matter in the light 
of dleir decision . The Maryland Court reheard dIe case in Craig v Maryland, no.IIO, Spring Teml 1988 (Court 
of Appeals of Maryland, April 8, 1991) and upheld their earlier ruling dlat the procedures adopted by the trial 
j udge did not compl y widl dle Supreme Court's criteria of an individuali sed finding that the child witness wi ll 
experience emarional trauma. At 12 they held "when the trial judge made his .. . finding that allUlOrized dle lise of 
closed-circuit television, he had U,e benefit only of expert testimony on the ability of the children to communicate; 
he did oa t question any of dle children Ilimself. nor did he observe any child's behaviour on the witness stand 
before making his mling ". 
The consti tutionality of the Maryland statlltealso came before dIe courts in Wildermuth v State , 3 10 Md. 496, 530 
A.2d 275 ( 1987) where the chief witness, the victim of abuse, was dIe nine year old daughter of the accused. The 
latter objected to the state's request to make use of dle statute and allow the child to give evidence via closed-circuit 
television. arguing dlat the statute violated dle Confrontation Clause. The Maryland Court of Appeals fo und [hat 
(he Statute was not unconstitutional, although the requirements set out ill the section were not satisfied in the 
particular case. 
In suumlary, dlerefore, the position as laid down by the Supreme Court is dlat dle presiding judge must make an 
individualised finding d,at a particular child wi tness will be hamled psychologically by giving evidence face-to-face 
in the presence of the accused. Although the Supreme Court refused to lay down wbat evidence had to be presented 
in order to make such a finding, dley nevertheless stated that dle trial court must find tilat the witness was 
traumatized by the presence of the accused and the emotional dist ress must be more than ordinary nervousness or 
exci tement or reluctance to testify. 
141 
Although tlle U.S . Supreme Court in Craig supra found tl,at there must be a case-specific finding of necessity in 
each case, Pershkow (199 1:942) argues that tlle decision is nevertheless a broad one. It "e ffectively declares as 
constitutional all state child protection statutes that can still preserve certain elements of confrontation ". The latter 
would include the following: tlle child must be competent to testify and mUSt do so under oath; the accused must 
have full opportunity to cross-examine the child ; and the judge, jury and accused must be able to view (including 
via video moni tor) the demeanour of the witness as the latter testifies. The Court in Craig avoided tlle language 
in Coy supra that strongly favoured an absolute right to face-to-face confrontation, and focused primarily on 
possible exceptions . This, Pershkow ( 1991:942) explains, "has returned confrontation clause juri sprudence to the 
line of precedent tJlat alertly and properly recognized the need for limitations on tJle right to confront one' s 
accusers" . 
3.4,5,1 Criteria for Determining Emotional Trauma 
There is general agreemem tJIat tl,e court is entilled to make use of protective measures where tlle child would 
suffer "uureasonahle mental and emotional harm "if testifying, according to Vigil v Tansy , 9 17 F.2d 1277 ( IOtll 
Circ. 1990) at 1279 and the court emphasised that there had to be an individualised , case-specific finding of hann . 
The CourtS have insisted that the finding must be case-speci fi c. In People v Henderson , 554 N. Y.S . 2d 924 (A .D. 
2 Dept. 1990) the Appeal Coun reversed a babysitter's conviction hecause tlle trial coun had based their finding 
of the children' s need to give evidence via closed-circuit television solely on an expert's testimony that all sexually 
abused children would benefit from this procedure, not the specific children involved in tJ,e case. 
In State v Self, 56 Ohio St. 3d 73,564 N.E. 2d 446 (1990) at451 tJle court stated tll3t there had to be "serious 
emotional trauma " and in State v Crandall, 120 N.J. 649, 577 A.2d 483 ( 1990) at 490 tllC criteria were described 
as "severe emotional or mental stress". However, in Leggett v State , 565 So.2d 3 15 (Fla. 1990) at 3 17 the court 
felt Ulat tllere had to be "at least moderate emotional or mental hamt ", which suggests a slightly lower standard Ulall 
the fonner cases. 
The Supreme COurt of Kansas in State v Chisholm , 250 Kan. IS3, 825 P.2d 147 (1992) set out the following 
factors which they believed should be used when detennining tile child 's capacily to tes tify in court in tJle presence 
of tbe accused: 
I. the probability tJ,at tlle child will suffer psychological injury if the child teslifies in court; 
II. the degree of tJle injury that is anticipated; 
III . whetller the anticipated psychological injury will be substantially greater than the reaction of the average 
victim of sexual violence. 
Another list of factors to be considered was set out by the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v Crandall supra 
at 490: 
1. the heinousness of the crime; 
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II. wheuler the child is particularly susceptible to psychological injury because of a pre-existing mental 
condition; 
Ill. whether the alleged abuser has any position of authority over the child; 
I v. Ule duration of the abuse; 
v. whether any weapon was used during the offence: 
V I. what physical hanll. if any, was inflicted upon the victim; 
vn . wheuler the child had been threatened in the event of reporting the alleged incident; 
Vlll. ule family relationship between tile victim and Ole accused; 
I X. whether the child has any history of chi ld abuse or incest. 
The different states vary in the factors that are required before face-to-face confrontation will be dispensed with. 
Some states require only a finding of "good cause", others require a finding of medical or oUler unavailability, and 
some even insist Ulat the child must have been harmed or violently threatened by the accused. A number of states 
actually stipulate the factors which judges have to consider when deciding to use close-circuit television or 
videotaped evidence (Wllitcolllb 1992: 155). 
What evidence will then be required to prove the above factors? What standards need to be complied with? 
At the original trial in Maryland v Craig supra several professionals gave evidence. One professional, a counsellor, 
testified that one of the victims with whom she had conducted a nlllllber of sessions would find it "very difficult 
if not impossible ... to sit in the saOle room widl Mrs. Craig and discuss the alleged abuse incidents , landl she would 
be unable to talk about what happened to her" (at 285). Gi ving evidence about anotiler of the alleged victims whom 
she had counselled, ule counsellor testified tilat he "would have great difficulty in ta lking in front of people, 
panicularly in from of Mrs Craig, whom he sees as a tilreatelung figure .. , he becomes agita ted and depressed ... 
bursts into tears and would be ullwilling or unable to proceed at that poinL .. land ) it would be necessary to remove 
the threatening agent. .. Ms. Craig" (at 286). She also testified, with regard to another victim whom she had 
counselled, that the lauer "perceived Ms Craig as having threatened her life and the li ves of her parents and her 
sibling .. . land] I believe that her fear would illlpair her ability to sit in front of that person or be in the same room 
with that person, Ishe) would be unable to discuss or to share with the requi red individuals that infonllatioll which 
she has to share regarding these allegations" (at 286). 
A psychologist, who had been counselling anouler of the alleged victims in the same case, tes tified Ulat if tile child 
were forced to give evidence in the presence of the accused, he would experience "an extreme level of high anxiety 
and distress . .. and that he exhibits ex treme regressive behaviour, dlUmb-sucking, you know , wanting ule blanket, 
wanting clingingness, extreme dependency , all dIOse kinds of behaviour. .. his ability to conmlUnicate would be 
grossly impaired if he were to testi fy in open court in the presence of Ms. Craig, ... land hi s] chanccs of 
cOllllllUlucating clearly would be enhanced if he were allowed to testify outside of Ms. Craig's presence" (at 286). 
In Siale v Self supra the alleged victim 's psychotherapist testified al 464 that "it would be extremely difficult for 
[tite victim) ... emotiOllally difficult for tilem to appear in COurt in the presence of her father and tell the COll rt what 
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occurred 10 her. I feel that it would be extremely traumatic for her and I obviously feel ~lat videotaping would 
definitely he to her advantage." In People v Guee, 164 A.D. 2d 946,560 N.Y.S. 2d 53 (2nd Dept. 1990),76 
N.Y.2d 986, 563 N.Y.S.2d 775,565 N.E. 2d 524 (1990) the trial court allowed the child to give evidence via 
closed-circuit television. In coming to this decision the court relied on the evidence of a social worker who 
specialised in working widl sexually abused children. The social worker testified at 56 that the offences had been 
committed in a particularly heinous manner; tllat tlle children were very young, aged 6 and 8; that the accused held 
a position of authority over the children; the mother had threatened the children that they would be responsible if 
their father went to prison; and the children were particularly susceptible 10 psychological hann because they felt 
that they had been abandoned by tlleir parents. 
It is clear from some cases that people who are not professionals, but who do have some knowledge of the child 's 
behaviour, may be allowed to give evidence. In State v Tafoya, 108 N.M. 1,765 P.2d 11 83 (N.M.App . 1988) the 
court was satisfied that a child should not face the accused after evidence was given by three experts and tlle 
children' s parents tllat testifying in court would cause the children "unreasonable and unnecessary haml". 
In Gilbert v Maryland, No.63, Spring Term, 1990 (Court of Appeals of Maryland , April 8, 1991 ) dle trial judge 
held a preliminary hearing at which the prosecutor and defence counsel were present but tlie accused, who was the 
stepfather of the twelve year old complainant , was excluded. The judge questioned the child and came to ti le 
conclusion that the child had difficulty testifying, and was terrified of tile accused. The judge refused to hear 
evidence from expert witnesses on tllis poiut and preferred to rely on her own observations . The judge then allowed 
the child to give evidence via two-way closed-circuit television. The Maryland Court of Appeals found the 
procedure to be correct explaining tlleir reasoning at 27: 
"The judgc made a case-specific finding of tile necessi ty for the child to testify out of the physical 
presence of the defendant. She personally observed, and carefully and fully interviewed, the child 
on the record. It is perfectly clear from ~le child's reaction to and responses to the judge's 
questions that dle presence of tbe defendant at the interview was not desirable because it would 
be harmful to tlle child . We hold tbat, in the circumstances here, the judge dit no t abuse her 
discretion in conducti ng tbe interview out of the presence of tlle defendant". 
From the Maryland v Craig decision supra it is clear that professionals will he required to give evidence to assist 
the court in detemli ning whether the trauma is severe eHough to allow face-ta-face confrontation to be dispensed 
witb. The above cases give some idea of what kind of evidence needs to be put before tlle coun, but it should be 
noted that the Supreme Court did Ilot give an opinion on how the experts should arrive at their conclusions or 
whether an objective second opinion was required. There is also no indication of how the conclusions of the experts 
were evaluated (GelUbala and Serritella 1992:21). 
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3.5 The Rule Against Hearsay and Child Witnesses 
3.5.1 Introduction 
Hearsay , according to American law, is defined as an out-of-court statement which is admitted in evidence to prove 
the trutll of its contents (Myers 1987:261). Rule 801(c) of the Federal Rules of Evidence defines hearsay as "a 
statement , other tllan one made by the declarant while tes tifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove 
the truth of the matter asserted" . 
The admissibility of hearsay statements becomes very important when dealing with child willlesses. As Myers 
(1987:260) points out, a 'significant proportion' of evidence from child witnesses comes ill the fOlm of out-of-court 
statements . In cases of sexual abuse, the admissihility of hearsay becomes even more crucial since the out-of-court 
statements by the children usually constitute the most important evidence. 
This evidence is often regarded as vitally important because tile statements made by the children are usually the only 
available evidence, since physical evidence is very rare in sexual abuse cases. The majority of these crimes arc 
non-violent in nature, such as petting, fingering . o ral sex etc. Added to this, is the fact that these crimes are of 
such a nature that they are usually perfomlcd in secret so there are no other witnesses, and, finally , children's 
memory fade with time (Myers 1987:260-1 ) . In the light of this, out-of-court statements made by children provide 
very important evidence. 
"In cases of child sexual abuse, the child 's out-of-court statements may be the most compelling 
evidence in the govenIDlent's arsenal. Indeed, hearsay may be the only evidence, since child 
sexual abuse frequently occurs in the absence of other witnesses or physical trauma to the child, 
and the child may be found incompetent or otherwise unavailable as a witness. But even the 
youngest, most inmlature sexual abuse victims often make casual, itUlocent remarks that are 
alarmingly accurate in their portrayal of sexual activities that should be unknown to a child. Such 
statements are usually inadmissible because they calUlot fit into the available exception categories. " 
(Whitcomb et al 1985:69). 
In practice, the most common form of hearsay evidence available in sexual abuse cases, is where the child victim 
makes a Statement to a mother or another adult about what happened. The mother (or other adult) gives evidence 
at the trial and the child' s statement is offered as evidence to prove the truth of tlle assertion where tlle child does 
not give evidence (Myers 1987 :262). In Alston v United States, 462 A.2d 1122 (D . C. 1983) a four year old child 
made a certain statement to adults in which she revealed the details of sexual abuse. At the trial the child did oat 
give evidence and these statements were held to be hearsay, and therefore inadmissible. Also in United States v 
Nick, 604 F.2d 1199 (9e1l Cire. 1979) a three year old made a statement to a physician describing a sexual assault. 
Since the child was unable to give evidence at the trial, the statement by the physician as to what the child had told 
him was held to be hearsay and inadmissible . 
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The general rule is that hearsay evidence is inadmissible because it is unreliable . It is excluded because it is 
generally less reliable than live testimony. [t consists of statements which are not made under oath , and dIe defence 
is not given an opportunity to cross-examine dIe origi nal utterer of dIe statement (Whitcomb et al 1985: 69) . Myers 
(1987 :275), quoti ng Weinstein , explains the reasoning for the inadmissibility of hearsay statements: 
"The orthodox approach - which , prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Ev idence, had been 
followed by a majority of courts - rejects all such statements offered substantively because their 
value depends ... on the credit of a declarant who was not under oath, not subject to demeanour 
observation by lhe trier and not exposed to cross-examination at the time he made his statement". 
According to Myers ( 1987:295-6) there are four risks involved in accepting hearsay evidence. Firstl y, there is dIe 
dauger of misperception. The person who makes tile out-of-court statement may not have dIe capaci ty to perceive 
the event he is talkiug about accurately. Secondly, the declarant 's memory regarding the event may be inaccurate. 
Thirdly, there is a danger tbat the declarant 's statement may be ambiguous and there is no guarantee that the hearer 
heard correctly. Fourthly , tbe declarant may be exaggerating or even lying. AldlOugh dlese risks would apply to 
in-court statements as well , there are three differences dlat have an importalll effect on dIe admissibility of this type 
of evidence . The witness in court takes an oatil which intends to stress the special duty of speaking the truth . The 
witness is in court so ule court can observe the demeanour and credibility of the witness . Finally. the witness can 
be subjected to cross-examination in court and this is supposed to test the weaknesses of the witness's evidence . 
AldlOugh the general rule is that bearsay is inadmissible, the courts have never illlerpreted the Confrontation Clause 
to exclude all out-of-coun statemelllS (Note 1985:809). In 1895 the Supreme Court in Mattox v United States supra 
admitted dm the rule against hearsay "must occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and the 
necessities of the case" (at 243). This has given rise to the development of a number of exceptions over the years 
in tenus of which certain hearsay statements can be admitted. This is based on the argument thal certain classes 
of out-of-court stateruents are likely to be reliable, for ins tance dIe exception relating to dying declarations is based 
on the belief that a person who is about to die will speak dIe truth (Note 1985:810). 
Other commonly applicable hearsay exceptions are complaints of rape, medical complaints and excited utterances . 
In addition to these exceptions, there are specially enacted exceptions in dIe Federal Rules of Evidence allowing 
lhe admission of certain hearsay statemems, as well as certain enactments in some states. 
3,5.2 Common Law Exceptions to Hearsay 
3.5.2.1 Complaint of Sexual Assault 
Traditionall y in cases of sexual offences, it is admissible to lead evidence that a wOlllan made a complaint that she 
was assaulted . The origin of this exception has been traced back to the old law of ' hue and cry' where the victim 
had to raise the alaml immediately after she was raped. 
"In England . the evidential use of those outcries and explanations came down to us in the 1700s 
as a traditional relic of dIe old law of hue and cry. Not only in such cases , but in all charges of 
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violence, the accuser must show, to sustain his charge, that he made hue and cry, aiall11ing the 
neighborhood freshly after the occurrence" (Wigmore 1974:240) . 
Although the original reason for raising a 'hue and cry' no longer applies, tile exception still remains and is based 
on a number of grounds (Myers 1987:345). Firstly, there is the belief that any person who has been raped will 
inunediately tell somebody about what has happened. If the victim is silent, this is regarded as a foml of self-
contradiction of the victim's allegation. 
"". the fact of a failure to speak when it would have been narural to do so is in effect an 
inconsistent statement or self-contradiction... It was entirely natural, after becoming the victim 
of an assault against her will, ulat she should have spoken out. That she did not, that she went 
about as if nothing had happened , was in fact an assertion that nothing violent had been done." 
(Wigmore 1974:298) 
Therefore a complaint of rape is admitted as corroboration of the victim 's evidence, and rebuts the inference of 
silence which is (supposedly) inconsistent with her allegation of rape (Whitcomb et al 1985:69). 
The general rule is Ulat for such a complaint to be admissible, tile victim must testify . Wigmore (1974: 307) 
explains Ulat "[s)ince the only object of the evidence is to repel the supposed inconsistency between the woman's 
present testimony and her fam1er silence, it is obvious that if she has not testified at all, there is 110 inconsistency 
to repel, and therefore the evidence is irrelevant", There is, however, authority that if the victim is too young to 
take ute stand, the complaint may still be received (PeopLe v Meacham , 152 Cal.App. 3d 142, 199 Cal.Rptr. 586 
(1984)) . 
The evidence admissible under this exception is limited to the fact that a complaint was made. The details of the 
complaint do not become admissible. In Lawson v State , 377 So. 2d 1115 (A1a .Crim.App. 1979) the COurt at 111 8 
explained: 
"[iJ t is a well established rule in Alabama that testimony concerning Ule prosecutrix ' s complaint 
must be confined to ute fact of Ule complaint. Details of the occurrence such as specifying the 
idenrity of the person accllsed. the injuries claimed to have been sustailled, or other minute 
circwnstances of the offense are lIot admissible, II 
This is set out even more clearly in State v Ramos, 203 N.J. Super. 197, 496 A.2d 386 (1985) at 388: 
"Only the fact of complaint, not the details . The purpose is to negative the supposed 
inconsistency of silence by showing Ulat there was not siletlce. Thus the gist of the evidential 
circumstances is merely non silence, i. e., Ole fact of complaint, but the fact only." 
Secondly, these fresh complaints are admissible when they are introduced to rebut an attack on the witness's 
evidence in court. If the defence were to allege that the story the victim has given on the stand has been made up . 
evidence of her recent/fresh complaint made soon after ule assault may become admissible (Myers 1987: 347). 
In this instance the details of tile event will become admissible, as explained by Wigmore (1974:3 11): 
"The details of the statement are admissible. Since Ole purpose is to show that she tells tile same 
story as on the stand , Ole whole of the complaint as made by her, with its temts and details, is 
to be received, and not the mere fact of the complaint." 
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Evidence of the fresh complaint is strictly speaking not hearsay. It is not introduced to prove [he truth of its 
contents, but simply to corroborate the victim 's evidence at the trial (Myers 1987:348). This is explained in State 
v Ramos supra at 388 where the coun explained Ulat "[a]lulOugh fresh complaint is often characterized as an 
exception to ule hearsay rule ... neither the hearsay rule nor its exceptions are involved with this principle of 
admissibility. The statement of tlle victim is offered nOt for the purpose of proving the truth of Ule assertion made, 
but to show that it was in ract made as corroboration of the victim' s assertion that she was assaulted" . There are, 
however, decisions which describe this as an exception to the hearsay rule. In State v Sanders , 691 S.W.2d 566 
(TemJ. Crim.App. 1984) the court held at 568 Ulat the statements of a fi ve year old "were admissible under ule fresh 
complaint exception to the hearsay rule". In Commonwealth v Bailey, 370 Mass. 388,348 N.E.2d 746 (1976) the 
court explained at 750 that "lfJresh complaint in cases of sexual crime evolved into a hearsay exception". 
Although this exception originally arose in cases of rape, it has been extended to include other sexual offences 
against children (Myers 1987:349). In State v CampbeLl .l'lIpra dIe Oregon Supreme Court allowed a mother of a 
three year old to give evidence that "at my home while seated in dIe recliner chair in the front room my three-year-
old told Ole Ulat a person licked her tee-tee" (at 701). The court in ulis case traced the exception of complai nt of 
sexual conduct all Ule way back to 1840 and explained that ule basis of this exception was to admit evidence "to 
corroborate the testimony of ... witnesses or to negate an inference of consent" (at 702) . 
An important requirement for admissibili ty in tertus of this exception is ulat ule complaint be made promptly i.e. 
within a reasonable time after the assault (Myers 1987:352). Court decisions as to what a reasonable time would 
be vary greatly in interpreting this requirement. In In re Cheryl H. , 153 Cal.App.3d 1098, 200 Cal.Rptr. 789 
(1984) a three year old victim made statements approximately two months after the alleged assault. The court held 
that these statements were too remote to be admissible in terols of this exception. However, in State v Baca , 56 
N. M. 236, 242 P. 2d 1002 (1952) the court found a ulree month delay to be reasOItable, whereas in State v Gibbons, 
97 Nev. 299, 629 P.2d 11 96 (1981) a complaint made two to urree hours after the assault was LOa remote. 
Some legal cOlllmentators argue ulat ulis exception has very limited value for children, especially those who are 
victims of sexual abuse. This is based on two grounds. Firstly, the exception is usually introduced to corroborate 
the victim'S evidence that consent was absent. Since children cannot consent to sexual acts, some courtS have held 
d,at dIe complailll of sexual assault is irrelevant in tbe case of children and, therefore, inadmissible (Whitcomb et 
al 1985:70). The second argument is that ule exception requires that the complaint be made within a reasonable 
time, and this happens very rarely in dIe case of children. Victims of child sexual abuse frequently endure abuse 
for long periods of time before revealing what has happened, and ulen the revelation usually occurs by accident or 
inadvertently widlOuttbe child even making a statement. In United States v Lips , 22 M.J . 679 (A. F.C.M .R. 1986) 
a psychologist gave evidence that approximately 70-90% of rapes go unreported or "are delayed in being reported 
because the victim is ashamed or fearful that no one will believe her" (at 683) . According to Russell (1983: 142) 
only a small percentage of child sexual abuse is reported, with only 2 % of intrafamilial and 6 % of extrafamilial 
abuse being reported. 
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Dziech and Schudson (1989: 140-1) argue that this exception is sti ll very important for a number of reasons. It 
serves to remind lawyers and judges that the creation of exceptions to the hearsay rule is not a new concept, and 
dlat the courts, especially in the case of child sexual abuse, have considered the statements made by children to 
adults to be important. The admissibility of these statements, they argue, is often essential in view of the trend of 
the defence to raise allegations of recent fabrication, persuasion, coercion or subsequent recautatioll. 
3.5.2.2 Medical Complaints 
In terms of this exception, certain hearsay statements will be admissible to prove the truth of their contents if the 
statements describe symptOms or feelings and are made to doctors or physicians for the purpose of diagnosis or 
treamlent. This exception has been codified into Rule 803(4) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which provides: 
"The following are 1I0t excluded by the hearsay rule, even though tile declarant is available as a 
witness. Statemems made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical 
history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character 
of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment." 
These statements are admissible since they reduce the usual risks associated with hearsay evidence. There is very 
little chance that a person can make mistakes about the physical symptoms he is experiencing since the declarant 
has the best knowledge of what he himself is feeling. It is also argued that the risks of lying are limited because 
tile declarant has a motive to tell the truth so that he can get the correct treatment (Myers 1987:358). Dziech and 
Schudson (1989:142) explain "tilat because a patient has a compelling reason to tell the truth to tile doctor, the 
statements are very reliable". Se1kin (1991:294) explains that the ratiollale behind the exception is tilat the 
trustworthiness of the statements are "assured by the likelihood that the patient helieves that the effectiveness of the 
treatment he receives may depend largely upon the accuracy of tile information he receives". The rationale that 
an individual may be highly motivated to give a doctor an accurate statement of his symptoms may be applicable 
to adults and older children, but young children may not understand the reason for being truthful (M yers 1987: 358). 
Myers, quoting from a note in tile Georgia Law Journal, explains that "[a[ very young child, however, might not 
realize that dIe doctor is trying to treat him. In such a case, the rationale for the exception would be inapplicable". 
In People in re W. c.L., 650 P.2d 1302 (Colo .App. 1982) tile child victim was found incompetent to give evidence, 
but the trial court allowed a physician to testify regarding statements made to him by the child under the Colorado 
Rule of Evidence 803(4) which emcted the medical exception. The Appeal Court, however, found that the hearsay 
statements of the child should not have been admitted ill tenns of R803(4) since (at 1304) there was "nothing in 
dle record ... which would establish that the victim understood, or was aware of, tile purpose of the queStiOlung 
by the doctor". However, in State v NeLson, 138 Wis.2nd 418 (1987) the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that even 
a three year old child is aware dlat statements made to a doctor and a psychologist are for medical purposes, dms 
extending the exception to very young children who would not nOllnally have fallen widlin this exception. 
To qualify in ternlS of this exception, a statement must be reasonably relevant to diagnosis or treaUnent. In BegLey 
v State, 483 So.2d 70 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1986) certain statements were made to a counsellor at a sexual assault 
centre. The court held that the statements did not fall within this exception since tile counsellor explained that she 
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had illterviewed the complainam "just to see how she was doing and what was trouhling her at the time " (at 73). 
At 74 the court explained that it must be shown that the statements were made for dIe purpose of diagnosis and 
treatmem, and that the victim was aware of the purpose for which the statemems were heing made. 
Statements of past medical history would fall widlin the exception. If a child were injured and the child made a 
statement describing fomler instances of abuse which gave rise to the incident , these would be admissihle. In State 
v Bawdon. 386 N. W. 484 (S.D . 1986) a six year old was taken to a physician to be examined on the premise that 
she may have been sexually abused. The physician asked ber whether anyone had touched her down in the genital 
area. and the child nodded her head in affimlation. The South Dakota Supreme Court found this evidence to fall 
withi n the exception and , therefore , to be admissible. 
There is some confusion as to whether the statement is allowed to include dIe identification of the person responsible 
for dIe injury. Originally this was beld to be inadmissible. lu State v Bellotti, 383 N. W. 308 (MinH.Ct.App . 1986) 
the court elucidated this point at 312 : "Dr Levit t's testimony included statements of Ole children not admissible 
under Rule 803(4). Dr Levitt testified dlat each child identified appellant as d,e man who had touched them. Such 
statements regarding who caused injuries generally are not admissible because they are irrelevant to medical 
diagnosis and treatment". 
This was oue of the reasons that this exception has been regarded as having a very limited application in the case 
of childreu since Ole doctor was allowed to tell what had happened but not who had done it (Dziech and Schudson 
1989: 142). However, the Wyoming Supreme Court ushered in a new approach in Goldade v State , 674 P .2d 721 
(Wyo. 1983), cert. dertied. 467 U.S. 1253 (1984) . The court held that in child abuse litigation, a statemem made 
by a child complainant identifying the abuser may be admissihle under dlis exception. The court came to this 
decision on the basis that part of the treatment of child abuse is to remove the child from the abusive envirollmem. 
In order to do this the doctor has to discover the identity of the abuser and , dlerefore. thi s hecomes pertinellt to 
treatment. In People v O/dsen . 697 P.2d 787 (Colo.App . 1984) Ole physician repeated the hearsay statement of 
a child which identified the accused as the perpetrator. The Appeal Court held that the statement was admissible 
under the medical diagnosis exception hecause "medical diagnosis in ole child abuse context required prevention 
of future abuse by identifying the perpetrator". States have been divided about the admissihility of the perpetrator 's 
identity after tltis decision. Some have continued to hold that these statements would be inadmissible whereas Ole 
growing majority have found them to be admissible (Myers 1987:360). 
III 1985 dIe Federal Court of Appeals followed the line of thought adopted in Goldade supra and strengdlened dIe 
argwnems for making these statements admissible . In United States v Renville. 779 F.2d 430 (8th Circ. 1985) the 
accused was charged with various counts of sexual assault on his eleven year old stepdaughter. The latter's doctor 
gave evidence tbat the girl had described acts of ami intercourse alld oral sex during all examimtioll after the 
assault. The doctor was permitted to testify that the child had identified d,e accused as the abuser. The court 
explained the reason for their decision as follows at 435 : 
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"First, child abuse involves more than physical injury ; dIe physician mUSt be attentive to treating 
the emotional and psychological injuries which accompany this crime... The exact nature and 
extent of tlle psychological problems which ensure from chi ld abuse often depend on the identity 
of tlle abuser. .. Second , physicians have an obligation, imposed by state law, to prevent an abused 
child from being returned to an environment in which he or she cannot be adequately protected 
from recurrent abuse ... information that the abuser is a member of the household is tJlerefore 
' reasonably pertinent ' to a course of treatment which includes removing tlle child from the home" . 
Although in this case the statement emanated from a doctor, it has provided a hasis for the exception being extended 
to include odler professionals, such as psychologists, counsellors etc, who treat the emotional and psychological 
injuries accompanying dIe crime (Dziech and Schudson 1989: 143). For instance, in State v Robinson supra a 
statement by a psychologist about what a ten year old victim said , including the identity of the abuser, during 
treatment was found to be admissible. And in State v Clements , 734 P.2d 1096 (Kan. 1987) the court hroadened 
the scope of dlese statements to include those made to mental health therapists. 
The broadening of this exception has been welcomed since it has often been regarded as having limited application 
insofar as children are concerned. The exception, however, applies only when the child has sustained injuries or 
discomfort serious enough to require medical attention. In practice, the majority of sexual abuse cases do not give 
rise to injuries and would, therefore, not fall within dlis exception (Whitcomb et al 1985:70). 
In People v Oldsen supra the accused was charged wi th various countS of sexual assault and incest committed on 
his five year old daughter. The child was found to be incapable of understanding the nature of the oath and was 
too young to communicate and relate facts to the court. At the trial the prosecution called as witnesses a school 
psychologist, a physician, an investigator and a social worker, all of whom had spoken to the child in a professional 
capacity. The psychologist tested dIe child at the request of a teacher because dIe gi rl was having trouble at school. 
The psychologist testified that the child told her that she was hurt when the accused tried unsuccessfully to put his 
penis into her vagina, that he hurt her brother to prevent the latter from reporting what had happened, and that she 
had touched the accused' s penis. The child was dlen referred to a physician, who examined her. The physician 
observed dlat dlere were certain injuries and asked tile chi ld who had caused the injuries . The child replied dial 
it was her daddy , that the injury was caused by his penis and he had told her not to tell anybody. An investigator 
gave evidence that the child told her dlat she and her father slept together and that she did not like to touch him 
hut that he wanted her to touch his penis. The social worker testified that the cllild told her that daddy had put his 
penis in her ... all dIe way. She said dlat daddy had done it "lots of times, millions". 
The accused was convi cted and appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the child 's hearsay statements should 
not have been admitted . The Court of Appeal had, therefore, to decide whedler the child 's statements had been 
correctly admitted in tenllS of the medical exception as set out in the Colorado Rules of Evidence. Rule 803(4) 
provides dlat "statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history or 
past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source 
thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment". The Appeal Court affimled the conviction and 
held that the statements introduced by dIe social worker, the psychologist and dIe physician were properly admitted 
under R803(4). 
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On review the Supreme Coun, referri ng to People in re W. c.L. supra , found that there was no evidence on the 
record that the child was capable of recognising the need to provide accurate infomlation for the purpose of medical 
diagnosis and treamlen! , and ulerefore, none of the statements were admissible under ule medical diagnosis 
exception. However, the court did find that the statements were supported by circumstalllial guaralllees of 
trustworthiness and they were. therefore, admissible in tenns of Rule 803(24), which was the residual exception 
to ule hearsay rule. 
Idaho v Wright supra dealt wi th the admissibility of statements made by a twO and a hal f year old gi rl to her 
paediatrician. At a preliminary hearing it was agreed by bolll ule prosecution and the defence that the child was 
not competent to testify. The trial court admitted the child 's hearsay statements to Ule paediatrician as fa lling wiulin 
the exception of medical complaints. The accused, Ille mother of the two li ttle girls involved, was found to have 
held dIe children down while her co-accused had sexual illlercourse with each child. Both were convicted and 
sentenced to imprisOllllent. Both accused appealed separately agai nst Ille conviction with respect to the younger 
child. The appeal under discussion here relates only to the first accused, namely dIe mother of the child , who 
argued that Ille admission of the child' s hearsay statements should not have been allowed and that they violated her 
constitutional rights. The essence of tile appeal related to dIe evidence of Ule paediatrician , Dr Janlbura , and I shall 
concentrate on his evidence in some detail since it raises issues which are very relevant to this study_ The relevant 
evidence of the doctor was set out at 3143-4: 
"A ... I started out wi th basically, 'H i, how are you', you know, 'what did you have for 
breakfast th is morning?' Esselllially, a few minutes of just son of chit chat. 
Q Was there response from KadlY to that first - tllOse first questions? 
A There was. She started to carryon a very relaxed , animated conversation. I then 
proceeded to just gently start asking questions about, well 'how are things at home', you 
know, those SOrts. Gently moving into the domestic situation and then moved imo four 
questions in particular, as I reflected in my records. 'Do you play with daddy? Does 
daddy play widl you? Does daddy touch you with his pee-pee? Do you touch his pee-
pee? And again, we established what was meant by pee-pee, it was a generic teml for 
genital area. 
Q Before you get into that, what was, as best you recollect, what was her response to the 
question 'Do you play with daddy?' 
A Yes, we play - I remember her making a commelll aboUl yes we playa lot and 
expanding on that and talking about spending time with daddy. 
Q And 'Does daddy play with you?' Was there any response? 
A She responded to dIal as well, that uley played tOgether in a variety of circumstances 
and , you know, seemed very unaffected by the question. 
Q And dlen what did you say and her response? 
A When I asked her ' Does daddy touch you with his pee-pee', she did admit to that. When 
I asked, 'Do you touch his pee-pee ' she did not have any response." 
These statements were admitted by the trial court, even though the declarant was not availahle to give evidence. 
On appeal to ule IdalIa Supreme Court dIe accused argued that tlle hearsay statements did not fall within any of the 
traditional exceptions, and there was no showing of panicularised guarantees of trustworthiness supporting the 
doctOr's statements. It was argued tbat, in fac t. Lhe hearsay statements were IlO( trustworthy because of the 
interviewing techniques employed by Dr Jambura. The majori ty of tile court found that the circumstances 
surrounding the interview indicated tJlat there were dangers of unreliability. The paediatrician, who was aware that 
the older child had made allegations of sexual abuse, may have had preconceptions. He did not videotape or make 
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an audio tape of the interview. He lost the picture that he worked with when he was conmlUnicating with the little 
girl. He used leading questions while interviewing the child and made no accurate record of her responses. He 
merely testified that the child 'admitted' tire facts - does this mean she said 'yes' or nodded or offered an 
explanation. The court came to the following conclusion: 
"Dr Jambura's testimony as presented lacks particularized guarantees of trustworthiness and, in 
fact, is fraught with the dangers of unreliability which tire Confrontation Clause is designed to 
highlight and obviate. We are not convinced, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the jury would 
have reached the same result had tile error not occurred. Thus, we reverse Wright's conviction 
on the count charged with respect to tile acts against the younger daughter because of the 
Confrontation Clause violation and remand the case for trial consistent herewith. " (116 Idaho 289, 
775 P.2d at 1231) 
Chief Justice Bakes dissented, arguing that the majority adopted a severely limited application of the ' indicia of 
reliability'test. The particularised guarantees of tmstworthiness and indicia of reliability, as interpreted in other 
United States Supreme Court cases, are to be determined from all the facts and circumstances of the case. In temrs 
of dre majority decision, evidence which would otherwise satisfy the tmstwortiriness standard, such as corroborating 
physical and medical evidence, becomes irrelevant. 
The State appeaJed to the U.S. Supreme Court, but tile latter found the statements to be inadmissible, although the 
court was closely divided in their 5 to 4 decision. The court set out a two part test at 3147 for determining whether 
hearsay in child sexual abuse cases will be admissible. Firstly, if tire child's statement falls under a firmly rooted 
exception to the hearsay mle, then the statement will be admissible. Secondly, if the child's statement falls under 
an exceptioll to the hearsay mle that is not firmly rooted, then the statement will be presumed to be unreliable and 
inadmissible. In order for the latter statement to hecome admissible, there must be a showing of 'particularized 
guarantees of trustworthiness' (at 3147). In determining what constituted 'particularized guarantees of 
trustworthiness', the U.S. Supreme Court refused to lay down specific procedures that ought to be followed when 
interviewing children that would guarantee admissibility: 
"Although dle procedural guidelines propounded by the [Idaho Supreme Court I may well enhance 
the reliability of out-of-court statements of children regarding sexual abuse, we decline to read 
into tile Confrontation Clause a preconceived and artificial litmus test for tile proceduraJ propriety 
of professional interviews in which children make hearsay statements against a defendant." (at 
3148) 
The U.S. Supreme Court did give examples of some factors that would serve as indicators of the reliability of such 
hearsay statements, the trustworthiness being detemlilled only from the circumstances surrounding the making of 
the statement (at 3149). This had the effect that any physical injuries the child may have would not be allowed to 
be used to increase the tmstworthiness of the hearsay. Kennedy, in his dissenting judgement, argued very 
vehemently that physical evidence is often tile best way of determining the tmstworthiness of a child's hearsay 
statement (at 3153-7). However, the following were the factors which the court suggested could be used as 
indicators of reliability: spontaneity and consistent repetition; mental state of the child making the statement; the 
use of terminology which would be unusual or unexpected in a child of a similar age; and the child's lack of 
motive to fabricate. The court did add at 3149-50 that" [tlhese factors are, of course, not exclusive and courts have 
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considerable leeway in their consideration of appropriate factors. We therefore decline to endorse a mechanical 
lest for detemlining 'particularized guarantees of trustworthiness' under tlle Confrontation Clause. Ratller the 
unifying principle is tllat tilese factors relate to whetiler the child declarant was particularly likely to be telling the 
trudl when the statement was made" , Using this test, the Court found that the child's statements in this particular 
case did not have sufficient trustworthiness to satisfy the Confrontation Clause, and were therefore inadmissible. 
Gembala and Serritella (1992:22) argue that the judgement does not offer any guidance as to when a hearsay 
exception becomes 'finnly rooted'. For instance, 'medical treatment' and 'excited utterances' have been held to 
be firmly rooted exceptions. However, the further problem is that it is difficult to detennine when a child's 
statement will fall under these exceptions, the result in the Wright decision supra itself being in point where tile 
paediatrician's statements regarding what the child had said were not admitted under the medical treatment 
exception. Despite this, tlle lower courts have applied the test in the Wright decision supra when trying to 
detemline if a hearsay statement of a child contains the 'particularized guarantee of trustwortlliness'. 
Two trends have emerged in the more recent cases which are of particular importance to the admissibility of 
children's hearsay statements (Gentbala and Serritella 1992:23). Firstly, professionals who interview children do 
not have to videotape their interviews, but the courts do look favourably upon those interviews tilat have been taped. 
Although the court in Wright supra fOWld the children's statemems to be inadmissible, because tiley were made in 
response to leading questions, subsequent courts have held that leading questions will not automatically make tile 
child's evidence unreliable. 
"Instead, some courts have recognized that it is somewhat absurd to conduct counselling sessions 
by simply waiting for a child to blurt out statements relating to sexual abuse. Therefore, tilese 
few courts have granted some leeway to counsellors when leading questions were used if tbey 
were carefully worded so as not to be overly suggestive. However, this is still controversial in 
batil the legal and mental health field." (Gembala and Serritella 1992:23-4) . 
In summary, the position seelllS to be that the Court will in certain circwllstallces admit the hearsay statements of 
some children, depending on the nature of the interview procedures that were conducted. The court refused to 
specify the criteria for interviewing procedures that would ensure the admissibility of such statements, and it is 
therefore difficult to provide guidance as to how these interviews should be conducted (Gordon 1992:69) . Gordon 
(1992:70) explains tilat many child protection teams are developing interview protocols [hat could be used for 
questioning children in these situations. Firstly, children's statement should as far as possible be allowed to be 
made as spontaneously as possible with very careful use of leading questions. Secondly, where possible interviews 
should be videotaped or audiotaped to provide a record of the interview. 
Chief Justice Bakes in his dissenting judgement in tile Idaho v Wright decision supra highlighted a number of 
problems tilat tllis decision would give rise to. A child's allegation of abuse is not always directed at a professional 
who is specifically [rained in interviewing child victims of abuse. A family doctor or paediatrician may notice 
evidence of abuse when conducting a routine examination, and may question the child and receive important hearsay 
evidence. In temlS of the Idaho Supreme Court decision this evidence will be inadmissible unless the doctor was 
professionally trained to interview children. In such a case it would be highly unlikely that the interview be 
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videotaped since famil y doctors do not nomlally videotape their examinations of patients. Rural conllllUnities do 
not have videotape equipment easily accessible and this could then, in temlS of the above decision, affect the 
trustworuliness of any interview taking place under these circumstances. 
A furtll er criticism of tile majority decision and a possible disadvantage of proceeding in tenns of this exception, 
is the fact that the majority found that one of the grounds that contributed to ule lack of trustworthiness in that case 
was the fact that the interrogation was perfomled by someone with a preconceived idea of what tile child should 
disclose (at 1227). This suggests tI,at the court is setting an additional standard which requires that tile interrogation 
be perfonned by someone who has no idea what the child will be disclosing. In most cases, however, the specially 
trained person wi ll be advised as to why he is pcrfomling dIe examination, either by the parents or dle investigators, 
but this wi ll mean that he has a preconceived idea of what tile child will disclose and this will in turn affect the 
trustworthiness of the chi ld 's statements. In fact, the judge concludes that "Itlo automaticall y disqualify an 
interview because he has 'a preconceived idea of what the child should be disclosing' will, in all probability, 
eliminate dIe use of nearly all statements made by young children to medical doctors, psychologists or social 
workers" . 
3.5.2.3 Excited Utterances 
TItis is ihe most COlll1nonJy used hearsay exception in tile case of child sexual abuse cases (Whitcomb et al 
1985:70). and has been codi fi ed in Rule 803(2) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. This Rule provides that 
statements will be admissible as an exception to dIe hearsay rule where the statemem relates "to a startling event 
or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition". 
The rationale for the admi ssi bility of dlese statements is that they are considered to be trus twortllY since they are 
made "shortly after a startling e\'ent , while the declarant remains affected by the stress of excitement caused by the 
event " (Myers 1987:329). People are unlikely, it is argued, to have the opportunity to dlillk of lying, and tllere 
is very little chance of a memory lapse since the declarant makes the statement under the influence of the event. 
The Advisory ConIDlittee, in their Note to Federal Rule of Evidence 803(2), as quoted by Myers (1987:329), 
explain: 
"The theory of Exception (2) is simply that circumstances may produce a condition of excitement 
which temporari ly stills ti,e capacity of reflection and produces utterances free of conscious 
fabrication. " 
The reasoning behind the admissibility of excited utterances is set out in Bishop v State, 58 1 P.2d 45 
(Okla. Crim. App. 1978) at 48: "That is, an excited utterance made contemporaneous with a specific event, which 
relates to or describes the event, is held to be reliable because its nearness to tile stimulating event excludes the 
possibility of premeditation and fabrication". 
There are. on tile other hand, many cri tics who argue that this type of evidence is very unreliable. Excitement is 
not a guarantee against lying and may even exaggerate distortions in perception and memory (Stewart 1970:27). 
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Myers (1987:320) argues that, in addition to being unreliable, excited utterances usually consist of crucial evidence 
which the defence does not have an opportunity to test by cross-examination. 
In order to be admitted as an excited utterance, the statement must comply with the following requirements: there 
must be a sufficiently startling experience which suspends reflective thought, and there must be a spontaneous 
reaction. The latter requirement is often measured by the amount of time which lapses hetween the event and the 
statement (Whitcomb et al 1985:70). In People v Butler, 249 Cal. App.2d 799,57 Cal.Rptr. 798 (1967), a five year 
old witnessed alleged offences perpetrated against odler children . Inmlediately after she left the accused's home, 
she stated that the accused was "playing nasties" widl some children. Although she did not give evidence at the 
trial, the above statement was admitted as an excited utterance. 
Originally the question of contemporaneity was very narrowly interpreted. For instance, in Brown v United States, 
152 F.2d 138 (D.C. Cire. 1945) the court reversed a conviction on appeal on the ground that a statement made by 
a complainant at dinner that he had been sexually assaulted earlier that day at school was not sufficiently 
contemporaneous. As a result of the difficulties associated with child sexual cases, the courts have expanded the 
traditional concept of contemporaneity to include the child's first disclosure, even if it comes months or weeks after 
the event. In Bertrang v State, 50 Wis.2d 702 (1970) the Wisconsin Supreme Court explained dIe new approach 
at 707-8: 
"The fact that dIe assertions are not made within a few minutes or even hours of the alleged 
assault is not controlling, nor is the fact that they are not volunteered but made in response to 
questions... A young child may be unable or unwilling to remember ... or be unwilling to 
testify, or at least inhibited in doing so from a feeling of fear or shame, ... The trial court should 
consider the age of the child, the nature of the assault, relationship of the child to the defendant, 
contemporaneity and spontaneity of dIe assertions in relation to the alleged assault, reliability of 
dIe assertions dlemselves, and the reliability of the testifying witness." 
An increasing number of courts admit statements which have been made mondls after the assault. They have based 
this on knowledge which is now available regarding the way abused cltildren react, namely that dIe child's 
disclosure may be delayed and spontaneous at the same time (Whitcomb et al 1985:71). The court recognised that 
young chi ldren are not ski lled at "reasoned reflection and at concoction of false stories under such circumstances" 
(Dziech and Schudson 1989: 144). The courts now examine not only the length of time that has elapsed between 
the assault and the statement but also whether the time could have reduced the spontaneity or in some way motivated 
fabrication. In In re O.E.P., 654 P.2d 312 (Colo. 1982) the court explained at 318 that "Ia llthough the temporal 
interval between the 'startling event' and the child's statement is not without significance, it is nOt conclusive 011 
the question of admissibility". In State v Mateer, 383 N.W.2d 533 (Iowa 1986) the court at 535 added that "lapse 
of time is only one of several relevant factors for dIe trial court to consider in determining the spontaneity of 
declarant's out-of-court statements". In In re CA., 201 N.l. Super. 28, 492 A.2d 683 (1985) the court at 686 
specifically stated that it is proper to make allowances for a child's youth in extending time during which nervous 
excitement continues and in Commonwealth v Bailey supra at 368: "The defittition of spontaneity is relaxed when 
the declarant is the victim of sexual assault". In State v Rawdon supra the court explained the question relating 
to lapse of time in the case of children at 486: "Where the victim is of an age as to render improbable that her 
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utterance was deliberate and its effect premeditated the utterance need not be so nearly contemporaneous with the 
act as in the case of an older person". In State y Doe supra the court explained that "cases have extended the time 
limit for young children because the danger of fabrication is more remote", alUlOugh in this particular case the court 
rejected a statement offered as an excited utterance when the delay was only dlfee days. 
The impOITal1t requirement appears to be the elemem of spontaneity and stress, as explained in State y Padilla , I 10 
Wis.2d 414, 329 N.W.2d 263 (CLApp. 1982) at 267 that "a dlree-day time period, as in die case here, is less 
contemporaneous than tbe time periods of the other reported cases. This does Ilot matter, however, because 
spontaneity and stress are the keys". The position is well summarised in State v Doe supra: 
"Nonnally. in order to fall within the excited utterance exception. a statement must occur 
inmlcdiatcly after the event in question. Complete spontaneity is 110t required. however, and we 
have allowed statements made by declarants a short time after the event in question... The 
question involved is nOt how much time has passed, but 'whether the statements was made while 
dIe declarant was still under dIe influence of the event to the extent that his statement could not 
be the result of fabri cation , intervening actions, or the exercise of choice or judgmem. " 
The extension of lime lapse has been welcomed by Olany professionals, who argue that the younger the chi ld and 
the closer her relationship to the abuser, the more likely it is that there wi ll be a long delay before disclosure. It 
is for this reason that the assault, dIe period between the assault and the disclosure, and the disclosure itself are part 
of the traumatic event (Yun 1983: 1755). 
Despite the court's willingness to broaden the time element in the case of excited utterances, there are still a number 
of difficulties associated WiUI this exception as far as children are concerned. Yun (1983: 1759) argues that the 
expansion of dIe res gestae exception in dlis way destroys "the integrity of ule exception, stretching it far beyond 
its traditional bouuds, and creating much uncertainty in its application". She suggests that a separate hearsay 
exception be introduced which is designed specifically for chi ldren who have been abused. 
A furth er cri tici sm levelled at the res gestae exception, as far as children are concerned, is that there are many cases 
which do not fall within the requirements of this exception. WhitcoOlb et al (1985:71) explain dlat young children 
may be UIlaware that what has happened to them is 'wrong' and may relate 111eir experience in a casual or 
unconcerned way without any shock or excitement. A child who has been abused by a parent for years may not 
regard such an assault as shocking or outrageous. In certain cases the child may even experience wamlth and 
pleasure. Tn these si tuations it is unlikely that any statement made by the child would qualify as an excited utterance 
(Myers 1987:33 I). Tn most cases the child's delay in reporting dIe incident is su great urat it cannot be forced 
widlin the excited utterance exception. In the vast majority of cases, children do not readily report sexual assaults 
for a wide variety of rcasons, amongst others the fear of being disbelieved, guilt, attempts to forget and threats by 
dIe accused of reprisal if disclosed (Whitcomb et al 1985:71). 
Lack of knowledge hy dIe judiciary as to dIe reasons for the delay has resulted in a very narrow interpretation of 
the time element in some cases. For instance, in Vera y State, 709 S.W.2d 681 (Tex.Ct.App . 1986) a statement 
made by an eleven year old who had been sexually assaulted was held not to be an excited utterance since a delay 
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of fi ve hours was found to be toO long. The court came to this conclusion after considering the fact that before 
the child made her statement she had conversations with bOUl her sister and her mother, and the child only began 
to cry three alld a half hours after Ute event. The reality of the way children deal with sexual assaults often does 
not allow statements made by them to be introduced as excited utterances since they do not fall within the rigid 
requirements laid down by ule law. 
One of the more recent decisions of the Supreme Court deals with a number of the issues relating to child witnesses 
and hearsay. In White v Illinois, 112 S.Ct. 736 (1992) the accused was charged with sexually assaulting a four 
year old child. The court tried twice 10 call ule child to give evidence, but emotionally she was incapable of doing 
so. The babysitter gave evidence that he was awakened by the child 's scream and saw dIe accused leaving the 
child 's room. The child dlen told him that the accused had put his hand over her mouth, threatened to beat her if 
she screamed and then proceeded to tollch her in the wrong places (at 739) while pointing 10 dIe vaginal area. The 
mother testified that she arrived an half an hour later and the child told her that dIe accused had "put his mouth on 
her front parts" (at 739). A police officer gave evidence that he arrived on the scene forty fi ve minutes later and 
ule child told him dle same story dlat she first told her babysitter and modler, including a statement that dIe 
defendant had "used his tongue on her private parts" (at 739). Four hours after ule child screamed, she was taken 
to hospital where she was examined by a nurse and then a doctor. The nurse and the doctor testified that she made 
idemical statements to dIOse she had made earlier to her babysitter and her modler. The Supreme Court approved 
the admission of dIe above evidence. It held that the chi ld 's statemcnts to the babysitter, the modler and the police 
officer all fell under the excited lItterance exception si nce they occurred immediately after or within forty-five 
minutes of dIe event. The statements made to dle nurse and the doctor were held to rail under the 'firmly rooted' 
medical rreaunent exception since the statements were made for the purpose of treatment. 
3.5.2.4 The Residual Hearsay Exception 
The Federal Rules of Evidence contain an exception in tenl1S of which dlC court may admit hearsay which does not 
fall widlin the traditional hearsay exceptions. This is known as dIe residual exception and is found in Rule 803(24) 
and Rule 804(b)(5). In temlS of Rule 803 the availability of dIe witness is immaterial and in temlS of Rule 804 
the declarant IllUSt be unavailable. The language used in boill are the same and illere is in fact no difference 
between dIe two (Myers 1987:360). This is supported by the decision in Huff v White Motor Corp., 609 F.2d 286 
(7 th Circ. 1979) where dIe court at 291 explained that "[tlhe two provisions are identical, and Rule 804(b((5) is 
therefore redundant, since 803(24) applies whether or not a declarant is a witness". 
Federal Rule of Evidence 803 provides: 
"Rule 803. Hearsay Exceptions: Availability of Declarant Immaterial 
Other exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of Ule foregoing exceptions but 
having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court detennines that (A) 
dIe statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) dIe statement is more probative on Ule 
point for which it is offered dIan any other evidence which the proponent can procure through 
reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of dlese rules and dIe interests of justice will 
best be served by admission of tbe statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be 
158 
admitted under this exception unless sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the 
adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it , has intention to offer tlle statement and 
the particulars of it, including the name and address of the declarant. " 
The purpose of this exception is to admit reliable hearsay evidence which does not fall within the existing 
exceptions, However, tllis exception was intended to be used as rarely as possible, especiall y in criminal trials, 
[n Huff v White Motor Corp supra it was mentioned by tlle Sevendl Circuit Court at 29 1 that "Congress intended 
that the residual exception 'be used very rarely, and only in exceptional circumSUlnces''', 
The requirements that must be complied with in order for a statement to fall within this exception are set out in 
United States v Renville supra at 439: 
i. The statement must have circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness. 
11. The statement must be offered as evidence of a material fact. 
111. The statement must be more probative on the matter for which it is offered than any other evidence tllat 
can reasonably be obtained, [n State v McCafferty , 356 N,W,2d 159 (S,D, 1984) tlle court found the 
hearsay statement of a seven year old child to be more probative than other evidence, explaini ng at 162 
that "1 i It is obvious that the statement is more probative than any adler evidence the SUlte could produce 
through reasonable efforts, In this type of loco-parentis and child situation, it is difficult to envision any 
evidence more probative than the statements and actions of the victim" . 
IV , The interests of justice must be served by admitting the statement into evidence, 
v. The opposing party must be given the notice specified within the rule. 
Most sUltes have adopted tllis Federal exception or enacted a similar provision. For insUlnce, dle State of Colorado 
has enacted a residual hearsay exception in Rule 803(24) which codified the circumstantial guarantees of 
tlustwordliness sUlndard as set out in a number of U.S. Supreme Court cases. This was set out in People v Oldsetl 
suprn where the court had to ascertain whether circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness had been complied with: 
"We can ascertain from the record tl,at the otller requirements of CRE 803(24) were met: the 
statements were offered as evidence of material facts ; the statements were more probative on the 
poims for which dley were offered dlan any adler evidence that reasonably could be procured ; 
the general purposes of the rules of evidence and the interests of justice were best served by the 
admission of the statements; and dle defendant had adequate notice in advance of trial that dle 
prosecution intended to offer dle sUltements." 
This exception is particularly applicable to children since the hearsay sUltements of children usually have dle 
necessary cirCUmSUltltial guarantees of trustworthiness. TIle factors showing trustworthiness would include, for 
insUlnce, the age of the child , the nature of the abuse. any physical evidence available , the relationship between the 
accused and the child. and tlle sponUlneity witll which the statement was made (Whitcomb et aJ 1985:72). In State 
v Taylor 103 N.M. 189,704 P.2d 443 (CLApp . 1985) the child 's hearsay statement was enhanced by medical 
evidence. The child had made an out-of-court SUltement tllat the accused had stuck his finger in tlle child's "butt" 
(at 452). The exanlining physician was called to testify and he gave evidence that the child' s rectulll was irritated. 
The court found that the physician 's evidence of the physical examination could be used to corroborate tlle chil d's 
hearsay statements. Also in United States v Quick supra the court accepted that the child's hearsay statements were 
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corroborated by the physical evidence of inflammation of her vagina . 
A child 's hearsay statements will also be enhanced by the detail which tile child supplies of the alleged abuse. In 
United States v Dorian, 803 F.2d 1439 (8th Circ. 1986) a fi ve year old made statements in which she accurately 
described an erection and explicit sexual behaviour the accused was alleged to have perfomled. At 1445 the court 
found that "[iJt is unlikely that Roxalme would have fabricated the story ... and ordinary experience suggests that 
Roxanne would not have engaged in dIe behavior with tile anatomically correct dolls that Monica Whiting observed 
absent some prior similar experience" . In United States v Cree, 778 F.2d 474 (8til Circ. 1985) the court at 477 
also found it "highly unlikely dJat a four-year-old child would fabricate sucb accusations of abuse". 
The use of tile residual exception is clearly illustrated in the case of People in re W.c.L. supra where a four year 
old girl went to visit her aunt. While undressing for a bath tile child spread her legs, faced her cousin and said: 
"Get me". When the aunt inquired what she was doing, she pointed to ber geni tals and said that Uncle W. tickled 
her. The child was taken to a doctor who examined her. The child told the doctor that Uncle W. touched her 
genitals "with his cock" and tilat it hurt (a t 1303). At dIe trial tile judge admitted the hearsay statements of tile aunt 
and the doctor, the fanner as an excited utterance and the latter as a statement to the doctor for treamlent. On 
appeal. the court confinned the conviction, but for different reasons. They held tilat the statement to tile aunt did 
not fall witilin tile exci ted utterance exception because 100 much time had elapsed since tile assault took place. They 
also found tilat the statement to tile doctor was not for diagnosis or treatment because the child did not understand 
the purpose of tile examination. However. tile Colorado Appeal Court admitted the hearsay statements under the 
residual exception since the circwnstances indicated that there was no "intellectual contrivances by the child" (at 
1305) . the statements were reliable, and they were essential to the jury's search for the truth. 
In United States v Cree supra two boys, aged four and two, were severely injured as a result of a beating they 
received from the accused. The children did not give evidence but a social worker was allowed to rei ate the 
description of what had happened which had been given to her by the four year old boy. On appeal to the Federal 
Court, the decision was confimled and the hearsay statement was fou nd to be admissible under the residual 
exception: 
"Maurice's age is a significant factor supporting the finding that tile challenged statements are 
trustworthy.. . It is highl y unlikely that a four year old child would fab ricate such accusations 
of abuse ... The propriety of requiring extremely young victims of abuse to take the stand as they 
only method for putting before the jury wlJat is, in all probability, the only first-hand account of 
abuse ... is debatable ... In a more relaxed environment, the child in this case was able 10 
provide his version of the relevant events and yet avoid a potentially traumatic courtroom 
encounter. " (at 479) 
Dziech and Schudson (1989: 146) argue that this decision is important for three reasons. Firstly, it has broadened 
tile excepti on to include instances of physical abuse as well. Secondly, it allowed statements for treatment to be 
made to a social worker, in addition to tile already accepted professions of doctors and nurses . Thirdly, the federal 
court was of the opinion that dIe reliability of a child's statement may actually he enJlanced if made out of court. 
This was further confirtued by dIe decision of State v Bellotti supra where the coun emphasised at 314 that "Iilf 
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a child cannot remember at trial an incident occurring months previously, she may nevertheless have remembered 
the incident and truthfully related it at the time she made the out-of-court statement. This is particularly true of 
children who have short memories and callilot accurately remember events occurring months or years prior to the 
competency hearing" . 
3.5.2.5 Hearsay Exception for Sexually Abused Children 
Since cases involving allegations of sexual abuse are difficult to prove and are often based on hearsay statements 
made by children who are too young or emotionally incapable of giving evidence, and the fact that these statements 
often do not fall within traditional hearsay exceptions, a number of states have created specific exceptions to the 
hearsay rule to allow the admissibi lity of statements made by children in these circumstances (Myers 1987:372). 
The Colorado statute (Colo . Rev. Stat. sI8-3-411(3) (1986) serves as an example: 
"Out-of-court statements made by a child describing any act of sexual contact, intrusion, or 
penetration, as defined in section 18-3-401, performed with, by, or on the child declarant, not 
otherwise admissible by statute or court rule which provides an exception to the ohjection of 
bearsay, may be admissible in any proceeding in which the child is a victim of an unlawful sexual 
offence pursuant to the provisions of section 13-25-129 ... " 
Washington enacted a similar provision in 1982 which formed the basis for statutes in a nwnber of other states 
(Whitcomb et al 1985:72-3). It is only the Kansas statute which is substantially different, since the latter applies 
only if the child victim is not availahle to give evidence at the trial, and it applies to any crime in which the victim 
is a child (Note 1985:811). The wording of the Washington statute is as follows: 
"9A.44.120 Admissibility of child's statement - Conditions. A statement made by a child when 
under tile age of ten describing any act of sexual conduct perfonlled witll or on tile child by 
another, not otherwise admissible by statute or court rule, is admissible in evidence in criminal 
proceedings by the courts of the state of Washington if: 
(l) The court finds, in a hearing, conducted outside the presence of the jury that the time, 
content) and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient indicia of reliability; and 
(2) The child either: 
(aJ Testifies at the proceedings; or 
(b) Is unavailable as a witness; Provided, tllat when the child is unavailable as a 
witness, such statement may be admitted only if there is corroborative evidence 
of the act. 
A statement may nOt be admitted under this section unless the proponent of the statement makes 
known to the adverse party his intention to offer the statement and the particulars of tile statement 
sufficiently in advance of the proceedings to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to 
prepare to meet the statement". 
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In tenus of this statute, if tlle child is not available as a witness there must be corroborative evidence . This 
requirement is in addi tion to the reliabi lity requirement which means that even where there are sufficient indications 
of reliability, the statement will be excluded unless there is corroboration. 
According to Myers (1987:377) the following factors would amount to corroboration: evidence by an eyewitness, 
evidence given by another child victim . an admission or confession by the accused , medical evidence that supports 
the child 's submission, psychological evidence , and any other evidence which would corroborate what the child said. 
In State v Gitchel. 4 1 Wash. App. 820, 706 P.2d 1091 (1985) tlle medical fi nding d,at partial penetration had 
occurred was used to corroborate dle child victim'S statement, and in Runion v State , 180 Ga. App. 440, 349 
S.E.2d 288 (1986) the accused's confession was sufficient corroboration of the victim'S statement. 
A major difference between d,e residual exception in the federal rules, and dle statutory exceptions enacted by the 
various states is one of approach . The fOlmer is to be used as sparingly as possible and only in exceptional 
circwnstances, as discussed earlier. However, the specially enacted exceptions by the various states are intended 
"to reach out and embrace as much reliable hearsay as possible" (Myers 1987:373). 
A number of courts have held that these statutes do not abridge the accused's constitutional rights, even where the 
child does not testify , usi ng dIe test set out in Ohio v Roberts supra. The test to detennine constitutionality has 
two parts: the witness must be found to be unavai lable. and if unavailable, the statements must either fall into a 
finnl y rooted hearsay exception or have adequate indicia of reliabi li ty (at 66). Hearsay exceptions, such as the 
Washington statute, are not firmly rooted exceptions, therefore in terms of the Ohio v Roberts decision supra to 
be admissible the statements must have adequate guarantees of reliability (Myers 1987:375) . In State v Slider, 38 
Wash.App. 689, 688 P.2d 538 , (1984) the court explained at 543: 
"It cannot be disputed tl,at the child sexual abuse exception is not a ' fimlly rooted ' hearsay 
exception. Therefore, 'particularized guarantees of trustworthiness' are required before hearsay 
is admissible" . 
The Washington statute requires dlat a hearing first be held to detemline whedler the statement is sufficiently 
trustwordlY. The kind of evidence admissible at such a hearing would include an interview witll the person who 
is going to repeat dIe child 's statement, any adler person who may have witnessed the making of dle statement, any 
person who has knowledge of dle alleged sexual assault , and, where possible, the child herself (Petersen 1983:829). 
According til Petersen (1983: 827) the hearing should focus on dle amount of time dlat has elapsed between the act 
and the statement and whether the statement was made in response to a leading question. The court must question 
dIe witnesses to detemline whether dIe child or dIe witness has any bias against dle accused or any motive for lying, 
and whetller any event occurred between dIe alleged act and the child's statement which could have accounted for 
the contents of the statement. Further factors to be investigated would be whedler the child was in pain or upset 
when the statement was made and whedler dIe temlinology used was age-appropriate. 
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3.5 .2.6 Competence of Hearsay Declarant 
The general rule is that the declarant of an out-of-court statement must also be competent. This is explained by 
Wigmore (1974:255): 
"TIle hearsay rule is merely an additional test or safeguard to be applied to testimonial evidence 
otherwise admissible. The admission of hearsay statements, by way of exception to Ule rule, 
therefore presupposes dlat the assertor possessed the qualifications of a witness in regard to 
knowledge and the like. These qualifications are fundamental as rules of relevancy . Thus these 
extra-judicial statements may be inadmissible because of their failure to fulfill ule ordinary rules 
about qualifications, even thougb they meet the requirements of a hearsay exception". 
However, in the case of children dlere appears to be an exception to this rule dmt tbe declarant mUSt be competent 
at the time the statement is made. The majority of decisions hold that an exci ted utterance will be admissible even 
though the declarant may be incompetent when dle statement is made. This is based on the argwllent Ulat excited 
uuerances are re liable due to the ci rcumstances in which they are made and not from the trustworthiness of dle 
declarant (Myers 1987:378-9). 
In State v Bauer, 146 Ariz. 134,704 P .2d 264 (Ct.App. 1985) the court stated at 267 that "filn Arizona excited 
uuerances of children who are incompetent to testify because of their age are adm issible in evidence". And in 
Bishop v State supra the court at 48 explained that "the fact [thatl a witness is ruled incompetent to testify because 
of age does not by itself negate the independent indicia of reliability which excited utterances possess, and which 
are ule key to uleir admissibility". In State v Galvan , 297 N.W.2d 344 (lowa 1980) a wilIless testified that twO 
days after tile alleged incident her twO year old daughter began to behave in a strange way . The child took a belt 
from her mother's clotiling and tied her hands with it, making gestures as though she were beating her chest. The 
child had witnessed a brutal murder, wbich was the subject of this case. At 347 the court held ule fOllowing : 
" ... dle witness's daughter was undoubtedly not competent to take an oath as a witness . The 
amhorities make it clear that admissibility in such cases does Ilot tum on the competence of the 
child to lake tile oatil , but on the spontaneity of dle utterance or act described." 
However, when dealing with statutory exceptions to the hearsay rule , tile picture is slightly different. The 
Washington statute , fo r instance, does nOt apply when the child , who made the statement , is found to be 
incompetent. This statement , unless it is an excited utterance, is regarded as being inherently unreliable and is 
therefore inadmissible (Whitcomb 1985 :74) . 
In State v Ryan supra the accused was convicted of sexually abusing two little boys, aged four and five. In temlS 
of the Washington hearsay exception, the trial court allowed the motilers and the aunt of the children to repeat 
certain out-of-court statements the boys had made to them. The prosecution and the defence agreed that the children 
were incompetent to testify and the court found corroboration in admissions made by Ryan. The Washington 
Supreme Court overturned Ryan' s conviction on tile basis that tile trial court had made three errors in their 
application of the statute . Firstly, dle WasllingtOn Supreme Court held that unavailability calUlot be established by 
simply stipulating tilat a child is incompetent , but rather a good faith effort must be made to produce the children. 
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Secondly, the court held that if the boys were found incompetent to testify, this finding of competency would render 
their hearsay statements unreliable and therefore inadmissible. At 203 the Washington Supreme Coun explained 
that "[iJf the declarant was not competent at the time of making the statements, the statements may not be 
introduced through hearsay repetition". The third reason for overturning the conviction was that the trial Court had 
failed to find circumstantial guarantees of the reliability of the boys' statements as was needed by both the 
Washington statute and the Confrontation Clause, alctlOugh the Washington Supreme Court confinned that the 
accused's admissions constituted sufficient corroboration of the abusive acts . 
3,6 Public Hearing 
3,6.1 The Right to a Public Trial 
Traditionally trials have been open to dIe public, the procedure going back to dIe days before dIe Nomlau Conquest 
when cases in England were brought before so-called 'llIoots', a body very similar to a public townllleeting (Press-
Enterprise Co v Superior Court, 464 U .S. 501 (1984) at 505). 
The right to a public trial was incorporated into the United States Constitution and is found in boul the First and 
the Sixdl Amendments. The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom 
of the press ... "(Amendment I , dIe Constitution of the United States) and the Sixth Amendment provides dIal "in 
all criminal prosecutions, dIe accused shall enjoy the right to a ... public trial" (Amendment VI, the Constitution of 
ule United States). 
The accused therefore has a right to a public trial. The right belongs to the accused and not to the public nor to 
dIe press . Neither dIe public nor dIe press have an unconditional right to an open trial in tenus of the Sixul 
Amendment. They only have a limited right under the First Amendment 10 have access to criminal trials (Perry 
and Wrightsman 1991: 141). This limited right derives, firstly, from dIe long tradition of open criminal trials and. 
secondly , from its role in dIe judicial process. In temlS of the latter, public access 10 criminal trials allows the 
public to participate in and serve as a check upon the judicial process, and it fosters dIe appearance of fairness 
which increases the respect ule public will have for dIe judicial process (Globe Newspapers Co v Superior Court, 
supra at 606-7) . 
This right has been upheld in a number of court deeisiOllS. In In re Knight Publishing Co, 743 F.2d 231 (4th Cire. 
1984) the Court found at 233 that "'\ t\he public and press have a right, guaranteed by the first amendment, to attend 
criminal trials". In Globe Newspapers Co v Superior Court supra the US Supreme Court held at 603 that "\tJhis 
COurt's recent decision in Richmond Newspapers fimlly established for the first time dlat the press and general 
public have a constitutional right of access to criminal trials "'. 
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3.6.2 Limitations on the Right to a Public Trial 
Although the right which the accused has to a public trial is of vital importance, it is not absolute and will be 
weighed up against any competing interest (Myers 1987:425). However, any denial of the rigbt to a public bearing 
must be exceptional , as was explained in tlle case of Waller v Georgia , 467 U.S. 39 (1984) where the Supreme 
Court provided tbe following guidelines at 48: 
"[Tlbe party seeking to close the hearing must advance an overriding interest that is likely to be 
prejudiced, the closure must be no broader than necessary to protect that imerest, the trial court 
must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding. and it must make findings 
adequate to support the closure. " 
The trial judge dlerefore has a limited discretion to override the accused 's Sixth Amendment right to a public trial , 
as well as the First Amendment right which the press and the public have. However. evidence must be led which 
proves that it is essential to close the court. The judge must make a find ing on this evidence and ensure that there 
are no adler possible ways of dealing witll dIe situation. The press or public would tllen have to be given an 
opportunity to address the court as well , forwarding arguments as to why they should not be excluded from the trial 
(Myers 1987:43 1). 
Any exclusiou of dIe public must therefore be based on strong evidence. The Supreme Court in Press-Enterprise 
Co v Superior Court supra at 510 explained that: 
"Closed proceedings, altllOugh not absolutely precluded, must be rare and only for cause shown 
dm outweighs the value of opemless .. . The presumption of openness may be overcome only by 
an overriding interest based on findings that closure is essential 10 preserve higher values and is 
narrowly tailored to serve that interest. " 
AJthough convincing n:asons have been forwarded for the closing of proceedings, as ill the case where evidence 
is given by an infomler, it is relatively conunon for this to happen in cases involving child wituesses , particularly 
those who are alleged to be complainants in sexual offences (Perry and Wrightsman 199 1: 142). 
In United States in re Latimore v Sielaff, 561 F.2d 69 1 (7tll Cire. 1977), 434 U.S. 1076 (1978) the trial court 
excluded d,e public during the evidence of a twenty one year old rape victim. The exclusion was upheld and the 
Seventll Circuit Court gave the following reasons for their decision at 694-5: 
"[Elxclusion of spectators during tlle testimony of an alleged rape victim ' is a frequent and 
accepted practice when tlle lurid details of such a crime must be related by a young lady' 
... Primary justification for tllis practice lies in the protection of the personal dignity of the 
complaining witness. The Supreme Court has recogrllsed tllat , short of homicide, rape is tlle 
'ultimate violation of self.' ... Rape constitutes an intrusion upon areas of the victim's life, both 
physical and psychological, to which our society attaches the deepest sense of privacy. Shame 
and loss of dignity . however unjustified from a moral standpoint, are natural by products of an 
attempt to recount details of a rape before a curious and disinterested audience. The ordeal of 
describing an unwanted sexual encounter before persons WitJl no more [han a prurient interest in 
it aggravates the original ilUury. Mitigation of the ordeal is a justifiable concern of the public and 
of the trial court. " 
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This view was adopted by the Supreme Court in Press-Enterprise Co v Superior Court , 106 S.CL 2735 ( 1986) 
where the court mentioned in obiter that the victims of sexual offences would in cenain circumstances justify the 
exclusion of the press and the public to protect til em "from the trauma and embarrassment of public scrutiny" (at 
2741). 
In terms of tilese decisions, the constitutional right granted to the accused and to the public and press will yield 
where tile complainant in a sexual offence is exposed to trauma and embarrassmenL In the case of chi ldren it has 
been held ti13t tile state has a duty to protect children from furtiler trauma. In Globe Newspaper Co. v Superior 
Court supra, the court at 607 explained that the state has an interest in "the protection of minor victims of sex 
crimes from further trauma and embarrassment". This is especially so in the case of sexual crimes where the child 
has to relate degrading and embarrassing detai ls to strangers. In addition to the trauma and embarrassment, children 
are placed in an alien setting and confronted with a nmnber of strangers. The courtroom is often frightening and 
intimidating for children, especially when it is fill ed with strangers. This may result in the child becomi ng so 
frightened that the child is unable to give accurate evidence (Myers 1987:427). 
Furtiler arguments for tile exclusion of tile press and tile public is the need to protect the child from intrusive media 
coverage which might ensue from the child 's evidence. The otiler argument that has been forwarded is tilat otiler 
victims, knowing that tiley will be exposed to tile press and public, will be deterred from reporting these offences 
(Whitcomb et al 1985:43) . 
AWlOugh the courts have recognised iliat the accused's rights will yield in favour of the above arguments, this does 
not mean ti13t whenever a child gives evidence tile public will automatically he excluded. The court will in each 
case have to decide whether it is necessary to protect tile child . In State v Hightower, 376 N.W.2d 648 (Iowa 
CLApp. 1985) tile prosecution applied for the public to be excluded when a ten year old complaimnt gave evidence . 
Altilough the accused objected, the trial judge granted tile application. The Appeal Court awarded the accused a 
new trial because tile prosecution had not proved that it was necessary to protect the child in this case. 
In order to detemline whetiler in a particular case it is necessary to exclude tile public, in order to protect a child, 
the trial judge needs to look at a number of factors. The court has to exanline the age of the child , the nature of 
the alleged crime, the psychological profile of the child , the preferences of the parents, and the wishes of the chi ld. 
In each case tile court mUSt be persuaded that tilere is "an overriding need" to exclude the public (Myers 1987:427). 
In response to tile problems experienced by sexual complaimnts having to give evidence publicly, a number of 
States have emcted statutes which bar some part of the public from the courtroom while tile complai1l3nt of a sexual 
offence gives evidence. Some statutes limit tile privilege to children while others apply to all cases involving sexual 
offences or cases involving vulgar or obscene language (Whitcomb et al 1985:43). Certai n states, for instance 
Arizom, Florida, Illinois and South Dakota, allow the press 10 remain in tile courtroom while tile child is giving 
evidence. Others exclude all persons who do not playa role in the actual conducting of the trial, and this would 
result in the exclusion of both tile public aud the press (Whitcomb et al 1985:44) . A number of states have enacted 
the provisions which exclude the public and the press, but have added certain exceptions or limitations 10 tile 
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enactments. An example is the Alaskan Code, which excludes the public from the trial while the young victim of 
a sexual offence is giving evidence. However, this privilege is granted on condition that the evidence, which is 
led while the public is excluded, will be available to d,e public upon request in dIe fOIDI of a tape recording or a 
transcript (Whitcomb et al 1985:43-4). 
These statutes have come up against constitutional challenges. In Richmond Newspapers Illc. v Virginia, 448 U.S. 
555 (1980) the U.S. Supreme Court decided 011 the constitutionality of a Virginia statute which permitted the court 
to exclude the public and the press at the sole discretioo of the judge. Acting in temlS of this statute, the judge 
excluded the public and press from the trial. The Supreme Court found the trial court's action to be unconstitutional 
since it violated the right of the public to an open trial. The trial judge did not make any findings which supported 
the closing of the trial; he did not try to find out whether there were any alternative solutions and he did not give 
due weight to the right of the press and the public to be present at the trial. In the GLobe case supra the 
constitutionality of a Massachusett's law, which required tlle press to be excluded when child complainants gave 
evidence, was at issue. The Court found the law unconstitutional and suggested that the question of whether the 
press and public should be excluded in a particular case should be left to the discretion of the presiding officer. 
This decision does not mle Out the possibility that the press could, in certain circumstances, be excluded (Berliner 
1985 : 173). In fact, the court agreed at 607 tlIat "safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a 
minor" was a compelling interest that would on occasion override the accused 's right to a public trial. 
The state argued in this case that tlley were justified in closing the trial on two grounds: firstly, to protect minor 
victims of sex crimes from further trauma, and, secondly, to encourage other victims to come forward and testify. 
The Supreme Court found the first interest to be compelling, but it could better be served by deciding the matter 
in each case rather than having a blanket exclusionary rule since not all victims will be traumatised by the presence 
of the public and press. The court found the second ground to be speculative and open to serious question on the 
basis of logic and common sense. 
Therefore, the question whetller a trial will be open or not to tlle public rests completely in the hands of the 
presiding judge and the prosecution, who will have to argue that "the interests of the particular child are compelling 
enough for tllejudge to close the trial to the press and public" (Perry and Wrightsman 1991:142). When the word 
'public' is referred to in tllis context, it does not include the following persons: the judge, tlle jury, the accused 
and his attorney, the parents of the child, the prosecution, a support person if the child should require one, the 
guardian ad litem for the child and the court personnel (Whitcomb et al 1985:43-4). 
Even if the press are excluded from the courtroom, this does not necessarily mean that there will not he any 
intrusion into the child 's privacy. The press are still entitled to publish details of tlle offence and the trial. It was 
for this reason that the Attorney General's Task Force on Fanlily Violence strongly urged that there be carefully 
managed press coverage of trials in which child victims were involved. Whitcomb et al (1985:46) discovered, 
however, in the course of their research that the media's co-operation in suppressing any identifying infomlatioll 
had been "variable". For instance, the child 's lJame is often witltheld in the press but t!ten the parents are clearly 
identified , or the child's lJaUle is withheld but photographs or fi lm clips of the child are published. So, although 
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closing the trial to the public and the press can shield a victim from the trauma of having to give evidence in an 
open court, it does not protect the child victim against public exposure by the media . 
3.7 The Competency Requirement relating to Child Witnesses 
3.7.1 The Common Law Position 
The majority of states in the USA do not have statutory provisions dealing with the competency of child witnesses, 
but have left the matter to be decided by common law. Although the age at which the presumption of competency 
is set varies from state to state, tilere is generally a rebuttable presumption that children under a certain age are 
incompetent to testify. It must be determined in each case whether the child is competent to give evidence or not. 
Even in those states where there is a statutory regulation, the presumptions are rebuttable (Melton 198 1:73). 
According to Wigmore (1974:399) the presumption that young children are incompetent to testify probably arose 
from tile belief that children below a certain age did not have the capacity to take the oatil. Gard, quoted by Myers 
(1987:59), explained the conmlon law position as foll ows: 
"Under the rule of tile later COlllmon law, children of the age of fourteen years are presumed to 
have sufficient intelligence to testify and to comprehend tile nature of an oath, unless the 
circumstances of the case are such as to raise doubt. As to a child who is under that age, tilere 
is no presumption in favour of competency; it is for the court, in its discretion, to determine the 
question as to whetiler the child has sufficient intelligence to testify and to comprehend tile 
Obligation of an oath." 
This is supported by tile decision of State v Schossow 145 Ariz. 504, 703 P. 2d 448 (1985) where tile court at 449 
said : "At coounon law no child under 14 years of age was eligible to testify as a witness ... it was not until 1779 
that tile law renounced tile rule of absolute disqualification." The English cOlllmon law tradition of excluding tile 
evidence of young children was found in the American colonies as well , and children younger than fourteen were 
excluded from giving evidence at a trial (Perry and Wrightsman 1991:38). 
The earliest recorded instance in American jurisprudence which involved tile evidence of children occurred in tile 
1600s and culminated in tile Salem Witch Trials of 1692 . During the course of 1692 a number of gi rl s living in 
the town of Salem in Massachusetts began to display strange symptoms and apoplectic fits. Doctors were unable 
to explain tile hysteria and it was suspected that ' darker forces' were at work. Influenced by tales of voodoo magic 
told to them by a West Indian slave, the young gi rl s claimed that they were possessed by lhe devil and accused three 
women, including the West Indian slave. of witchcraft (Selkin 199 1 :6). 
The nwnber of accused alleged to be involved in the incident increased. The girls were urged by the elders to name 
the person involved in the witchcraft and, as Selkin (1991 :8) puts it, "it appeared tirat nearly half the people in the 
vi llage had signed their souls over to the devil ". These accusations resulted in 250 people being arrested and tried. 
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The key evidence in 19 of the 20 trials , which led to conviction and execution, was provided hy four girls who 
became known as dIe 'circle gi rls' . These gi rl s provided 'evidence' d,at they had been afflicted by witchcraft by 
having apoplectic fits and vomiting pins at the trial (Perry and Wrightsman 1991 :39). 
The girls , at the time of dle trial , were aged between five and sixteen and gave evidence that they had seen the 
accused fl ying on broomsticks and that dley had seen animals speaking. On dle basis of their evidence, nineteen 
people were convicted and executed. A number of others who had been convicted were spared execution hecause 
they admitted d,at dley were involved in wi tchcraft (Ceci and Bruck 1995:8). 
By the early 1700s a number of the accusers had recanted dleir evidence and begged forgiveness. Perry and 
Wrightsmall (1991: 39) quote the confession of Ann Putnam, dIe most damning of the child accusers, in 1706: 
"[ desire to be humbled before God for d,at sad and humbling providence that befell my father's 
family in dIe year 1692: that I , then being in my childhood, should by such providence of God, 
be made an instrument for the accusing of several persons of a grievous crime, whereby their 
lives were taken away from dIem, whom now 1 have just grounds and good reason to believe they 
were innocent persons ... " 
Selkin (1991:6-7) , in analysing the Salem Witch Trials, suggests that they are "It]he quintessential example of 
masked sexual motive, expressed in hysterical form ". He also dJeorises that the roots of dIe witch mania sprouted 
from dIe imagillary games played by a group of young girls at the village minister's house, and that the children, 
stimulated by dIe attention they were receiving, became more involved in dleir own imaginings. The elders of dIe 
cOOllnUluty, in dleir desire to protect the connllUtuty against danger, were remarkably credihle and gullible as the 
following interrogation of Sarah Carrier, aged eight, demonstrates. Sarah's modler was subsequently hanged as 
a witch (Selkin 1991 : 8): 
"How long hast thou been a witch?" 
"Ever since T was six years old." 
"How old are you now?" 
"Nearly eight years old. " 
"Who made you a witch?" 
"My mother. She made me set my hand to dIe book." 
"You said you saw a cat once. What did dle cat say to you?" 
"It said it would tear me to pieces if I would not set my hand to the book." ISarah is speaking 
here of the Devil's Book.] 
"How did you know it was your mother? " 
"The cat told me so, dlat she was my modJer." 
These trials had important implications for American legal hi story since they highlighted a number of issues which 
became sigluficant as far as child witnesses were concerned. As Perry and Wrightsman ( 1991 :39) point out, the 
major effect of the Salem Witch Trials was that for two hundred years after the trials dIe courts frequently referred 
to the Salem 'circle girls' as grounds for not allowing tile uncorroborated evidence of children at trials. 
The issues raised by the Salem trials are still of significance today. At what age is a child qualified to be a credible 
witness; do children have the abi li ty to remember accurately and is it possible to interview young children without 
being suggestive (Selkin 1991: 9) . 
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Children under the age of fourteen were thus irrebuttably presumed to be incapable of testi fy ing in court. As 
Gabarino et al (1989: 127) explain, tile "guiding hypotheses was tllat children are unreliable witnesses in general, 
and tllat the good child witness is a rare exception". It was only in 1779 that a panel of twelve judges, influenced 
by the decision in Rex v Brasier supra in England , moved away from the idea that there was a speci fi c age below 
which children were incompetent to testi fy. As Wigmore (J 974:400) explains, after tile decision in Brasier supra 
"the rule has been clearly accepted, tllat there is no specific age below which capacity will always be deemed 
wanting" . 
This is particularly illustrated in the case of 'Little Mary Ellen', which led to the famlation of the Society for the 
Prevention of Cruelty to Children. The case dealt with the physical abuse and neglect of an eight year old girl , 
Mary Ellen Wilson, as reported in the New York Times , April 22, 1874 and quoted in Sloan (1 983: 148-9): 
"The little child was put upon tile stand , and having been instructed by Recorder Hackett in the 
nature and responsibility of an oatil, was sworn. At first she answered the questions put to her 
readily, but soon became frightened and gave way to sobs and tears. She was soon reassured, 
however, by tile kind words of Recorder and District Attorney Rollins, and intelligently detailed 
the story of her ill-treatment." 
Traditionally the leading case in the USA has always been Wheeler v United States , 159 US 523 (1895) where the 
witness was tile 5 year old son of a murder victim . The court held that tllere is no age below which a child 
automatically becomes disqualified as a witness, rather it depended in each case wbetller the child could differemiate 
between the truth and lies : 
"That the boy was not by reason of his youth , as a matter of law, absolutely disqualified as a 
witness is clear. While no one would think of calling as a wi tness an infant only two or tllfee 
years old, tllere is no precise age wbich deten]]ines tile question of competency. This depends 
on tile capacity and intelligence of tile child, his appreciation of tile difference between trutll and 
fal sehood, as well as of his duty to tell tile fonner. The decision of tbis question rests primarily 
with the trial judge, who sees the proposed witness, notices his maImer, his apparem possession 
or lack of intell igence, and may resort to any examination which will tend to disclose his capacity 
and intelligence as well as his understanding of tile obligat ion of an oatb ." (at 524-5) 
From 1895 it was, tllerefore, settled law tllat children could testify in court. This was further emphasised by the 
decision in Rosen v United States, 245 U. S. 467 (1918) where tile Supreme Court had the fo Uowing to say 
regarding competency at 47 1: 
" ... the conviction of our time that tile truth is more likely to be arrived at by hearing the 
testimony of all persons of competent understanding who may seem to have knowledge of tile 
facts involved in a case, leaving the credit and weight of sucb testimony to be determined by tile 
jury or by the court, ratller than by rejecting witnesses as incompetent. " 
However, in practice the competency criteria were so rigidly applied that countless children were excluded from 
giving evidence, many of whom would probably have confoffiled with tile Wh eeler supra standards if correctly 
applied (Dziech and Schudson 1989: 134). 
170 
Although Ule Supreme Court in Ule Wheeler case supra allowed a five year old to give evidence, a number of states 
began enacting provisions that presumed children under the age of fourteen to be incompetent. Using these 
provisions, judges found so many children to be incompetent that these sections were accused by Galante (1984:3 I) 
of being ule prime legal rule responsible for preventing the successful prosecution of child abuse cases. 
3.7.2 Federal Rules of Evidence 
11le Federal Rules of Evidence became effective on the 1st July 1975 and indicated a move away from the common 
law rule which preswned competency only in ule case of children over the age of fourteen (Whitcomb et al 
1985:31). Federal Rule 60 1 deals with the question of competency, and provides: 
"Every person is competent to be a witness except as otherwise provided in these IUles. 
However, in civil actions and proceedings , wid] respect to an element of a claim or defense as 
to which State law supplies ule rule of decision, the competency of a witness shall be determined 
in accordance with State law. " 
Since Federal Rule 601, or a version of it , has been adopted by various states in the USA, it is important to analyse 
Ihe implications of this rule. The Advisory Committee Note on Rule 60 1 says that a "witness wholly without 
capacity is difficult to imagine. The question is one particularly suited to the jury as one of weight and credibility". 
As Myers (1987:63) points out. the intention of the legislative drafters was to remove Ule emphasis on competency 
as a prerequisite for giving evidence. Commentators on Rule 601 have suggested dlat the Rule is designed "to 
curtail the need for preliminary inquiry into witness competency" so that dle jury simply evaluate the evidence in 
tenns of its weight and credibility. According to Weins tein and Berger, commentators on the Rule, alulOugh the 
traditional inquiry into competency is 110 longer required, judges may nevertheless conduct such an examination to 
detennine whether a witness should be allowed to testify or not (Myers 1987:64). 
Literally, Rule 601 provides that every person is competent to be a witness. The question that has been asked is 
whether tile Rule has removed the court 's discretion to detennine whether a witness has the capacity to testify or 
not. According to Myers (1987:64). the answer to uli s question is a definite ' no', since there are a number of other 
Federal Rules in temlS of which incompetent witnesses could be prevented from testifying. For instance, ule child 's 
evidence could be excluded in terms of Federal Rule 401 in tilat it was not relevant since ule wi tness was so lacking 
in credibility. Weinstein and Berger, as quoted by Myers (1987:65), explain it as follows : 
"[Slince there are no longer artificial grounds for disqualifying a witness as incompetellt. the 
traditional preliminary examination into competency is no longer required. But a trial judge still 
has a broad discretion to control the course ofa trial (Rule 611) and rule on relevancy (Rule 401 
and 403). If competency is defined as the minimum standard of credibility necessary to pemlit 
any reasonable man to put any credence in a witness's testimony, then a witness must be 
competent as to the matters he is expected to testify about; it is the court's obligation to insure 
that he meets that minimum standard. In making ulis detemlination the COurt will still be deciding 
competency. II 
Examples of other Federal Rules in terms of which a child's evidence could be excluded are set out by Myers 
(1987:65-7): If the child is very young, the court could in terms of Rule 602 rule that ule child lacks personal 
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knowledge; if the child is unable to remember events at the trial , tile evidence could be excluded on the ground that 
the child does not possess personal knowledge in terms of Federal Rule 602; if the child is so margi nally competent 
the court could find tilat the probative value of tile evidence is outweighed by the prejudice to the accused in temlS 
of Rule 403. Rule 603 is of special importance since it provides that "[blefore testifying, every witness shall be 
required to declare that he will testify truthfully , by oatil or affimlation ". This obviously implies that the witness 
understand tile difference between the uuth and lies and be able to appreciate the duty to tell tile truth. If a child 
witness is unable to do this, then his evidence could be excluded in tenns of this rule. 
Therefore, altilough Rule 601 does in theory remove tile competency requirement by presuming all witnesses to he 
competent , there are other rules in temlS of which the evidence of a witness could be excluded. However, Myers 
(1987:67) does suggest that the competency examination may perhaps he used under the guise of otiler rules. As 
he points out , "a competency decision by any other name is still a competency decision, and that conceptualizing 
competency in tenus of minimal credibility or relevance has more to do with semantics than substance". Weinslein 
and Berger acknowledge tilis point by saying that "[iln making this detennination the court will still be deciding 
competency" (Myers 1987: 67) . 
However, Federal Rule 601 has introduced a trend of moving away from the o ld competency rule, and Blinka 
(1986: 15) explained in 1986 that "[aJnything resembling tile old ... procedure should be used sparingly and rarely, 
since jurors are readily capable of assessing the veracity of the child witness. The ... evidence code is in favor of 
allowing the child to testify . All doubts should be resolved in favor of pemlitting the child to take tile witness 
stand" . 
The modernisation of tile competency rnles does not imply that children have tile same ability to recall and 
communicate as adults . All it intends to do is give tile jury an opportunity to see and hear child witnesses and tllen 
to evaluate their credibility (Dziech and Schudson 1989: 136). This view is found in some jury instructions, for 
instance tile Wisconsin Jury Instructions on child witnesses reads as follows: 
"A child is a competent witness and his testimony should be weighed in the same mamler as 
testimony of any other witness. Considerations of age, intelligence, ability to observe and report 
correctly. ability to understand the trutil , conduct on the witness stand , interes t, appearance. and 
other matters bearing on credibility apply to a child witness in conmlon Witil a ll wi tnesses. " 
(Dziech and Scbudson 1989:206). 
There are very few federal Court decisions relating to the competency of child witnesses. l1lis is because. firstl y, 
the district court judges follow Rule 60 I and allow all persons to testify and, secondly, because it is a mat ter which 
does not normally arise ill a federal court (Myers 1987:67). The decisions that do reach the federal courts seeIll 
to indicate that the courts follow the ordinary conmlon law principles of competency. In United States v Saenz, 
747 F.2d 930 (5 th Circ. 1983) the court , in interpreting Rule 601 , held that every witness is competent to testify , 
and competent here 1l'1eal1S that "she is capable of communicating relevant material and understands she has an 
obligation to do so" (at 936). In United States v Odam, 736 F.2d 104 (4til Circ. 1984) the court discussed tile 
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question of competency under Rule 601 and said tbat the only ground for disquali fy ing a willless in tenus of this 
rule would be if the witness did not have knowledge about Ule event which he had to testi fy to, did nOt have the 
capacity to remember or did not understand the duty to tell the truth (at 110). 
However, in United States v Gutman, 725 F.2d 41 7 (7 Ul Circ. 1984) Ule defence wanted the trial Court to hold a 
pretrial hearing on the competency of a witness who suffered from a mental illness. The trial judge denied the 
motion and on appeal the Court held that uds was not incorrect , but did add that " la Jlthough insatdty as such is no 
longer a ground for disqualifying a witness, ... a district judge has Ule power, and in an appropriate case the duty , 
to hold a hearing to determine whether a witness should not be allowed to testi fy because insanity has made him 
incapable of testifying in a competent fashion". This decision would then seem to sanction Ule use of preliminary 
competency examinations similar to ulOse which were held before the introduction of Rule 601 (Myers 1987:69). 
Although in terms of Rule 601 the courts do not have to hold an inquiry into competency as trial judges have been 
invested widl Ule auulOrily to evaluate and decide upon the competency of children, according to Myers (1987:70-1) 
the courts will probably continue to conduct preliminary competency examinations . 
3.7.3 State Rules Regarding Competency 
Each state has its own competency standards and Ulese are found in state laws, court rules of evidence or codified 
rules of evidence . In analysing the competency provisions of various states, Whitcomb et al (1985:31 -2) divided 
the states inlo the following groups: 
i. There are those states (twenty in number) which follow Federal Rule 601 and declare every person to he 
a competent witness. This rule was interpreted literally in dle case of Commonwealth v Anderson, 552 
A.2d 1064 (Pa.Super. 1988) where the PemlSylvania court interpreted the rule at 1064 as meaUling that 
"testimony of any person, regardless of mental condition, is competent evidence , unless it contributes 
nothing at all because the witness is wholly untrustworthy" . AldlOugh Ule traditiOltal competency 
examination is U1Ulecessary, as mentioned above the trial judge still has Ule audlOrity to evaluate and rule 
on a child's competency. 
AlulOugh a number of states have adopted some version of Rule 60 I , there are very few legal decisions 
interpreting it. The courtS appear to follow Ule Federal lead by relying on the tradi tional common-law 
principles of witness competence. For iIlStance, in State v Guy, 419 N. W. 20 152 (Neb. 1988) the State 
of Nebraska interpreted it as follows at 155: 
"In ruling whether or not a child is a competent witness, the trial court must determine 
whether a child is sufficiently mature to receive correct impressions by his or her senses , 
wheUler the child can recollect and narrate intelligentl y, and wheuler the child appreciates 
the moral duty to tell the truth." 
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In certain states a proviso of some SOrt has been added to Rule 601, qualifying it in some way. For 
example, in the state of Kentucky the statute reads that "every person is competent... urdess he be found 
by the court incapable of understanding the facts concerning which his testimony is offered". The statute 
in Massachusetts provides that" [alny person of sufficient understanding . . . may testify". The effect of 
these qualifications is simply to ensure that the trial judge has the power to evaluate the competency of a 
witness. 
II. There are those states (thirteen in number) which presume that any person will be competent if he 
understands the concept of the oath or the duty to tell the trnth. An example here would be the state of 
Georgia which has a statute providing that children who do not understand the concept of the oath will oat 
be competent to give evidence (Myers 1987:72), 
Ill. There are states (five in number) which specifically stipulate that children will only be competent to testify 
if they understand the nature and obligation of the oath or the duty to rell the truth. Witnesses can 
substitute an affirnlarion for the oatiL In both , the underlying concept is an understanding of the 
seriousness of the proceedings and the duty to speak tile truth. 
IV. Thirteen states hold that children under certain ages are presumed to be incompetent In eleven of these 
states the threshold age is ten, while in two states children under twelve are presumed to be incompetent. 
In Idaho tile Idaho Code provides that "[tlhe following persons camlOt be witnesses: Children under ten 
(10) years of age, who appcar incapable of receiving just impressions of the facts respecting which tIley 
are examined, or of relating them truly". Although children below these specific ages are preswued to 
be incompetent, the vast majority of children over the age of five are found to be competent to testify once 
they have been questioned by the courts, This is supported by the decision in People v Rowell, 463 
N.Y.S.2d 426 (1983) where tile appeal court confirtlled drat the trial court had correctly found an eleven 
year old to be competent even though tIlere was a presumption in the state that children under the age of 
twelve were incompetent to testify. 
Also in Victor v Smilanich, 54 Colo. 479, 131 P.392 (1913) where the court said that incompetency did 
not apply to all children under the age of ten but only to those children under ten who "appear incapahle 
of receiving just impressions of ule facts respecting which they are examined, or of relating ulem truly". 
Here a six and a half year old boy was held to be competent since he understood urat he was supposed to 
tell the trutil and could be punished if he did not and he bad a fair understanding of the obligation imposed 
by the oatil. In Berger v People, 122 Colo. 367, 224 P.2d 228 (J 950) a seven and a half year old boy was 
found to be competent as he was able to "receive just impressions of fact and trutilfully relate the same". 
AltilOugh there are specific age limits mentioned in the statutes of these states, the limits would appear to 
affect only the presumptions. Children above ulose specific ages are presumed competent whereas children 
below those ages are presumed incompetent. As stated in People v Waltrous (1935)7 Ca1.App.2d 7 at 10 
"Ule test is not one of age but of understanding and ule capability of receiving just impressions and relating 
174 
those facts truthfully". According to Selkin (1991: 118), this appears to be the only Californian case where 
the children, twin girls aged four, were found incompetent to testify . California has been regarded as quite 
liberal in finding children competent. In People v Slobodian (1948) 31 Cal. 2d 555 a 6 year old who 
believed there were 12 days in a week was regarded as competent, as was a five year old in People v Pike 
(1960) 183 Cal.App.2d 729 who could not recall where she lived, the name of her school, how long she 
had gone to school, or the names of her classmates . 
v. There are states (five in number) which do not have any statutes or court rules relating to the competency 
of children. According to dIe case law, these states seem to follow the traditional common law standard 
d,at children under the age of fourteen are presumed to be incompetent. There would, therefore, have to 
be an inquiry in each case to detemline whether a child under fourteen was competent or not. 
vi. A number of states have created a specific exception in tbe case of sexual abuse matters, without 
interfering with their overall competency provisions. This is in accordance with recommendations by the 
American Bar Association's National Legal Resource Center for Child Advocacy and Protection that child 
victims of sexual assault be considered competent witnesses and be aUowed to testify without first having 
to qualify to do so. 111e presiding officer would dlen determine dle weight and credibility that should be 
given to the evidence (Myers 1987:73). In response to this various states created specific statutory 
exceptions. In Alabama a statute was enacted which provided dlat "[ nlotwidlstanding any other provision 
of law or rule of evidence, a child victim of sexual abuse or sexual exploitation, shall be considered a 
competent witness and shall be allowed to testify widlOut prior qualification in any judicial proceeding". 
A similar provision is found in the Utah statute which provides that a "child victim of sexual abuse under 
the age of ten is a competent witness and shall be allowed to testify without prior qualification in any 
judicial proceeding" (Myers 1987:74). The use of the word "shall" in dlese statutes appears to be 
peremptory. The question dlat arises is whedler the traditiollal role of the presiding officer to evaluate dle 
child's competency has been completely removed. Although there is an obvious need for the court to hear 
the evidence of a child in a sexual abuse case, it is also important that the accused be granted basic fairness 
and due process of law (Myers 1987:74). 
3.7.4 The Test for Competency 
The onus to detennine competency is on dle presiding officer (Stafford 1962:312). It is his duty to evaluate the 
child's ability to differentiate the truth from a lie, the ability to understand the duty to tell dle trudl and dIe 
consequences of not doing so (Benedek and Schetky 1986: 1225). 111e landmark decision of Wheeler v United 
States supra fonnulated the basis of the competency test, when the court at 525 said that it depended on the capacity 
and intelligence of the child, his appreciation of the difference between truth and falsehood, as well as the duty to 
speak the trudl. 
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AldlOugh the primary emphasis is on the child 's ability to differentiate truth from falsehood. there are other aspects 
which are included in tile examination. It is also necessary for a child to have adequate cognitive skills to 
comprehend the event he has witnessed and be able to communicate his memories of the event in response lO 
questions (Melton 198 1 :75). The test for competency was explained by the court in Cross v Commonwealth , 195 
Va. 62, 77 S.E.2d 447 ( 1953) at 449: 
"A child is competent to testify if he possesses thc capacity to observe events, to recollect and 
conlllUnicate them, and has the ability to understand questions and to frame and make intelligent 
answers, with a consciousness of the duty to speak the trutll ." 
Benedek and Schetky (1986: I 225) sunlllarise the position of the courts as follows: 
"The courts have decided that to understand the duty to tell the truth , a child must possess the 
mental capacity at the time of tile occurrence to observe and register tile evem accurately 
(registration and memory); tile memory sufficient to retain an independent (uncoached) 
recollection of tile event (storage capacity); tile ability to communicate tllis memory (recall and 
conmlUnication); and the ability to understand one's obligation to speak the trutll. " 
The test, therefore, of a child's competency involves four fundamental issues: firstly, the child must have the 
mental capacity at the time of the occurrence in question to observe and register the event; secondly , the child must 
possess memory which will be sufficient to enable him to retain an independent recollection of the observations 
made; thirdly, the child mUSt have the capacity to translate the memory of these observations into words; and , 
fourtilly, the child must possess sufficient intelligence to understand the obligation to speak ule truth (Stafford 
1962:3 13) . This implies that to assess a child 's competency to testify, an assessment of the child 's moral , cogni tive 
and emotional capacities to give evidence is required (Melton 198 1 :75). 
3.7.4.1 Mental Capacity to Observe 
To be able to give evidence as a witness, a child must have dIe capacity to observe an evenl. This implies the 
ability to register sensory perceptions i. e. tile child must be able to see things, hear them, touch them, smell them 
or taste them. 
It is obvious that children do possess dle physical capacity to register tllese perceptions, but the real issue is wlretller 
children notice what goes on around them in the same way as adults do. Johnson and Foley (I 984:35-6} conducted 
research into children's abili ty to observe and remember events, and they came to the conclusion that it could nOt 
be said that children notice less Ulan adults. Children are as capable as adults of observing and remembering simple 
events. More complex or symbolic evenrs present greater difficul ty for young children, but there are circumstances 
in which children are actually better at observing events than adults. This and otller research will be investigated 
ill greater detail at a later stage. 
The requirement here is that dIe child must have dIe capaci ty to observe at the time the event occurred (Melton 
198 1 :75). The general ru le is ulat competency is detemlined when the child gives evidence, which means Utat the 
child 's competency will be assessed at the trial. This is accepted by common law sources. Wigmore (l 974:641 ) 
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says that the "time of utterance of the testimony is ordinarily the time when the quali fication must ex ist". The court 
in State v Gamer, 11 6 Ariz. 443, 569 P.2d 1341 (1 977) held at 1344 that "Itlhe competency of a child to testify 
relates to the time when the child is produced as a witness, not to the time when the event occurred ". However, 
in State v Butcher, 165 W. Va . 522, 270 S.E.2d 156 (1 980) the court at 158 held that competency is determined 
at the time the child gives evidence but in relation to some elements of competence. such as the capacity to obselVe 
or register perceptions, incompetence at dIe time of d1e event could disqualify a child as a wimess. 
It does not follow by implication that incompetence at the time of the event would au tomatically disqualify a witness 
later at the trial. There are two separate factors d,at are being dealt with here: dIe child must be able to relate facts 
truly (at the time of d1e trial) but must also be capable of receiving just impressions of the facts (at d1e time of Ole 
event). This has d1e implication ti1at it is possible for a child to be much younger with different mental capabili ties 
at dIe time of the event as opposed ro the date of the trial (Stafford 1962:306) . 
Myers (1987: 103) gives an example, showing how incompetence at the time of the event does not necessaril y 
disquali fy a child from giving evidence. If a three year old were to witness a coll ision, the child would have tile 
capacity at the time of tile collision to observe the event but would not have the abili ty to relate what was observed. 
The child would therefore be incompetent at d1e time the event occurred. If, at the time the trial takes place, the 
child has the ability to relate what was observed, then dIe child would be competent. 
Although it is accepted that d1e question of competency has to be decided at the time of the trial , most states hold 
that d1e COlirt must detenlline that the child was also competent at the eariier date as well (Stafford 1962:306). 
3,7.4,2 Memory 
A child witness must have the capacity to remember the event about which he has ro testi fy at the trial. This 
requirement is complex as there are actually three issues involved: fi rsdy, the child must have the capacity to recall 
events; secondly, the child must be able to separate fact from fantasy; and thirdl y, the child must be able to 
maintain those memories independently, without being influenced by others (Whitcomb et al 1985:35). 
Although a child must possess a certain degree of memory in order to be competent , this does not mean d,at d1e 
child 's memory has to be perfect. In Phillips v State , 173 Ga. App. 396, 326 S. E.2d 775 (1 985) the court held dlat 
the fact d,at the eight year old witness could not remember the time of or d1e year in which the incident took place 
did not render her incompetent. 
Most children have sufficient memory to qualify as witnesses, but th is does nor mean that memory is the same ill 
children as in adul ts. For ins tallce, children are less skilful than adults in remembering events using free recall. 
This does not mean dIat children provide incorrect info mlation, they simpl y produce less infonnation. When 
questioned using specific questions, children have been found to be on par with adults (Whitcomb et al 1985:35). 
Marin et al conducted a study in which dIe perfom1ance of children was compared to adults OIl eyewitness tasks. 
177 
Students, aged between five and twenty-two, were placed in a situation where a specific incident was staged, and 
were then questioned about dIe event after a brief interval and again after twO weeks. Memory was assessed using 
free recall and objective questions. The results showed d,at the older subjects were superior only on the free 
narrative tasks. Older subjects produced much more material on free recall , but the youngest subjects were 
significantly more likely to recall correctly those items which dley did recall , with only 3 % of dIe answers being 
incorrect (Melton 198 1 :76). Since younger children require cues to ass ist them in remembering, dIe style of 
questioning is very important. Research seems to indicate dlat it is the style of questioning which could be to blame 
for inaccurate evidence rather than the age of the child (Whitcomb et al 1985:36). 
3_7-4-3 Capacity to Communicate 
The child witness must have the capacity to conmlUnicate in order to make himself understood. According to 
Wigmore (1974:71 3), the witness must conununicate his memory to the court , and communication involves "a 
capacity to understand ques tions put, and to frame and express intell igent answers" . In Rhea v State. 705 S. W. 2d 
165 (Tex.Ct .App. 1985) a dlfee year old child was declared incompetent because she could nOt communicate 
adequately. 
The vast majority of children possess the ability to conunutucate tJle fac ts of a case. This problem is more relevant 
to younger children, aldlOugh children as young as twO are capable of relating simple occurrences. By the age of 
fi ve children understand most of the granmlatical rules of their native language and can construct complex sentences 
(Myers 1987:84). 
It has been accepted that young children do have the capacity to conunUlucate if certain minor accommodations are 
made, dIe most obvious being an adjustment to the child 's level of language development (Whitcomb et al 1985 :37). 
As Wigmore pointed out supra . in order to conunUlucate a child must be able to understand the question d,at is 
being asked. Adults often use metaphors, analogies, words and concepts that are beyond dIe comprehension of 
children. Legal professionals use specialised techtucal language that most adults do not understand (Myers 
1987 :85). If a child is expected to understand a question, it must be framed in language that dIe child is able to 
comprehend. 
In addi tion to understanding the question, the child wi tness must be able to communicate facts. Children often 
commUlucate differently from adults but this will not necessarily render the child incompetent. In State v Lairby, 
699 P. 2d 11 87 (Utah 1984) a six year old used the word ' winky ' instead of penis. Although dIe court was not 
dealing with the question of competency here, they stated at 1206 that a child may "relate facts differently than 
would an adult , but tbat does not prevent a child from testifying truthfully, accurately, and in a malUler which can 
be understood by the jury". 
The mere fact that a child hesitates to reply or is shy does not render the child incompetent. In State v AmlStrong, 
453 So. 2d 1256 (La.Ct.App . 1984) a four year old gave evidence. The court held d,at even tJlOugh her answers 
were hesitant , dlis did not render her incompetent. According to Myers (1987:85), even refusing to answer some 
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questions will not render a child incompetent. He refers to tile case of PendLeton v Commonwealth , 685 S.W.2d 
549 (Ky . 1985) where a six year old refused to listen to questions and placed her fingers in her ears towards the 
end of cross-examination. The cwld was nevertheless held 10 be competent and her evidence accepted. 
The majori ty view appears to be that inconsistency in re lating events will not necessarily render a child incompetent. 
In State v Butcher supra the West Virginia Supreme Court explained at 159 that the "fact that the testimony of a 
witness is inconsistent does not render her incompetent as a witness; rather. such inconsistency goes to her 
credibility". 111is is supported by the decision in State v Rogers , 692 P.2d 2 (Mom. 1984) where the Montana 
Supreme court found that inconsistencies in the evidence of a four year old regarding the dates, times and details 
went to credibility and did not affect her competence. However, in Barnes v State , 173 Ga.App . 907 , 328 S.E.2d 
583 (1985) Judge Benham delivered a dissenting judgement in which he argued that the inconsistencies in the fi ve 
year old's evidence were so serious and related to such crucial matters that she was incompetent. In State v PheLps, 
696 P.2d 447 (Mont. 1985) the Montana Supreme Court found a five year old , who thought he was in a police 
station and that the j udge was a karate expert , to be competent. In Busby v State , 174 Ga.App. 536, 330 S.E.2d 
765 (1985) a fi ve year old witness was found 10 be competent even ulOugh "her replies were not always full y 
responsive and did not demonstrate a fiml grasp of such abstractions as the duration and frequency of events 
occurring in a temporal framework " (at 767) . The basis of these decisions appears to he that if the child can 
communicate effectively about the events concerned, then mistakes and inconsistencies will not render the child 
incompetent. 
Generally children communicate verbally , but there may be occasions when uley use non-verbal communication. 
This may occur when the child has difficulty putting ulOughts into words or if the child is 100 shy or embarrassed 
to say certain words. For instance, the child may attempt to communicate by means of a drawing or the use of 
anatomically correct dolls. In State v Rogers supra Ibe four year old witness was allowed to demonstrate the 
accused's actions using an anatomically correcl doll . Also in Kehinde v CommonweaLth , I Va.App. 342, 338 S.E. 
2d 356 ( 1986) where the Appeal Court held tllal Ibe Irial court had not abused its discretion when it allowed a child 
to illustrate penetration by the use of anatomically correct dolls. 
3.7.4.4 Personal Knowledge 
Federal Rule 602 requires every witness to have persOltal knowledge regarding the matters he is 10 testify to. This 
rule has been re-enacted in a number of State Codes. For instance, section 702 of the Colorado Evidence Code 
includes Ihe requirement of personal knowledge (Selkin 1991: 119). Although tilis requirement is usually fOWld in 
the general competency and disqualification sections of rules and codes, ulis is "now a condi tion for admission of 
test imony of the witness regarding a particular matter, not their general competency 10 testi fy" (Selkin 1991: 119). 
Myers ( 1987:76) agrees with this explanalion, stating that tile requirement of personal knowledge is not a 
component of competency. He illustrates the point by using the following example of a dlirteen year old standing 
on a street comer. The child is intelligent, has a good memory, is able to communicate very well and understands 
dIe duty to speak the truth . A person passes behind ule child , outside Ihe child's fiel d of vision. Although ule child 
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would be perfectly competent to give evidence as a witness, tile child would have no personal knowledge. 
All that is required is that the witness possess some personal knowledge of the event. In Senecal v Drollette , 304 
N. Y. 446, 108 N.E. 2d 602 (1952) the Appeal Court held tiJat the trial court erred in excluding the evidence of 
a twelve year old boy who had obtained only a brief glance of a passing car on the basis that he did not have 
personal knowledge. 
3.7.4.5 Obligation to Tell the Truth 
The final requirement is that the child must possess sufficient intelligence to understand tile obligation to speak tile 
truth . This implies that the child must understand the difference between the truth and lies, and also be able to 
appreciate the obligation to tell tile truth. Whitcomb et al (1985:33) define it as "an appreciation and consciousness 
of tile duty to speak tile trutil and a sense of moral responsibility ". 
Tlus requirement is the one which is probably emphasised the most by the courts, and even states that bave liberal 
competency standards require a minimal understanding of what it means to tell the truth. In State v Eiler, 762 P.2d 
210 (Mont. 1988) an eight year old girl was found to be competent to give evidence about an incident which had 
occurred four years earlier. Tbe accused appealed against his conviction on tile grounds tiJat the child had not 
appreciated the duty to tell the trutil and he quoted the following portion from her evidence (at 214): 
"Q. What is the reason for telling the ttuth? 
A. (No response) 
Q. Do you believe in God? 
A. Yes 
Q. Okay. And does God have any tiling to do witit you telling the !ruUl? 
A. Yes 
Q. What does God have to do wiUt that? 
A. I don't know." 
The Appeal Court ruled tita! the child did understand the difference between the truth and a lie , and was aware tila! 
lying entailed punislnnent. They referred to Ule following portions of her evidence which the defence had neglected 
to highlight at 214: 
"Q. Wbat does it mean to tell the truth? 
A. To tell what really happened. 
Q. Okay. W1,at do you tilink happens if you don't tell tite truth? 
A. You won't be resurrected. 
Q. Okay. Do you get in trouble for not telling the truth, not telling the truth at school? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Wbat happens if you don ' t tell the truUl at school? 
A. You have to go to detention. 
Q. What is detention? 
A. You have to stay in in recess. 
Q. And do you ever - would you get in trouble at home for not telling Ule trutit? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What happens if you don ' t tell the truUl? 
A. You have to go to bed." 
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n,e child must in some way be able to distinguish between the concept of truth and lies. In Heckathorne v State , 
697 S.W.2d 8 (Tex .Ct.App. 1985) the court had to consider the competency of a five year old wi tness. They came 
to the conclusion that the child did understand the difference between the truth and lies because she explained Otat 
the truth was "telling what really happened" and a lie was "what didn't really happen" <at II). In In re R.R. , 79 
N. J. 97. 398 A.2d 76 (1979) Ole New Jersey Supreme Court found the following child capable of understanding 
the difference between Ole truO, and a lie and, therefore, to be a competent witness: 
"Sean responded O,at truOlfulness 'means to be good ' and O,at if he tOld a lie, ' I be bad'. Sean 
also stated that if he were bad he would 'get a beating', and Olerefore he tried to be good all the 
time. Finally, Sean indicated that he would not be ' bad' when answering questions in court but 
would instead relate what bappened ' Ole way it was '" (at 79). 
And in Ole well known case of Wheeler v United States supra the United States Supreme Court had the following 
[0 say about the competency examination at 524: 
"The boy .. . said among other things that he knew the difference between the truth and a lie; that 
if he told a lie Ole bad man would get him , and O,at he was going to tell the truOl. When further 
asked what they would do with him in court if he told a lie, he replied that Oley would put him 
in jail. He al so said O,at his mother had told him that morning to ' tell no lie ', and in response 
to a question as to what d,e clerk said to him , when he held up his hand , he answered ' don ' t you 
tell no story '. ' 
Understanding the difference between Ole truth and lies does not mean that the child must understand the abstract 
concepts of truth and falsity. In Posey v United States , 41 A.2d 300 (D.C.Ct.App. 1945) a ten year old said O,at 
he did not understand the "difference between right and wrong; that he did not know what an oath was; but upon 
inquiry as to what did happen to him if he did not tell Ole truth he said he would be whipped" (at 301) . The Appeal 
Court found the child to be competent, stating at 301 -2 that the fact that the boy said he did not understand Ole 
difference between right and wrong did not bind them as Ole court bad to reach a decision on the whole 
examination: 
"Many an intelligent adult would hesitate before claiming an understanding of Ole difference 
between right and wrong ... Philosophers, theologians and moralists have dealt with Oli s subject at 
lengOl and have not always reached Ole same conclusion ... It is easily understandable that this ten 
year old boy, in a strange and embarrassing setting would give negative answers to abstract 
questions concerning the difference between right and wrong or the ltature of an oath, and yet at 
the same time have sufficiem capacity for observation, recollection and conmlUnication. plus a 
consciousness of the duty to tell the truOl, to fully qualify him as a witness ... " 
In People v Norfleet, 142 Mich.App. 745 , 371 N. W.2d 438 (1985) a seven year old witness said ~lat sbe did not 
know Ole difference between d,e truth and a lie and did not know tbe difference between right and wrong. The trial 
court excluded her evidence. The Michigan Appeal Court held that it was an error to exclude the child 's evidence 
without furOrer inqui ring into her capacity. 
n,e mere fact, therefore, O,at a child says he does not understand Ole difference between right and wrong , does 
not automatically make him incompetent. The court must examine the child to find out whether he really does 
understand the concepts or whether he is simply confused (Myers 1987:96). This is supported by the decision of 
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State v Ybarra , 24 N.M . 413 . 174 P. 212 (191 8) where the court had the following to say at2 13: 
"TIle fact that a child states in express tertns that he does not understand dIe nature of an oath is 
not of itself sufficient ground for his exclusion as a witness, where it clearly appears dlat the child 
has sufficient intell igence to understand dIe nature of an oadl and to narrate the facts 
accurately ... " 
In State v Pettis , 488 A.2d 704 (R.l. 1985) the Appeal Court upheld the decision of the trial court who found a 
mentally retarded fourteen year old witness to be competent despite the fact that she could not explain the difference 
between truth and falsehood as the trial judge was "satisfied dlat in her own humble way she appreciates the 
necessity for telling the trudl". 
In addition to being able to understand the difference between the trudl and lies, dIe child witness must also be 
aware of the obligation to tell the truth. Historically children were asked questions about church attendance and 
their belief in God to detemline their knowledge of trudl and lies, but dIe current trend of dIe courts has recognised 
dlat these types of questions "may be irrelevant due to the changes in attitudes and cultural emphasis on religion 
and church attendance" (Whitcomb et al 1985 :33-4) . For instance, in State v Col/ier, 23 Wn.2d 678,162 P.2d 267 
(1945) a nine year old boy was asked "Who is God?" He was unable to answer the question, saying only "I know 
he never told a lie." In detemlining whether the child was competent, the court said at 272: "We may observe, 
parenthetically, that a good many adults would have some difficulty with dlat question". 
TIle child witness must also be aware that telling lies will result in punislmlenl. It is not necessary that the child 
understand the concept of divine punishment for lying under oath nor dIe legal concept of perjury. All that is 
required is that the child must believe that the punishment wi ll follow. It is irrelevalll where dIe punishment will 
come from. It could emanate from God , the judge, the police or a parem (Myers 1987:98) . In In re R.R. supra 
dIe court at 82 stated that children are allowed to testify "so long as dley evince a connnitmem to speak dIe trudl 
out of fear of future punishment of any kind" . In State v Higginbottom , 3 12 N.C. 760, 324 S.E. 2d 834 (1985) 
a four year old, who believed that "a heavenly Fadler punished persons who told lies" (a t 839), was held to be 
competent. 
It is sufficient that dIe child believes in punislunem, it does not matter what the punishment is. In In re A.H.B., 
491 A.2d 490 (D. C. 1985) dIe eleven year old witness believed that he would be put in "a home" if he told a lie 
(at 494), whereas in People v Delaney, 52 Cal.App. 765 , 199 P. 896 (1921 ) the child believed he would go to jail 
if he lied. 
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3.7.5 The Oath 
At common law a child was incompetent if dlere was no understanding of the religious implications of an oadl or 
a belief in divine retribution (Myers 1987:99). According to Wigmore (1974:400), "'t]he nature of the child's 
belief is in theory to be judged by the same theological tests ordinarily applicable. For children, however, it is 
customary to employ simpler language and more concrete tests than are usual widl adults". 
The oath has not been abolished, instead wi tnesses are entitled to choose between the oath or an affirmation. 
Although histOrically dIe purpose of the oadl was to instil a fear of divine retribution for swearing fal sely , in temlS 
of current law the purpose is more secular. Its function is "to arouse the conscience of the witness and remind the 
witness tilat she has a special duty to tell the trudl in court" (Myers 1987: 100). Federal Rule 603 provides that 
before testifying "every wi tness shall be required to declare that he will testify truthfully, by oath or affirulation 
administered in a foml calculated to awaken his conscience and impress his mind with hi s duty to do so". In People 
v Parks , 390 N. Y.S. 2d 848 (1976) the court explained tile oath as serving two functions, namely "to alert the 
witness to the moral duty to testify truthfully and to deter false testimony by establishing a legal basis for a perjury 
prosecution". In the case of a child witness, all tilat is now required is that dIe child must understand tilat he will 
be punished if he tells a lie. This duty is summarised by Stafford (1962:318) as follows: 
"It is not necessary that he understands the legal nature of an oath or appreciates the forulality of 
taking it as long as he has an adequate sense of dIe impropriety of falsehood. In other words, he 
need not be able to define an oadl, perjury or testimony." 
The administering of the oath does not require any particular words. The administering officer simply has to use 
a method which is most binding on the person. Therefore, it is not necessary to use the words 'oati, ' or 'swear' . 
All dlat is required is that the child must understand tile necessity of telling the truth. It will be sufficient if he asks 
the child 'to promise' to tell the truth (Stafford 1962:3 19). In Burkett v State , 439 SO.2d 737 (Ala .Crim.App. 
1983) a five year old child promised to tell the 'absolute truth ' but did not take the oatil. 111e court held that her 
promise served the purpose of swearing an oadl to tell the trutll ' in substance if not in form'. In In re R. R. supra 
the Supreme Court mentioned that it was not necessary "that an infant moudl the traditional litany nor comprehend 
its legal significance". 
The oatil will in most cases be administered to the chi ld after competency has been decided, altilOugh tllis will not 
be affected if tile oath is administered before the competency examination (Myers 1987: 100). Since Federal Rule 
60 1 assumes all the witnesses to be competent, states following dlis rule will not always conduct a preliminary 
examination into competence. and the oath will tllerefore be administered before any issue of competence arises. 
There are a number of states which allow children to testi fy witllout taking the oadl or making au affimlation. In 
Florida, for instance, the court has dIe discretion to allow the child to give evidence widlOut taking the oath if the 
court is satisfied that the child understands dIe obligation to speak the truth. In New York children under the age 
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of twelve who do not understand dIe concept of the oath can give unsworn evidence if dIe court is satisfied that dIe 
witness has sufficient intelligence and capacity. The latter statute does, however, add the proviso that the accused 
may not be convicted on unsworn evidence without corroboration (Myers 1987: 101). 
If a child does not understand the concept of the oadl, the court has dle discretion to instruct the child on the 
meaning of the oath and, according to Myers (1987: 102), a recess may be called for this purpose. Wigmore 
(1974:406) deals with the question whether a child may become competent to take dle oath after he has been 
instructed by the court, and says drat dIe law is settled that the judge is allowed to make a temporary postponement 
in order to instruct the child on the oath. He explains it as follows: 
"But if the test is after all only a formal one, if practically the necessary belief is only an 
acceptance, an authority, of certain theological positions unprovable by personal knowledge, then 
it is perhaps not inconsistent to allow its content to be explained and accepted in five minutes or 
some longer time proportionate to the child's intelligence: in other words, dIe judge may instruct 
the child what dlis belief is, and the child may accept it on this authority and be as well prepared 
to take the oath on the spot as he would have been after receiving the same direction from 
parental authority." 
3.7.6 The Competency Examination 
It falls within the judge's function to determine whether a child is competent to testify or not (Myers 1987: 104). 
Since there are a number of states which presume all witnesses to be competent or, more specifically, all child 
victims to be competent, it has been argued drat tirese statutes have removed the traditional function of the court 
in as far as the competency examination is concerned. However, as soon as the defence raises the competency of 
the child as an issue or it becomes apparent that the child may be incompetent, then dIe court will have to conduct 
such an examination. So, even in those states which presume all witnesses to be competent, the competency 
examination may still , and in many cases will still, take place. For instance, Delaware took over Federal Rule 601, 
enacting it verbatim. This means dlat all children in Delaware are presumed competent and therefore a preliminary 
examination would not be necessary. In practice, preliminary examinations are still held and this was endorsed by 
the Delaware Supreme Court which stated in Ricketts v State, 488 A.2d 856 (DeI.Super.Ct. 1985) at 857 that 
"under the Delaware Rules of Evidence the six year old rape victim is presumed competent to testify once the trial 
judge is satisfied by voir dire that dIe child understood her obligation to tell the truth, and dIe difference between 
truth and falsehood. 
The trial court has a broad discretion to determine the competency of child witnesses , and their decisions will be 
affinned unless it is shown that the court abused its discretion (Myers 1987: 104). The trial court's decision will, 
therefore, not be disturbed unless it has been abused. Once the trial court has determined the question of 
competency, "it will not be disturbed on review, unless it appears from the examination of the child ... or from his 
testimony, that the trial court clearly abused its discretion" (Se1kin 1991: 116). Abuse of discretion in relation to 
a mentally ill witness came before the court in People v Cola, 3 Colo.App. 264, 564 P.2d 431 (1977) where the 
trial court fonnd a witness, who had previously been adjudicated insane, to be competent without holding an inquiry 
into the witness's present competency. The Colorado Appeal Court held Ulat the trial court had abused its 
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discretion. What will amount to an abuse of discretion will clearly depend on the facts in each case. The appeal 
courts are loathe to interfere with a trial court's discretion because the latter has the advantage of seeing and 
speaIcing to the witness, as can be seen from the decision in State v Moser, 82 S.D. 149, 143 N .W.2d 369 (1966) 
where the supreme court found that the trial court had not abused its discretion by finding a child younger than tIltee 
years to be incompetent without conducting a competency examination . 
There are certain limits to the court's discretion in conducting the examination. For instance, the court is not 
allowed to promise the child a reward for telling the truth (Myers 1987: 105). In State v Cook, 485 So.2d 606 
(La.Ct.App. 1986) the trial judge gave the child sweets after she had given evidence. The Appeal Court held tIlat 
the "trial judge's decision to reward the child witness with candy in the presence of the jury cannot be justified" 
since his behaviour "could certainly be viewed by the jury as an indirect comment on the witness's veracity" (at 
609). Also in State v R. W., 104 N.J. 14, 514 A.2d 1287 (1986) where the judge promised to give the child witness 
an ice cream if she said what was 'real', the appeal court found that there had been an abuse of discretion and said 
at 1289: 
" ... we state without hesitation that the trial judge abused his discretion by promising the child ice 
cream and in subsequently giving it to her, thereby suggesting to tile jury, albeit inadvertently, 
that the infant had indeed testified truthfully." 
It would appear that this rule applied to the courts only, possibly since they have to maintain a stance of objectivity, 
because in People v Matthews, 17 IlI.2d 502, 162 N.E.2d 381 (1959) the Appeal Court upheld the trial court's 
decision that a child was competent even though her mother had promised her a paint set if she told tile truth . 
In those jurisdictions where children below a certain age are presumed incompetent or where they must be able to 
distinguish between truth and lies, the court will have to conduct an examination into the competency of the witness. 
The traditional procedure is to conduct a preliminary examination, which is also referred to as a voir dire 
examination. The latter phrase includes all questioning on the subject of competency (Myers 1987:105-106). In 
Toney v Bouthillier, 129 Ariz. 402,631 P.2d 557 (Ariz.Ct.App. 1981) dIe Arizona Appeal Court at 562 said that 
Ihe trial court must examine a child witness on voir dire before determining competency. Similarly in State v 
Samson, 388 A.2d 60 (Me. 1978) the court held at 64 dlat a preliminary examination must be held to determine 
competency. 
In determining competency, dIe primary emphasis is on the child's ability to differentiate truth from falsehood, to 
understand the duty to tell tile truth and to understand what will happen if dIe truth is not told (Melton 1981 :74). 
How then are these examinations to be conducted? According to Wigmore (1974:642), one way of ascertaining 
competency is by observing the behaviour of a witness. Myers (1987: 108) is of dIe opinion that this medlod is 
unlikely to be used on its own under the present approach to competency with tile majority of states presuming 
children to be competent. He tinds it hard to imagine a court excluding a child without first conducting a voir dire 
examination. Although rare, this has already happened, as in the case of State v Moser supra where the appeal 
court upheld tile trial court's decision thaI the witness, under tile age of dltee, was incompetent even though Ihe 
trial court had not conducted a preliminary inquiry into competency. 
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In practice it would seem that the court will conduct a preliminary examination into the child's competency, while 
at the same time observing the child 's behaviour in the witness stand. How the competency examination is to be 
conducted remains widlin the discretion of the presiding officer. This is supported by a number of court decisions. 
In Wilson v State, 221 So.2d 100 (Miss. 1969) at 102 the court said dlat the "competency or incompetency of 
children to testify is largely an issue within dIe sound discretion of the trial judge". 
It is usual for dIe competency examination to be conducted by the judge himself, although the parties to dIe case 
may examine the witness provided that dIe final detertnination remains with dIe judge. The Court of Appeals in 
In re A.H.B. supra at 492 explained that the trial judge "may conduct a voir dire of the child widl or widlOut the 
participation of counsel, either in the presence or the absence of dIe jury (if there is one), during or before trial". 
On the odlcr hand, in State v Wilson , 103 N.E.2d 552 (1952) the court at 555 explained that when a child witness 
is under the age of ten "it is the duty of the trial judge to inunediately examine the child, widlOut the participation 
or inference of counsel, to determine dIe child 's competency to testify". Similarly in State v Workman, 471 
N.E.2d 853 (1984) dIe court stated at 859 that dIe examination as to competency is exclusively for dIe cOurt with 
counsel playing no part. Wigmore (1974:398) disagrees with the latter decisions and argues U13t dIe examination 
should not be limited to the court alone, and that counsel should be given an opportUluty to take part in the 
examination. 
It would appear from dIe decisions dlat it is the role of the court to conduct the preliminary examination into the 
competency of a child witness, but it would not be an abuse of discretion if the court allowed counsel to conduct 
the examination provided that dIe court makes an independent decision on dIe question of competence (M yers 
1987:109-11 0) . The position is summed up in the case of Sprayberry v State , 330 S.E.2d 73 1 (1984) where the 
court allowed counsel to question two children rather dIan conduct the examination itself. The court then decided 
that the children were competent to testify on dIe basis of counsel's examination. The Appeal Court confimled dlis 
decision and explained dIe posi tion at 733: 
"The objective is for tbe court , not anyone else , to detennine competency as a preliminary to the 
calling of a cballenged witness. Here the court clearly assumed and discharged dlat function. 
The fact dlat the court allowed dIe attorneys representing both sides to actually pose the questions 
did not dimilush the function or abdicate responsibility for making dIe decision based on evidence 
produced before it and its observations." 
Although courts do allow counsel to question dIe child during dIe course of the competency examination, tbere is 
disagreement as to whedler the defence has a right to question the child . Wigmore (1974:87) notes dlat it could 
be argued that, because the ordinary rules of evidence do not apply at preliminary hearings, dlere is no absolute 
right to cross-examination at the competency examination. However, he adds that in modern practice cross-
examination at these hearings is pernlitted as a matter of routine and this may therefore be a matter of constit utional 
rigbt. 
This gives right to dIe issue whether the right to question dIe child at the competency examination is a 
constitutional matter. As dealt with above, dIe accused has a Sixdl Amendment right to confront witnesses who 
give evidence against him in criminal prosecutions. Does dlis right ex tend to the competency hearing? In People 
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v Garland, 393 N.W.2d 896 (1986) the Michigan Appeal Court upheld the decision that the defendant be excluded 
from the competency hearing. This was also the decision in People v Breitweiser, 349 N.E.2d 454 (1976) where 
the court held that the preliminary examination of a child witness did not interfere with any right of the accused, 
and his interes ts were not violated when he was excluded from a competency hearing (Myers 1987: 112). In State 
v Roberts , 139 Ariz. 117, 677 P.2d 280 (Ariz.CLApp. 1983) ule judge questioned a nine year old victim in 
chambers outside ule presence of tlle accused, and refused to produce a transcript of the examination. The Arizona 
Court of Appeal held that ulis procedure did not violate the accused's rights to due process, confrontation, or 
effective assistance of cowlSe!. In Moll v State , 351 N.W.2d 639 (Milm.CLApp. 1984) the court at 645 held tllat 
tlle accused' s right to confrontation was not denied wben he and his cowlsel were excluded from the preliminary 
hearing. The court further added tbat, although an accused could be excluded from the competency examination, 
counsel should be allowed to attend the hearing unless tlle court is of the opinion that ule attoniey's presence might 
intimidate ule cbild or interfere witb ule latter 's ability to comlllunicate . If tbe judge does allow the accused or his 
counsel to be present at the competency hearing, he has ule discretion to prevent any questioning from the defence 
or to lilllit and control the questioning (Myers 1987 : 11 2). In Moll v State supra the court found at 643 tbat the 
accused had no right to question the cbild at the competency examination, and in State v Taylor supra the Court 
of Appeal upheld Ule trial court 's decision tbat counsel submit their questions in writing raOler tban question the 
child orally. 
As Oseid (1985: 1380) points out, Ole preliminary competency hearing is of crucial importance because in many 
cases, especially those relating to abuse of cbildren, a finding of incompetency means the child will not be allowed 
to testify and often the state is Olen forced to wiuldraw ule charges. Tllis process creates a number of conflicts 
between the state (in its role of protecting the child and ensuring convictions in the case of guilty offenders), the 
child (and the psychological trauma that the cbild had to undergo during the criminal process) and the accused (who 
has rights to confrontation, representation and due process). She goes on further to explain how an accused's 
rights can become important in a competency bearing. Since part of the competency exanlination relates to testing 
the child 's ability to remember, the judge may inquire about the actual event in issue. If such questioning does take 
place, Oseid (1985: 1384) says that "the pre-trial competency hearing becomes a crucial point in the proceedings 
because suggestion, through leading questions about the assault during the competency hearing, may dictate how 
ule child will later testify at the trial ". In Moll v State supra Ule MilUlesOla Court of Appeals addressed Ole problem 
at 643 in passing and suggested that the court should not refer to tlle actual matter before trial by saying that "the 
trial court has broad discretion as to Ule type of question to be put to the child during ulis preliminary examination, 
but should not elicit from the cllild Ole anticipated testimony concenling Ole alleged offellSe, recogllizing ule 
suggestibility of young children". 
To detennine wheuler the accused has a right to be present at a hearing, the test is whether his presence might 
affect his opportunity to defend (Oseid 1985:1387). In State v Cennak, 350 N. W.2d 328 (M iIllLl984) Ole 
Minnesota Supreme Court made mention of the accused's constitutional right to be present at in camera hearings 
relating to the competency of child witnesses. However, in Moll v State supra the MilUlesota Court of Appeals 
dismissed this statement as obiter dicta and found that ule accused had no constitutional right to be presem at the 
preliminary hearing. 
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Oseid ( 1985: 1389) argues that tbere are a nwnber of factors which support the decision in Moll v State supra. 
Firstly , the accused only has the right to be present when his presence affects his opportunity to defend. The sole 
function of the competency hearing is to detemline competency and llot the content of the trial evidence . The 
confrontation rights of cross-examination, appearance before the jury and the giving of evidence under oadl are nOt 
applicable al this preliminary hearing. Secondly , competency is a question of law, and one which fa ll s solely within 
the trial judge's discretion. Tn State v Ritchey, 107 Ariz. 552, 490 P. 2d 558 (1971) the Arizona Supreme Court 
held the foll owing at 561 : 
"We do not find dIe same compelling need for a defendant to be present at such proceeding 
{competency determination I as we find when a personal constitutional right, such as trial by jury, 
is at stake . Here a defendant's attorney can adequately exercise dIe defendant's rights. The 
determination of the competency of a witness to testify is a matter of law to which legal counsel 
is specially qualified to address himself. " 
Thirdly, a strong argument favouring the exclusion of dIe accused from a competency hearing is the welfare of 
the child. As pointed out by Ule court in Moll v State supra at 42 the defendant 's presence at a competency hearing 
often "servelsl no other purpose dIan to intimidate the child". 
The majority of court decisions hold Ulat excluding the accused is "bodl proper and constitutional " (Oseid 
1985: 1390). The TIIinois Appellate Court in People v Breitweiser supra was of the opinion Ulat the purpose of the 
competency examination was to detemline the competency of the witness and not to cross-examine the chiJd , 
therefore there was no need for the accused to be present. The court noted at 456 that once dIe witness took the 
stand, then "this witness may be cross-examined, like any otller competent witness to detemline the weight and 
credibility of his testimony. It is here, in open court , dlat the defendant has the right to confront the witness and 
probe into his capacity for memory and perception". At dIe trial there will be adequate opportunity for ule accused 
to test the competency of the child. 
A more serious problem arises from the use of varied practices by judges in conducting competency hearings. 
Some hold them in open court just before Ule trial and allow the accused to be present while others hold the 
proceedings in chambers and exclude dle accused. Oseid (1985: 139 1-2) argues Ulat it is these inconsistent practices 
which may infringe upon the accused's rights, and suggests that a single procedure should he followed nationwide. 
As far as cases of sexual abuse are concerned , she suggests dlat the accused be excluded from the preliminary 
competency hearing since dle purpose of the hearing is to determine competency and not the guilt or ilUlOcence of 
the accused. She further suggests that dIe judge be careful not to ask any questions relating to evidence that is to 
be heard at the trial. 
However, th is still leaves unanswered the issue of how the accused's rights are to be protected by ensuring that 
there is no suggestion or leading of evidence that is to be presented at the trial if the accused is goi ng to be excluded 
from Ule competency hearing. Oseid (1985: 1392) suggests that the most logical compromise would be to allow ule 
accused' s legal representative to be present at the hearing. In United States v Wade , 388 U.S. 218 (1967) ule 
United States Supreme Court accepted that suggestibility is a problem in pre-trial proceedings . In Miranda v 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) dle Supreme Court accepted Ole danger of possi ble suggestion when police 
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interrogate an accused in the absence of his counsel. The court was of the opinion that the" assistance of counsel 
can mitigate the dangers of untrustworthiness ". Although his case related to the interrogation of the accused, the 
court'S analysis of the benefits of having defence counsel preseot would also apply to the pre-trial hearing (Oseid 
1985:1395). 
The presence of defence counsel at a preliminary hearing will assist in ensuring that the questions asked are related 
solely to the issue of competence and are not suggestive. As mentioned supra tile questioning of tile chi ld is in the 
discretion of tile judge, and tilis discretion is so wide that it will only be interfered with by an appeal court if there 
has been an abuse of discretion. Although various courts have found tilat there was no error in permitting a willless 
to tes tify about specific events when testing the child 's competence, Oseid (1985: 1396) argues that "a high potential 
for suggestibility results if a judge not only tests a child 's abilities to remember and trutilfull y relate the assaul t 
infomlation but also asks leading questions to test those abilities. Such leading questions may taint the child 's later 
trial testimony unless defense counsel is tilere to serve as a check". 
The best compromise then would seem to be allowing defence counsel to be present at tile competency hearing while 
excluding Ule presence of the defendant. One problem that might arise is if the accused decides to represeot 
himself. Since he would not have counsel to represent him, he would then have to attend the competency hearing 
and , as Oseid (1985: 1392-1393) suggests, some accused might tactically choose to represent themselves, believing 
that tiley might be able to intimidate Ule child during the hearing. A possible solution would be the use of closed-
circuit television which would enable the accused to observe the hearing. 
As far as the jury is concerned, Ule practice is to hold tile competency examination in their absence. This was the 
decision in State v Singh, 586 S.W. 2d 410 (Mo.Ct.App. 1979) where the court held that the established procedure 
is to hold tile voir dire examination outside tile presence of the jury. Also in State v Hunsaker, 39 Wash.App . 489, 
693 P.2d 724 (1984) the court came to tile same decision at 725 where it said that "the trial court followed the 
approved and accepted practice of conducting a competency hearing for each child out of the presence of the jury" . 
Myers (1987: 113) points out the danger that, since rules of evidence do not apply during the prelimillary hearing, 
the jurors might be exposed to inadmissible evidence. 
SOOle courtS have promoted the idea of allowing the hearing to take place in the presence of the jury since the 
evidence Olay be relevant to credibility. This was mentioned as an obiter conmlent in the case of State v Butler, 
27 N.J . 560, 143 A.2d 530 (1958) at 555 where the court said Ulat the hearing could be conducted in or out of Ule 
presence of the jury as "[ilt may be desirable to take the testimony in the presence of the jury because. asswning 
a finding of competency to testify, ordinarily the evidence is relevant to tile subject of the credibility of the 
witness" . 
The courts will consider any evidence that will assist them in detenuining the competency of the chi ld. The child 
himself will provide dJe primary evidence in the fortn of tile examination. This involves an inquiry WiUl questions 
aimed at investigating dle child 's understanding of trudl and falsehood, and questions relating to his cognitive 
ability. According to Melton (1981:74), the typical kinds of questions would include: what is your name? how 
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old are you? where do you live? do you go to school? do you know what happens to anyone telling a lie? do you 
know why you are here today? would you tell a true story or a wrong story today? suppose you to ld a wrong story, 
do you know what would happen? do you know what an oath is? 
According to Stafford ( 1962: 314) , a judge of the Superior Court in Washington, dlese questions should be simple 
and direct and designed to ascertain the general intelligence of the child and his ability to understand the duty to 
tell the truth. TIle questions should be understandable to the child otherwise they become meaningless. For 
instance, a child will probably not understand what is meant by the question ' with whom do you reside?' whereas 
'with whom do you live?' would make sense. I submit that ' who do you live widl? ' would make even better sense 
to a child . 
Stafford (1962:3 15) gives the following example of a typical competency examination conducted by the court: 
"Q. What is your name? 
A. Katherine AllJle Craig. 
Q. How are you feeling today, Katherine? 
A. Fine . 
Q. What are the names of your mother and father? 
A. 
Q. Do you have any brodlers and sisters? 
Q. What are their names? 
Q. Do they live at home? 
Q. By the way, how do you spell your name? 
Q. How old are you, Kadlerine? 
Q. When is your birthday? 
Q. How did you get here today? 
Q. Do you know what building you are in now? 
Q. What town are you in now? 
Q. Where do you live? 
Q. What school do you go to? 
Q. How far do you live from school?" 
According to Stafford, these questions will reveal dIe following information: the child's ability to understand simple 
questions; the child's age, knowledge of his own age and birdldate; his residence; knowledge of dle people who 
live with him; his ability to remember; and his general intelligence. Stafford does not supply us with the age of 
dIe child who took part in dlis competency hearing, but I submit that d,e questions would have to be very different 
in dIe case of a very young child . Questions relating to time and place have to be phrased in rar more concrete 
terms for younger children. 
If, after examining the child , the court does not have sufficient information to make a decision, the court has the 
discretion to consider other evidence relating to dIe child 's competency, such as the child 's school records or a 
teacher or a parent may give evidence of dIe child 's ability. In rare cases a psychiatrist or psychologist would be 
allowed to give evidence regarding dIe chi ld 's competency (Myers 1987: 114). 
Although the question of competency relates to concepts such as the child 's cognitive ability, which is psychological 
in ltature, it is rare for the court to hear evidence from psychologists or psychiatrists regarding dle competence of 
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children with normal intellectual ability. Rarely the court may allow a child to be evaluated by a psychiatrist or 
psychologist where there is doubt as to competency as in the case of some mentally retarded children (Myers 
1987:115). In United States v Benn , 476 F.2d 1127 (D.C. Circ. 1972) the witness was a mentally retarded 
eighteen year old rape victim. The trial court denied an appl ication that the witness be evaluated by a psychiatrist 
on the question of competence. This decision was affimled by the circuit court. In Page v State, 274 Ind. 264. 
410 N.E.2d 1304 (1980) Ole witness was a Olineen year old mentally retarded rape victim with the mental age of 
five-and-a-half. The defence counsel requested that the child undergo psychiatric evaluation to detemline 
competency. The trial court denied this application and found the witness to be competent. TIlis decision was 
upheld by the Supreme Court and Oley added at 1306 that the accused did not have a "right" to subject Ole child 
to a psychiatric evaluation. 
Since most children are regarded as competent by the courts, psychiatric evaluations are seldom necessary. Myers 
(1987: 116) explains that the judge is almost always capable of coming to a decision without such an evaluation and, 
secondly , they "constitute an unwarranted invasion of the child's privacy, and may lead to harassment ". This was 
Ole view accepted by the court in Collins v United States, 491 A.2d 480 (D .C. 1985) where the court had tbe 
following to say regarding psychiatric evaluations at 484 , aWlOugh Ole witness in this case was not a child: 
"The decision whether to order a psychiatric examination of a witness to determine his 
competency or to aid the jury's assessment of credibility is a matter within Ole court's 
discretion ... Because such an examination has the potential to impinge upon a witness's right to 
privacy and to harass a witness, a preswnption exists against ordering mental examinations. 11 
In the majority of jurisdictions it is the trial judge who has the discretion to order Olat a child undergo a psychiatri c 
evaluation to detemline competency (Myers 1987: 117). In State v Hubbard, 601 P.2d 929 (U tah 1979) the court 
explained it as follows at 930: 
" ... if it were to appear that Olere is a substantial doubt that a witness is capable of understanding 
and appreciating Ole duty to tell Ole truth , or that be is able to perceive, remember an 
conullunicate facts widl reasonable accuracy, the trial judge might grant a request for la 
psychiatric] exanlination before pemlittinghim to testify ... JT]he detemlinationas to whedler such 
an examination should be had must necessarily rest largely within Ole discretion of Ole trial 
judge. " 
Despite the fact that trial judges do have the discretion to allow these examinations, decisions of the various appeal 
courts have held Olat these examinations should be Ole exception and nOt the rule (Myers 1987: 11 7). The Appeal 
Court in State v Butler supra pointed out at 556 Olat Ole granting of psychiatric examinations of witnesses has to 
be decided with great care and "Ia]rders to pemlit it to be done should be executed only upon a substantial showing 
of need and justification". 
3.7.7 Overtuming of Competency Decision 
In prac tice Ole vast majority of children over the age of five, including some children aged Orree, are judged to be 
competent after questioning by the court. However, what happens when a child, who has been found to be 
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competent, demonstrates at the trial that he is in fact nOt competent. The courts have held that a pre-trial decision 
afcompetence can be overturned at trial. This was held in People v Murphy, 526 N.Y.S.2d 905 (Supp. 1988). 
The j udge held a pre-trial hearing to detennine the competency of the nine year old victim. The examination 
consisted of two interviews. At the first, the judge found the boy to be so unresponsive tilat he decided he was 
incapable of providing sworn evidence. Having been requested a second opportunity to examine tile boy, tile judge 
found the boy to be more responsive and capable of articulating his understanding of tile need to tell the truth. He 
thus found the child capable of understanding the oath and giving sworn evidence. At the trial it became 
increasingly obvious that the boy did not understand the importance of telling the trntil and "that at times he became 
so unnerved by the questioning tiillt he did not even know what the trulb was" (at 908). The New York Supreme 
Court upheld the trial court 's decision, explaining it as follows at 908: 
"As a rule, the detertnination of that capacity made prior to the trial is not altered by events at 
the trial. However. as tills case demonstrates, the more infOffilal , comfortable aunosphere in 
which the exploration of a child 's testimonial competence is conducted can result in a 
misevaluation of the child 's capacity. Under tilese circumstances ule trial court has an obligation 
to alter its detennination. To hold otherwise would require that court to adhere mechanically to 
a ruling made in the exercise of its discretion which it kJloWS to be erroneous." 
Therefore, although most children over the age of five will be found to be competent, the decision made at the 
competency hearing is not irrevocable. As Perry and Wrightsman (1991:43) explain, the competence of the child 
can be questioned at any stage of the trial. Cleary (1984:643) supports tilis, arguing that often the incompetency 
of a witness only appears when the trial is in progress. It is only when the witness's evidence is being led or he 
is bei ng cross-examined Ula( the incompetency becomes obvious. The witness must then be stopped and the 
"preceding testimony ordered expunged". 
3.8 The Cautionary Rule relating to Child Witnesses 
3.8.1 The Common Law Position 
The court is entitled in tenns of the conUlIon law to convict an accused on tile uncorroborated evidence of a 
complai1lllnt in a sexual offence. Wigmore (1974:45 1) explains that "the testimony of lbe prosecutrix or injured 
person, in the trial of all offences against the chastity of women, was alone sufficient to support a conviction; 
neither a second witness nor corroborating circumstances were necessary". Corroboration only becomes necessary 
where tbe complainant's evidence is unclear or unconvincing or the credibility of the witness has come under attack. 
This approach was accepted in Roberls v State , 87 Okla.Crim. 93, 194 P.2d 219 (1948) where tiley explained the 
position as follows at 224-5: 
"The court has often announced the rule to be dlat where the evidence of the prosecutrix is 
contradictory, uncertain, improbable, or she has been impeached, it is necessary, under the law, 
that her testimony be corroborated ... But Ulis court has also held that one may be convicted upon 
the uncorroborated evidence of the prosecutrix where her evidence is not contradictory, uncertain 
or improbable, and she has not been impeached." 
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The need for corroboration in cases of doubt was also accepted by tile court in State v Baldwin, 57 1 S. W. 2d 236 
(Mo. 1978) at 239, where it was stated that "in those cases where the evidence of the prosecutrix is of a 
contradictory nature, or when applied to the admitted facts in the case , her testimony is nOt convincing and leaves 
the mind of the court clouded with doubts, that she must be corroborated or a judgment cannot be sustained". 
As time progressed tilis practice began to be interpreted as insisting upon the requirement that, unless evidence was 
clear and convincing 1 there had to be corroboration, and Wigmore refers to a number of cases where convictions 
were reversed because there was no corroboration (Myers 1987: 173). In add; tion a further practice developed of 
requi ri ng corroboration in the case of child witnesses specifically. In People v McGrath, 28 1II .2d 132, 190 N. E.2d 
746 (1963) the court explained at 748 that "where a conviction for taking liberties is based upon tile testimony of 
a child of tender years, the evidence must be corroborated or otherwise clear and convincing in order to sustain 
a judgement of guilt ". [n response to dlis a number of states enacted statutes which required that dIe evidence of 
a complainant in a sexual matter and the evidence of children had to be corroborated . 
3.8 .2 Basis of Corroboration Requirement 
Perception of children: Child witnesses are Uluque in a number of respects and it is specifically tilese 
characteristics which affect dle perceived credibility of children. Goodman (1 987:28) conducted research on how 
jurors perceive child witnesses, and found that cLuldren exhibit a number of characteristics which lower their 
credibility in Ole eyes of adults, for instance, powerless speech style, low status, and lack of confidence . Less than 
fi fty percent of tile respondents in the study believed that children would respond accurately , indicating Olat jurors 
perceived children as being less reliable witnesses than adults. 
Children tend to fantasise: There is also the fear that children fantasise and fabricate allegations of sexual 
abuse. Many psychiatrists , who were trained in Freudian analysis, attributed children's reports of abuse to fantasy 
(Sloan 1983: 12) . This finding is supported by Goodman (1 984: I I) who gave tile fo llowing reasons therefore : 
"Tbese historical perceptions about children continue in society today: Our culture holds 
ambivalent views about children; they are seen as imlocent and truthful , but at the same time as 
manipUlative or even devious. A child who reports a sexual assault may be seen as an iIUlOCent. 
trutilful victim or as a creature of uncontrolled sexual fantasy. A child who witnesses a murder 
may be viewed as having no reason to lie, but as being highly suggestive . " 
Since complainants in sexual cases have lradilioltally been regarded with suspicion , this suspicion was then also 
transferred to children who were victims of sexual assaults. The dangers of convicting on tile uncorroborated 
evidence of female complainants was explained in the famous passage by Wigmore, as quoted by Myers (1 987: 11 8): 
"Modern psychiatrists have amply studied the behavior of errant young girls and women coming 
before tile courts in all sorts of cases. Their psychic complexes are multi farious. distorted partly 
by inherent defects, partly by diseased derangements or abnortllal instincts , partly by bad social 
environment, partly by temporary physiological or emotional conditions. One form taken by these 
complexes is dlat of contriving false charges of sexual offenses by men. The unchaste (let us call 
it) mentality find s incidental but direct expression in the narration of imaginary sex incidents of 
wluch the narration is the heroine or tile victim . On tile surface the narration is straightfo rward 
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and convincing. The real victim , however, too often in such cases is the inllocent man; for the 
respect and sympadlY naturally felt by any tribunal for a wronged female helps to give easy credit 
to such a plausible tale ... 
No judge should ever let a sex offense charge go to the jury unless the female complainant 's 
social history and mental make-up have been examined and testified to by a qualified physician. " 
These comments carried such weight dlat courts began to insist that women, including young girls, undergo 
psychiatric exanli nations to detenlline their credibility . Over the last dlirty years Wigmore's beliefs have been 
rejected as legally and psychologically unsound (Myers 1987: 11 8-9). In People v King, 41 Colo.App. 177 . 581 
P.2d 739 (1978) the court held at 741 that a psychiatric examination of a child in a sexual abuse case should be held 
"onl y where there is a compelling reason for it". In Holder v State , 272 Ind . 52, 396 N.E.2d 112 (1979) the appeal 
court upheld the trial court 's decision to refuse to order a psychiatric evaluation of a nine year old rape victim . 
Finally, in State v Romero , 94 N.M. 22, 606 P.2d 1116 (Ct.App. 1980) the court accepted that the belief that 
psychiatric examinations need to be ordered routinely in rape cases "is based on ouunoded notions of the instability 
and duplicity of women in general, and , as such, should be discarded al togedler". This has led to some 
jurisdictions balUllng psychiatric evaluations of victims in cases of sexual assault. For instance, the Californian 
Penal Code provides as follows: 
"Cal. Penal Code sl112 (West 1985) : The trial court shall not order any prosecuting witness, 
complaining witness, or any other witness, or victim in any sexual assault prosecution to submit 
to a psychiatric or psychological examiltation for the purpose of assessing his or her credibili ty. 
Children are suggestible: A furdler danger involved in accepting the evidence of a child is suggestion. The 
event may have been implanted in the child 's mind by another adult. This danger is explained by Coleman in dIe 
following extract quoted by Myers (1987: 369): 
"When it comes to a child 's statements about sexual victimisation, there are not two possibilities-
lying or tell ing the trutll - but dlree. A child Illay be neidler lying nor telling the trudl. A child , 
particularly a very young one, Illay say what he or she believes is true, even though it is not the 
truth . 
At first blush, dri s seems a rather unlikely possibility, to say the least. A child believes in sexual 
abuse which has not taken place. [would certainly be skeptical of such an idea if I hadn't had 
a chance to see how children are being manipulated by adult interviewers - sometimes by a police 
officer or protective service worker, sometimes by a mental healdl professional - who have been 
trained to believe tllat those who really care and are sufficiently skilled at their work will help dIe 
child talk about sexual abuse. " 
For dlese, and many otller reasons, children have traditionally been regarded as suspicious willlesses. The law's 
response to these perceived dangers was to require dlat a child 's evidence in sexual offence cases be corroborated. 
3.8.3 Statutory Position 
Based on dIe above grounds, the majority of dIe states imroduced corroboration requirements regulating dIe 
evidence of complainant in sexual crimes, including in dlis category bodl children and adults. However, by the 
1970s with the acceptance of psychological research, there was a move away from the requirement that 
complainants in sexual crimes had to be corroborated (Myers 1987: 173). 
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In 1980 in Lancasler v PeopLe, 200 Colo. 448, 615 P.2d 720 (1980) the court was already saying that "children 
of tender years are generally not adept at reasoned reflection and at concoction of false stories under such 
circunlstances" (at 723). In State v Myatt, 237 Kan. 17, 697 P.2d 836 (1985) the court followed the same 
approach, stating at 841 that "[iJt is also beginning to be recognised that a child's statements about sexual abuse 
are inherently reliable". In response to these developments the courts in various states began to reject the idea that 
corroboration was essential in the case of children. In United Siaies v Bear Runner, 574 F.2d 966 (8th Circ. 1978) 
the court explained that "[alt least 35 states now reject any corroboration requirement for rape", while in Siale v 
Byers, 102 Idaho 159, 627 P.2d 788 (1981) the court stated that the requirement for corroboration in sexual cases 
no longer applied in IdallO. The Minnesota Court of Appeal held that "[clorroboration of the testimony of a 
complainant in sex offenses is not required" in State v Carver, 380 N.W.2d 821 (MiIU1.Ct.App. 1986) at 826. 
By 1983 Sloan (1983: 112) reported that only four jurisdictions , namely Nebraska, Columbia, Georgia, and New 
York, still required the corroboration of minors in all sex offence cases, while seventeen states had watered down 
versions. only requiring corroboration in special or limited circumstances. 
The position at present is that there is no substantive requirement insisting OIl corroboration in cases of sexual 
offences. Rather, the rule is that the court can convict on uncorroborated evidence but if the complainant's evidence 
is uncertain or unclear they may require corroboration (Myers 1987:173). The position was explained in Siale v 
Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604 (Minn. 1984) at 608 as being that "in a prosecution for criminal sexual conduct the 
complainant's testimony need not be corroborated. Corroboration of an allegation of sexual abuse of a child is 
required only if tile evidence otllerwise adduced is insufficient to sustain conviction". The Texas Court of Appeal 
stated in Moore v Siale, 703 S.W.2d 762 (Tex .Ct.App. 1985) at 763 t1mt the "rule is well-established t1lat in 
statutory rape cases the victim's testimony need not be corroborated ". 
But, as Sloan (1993: 113) points out, even where tile strict corroboration requirement has been abolished, 
corroboration may still be necessary. Juries are less likely to convict on the evidence of a child alone, since t11ey 
perceive children to be less credible than adults, as argued supra. Although, therefore, there may be no substantive 
requirement for corroboration, in effect corroboration will still remain a requirement as long as presiding officers 
and jurors harbour suspicion regarding the credibility of children. 
Where corroboration is required, it can include any admissible evidence which tends to support or strengthen the 
child's evidence (Myers 1987:175). What constitutes corroboration wi ll vary from one case to another, as was 
pointed out by the court in In re Brunken, 139 Ill.App.3d 232, 487 N.E.2d 397 (1985) at 401 where it was 
explained that "[wJhat facts or evidence will serve as confirming or corroborative facts will necessarily vary 
depending on tbe facts to be corroborated". Corroboration could include physical evidence such as that produced 
by a medical examination. a confession or admission by the accused , eyewitness testimony or even expert testimony. 
The final decision as to wbether evidence will be capable of serving as corroboration will depend on the discretion 
of the judge (Wigmore 1974:464-5). 
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4. CHILD WITNESSES IN INQUISITORIAL SYSTEMS 
4.1 Introduction 
The procedures adopted in the various continental countries vary from being completely inquisitorial in nature in 
some instances to a mixture of inquisitorial and accusatorial in others. A very hrief investigation will be made into 
the procedures specifically relating to child witnesses in the following three continental countries: the fanner West 
Germany, France and the Scandinavian countries . Finally, certain aspects of the procedure used in Israel will also 
be studied. 
Of particular importance to child witnesses is the use of psychological experts in West Germany and the 
development of the science of evaluating witness credibility, which plays an important role in assisting the court 
in detemlining the truthfulness of children's statements in this country. This science has now also received much 
interest in the USA, and is tilerefore of importance to tilis study. 
In the French legal system children give their evidence to a professional, called the judge d'instruction, and are 
thereby spared the necessity of a court appearance. This practice has, however, given rise to its own difficulties 
which will be discussed infra. A further point of interest in this system is the role of the expert who is appointed 
to assess and compile a report on the credibility of a child witness for tile court. 
The Scandinavian countries have a mixture of inquisitorial and accusatorial procedures. In Norway a child 's 
evidence is given at a judicial interview which takes place before the trial. The report of this interview is then 
presented to tile court and the child is spared a court appearance. In Denmark the child's evidence is taken at a 
hearing before the trial, but the prosecution and defence are entitled to be present and examine the child. In 
Sweden the videotaped interview conducted by tile police is used to replace the child's evidence in court. As can 
be seen, the legal solutions differ from one Scandinavian country to another, but a common trait in all is an attempt 
to avoid a court appearance for the child witness. 
In Israel tile office of the youth interrogator is of particular relevance to this study, since that official is responsible 
for interrogating the child, making the decision whether the child will appear in court or not and, finally, appearing 
in court in lieu of the child. He has often been referred to as fulfilling the role of the prosecutor, defence counsel 
and judge. 
4.2 Fonner West Gennany 
4.2.1 Procedure Adopted in Criminal Trials 
The philosophy upon which the inquisitorial procedure in West Germany is based, is the "exploration of what is 
caJled 'material truth'''. The court decides what has to be proved by evidence and what evidence wiJl be sufficient 
to do so, and is therefore not limited to motions and evidence presented by the parties (Frehsee 1990:30-1). 
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The German criminal trial is divided into three phases: the preliminary proceedings , the intellllediate proceedings, 
and the main proceedings (Frehsee 1990: 30). In theory the preliminary proceedings are governed by tile prosecutor 
of state, but in practice the police investigate mOst cases themselves and inform the prosecutor of the outcome. In 
effect most witnesses are imerrogated by the police. In terms of the German Criminal Procedure Code the 
prosecutor has tile status of an ' autonomous agent of justice', which means that he is not only called upon to 
produce incriminating evidence, but is obliged to act in an independent and neutral maImer and must invesligate 
the case tilOroughly, producing evidence that would be to tile advantage of both parties (Frehsee 1990:30-1). 
It is perhaps important to mention one of tile characteristic principles of the Gemlan criminal procedure, namely 
that the police and prosecution are forced to investigate any criminal matter tiley have been notified of. The police 
have no discretionary power at all in this regard, and prosecutors have ouly recently been given some discretiouary 
powers insofar as minor cases are concerned. This means that in the case of violent or sexual offences against 
c11ildren there is hardly any possibility of the proceedings being stopped, even if it would be in the interest of the 
child to do so (Frehsee 1990:31). 
In tile intemlediate proceedings, tile court has to make a decision as to whether there is sufficiem evidence to open 
the main proceedings. This is done witilOut an oral hearing. The main proceedings are based on the principle of 
directness which forces the court to limit evidence to facts which are readily accessible. This has the implication 
that the court has to interrogate the witnesses tilemselves. Therefore, if the witness is a child. tile court has to 
interrogate the child . It is the function of the presiding officer to question the witnesses and cross-examination , 
although not prohibited by law, is completely uncommon in practice (Frehsee 1990:30-3) . 
Once oral evidence has been heard , the expert gives an oral statement based on his written expert report . The 
expert is an aid of tile court who is appointed to assist tile court with Ius specialised Imowledge. The court is not 
bound by tile expert 's evaluations and recommendations. Although it is one of the duties of a judge to assess the 
evidence before him, the courts have recently begun to accept tile psychological findings relating to tile credibility 
of witnesses, with the implication tilat more weight is attached to tile expert's opinion (Frehsee 1990: 32). 
It is not obligatory that such an expert be appointed in every case, but in accordance wi til the principle of directness 
tile court is obliged to use readily accessible evidence. The court would , therefore, be bound to hear an expert if 
evaluation is difficult because of tbe particular facts of a case. This has particular re levance to child witnesses and , 
in fact. in cases of sexual offences against children the attendance of an expert is common. The obligation to 
appoint an expert will depend on tile factors of each case. For instance , the severity of the accusation, how relevant 
the cluld 's evidence is , and any deviation in the c1uld's appearance or behaviour tilat sets him apart from children 
of his own age (Frehsee 1990:32). 
The expert can be appointed at any stage of dIe proceedings. For instance. a psychological expert can be appointed 
in the pre-trial phase by tile prosecution to assist in detemlilung whether the prosecution possesses sufficient 
evidence for a fomlal indictment (K6hnken and Steller 1988:37). The appointment of a psychological expert is 
traced back to a decision of the Supreme Court of the Federal Republic of Gemlany in 1954 where tile court ruled 
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that expert witnesses must be called to assess the truthfulness of children's evidence, if the latter constitutes the only 
or the main evidence and if there is no other corroborating evidence (Kohnken and Steller 1988:37). The expert 
will be appointed either by the court or the prosecutor during the intermediate proceedings, and may even be 
appointed by the police in urgent matters. The parties themselves may suggest the appointment of an expert, but 
the final decision will remain with the judge. If any of the parties are unhappy about the expert's evaluation, the 
judge does have the discretion to appoint a further expert (Frehsee 1990:32-3). 
The expert does not represent either party, but has to make an objective evaluation. This neutrality and 
objectiveness is reflected in the fact that psychological experts, who were appointed to examine the child at the pre-
trial phase, are often later appointed by the court as well with the agreement from the defence. The expert is seen 
as an 'aid to the court' rather than an aid to eitlter party (Kohuken and Steller 1988:37). 
Where called upon to determine the credibility of a witness, the expert only has to answer specific and detailed 
questions. He does not take over the judge's role in the sense of interrogating tlle witness to find our any furtller 
information (Frehsee 1990:33). Once the expert has completed his examination, he must present a written report, 
either to the prosecution or the court. In the case of the report to the prosecution, if tl,e expert's evaluation is that 
the child's statements is trutllfu1, then the prosecution will indict the accused and the trial will follow. The expert 
than becomes involved from the begimting, and at the end of the hearing of evidence he will have to explain his 
findings to tlle court. 
4.2.2 The Child Witness in Criminal Proceedings 
4.2.2.1 Repeated Interviews 
As mentioned supra, all cases involving violent or sexual offences against children must be investigated. Child 
complainants will first be interviewed by the police. In practice the child ends up being interrogated not only by 
the police, but also by the prosecutor, the expert and eventually the court. In addition to this, a witness can be 
questioned in several main hearings in the course of the successive stages of appeal. Since repeated interrogations 
have been found to disturb child witnesses and contribute to tl,e stress tlley experience, certain guidelines for tlle 
conduct of criminal procedure have been introduced, which are binding on the prosecutor and recommended for 
the judge. In terms of tllese guidelines repeated interrogations of the child should be avoided as far as possible, 
and it is recommended that a child psychologist be allowed to attend from the first interrogation (Frehsee 1990:33-
4). 
4.2.2.2 Competency 
As far as competency is concerned, there is no age limit set for the giving of evidence. In each case it will depend 
on whether the child has tlle capacity to give evidence. The child must have the mental and cognitive ability to 
perceive the event, to understand tbe questions posed and to relate comprehensibly what has happened. In practice, 
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the limit is usually set between Ule ages of four and five. Children under the age of sixteen may not take the oadl. 
There is also no formal requirement that a child's evidence must be corroborated (Frehsee 1990:32). 
4.2.2.3 Right to Refuse to Testify 
A child can refuse to give evidence, relying on the general right available for a party to refuse to give evidence 
where ule accused is a relative. The child also has the right to refuse to answer particular questions which might 
put a relative in danger of criminal prosecution. Where the accused is a relative, the court will first have to 
detemline whether the child has sufficient understanding of the meaning of the right to refuse to give evidence. 
Otherwise the child must be willing to be a witness and ule parents have to give uleir consent. Where one of the 
parents is an accused, a curator must be appointed to decide if the child may be a witness or not (Frehsee 1990: 34). 
Also relevant is the fact urat a child under the age of fourteen cannot be forced to give evidence, since penalties, 
as in sentencing for contempt of court, may not be imposed upon children under the age of fourteen (Frehsee 
1990:34). 
4.2.2.4 Cross-examination 
In inquisitorial proceedings the presiding judge plays the dominant role and it is his duty to question witnesses. 
Although cross-examination is not prohibited by law, it is completely unconmlon in practice. As far as children 
themselves are concerned, only the presiding judge may pose questions to children under ule age of sixteen. Odler 
parties can propose additional questions to be asked by the judge. The judge does have ule discretion to allow other 
persons to ask questions directly, but this can only be done if any disadvantage to the child can be excluded 
(Frehscc 1990:33). 
Frehsee (1990:36) argues urat allowing only a single person to question a child will only be advantageous where 
that person has the requisite ability to commutticate with children and be capable of empathy towards them. Since 
these sldlls are not necessarily present in presiding officers, the advantage is not guaranteed and Frehsee (1990:37) 
refers to a number of disappointing failures in practice. It has been proposed urat a psychological expert be allowed 
to interview the child in the main hearing, but ulis is in total contradiction to the function of the judge and the 
expert and it would, ulerefore, not be possible to introduce such a law. 
4.2.2.5 Presence of the Accused 
Disadvantages in giving evidence in a courtroom are also to be found in the inquisitorial procedure as highlighted 
by Frehsee (1990:32): 
"The special critical elements of an interrogation in court lie in the fotmalised, ritual and 
alienating nature of the situation which is characterised by structural scepticism against the child, 
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causing fear and insecurity. The creation of a confidential atmosphere is impossible under these 
conditions" . 
In fact, tile GemJan CrimilJal Procedure Code provides tiJat the accused can be excluded if any serious disadvantage 
will be experienced by a witness under the age of sixteen. There are furtiler exceptions to the giving of direct oral 
evidence in certain instances in the case of children. The record of a former interrogation by a judge can be read 
in court in lieu of the child giving direct oral evidence where the prosecutor, defence counsel and accused agree. 
This can also be done where there are "insurmountable impediments" to the child appearing persolJally. An 
example of such an impediment would be where tile parents refuse to let the child give evidence on reasonable 
grounds, for instance where it would result in a disturbance in tile child 's education or development (Frehsee 
1990:34-5) . 
For this reason it is often recommended ti1at use be made of the possibility of requesting an interrogation by a judge 
during the preliminary proceedings. If at tile time of the main proceedings the child is not able to testify and there 
is no record of interrogation, the court can order that a judge question tile child separatel y. In 1988 provision was 
made for tile admission of records of interrogations carried out by officials other than a judge, for instance, a police 
officer or a prosecutor. For these records to be admissible, defence counsel must be present at tile main hearing 
and tile admission of the record must be acceptable to the prosecutor, accused and his counsel. (Frehsee 1990:36). 
The record can also be admitted where there is no possibility of hearing the child within a reasonable space of time, 
usually where another interrogation would be dangerous for the child's health. (Frehsee 1990:36). 
Frehsee (1990:36), however, argues that this is no final solution because the re levant provisions were originally 
aimed at the situation where there is an absolute impediment to the appearance of the witness, as in the case where 
the witness is dead or in hospital. This then has the effect that the court would have to make a decision as to the 
degree of danger for the child and the severity of any damage that is anticipated which may require further medical 
investigation. 
It has been proposed that a tape-recording be made of tile child's first interrogation and ti1at tilis tape-recording 
replace the child 's evidence at the main proceedings. However, this is not possible since a tape-recording is only 
accepted as an object of examination. This means that it can only give evidence for facts which are evident from 
its existence i.e. that the child is being interviewed. (Frehsee 1990:37) . 
4.2.2.6 Public Trial 
TIle presiding officer has tile discretion to exclude the public from the courtroom when children under the age of 
sixteen are being interrogated (Frebsee 1990:34). 
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4.2.2.7 Victim Protection Act 
In 1988 the Victim Protection Act was introduced. Although the original focus of the act was Ole pro tection of 
women in rape proceedings, it applies to witnesses of all ages who are the victims of crime. The most important 
ilUlovations include Ole following: while the victim is being interrogated she may be accompanied by a person whom 
she truStS; the victim has the right to have an attorney present; the victim's attorney is entitled to inspect evidence 
and read the records. These provisions have an even wider implication in the sense that, even though a child may 
have certain rights, Ole child will very rarely be aware of Olese. For instance, a child witness is enti tled to ask for 
the public to be excluded or even the accused, fo r that matter , when being interrogated. A child witness can also 
refuse to answer certain questions, but the child will be unable to do so unless informed of this right (Frehsee 
1990:35). 
4.2.3 The Child Witness in Civil Proceedings 
In matters relating to children, namely wardship proceedings and the family court, the procedure is inquisitorial 
in nature. Where the child is over the age of fourteen, the judge must question the child. On the other hand, where 
the child is under the age of fourteen, the judge ought to question tile child if this is possible. In prac tice it means 
Olat children as young as two and a half are questioned, although in the case of the latter a psychologist is often 
appointed (Frehsee 1990:28). 
Since the procedure is inquisitorial in nature, the judge is the person who examines the witnesses, although he does 
have the discretion to pernli t or reject direct questions from Ole parties. In the wardship court and the family court 
the interrogation of Ille child is infornlal and Ole judge can question the child at the latter's home in fanl iliar 
surroundings. Even in other civil actions, whk h are more adversarial in nature, such as an action for damages. 
the interrogation can be conducted in the judge's office with the public excluded, altllOugh the accused may nOI be 
excluded (Frehsee 1990:28-9) . 
4.2.4 Evaluation of Statement Credibility 
A very imponant development insofar as child witnesses are concerned took place in the former West Gemlany and 
is known as statement credibili ty altalysis. This has special re levance to the evaluation of a Cl1ild witness's 
credibility or accuracy. When a child witness gives evidence in a case, the coun must evaluate the accuracy and 
truthfulness of the child's statement. This can be done in one of two ways, either using psychological lay persons 
or using a psychological expert (K61111ken 1990:39). 
The fonner evaluation is carried out by psychol ogical lay persons, namely jurors, attorneys or police offi cers. The 
evaluation is done by observing the child while the child is questioned, and piecing tOge tIJer any addi tional 
infonnation relating to the child 's personali ty, cogni tive abilities and reputation in order to form a composite 
approach to credibility. TIns is also known as a social judgement or impression fomlation task (KblUlken 1990: 39). 
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The latter evaluation, also known as a psychodiagnostic decision-making task, is where a psychological expert is 
appointed to assess the truthfulness of a child witness's statement. The psychologist will be an expert in the 
psychology of witnesses, particularly child witnesses, and will be appointed to collect the relevant data, using 
specific psychodiagnostic methods (Kohnken 1990:39) . The statement analysis approach is based on the assumption 
tilat a child wilDess will not be able to invent a story, producing the same quality of content as would be found when 
relating a real event (Kohnken and Steller 1988:38). 
4.2.4.1 Credibility Judgement by Psychological Lay Persons 
Although there is almost no experimental evidence available on the abi lity to discriminate between truthful and false 
witness statements in a court setting, there is a considerable amount of empirical findings on this ability in 
laboratory settings. In these experiments the subjects relate some personal event either truthfully or deceptively. 
They are videotaped while so doing, and Ule videotape or a written transcript thereof is then presented to another 
group of subjects who have to judge whether ule statements are truthful or not (Kohnken 1990:40). 
TIle results of more Ulan forty experimental studies have shown that the proportion of correct decisions falls in a 
range between 45% and 60%, where 50 % of the correct decisions are based on chance i.e. guessing (Kohnken 
1990:40). In 1988 Kohnken (1990:41) conducted a survey on various aspects of credibili ty judgement and found 
that people overestimate their ability to detect deceptions because uley make certain fundamental judgement errors 
when they try to detect deceptions. He refers to the following four errors in judgement which are particularly 
important and misleading. 
l. People erroneously believe that certain behaviours indicate deception , and other bebaviours, which are even 
more valid indicators of deception , are underestimated or even ignored. For instance, many people are 
of the opinion that the face, and especially the eyes, reveal deception. However, empirical evidence has 
shown that the opposite is true i.e. the detection accuracy is worst if the face is the only source of 
infonnation (Kohnken 1990:41). 
People who took part in the experiments were asked whether they could be deceived by the 
conmlUnicator's eyes, and uley tended to believe that this was not possible. In fact, eyes seem to be one 
of the most efficient instrumems of deception. Kohnken found that people are particularly efficient at 
controlling their expression and gaze (Kohn.ken 1990:41). 
11. People believe that there are certain behavioural characteristics which exist in most people which act as 
clues when they lie. Kohnken (1990:41-2) interviewed more Ulan 200 subjects, including jurists and 
police, about whether they believed in Ule existence of Ulese clues. Approximately 60 % of Ule subjects 
believed ulat these behavioural clues did in fact exist and were more or less consistent across people. 
Research has itself shown that these behavioural clues not only vary between different people but may even 
vary for the same person in different si tuations, and it would therefore be misleading to generalise Ulat 
certain behavioural characteristics are indicative of deception . 
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111. People assume that these behavioural characteristics associated with lying will increase in frequency and 
intensity when a person is lying. For instance, it was the belief among the subjects that people who were 
lying would blink more often, shrug more often, take longer to respond to a question and turn their eyes 
away more often. However, the data shows that most of tllese behaviours decrease when a person is lying 
(Kohnken 1990:42-3) . 
IV. Study subjects were questioned as to what strategy tlley believed would detect deception in another person: 
either to show suspicion and doubt when questioning someone, or not to show any suspicion and allow ti,e 
person to feel confident and secure. Most study subjects were convinced that tile most efficient strategy 
to deternline whether someone was lying, was to display overt suspicion, ask tOugh questions and try to 
make the person nervous (Kohnken 1990:43). Ekmallll (1985) described this type of error as the 'Othello 
error ' . Othello accused Desdemona of having committed adultery and tlueatened to kill her. In her fear 
she showed exactl y tllOse behaviours which OUlello erroneously interpreted as indicating her guilt . 
Recent empirical research has shown that this strategy is misleading in two ways. Firstly, if a witness is 
a ski lful liar, he will recognise that he is under suspicion by the method of questioning and will ulen 
accordingly adapt his behaviour to what he believes represents an honest witness. Secondly, an honest 
witness may become nervous if viewed with suspicion and doubt, and this nervousness often produces the 
very behavioural characteristics which are interpreted as signs of lying or deception. The best strategy , 
therefore, in questioning a witness would be to remain as neutral as possible (Kohnken 1990:43). 
4_2.4.2 Credibility Judgement by Psychological Experts 
The evaluation of statement credibility is based on uuee elements, briefly summarised as fo llows: 
i. an analysis of the individual characteristics of ule child witness; and 
ii. an analysis of any possible moti ve ule child might have for making a fal se statement; and 
iii. an analysis of the child' s statement itself (Kobnken 1990:44). 
According to Undeutsch (1984:54-5) a major concern for trial courts as well as forensic psychologists on the 
European continent was the testimony of alleged victims of sex offences wbo were children. The reasons for the 
concern arose out of ule fact tl13t in cases of this nature ulere was very little physical evidence, children were not 
considered to be as competent and responsible witnesses as adults, and society demanded that sex offenders be 
prosecuted and convicted . As a resul t of these concerns, Gem13n psychologists have been used in trials relating 
to sex offences agai nst children since tile beginning of this century. In fact, the following di rection applicable to 
tbe interrogation of children in ule investigative phase of criminal proceedings was incorporated into the official 
'Guidelines for ule Prosecuting of Crimes' (Undeutsch 1984:55) : 
"If there is any doubt as to the credibility , an expert, knowledgeable and experienced in the field 
of child psychology, is to be called in. (No. 25 in the original 1935 version; No. 19 in ule 1977 
version)" . 
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Despite this directive, it was only after World War II that the use of psychological experts began to gain momentum 
in the courts with the establislmlent of ule special juvenile courts in 1953, which were created for hearing criminal 
offences conmlitted by or against persons under the age of twenty-one. These courts were more inclined to make 
use of experts, which in turn gave psychologists ample opportunity to become acquainted with the actual needs of 
the trial courts. The crucial question that arose in most of the cases was ule issue of wheUler children could 
separate truth from falsehood (Undeutsch 1984:55). 
This assessment of the truthfulness of stJItements has a history in Gennan psychology which goes back to Ule 1930s, 
when psychological and juristic literature began to describe certain characteristics as being indicative of truth or 
lies. It was only in 1982, however, that this meulOd of statement analysis was first described in English by 
Undeutsch (Kohnken and SteUer 1988 :39) . 
In judicial proceedings the credibility of a witness has always depended on evidence of specific instances of conduct 
which are assumed to be probative of ule truthfulness or otherwise of the witness. These asswnptions, according 
to Undeutsch (1984:56) , have their roots in public opinion (" the second-hand , irresponsible product of mUltiplied 
guesses and gossip which we tenn ' reputation''', quoting Wigmore) and therefore camlot form a reliable basis for 
the assessment of ule truthfulness of a particular statement. In contradistinction , the assessment of stJItement 
credibility is based on the premise that in judicial proceedings it is not ule veracity of the reporting person but the 
truthfulness of ule statement Ulat has to be determined. Since truUl exists and fal sehood has to be invented, the 
reasonable deduction was made ulat truUJful accounts of events which have been experienced by the witness differ 
in certain characteristics from those UJat are entirely or partially invented. This has been referred to as Ule 
Undeutsch hypoulesis (SteUer 1989:137). These characteristics which assist in distinguishing between truth and 
fal sehood are known as ' criteria of reality' or ' reality criteria' and have been developed to form a key for 
detennining ule veracity of statements (Undeutsch 1984:57) . 
When a psychologist is appointed as an expert witness, he will get a complete copy of ule case file, including 
documents of previous investigations, copies of witness statements and any other necessary evidence. He also has 
the right to examine the child outs ide the courtroom using any legal psychodiagnostic meulOd he may believe 
applicable. In order for an expert to evaluate the truulfulness of a statement, certain background infoonation is 
requi red regarding the individual'S personality, and cognitive and verbal competencies. This infoffilati on is obtained 
by interviewing oUler people who know the child, such as parents or teachers, to find out details about the child 's 
cogni tive and social development. In addition to this, a tes t of general intelligence will be conducted and a 
personality questiOIlllaire completed (Kohnken 1990:44-5). 
The main part of the evaluation will take ule fonn of an interview with the cbild . The purpose of the interview 
is to detennine whether the child may have any reason to lie, and to observe the child 's non-verbal and speech 
behaviour for any possible clues to lying. It is very importJInt to assess the child 's general verbal competence , since 
this will be used in the analysis of ule stJItement later. For instance, more detail will be required from a child who 
has a high degree of verbal competence . The analysis of the stJItement is then conducted according to the reality 
criteria , which are applied to the content of the stJItement to deteffiline whether the latter is trutlJful (Kohnken 
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1990:44-5). Forensic research has shown that trudlful accounts of self-experienced , real occurrences display some 
of the following fundamental criteria (Undeutsch 1984:59). These criteria (reali ty criteria) consist of nineteen 
different criteria, which are organised into five categories, and are briefly sunmlarised as follows: 
i. General characteristics 
The first category focuses on the general characteristics of the statement. Here attention is paid to tlhe logical 
structure (1) of the statement and whether it contains any contradictions or inconsistencies. Logical structure does 
not mean that the events in the statement should follow a logical sequence. This leads to the nex t criteria, namely 
an IInstructured production (2). An unstructured production may be an indicator of credibility, since "[f)abricated 
testimonies and fantasies are usually characterised by a structured, generally chronological manner of presentation 
widl clear attempts by dIe witness to demonstrate causal connections " (Kohnken 1990:47). Kohnken (1990:46-7) 
explains dlat witnesses, especially children, will rarely have the cognitive capacity to report an invented story in 
a disorganised way wi III fragments of the event scattered tlhroughout tlhe statement. The last criteria in this category 
relates to dIe quantity of detail (3) supplied by dIe witness, such as dIe descriptions of places, persons. evems etc. 
This is asswned to be an indicator of reliability since it is impossible for most children to make up a statement with 
a lot of details (Kohnken and Steller 1988:41). 
ii. Specific Contents 
This category refers to dIe specific contents of Ille statement and is based on Ille assumption that a child would not 
be able to invent stories containing the criteria referred to here. Therefore, if these characteristics are found in dIe 
statements, they will be seen as indicators of credibility. Contextual ell/beddings (4) are seen as being an indicator 
of trutlhfulness. Events are almost always embedded in larger social and physical situatiollS and related to particular 
time circumstances. The more complex tlhese interrelationships between everyday occurrences, schedules and 
habits , tlhe less likely tlhe statement is fabricated because it is very difficult for a lying witness to fit a complex event 
into a complex envirollllenl. The teml descriptions of interactions (5) is used to explain Ille fact dlat naturally 
occurring eventS are usuall y characterised by a sequence of actions and reactions, explained as consequences of 
previous stimuli. Since it would be extremely difficult for a child to construct such stimulus-response relationships, 
dleir presence can be perceived as an indication of credibility (Kohnken 1990:47). 
Another indicator of credibility would be tlhe presence of dIe criteria , knowll as reproduction of conversation (6). 
In temlS of this criteria dIe witness reports conversations that take place between different persons, using the same 
speech behaviour, vocabulary and fonnulations of tlhe particular persoll . A furdler indication of credibility is the 
presence of unexpected complications (7). Real events are often interrupted by unexpected complications and 
obstacles, but Illese are very rarely mentioned by lying witnesses since dley would raise difficulties in maintaining 
the lies, especiall y when questioned more than once (Kohnken 1990: 47). 
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ii. Peculiarities of Content 
The third category focuses on the peculiarities of the statement 's content. This is viewed on a qualitative basis and 
looks at the concreteness and vividness of the statement. The presence of these criteria are indicators of credibility. 
If a statement contains details which are unexpected and surprising (unusual details) (8) the witness is probably 
being truthful, since lies very rarely contain unusual details. Supetf/.uous details (9) are those detail s which are not 
strictly next necessary for describing the event and a person, who was lying, would probably not think about 
inventing irrelevant, superfluous details. Accurately reported details misunderstood (10) is a criteria that is 
particularly important when evaluating the truulfulness of a child's statement. This includes details and actions 
which the child reports but which are not understood by the child in their particular context. Related external 
associations (11) are also indications of truulfulness. This refers to a witness describing conversations with the 
perpetrator which refer to earlier events which are related to the incriminating event. Kohnken (1990:48) provides 
an example of such a related association in the context of an incestuous relationship where the witness (daughter) 
mentions a conversation she had with the accused (fatller) in which they discussed tlle daughter' s sex ual experiences 
with other men. The account of subjective mental state (12) would include descriptions of feelings like fear or 
disgust, and attribution. of the perpetrator 's mental state (13) refers to descriptions of emotions and motivations 
which are attributed to the perpetrator (Kbilnken 1990:48). 
iv. Motivation-related contents 
This category relates to ule motivation of ule child to make a statement. Here the deception is perceived as 
motivated, goal-directed behaviour. The lying witness tries to construct a report and behave in a way in which 
he believes a credihle person would behave. Therefore, if a child witness spontaneously corrects his own testimony 
(14), admits lack of memory (15) or raises doubts about his own report (16) , these behaviours are seen as indi cators 
of credibility. Included here are tlle cri teria of self-depreciation (17) of the witness and pardoning the perpetrator 
(18) . If a witness wants to incriminate a perpetrator falsely, it will not make sense then to try to exonerate him 
(Kohnken 1990:48-9). 
v. Offence-specific elements 
The final category relates to ule specific elements of ule offence and emphasis is then placed on details 
characteristics of the offence (19). The experts will have to have knowledge of the actual characteristics of the 
offence. Elements of a statement which are discrepant in tenns of everyday knowledge or stereotypes but which 
are consistent with criminological research findings will also be indicators of truulfulness. Kohnken (1990:49) 
explains ulis clearly as follows: 
"I n cases of incest. for example, the veracity of a statement might be questioned because the 
descriptions of ule relationship include no defence, a long period of ule incestuous relationship, 
relatively harmless sexual behaviour, and progressive development as well as a change in the 
attitude of the victim towards the perpetrator of the crime, All these elements can be considered 
as offence-specific for incestuous sexual relationships and at the same time are contradictory to 
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beliefs held by non-professionals ". 
In addition to providing an objective method for assessing the veracity of a statement, the courts found dlat experts 
also provided valuable information about the victim 's capaci ty , developmental stage and personality. Undeutsch 
(1984:61) explains the situation as follows: 
"On the basis of criteria of reality, tbe assessment of the truth-value of the witness's account was 
understandable and evident. In this way, dIe expert proved to be of great assistance to the 
investigator of fact in arriving at the truth. On the basis of such experience the courts were open-
minded enough to welcome expert testimony and to benefit from it ". 
In 1954 the Supreme Court of the Federal Republic of Germany handed down a policy decision in temlS of which 
they held tbat a psychologist or a psychiatrist must give evidence as to tile truthfulness of tbe wi tness ' s account, 
especially in sex cases, whenever the conviction depends primarily or exclusively on tbe evidence of a child , or jf 
the witness's evidence is not corroborated by other evidence. The Supreme Court determined, by judicial notice, 
"that the subject matter of dIe expert's inferences regarding the truthfulness of a witness's testimony is one as to 
wbich a reliable body of scientific knowledge has been developed" (Undeutsch 1984:61). 
Since this decision, psychologists have been used in criminal proceedings to such an extent dlat Undeutsch (1984:6 1) 
quotes Arntzeu's statistical figures, indicating dlat by 1982 experts had been appoimed to render opinions on dIe 
credibility of statements in at least 30 999 cases with numbers perhaps even reaching tile 50 000 mark. 
When making a final judgement on dIe credibility of a statement, the first step is to determine whether tilese criteria 
are present or not, then to rate the strengdl of tile criteria. These results are dlen integrated in an overall j udgement 
against dIe background of the witness's persouality and his cognitive and verbal abilities to foml a final assessment 
of the trndlfulness of the statement (Kbhnken 1990: 49). A detailed report is dlen compiled, setting out dIe findings 
before the date of tbe trial. If the case goes to trial , the expert will have to give oral evidence at dIe end of the 
hearing on the fllldings contained in dIe report (Undeutsch 1984:62). AltllOugh the psychologist's report wi ll be 
presented to court , the final decision on the credibility of dIe statement will still remain widl the court. The court 
will evaluate the expert's opinions in dIe light of all dIe other evidence, and will dlen make a decision on Ule 
credibility of the statement (Kbhnken 1990: 50) . 
Although a great deal of empirical research bas been conducted on statement analysis, with Arntzen reporting that 
he and his co-workers analysed approximately 24 000 eyewitness statements, 92 % of which dealt with children 
involved ill cases of sexual abuse, dIe question that emerges relates to the validity of the method employed 
(Kbhnken and Steller 1988:42-4). Undeutsch (1984:63-4) argues that it is very difficult to prove dIe validity of this 
meUlOd of analysis, because laboratory experiments are of very little use in this situation. Laboratory experiments 
differ considerably from real-life situations, especially when trying to evaluate a technique that is analysing dIe 
qualities of genuine experiences of emotionally affecting events. Lersch, as quoted by Undeutsch (1984:63), 
emphasises dIe point as follows: 
"It caonot be disputed that experimentati on in psychology has led to significant results and will 
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continue to do so in the future. However, anyone with more profound insight into human nature 
and the peculiarities of mental activities recognizes that laboratory experimems are appropriate 
only for a limited domain of, predominanrly peripheral, mental processes; and that it is 
particularly the more profound, central experiences which will never be successfully subjected to 
scientific experimentation". 
The validi ty of this technique will depend on field studies, but dlese also carry with them unique difficulties. The 
greatest problem relates to the criterion against which the accuracy of the technique is to be measured, since in 
criminal cases there is no objecti ve, independent and reliable criterion. In a criminal matter it is virtually 
impossible in most cases to discover ' the trudl ', and dlerefore impossible to evaluate dIe statement aItalysis in temlS 
of this ' truth ' (Undeutsch 1984:64). Perhaps, as a result of these difficulties K6hnken and Steller (1988:42-4) argue 
that the empirical suppOrt for statement analysis is still insufficient and tllat more ex perimental research widl more 
elaborate and ecologically valid material is required. They add however, that statement aItalysis should not be 
rejected completely "since the technique reflects a good deal of expert knowledge and is based on the extensive 
practical experience of psychological experts" (K6hnken and Steller 1988:44). Undeutsch (1984:64) also adds that 
an important point to bear in mind is that "[a)ldlOugb this metbod has been applied in many tllOusands of cases 
during the last three decades, tbere is not a single case to be found in dIe literature, or otllerwise documented, in 
which dIe aItalysis of statement, if applied by a competent expert and according to generally accepted rules, led to 
the clear finding tllat the statement had to be considered as the trutllful account of a persoItally experienced real 
event, al1d which later. in the criminal proceeding or afterwards, turned out to be in confl ict wi th other relevant 
evidence". This, he argues, can be seen as a strong indication of dIe validity of this technique. 
The development of this field of psychology has spread to neighbouring coumries. For instance, tile Gennan 
Democratic Republic have dIe following guideline, issued by the Supreme Court on 16 March 1978. whicb allows 
the appointment of an expert for this purpose: 
"If required the child witness's general ability to report evenrs accurately and completely, as well 
as his/ber special ability to report accurately and completely dIe particular event under 
investigation is to be assessed by tlle aid of expert opinion". (Undeutsch 1984: 62). 
In Austria tlle Supreme Court has ruled tiJat whenever an evaluation of evidence, which can include tlle assessment 
of the credibility of a child witness, requires special knowledge, an expert must be appointed. In Switzerland, tOO , 
dIe Criminal Court of Appeals for tlle District of Bern ruled thal a psychological expert should under certain 
circumstances be appointed for the character and credibility of a child witness. The assessment of statement 
credibility has also been accepted in Sweden and the CrimiItaI Procedure Code contains a provision (519) which 
elJables "an expert who possesses special knowledge of child psychology or the psychology of interrogation" to be 
called if the evidence of a child is going to be of decisive importance for the investigati on of the crime (Undeutsch 
1984:62-3). 
In a effort to develop a standardised and scientifically based method for interviewing children and evaluating the 
content of dleir statements to assess dleir validity, Raskin and Esplin (199 1 :267) began tlle development of statement 
validity assessment in the United States. This has since been modified and extended to satisfy dIe requirements of 
the American justice systems. 
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This version of s"'tement analysis has shifted partially from the traditional Gemlan emphasis on the application of 
content crileria to a broader analysis that focuses more on the interview procedures and possible influences on the 
child 's s"'tement . The aim of statement validity analysis (SVA) has also changed slightly and the primary focus 
is now to obtain infomlation quickly that will assist in detemlining whether a crime has taken place and how to 
protect the child and apprehend the perpetrator, as explained by Raskin and Esplin (1991 :268): 
"Tt must be emphasized that the main value of SVA lies in its utility for gathering infomlation, 
guiding investigations, making administrative decisions, and exercising prosecutorial discretion. 
In some cases, tbe results of SV A are presented as evidence through expen testimony in coun". 
The American version of SV A consists of three components, as explained by Raskin and Esplin (1991 :268): 
I. a structured interview conducted with the child witness; 
n. a criteria-based content analysis based on the Undeutsch hypothesis; and 
iii. an integration of the results of the content analysis with information derived from a set of questions 
(validity checklist) . 
The purpose of SV A here is to provide an assessment of the validity of the recorded statemem, not of the general 
credibility of the child witness. Although all the three above components derived from Undeutsch's statemem 
reality analysis, they have been developed and modified by recent research. Horowitz (1991 :293) investigated the 
available research on SV A in the United States, reviewing the few laboratory and field studies that have been 
completed. TIle studies suggest that criteria-based content analysis may be a reliable and accurate assessment 
procedure, aldlough many questions and research issues remain unresolved. 
4.3 France 
4.3.1 Introduction 
The French penal system works on dIe principle that an accused is illlocent until proven guilty. and die duty is UpOIl 
dIe public prosecutor to discharge the burden of proof (Hamon 1990:53). In order to discharge dlis burden, the 
prosecutor may use any evidence provided the evidence has been obtained in accordance with procedural rules. 
Not only is the admissibility of evidence much freer as far as procedure of proof is concerned , but its probative 
force is also left to the discretion of the judge, dIe latter known as the system of moral proof or intimate conviction 
(Hamon 1990:53). 
The position of the child witness in France is very similar to tllat in Germany. A distinction should perhaps at dlis 
s"'ge be drawn between the judge d'instruction and dIe final court appearance in the criminal court. Thejudge 
d'illstruclioll is the legal authority responsible for discovering and gathering evidence. He bas dIe power to conduct 
searches , seize objects and documents, hear witnesses and question the accused. He has to investigate on behalf 
of bodl the prosecution and the defence (Hamon 1990:57). 
The child witness will give his evidence widlOut having to take the oatb since children under the age of 16 are 
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exempt from the oath in terms of article 108 of the Code de Procedure ?enale. The child can give his evidence 
in the context of confrontation with the accused, which is left to the discretion of the judge d 'inslruccion who can 
make a decision as to what is appropriate in the circumstances, since the practice of confrontation is not regulated 
by the Code de Procedure ?enale. The whole question of confrontation is optional and the accused does not have 
the right to object. In practice, confrontations do, however, take place (Hamon 1990:58) . 
In France children rarely give evidence in a criminal court , and the judges avoid as far as possible making child 
victims appear in court. In support of this, Hamlon (1990:60-1) refers to the 15th Chall/bre Correctionnelle du 
Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris, which is a specialist chamber dealing with offences relating to children, 
especially those involving violence, maltreatment and inmlOral acts. The evidence of a child victim is rarely 
required at this hearing. Minors who do testify are those aged between 15 and 18 who are capable of expressing 
themselves in public and where the accused is not related to the child. In cases of incest, and acts of paedophilia 
involving children under the age of 12, the victims do not testify in person. In temlS of dle statistics supplied by 
Hamon (1990:62), dle 15th Chamber does not hear dle evidence in person of more than 10 to 15 minors. 
Therefore, all necessary evidence in these cases is gathered by dle judge d'inslructioll before the trial and is 
presented as part of the illstruction. 
Despite dle fact that the instruction phase is separated from the hearing and dlUS saves the child victim from having 
to testify at the trial , Hamon (1990:62) nevertheless questions dle effectiveness of dlis protection and argues that 
"it may be a matter of debate as to whether we are simply given dle impression that dle victim is protected". He 
is of the opinion d,at children still find dle French legal system daunting because they have to undergo interrogations 
by the police, gynaecologist and psychiatrist. In addition, they must testify before the judge d'instruction in 
confrontation with the perpetrator , even though the child may be spared dle court appearance. Hamon (1990:63) 
argues dm this may be detrimental in itself since it may have d,e perverse effect that victims feel 'dleir ' trial has 
been confiscated from them. He uses the following anecdote to explain the point: 
"Hence whedler dle child should be present at dle trial or not is a most important question. In 
fact one of my colleagues, ajudge des enjants, reminded me of dle following anecdote: a minor, 
a victim of incest, had not been present at the trial of her father because she had not been called 
upon to testify against him. The father had been convicted. The minor, however, asked for dle 
trial to be restarted : it had been confiscated from her, stolen. TIlis new fraud, as it appeared to 
her, was absolutely unbearable and almost constituted a supplementary wound, a rift, a gaping 
hole preventing her from rebuilding herself" . 
4.3.2 The Role of the Expert 
It is submitted that special emphasis be accorded to the role of the expert in dlese proceedings, since the 
development of this field is receiving increased attention in the United Kingdom and the United States of America. 
In France each Court of Appeal has an official list of experts, appointed by a commission acting on applications 
received by individuals who have the requisite professional qualifications and at least five years' experience. The 
position is an honorary one, but carries certain obligations, for ins tance, the duty to undertake the tasks ass igned 
to them and to carry dlem out within the times allotted (Bardet-Giraudon 1990:68). 
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Although the procedure in France used to involve the appoinunent of two experts , the position nowadays is only 
to appoint a single expert. The judge does, however, retain the right to nominate two experts if the complexity of 
the matter justifies it. Where an additional opinion is required, a second expert will be nominated, and sometimes 
even three. In a highly contentious case up to five experts may be nominated. However, the experts only submit 
Olle combined report, signed by all of them. If an expert refuses to agree with a report, the whole opinion will be 
annulled and tile judge must nominate a new group of experts . Only in very rare cases can the defence call their 
own expertS as witnesses, since tilis does not fall within the inquisitorial nature of proceedings and the courts do 
not wish to create an adversarial enviromnent for experts to operate in (Bardet-Giraudon 1990:69). 
Insofar as child witnesses are concerned, the expert must study tile credibili ty of the child, namely whetiler it is 
possible for tile child to relate the facts with a degree of correctness. This examination differs vastly from the 
assessment conducted in terms of statement validity analysis, as piloted in West Genuany. In the fomler, for 
instance, credibility is grounded in psychological notions that are practical rather than experimental, like frankness 
and sincerity. The function of tile expert in French law is not to make the child repeat again what has happened 
to him or investigate any further factual details, but rather to assess the credibili ty of the child (Bardet-Giraudon 
1990:70) . 
The assessment of credibili ty takes the foml of an interview, which does not deal with tile facts of the case but with 
tile child's personality, his home life, school life, friends and hobbies. Questions relating to tile facts of the case 
will only take place at tile end of the interview, and tilese questions will be brief, and curtailed if the child's 
reaction so requires. The expert has to establish the abilities of the child to tell the truth and to testify, and a 
written report must be submitted which would tilen be avai lable if any difficulties regarding credibility should arise 
during tile trial (Bardet -Giraudon 1990:71-2). 
4.4 Scandinavian Conntries 
4.4.1 Introduction 
AltllOUgh Dellllark, Sweden and Norway are often referred to as a single entity, namely the Scandinavian countries, 
tile individual countries themselves have substantial differences in procedures. Generally speaking, the Scandinavian 
countries have a mixture of illquisitorial and accusatorial procedure. For instance, DeIIDlark and Norway make use 
of Ihe jury system in criminal cases whereas Sweden uses professional judges and lay assessors (Andenaes 1990:9). 
The Scandinavian countries have the following inquisitorial features: the trial is less technical and less fomlal since 
there are fewer mles of evidence; all relevant evidence may be presented and the trial court assesses the weight to 
be accorded to the evidence; and rules of hearsay and corroboration are not appl icable. The use of experts by tile 
court also follows an inquisitorial fomlat, in tilat experts are appointed by the court at public expense. This 
prevents the "so-called battle of experts" (Andenaes 1990:9). 
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On the other hand, certain features of tile procedure are accusatorial in nature. The parties themselves must present 
their evidence. Witnesses are examined and cross-examined by prosecution and defence, although there is no clear 
distinction between examination-in-chief and cross-examination. The method of giving evidence does not foll ow 
the same fonnat as that conducted in other accusatorial systems. The witness must be given an opportunity to give 
a coherent account before more specific questions are asked (Andenaes 1990:9-10). 
As far as the oath is concerned, the oath has been abolished altogether in Denmark. In Norway the oath has been 
replaced by a solemn declaration that the witness is going to tell tile truth , except in the case of children under the 
age of 14. Sweden has retained the oath , al though children under the age of 15 are not heard on oath (Andenaes 
1990: 10). 
4.4.2 Norway 
Starutory rules relating to child witnesses first appeared in Norway in 1926 in response to a call for refonn from 
the National Association of Women who were concerned about the negative effects chi ldren experienced as a result 
of court appearances . The new rules enabled children under tile age of 16 to undergo a judicial interview by an 
examining magistrate. This interview is not regarded as a court session and, therefore , parties have no right to be 
present. The magistrate who conducts the interview must write a report on the chi ld's testimony, giving his 
personal impression of the child witil respect to the latter's maturity and trustworthiness. At tile trial the examining 
magistrate' s report will be read as a substitute for tile child 's appearance in court. The child will then onl y have 
to appear in court if there is a special reason for so doing , where, for instance, identification of the perpetrator is 
an issue. If tile child does have to appear in court , all examination will then be conducted by tile presiding judge 
and not tbe parties involved (Andenaes 1990: 10). 
Although this procedure is not in accordance wi til the ordinary rul es of criminal procedure since tile court does nOt 
see and hear the witness and tile parties involved do not have an opportunity to cross-examine, it was felt that the 
primary purpose of the refornl was to protect tile child and that it produced better evidence, as explai ned by 
Andenaes (1990: 11): 
"The primary purpose of the refonn was to protect tile child, but other considerations played a 
role as well. The memory of a child is short, and tile overwhelming experience of the courtroom 
may be paralysing, especially in tile solemn atnlOsphere of a jury trial. Judges and state attorneys 
expressed tile opinion tilat tile first testimony of tile child is more reliable than what it is able to 
tell at tile trial , perhaps many months later. The feeling was ti13t the refonn was not only to tile 
advantage of tile child, but also gave a better basis for tiw verdict". 
In 198 1 certain changes relating to children were introduced and in 1985 more detailed rules were given by a royal 
decree. The age limit was reduced from 16 to 14 years. since it was felt that children between the ages of 14 and 
16 would be capable of giving evidence in court if tile accused and tile public were excluded during the 
examination. A further change was introduced in the sense tilat judicial interviews conducted out of court could 
also be used in cases other tilan those relating to sexual offences if the interests of the child demanded it (Andenaes 
1990:1 1). 
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In terms of the new rules, an examining magistrate is given the power to call for a qualified person to assist in tile 
interview, and if he thinks fi t he may allow this person to conduct the wbole interview while he simply controls 
dIe fairness of the questioning and wri tes tile report. In Oslo, Norway's capital , tile judges usually prefer to leave 
the assistant to conduct the interview while the judge sits behind a one-way mirror and monitors the questioning. 
The assistant, who could be a psychologist, a social worker or a policewoman, wi ll often have to give evidence in 
court to supplement the report. Of particular interest is the fact that dIe assistant is required to become acquainted 
widl the child before dIe interview, although the case may not be discussed at this stage. Where possible, the new 
rules require that the interview be videotaped, and tile videotape will tilen be used as evidence, thus giving the court 
a better opportunity to assess the value of tile evidence (Andenaes 1990: 11) . Andenaes (1 990: 14) reports that 
studies have mentioned a problem insofar as psychologists and psychiatrists, acting as assistants, are concerned, 
namely tile use of leading questions. For this reason the courts seem to prefer using the assistance of female police 
officers who have experience in titis field . 
The judicial interview usually takes place in the magistrate's chambers, aWlOugh in the case of very young children 
il is reconunended that tile interview be conducted in domestic surroundings if possible or any other place where 
the child may feel comfortable. In Oslo the judicial interview takes place in a specially funtished room for 
interviewing childreu which is situated at tile police headquarters. The parents or person, in whose charge the child 
is, have the right to be present at the interview, unless tile person is tile alleged perpetrator. In the latter case the 
magistrate will have to appoint a substitute guardian to represent the child at the interview (Andenaes 1990:12-1 3). 
When the 1981 refo rms were being prepared, the drafting Conunission proposed that the defence counsel be allowed 
to be present at the judicial interview since the latter was in effect a substitute for the court appearance, and it 
seemed fai r to allow the defence couusel and prosecution to be present. This proposal did not extend to dle 
accused. The Commission proposed that , in addition to allowing the parties to be present, they be allowed to 
submi t supplementary questions to the magistrate afterwards. Thi s proposal was not accepted since it was felt that 
the presence of the parties at tile judicial interview would change the atmosphere of tile interview and since the 
interview was videotaped the parties would have tile opportunity to ask for an additional interview if they felt there 
were supplememary questions tiJat needed to be asked (Andenaes 1990: 12). 
In Norway there is no specific competency requirement. In each case it will bave to be deternlined whetiler tile 
child has sufficient understanding and abi lity to express himself. The fact that the child 's evidence is given at the 
judicial interview often enables much younger children to give evidence since the whole situation is more informal. 
However, even if a child is U1Jable to express himself sufficiently, evidence from a parent, or police officer about 
what the child said will be admissible since there is no hearsay rule (Andenaes 1990: 12). 
4.4.3 Denmark 
Although the general rules of criminal procedure in Norway and Denmark are very similar, the judicial interview 
of cltild witnesses is not Imown in DaItish law. The rules relating to child witnesses are more fl exible in DelmJark 
and the metilOd adopted is something in between a police hearing and a judicial hearing (AndelJaes 1990: 14-15). 
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The Code of Procedure in Dellllark gives tlle court a discretionary power in certain circumstances to accept 
previously recorded testimony as a substitute for the court appearance. TIlis provision is especially used in the case 
of children, since the Chief Prosecutor has recommended that children under the age of 15 should be spared a court 
appearance. In practice the child will be heard as a witness by the local court as soon as possible. The report of 
this hearing and the tape, if the hearing has been recorded, will be introduced in court in lieu of the child appearing, 
altllOugh the child can be summoned to appear at the trial and be required to answer questions of a neutral kind to 
assist tlle court in gaining an impression of the child (Andenaes 1990: 15). 
At the initial hearing, both the prosecution and the defence will be present and are entitled to examine the child. 
The accused can also be present, although he will be removed if necessary to get ule child to speak. An attempt 
is made to ensure that proceedings are not too fomlal, and they will usually take place in the judge's chambers 
rather tllan in the courtroOIl1. A new development has arisen whereby the actual interrogation is conducted by a 
qualified police offi cer and is video-recorded. The judge, prosecution, defence and accused watch the interrogation 
on a televisionll1oni tor in another room, after which the defence may put addi tiona l questions. The police and court 
may, in tenns of the rules of procedure, apply for tlle assistance of a psychologist or psychiatrist during the hearing, 
although this provision is rarely used (Andenaes 1990: 15). 
4.4.4 Sweden 
TIlere are certain guidelines laid down as to the manner in which police are to conduct an interview with a child 
witness in Sweden. The questioning must be conducted in such a way that the child is not harmed. Repeated 
interviews should also be avoided as far as possible. The interview mnst be conducted by a person experienced 
in this task and , where possible, female policewomen should conduct the interviews of girls and young children 
(Andenaes 1990: 16). 
It has become the common practice to videotape tltis interview and show the videotape in court to replace the child 's 
evidence. This was introduced to spare the child the strain of going to court and having to give details of intimate 
and embarrassing experiences . As in the United Kingdom, the interview is conducted by a police offi cer, so there 
is the danger that leading questions may be asked, but in Sweden the defending counsel do not have very many 
objections to tlle system since they can attack the quality of the videotape in court (Smitll 1990:22-3). 
The general rule of procedure in criminal courtS is that all witnesses give evidence in court , altllOugh the Code does 
provide tlJat if a witness is under the age of 15 the trial court has a discretion in this regard. With the introduction 
of videotaped police interviews and the fact tl,at tlle Code allows the court to accept statements to the police where 
warranted by special circwnstances, i( has become the conunon practice to use this videotaped imerview at the trial 
instead of hearing the child (Andenaes 1990: \6). 
214 
4.5 Israel 
4.5.1 Introduction 
When the State of Israel was founded in 1948, tile British Mandate in Palestine was terminated. However, Laws 
of tile State of Israel provided that the law in fo rce at the time of independence would remain valid until replaced 
or amended by the Israeli parliament. In tile field of criminal procedure and evidence very few changes have taken 
place and the law applicable is very much the English common law (Hamon 1990:81). 
The courts in Israel are organised in a hierarchy of Supreme Court, district couns and magistrate courts. Cases 
are heard by professional judges and the jury system does not exist. Trials are usually open to the public and the 
procedure adopted is of accusatorial nature. (Hamon 1990:8 1). The accused has the right to be confronted with 
tile witnesses testifying against him and to cross-examine tilem (Hamon 1988:263). 
4.5 .2 The Law of 1955 
Following a number of cases in Israel where children were exhaustively interrogated, concern about the hanll 
inflicted upon child victims by court appearances led the Israeli legislature to promulgate legislation that would 
protect these children (Hamon 1988:264) . This is further explained by Hamon (1990:82): 
"Special hann may be caused by calling the victim to give testimony in court. When a child is 
required to give, in a public place, a detailed and accurate description of intimate abuses inflicted 
upon him, he re-lives the shocking experience he encountered over and over again. This often 
irreversible haml greatly increases if the child becomes subject to cross-examination, including 
doubt cast on the nature of his behaviour during the occurrence, or being suspected of 
untruthfulness" . 
The aim of the new legislation was to protect tile mental well-being of child victims while at the same time causing 
as li ttle disruption to the administration of justice as possible. This was encapsulated in the Law of Evidence 
Revision (Protection of Children) Law, 5715 of 1955. This law set out to protect children under the age of 14 from 
the negative effects of a court appearance, and created the role of youdl interrogator who was given the power to 
decide whether, and under what conditions, dle interrogation of a child in court would be pemlitted. Generally the 
power relates to children who are victims, but can also be applied where the child is a suspect or an eyewitness 
(Hamon 1988:264). In the words of Hava David (1990:99) "Itjhis Law gave birth to a new and unique professional 
creature- tile youth interrogator- who became a central figure invested with enoml0us powers, privileges and 
responsibil ities" . 
4.5.3 The Role of a Youth Interrogator 
The YOUtil interrogator is the central fi gure in cases involving children. Section 2(a) of tile Law of Evidence 
Revision Law supra provides as follows: 
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"Save with the pennission of a youth interrogator, a child shall not be heard as a witness as to 
any offence against morality committed upon his person or in his presence, or of which he is 
suspected, and a statement by a child as to such an offence shall not be admitted as evidence". 
In terms of this section the youth interrogator is the person who decides whether the child will appear in court. 
According to statistics supplied by Hamon (1988:266), youth interrogators do not allow the child to make a court 
appearance in approximately 85 percent of the cases. While conducting the interview, the youth interrogator has 
the opportunity to observe the child which assists him in coming to a decision as to whether he will allow the child 
to testify in court or not. This is explained by David (1990:103) as follows: 
"All along I fornl my opinion about the girl's personality, which in the end will help me to come 
to the vital decision I have to make as youth interrogator, i.e. whether to pennit tile girl's 
appearance in court or not. " 
This implies that the taking of evidence in the cases where tile child does not appear in court will become the task 
of the YOUdl interrogator. He is tilen, according to Hamon (1990:88), fulfilling the function of dIe prosecution, 
defence and judge. He decides what to ask, and how, and be also has the power to reject a judge's request to put 
additional questions to the child. He will also determine whetiler a child may take part in an identification parade 
and, if so, to what extent. He will arrange tile identification parade and accompany the child to "see to it that 
everything takes place so as to cause the least possible harm" to the child (David 1990: 104). 
David (1990: 105-6) discusses tile factors which have to be taken into account when deciding whether the child will 
appear in court or not. Firstly, it must be detennined whether the court appearance will in fact be traumatic for 
the child. If the offence did not leave any traumatic traces or was not of a very serious nature, a court appearance 
may be more beneficial. Secondly, the possibility of any advantage in tile making of a court appearance must be 
investigated. This is very rarely advantageous to a child, since d,e trial will usually take place a year after the 
interrogation by which stage tile child may have forgotten the whole experience. This means that the court 
appearance will force the child to relive the experience and be confronted with authoritative figures "who will ask 
her provocative questions in a strange language". In addition to this tile setting of the courtroom itself does not 
engender an inviting atmosphere. Thirdly, the protection of the public interest is an important consideration. The 
fact tI,at a particular child may be harnled by a court appearance must be weighed up against the need to protect 
society. Fourthly, dIe youth interrogator will assess the other available evidence to deternline whether there is any 
corroborating evidence. If there is no corroborating evidence, it will become essential for the child to appear in 
court. Lastly, tile youth interrogator must weigh up a comprehensive report recorded by himself as opposed to 
obtaining a first-hand story from the child which may lack many vital facts. 111is will, of course, depend on the 
age of the child and the possibility of getting the child to give evidence in a court environment. 
If the youth interrogator decides against tile child giving evidence in court, he himself will have to appear in court 
and take dIe witness stand. He will then read aloud the evidence contained in the report compiled by himself. The 
judge will then inquire whetiler the youth interrogator grants his pemlission for the child's appearance or not. The 
youth interrogator will then read out his reasons for deciding against tile child appearing in court (David 1990: 107). 
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If the youth interrogator is of tlle opinion that tlle child should attend tbe court appearance, he will tllen revisit tlle 
family and prepare the child for the court appearance by re-reading tlle latter's evidence to him. and explaining the 
court setti ng, tlle procedure and the roles of tlle parties involved. On the day of the trial , the youth interrogator 
ensures that the child does not have to wait for toO long before testifying, and he will stand close to the child while 
the latter gives evidence. The youth interrogator does not have the power to interfere in the hearing, although he 
does have tlle power to ask the judge to discontinue the trial if he is of the opinion that tlle continuance of the trial 
may cause mental harm to the child in terms of s I (c) of the Law of Evidence Revision (Protection of Children) Law 
(hereinafter referred to as "the Act"). The final decision, however, remains with the judge (David 1990: 108). 
Before the trial begins, the youtll interrogator sees tllat no unautllOrised person is present in tlle courtroom. Section 
2(b) of the Act provides that no person otller tllan tlle parties may be present at the trial (David 1990: 108). 
Youth interrogators themselves believe that their function is dual in nature. They are not only responsible for 
gathering evidence for trial but also have to provide initial care for the child and his family, although there is no 
reference to this function in tl,e statute (Hamon 1990:84). This can be seen in David's ( 1990: 103) explanation of 
her role as a youth interrogator: 
"Up to this stage I have acted solely as proscribed by law. I have conducted a police 
interrogation which includes all the necessary legal elements. Once I am satisfied that I have got 
the whole slOry and things are clear to me, and will also be clear 10 the police and the court, I 
switch over and act in my professional capacity. [become a social worker dealing witll a case 
of crisis intervention of a special kind, in one single session. I see it as my professional duty to 
help the girl and her parents, and the family unit in general, to cope witll this situation so as to 
leave tlle least possible negative traces. " 
It is also in tlle discretion of the youth interrogator to decide whetller a child must undergo a medical examination. 
AltllOugh tile Israeli law used to provide that in every case of a moral offence committed against a child there had 
to be a medical examination, this has now changed and tlle discretion has been placed in tlle hands of the yOUtll 
interrogator, since it was felt that this examination is often the most traumatic experience of all. In making this 
decision, the YOUtll interrogator will look at the nature of each offence, whetller there was penetration or an attempt 
to do so, or whether any physical contact has taken place which may have left traces. If the youth interrogator 
decides that a medical examination is necessary , he will accompany the child to the examination and explain the 
details of the offence so that the child does not have to answer any further embarrassing questions (David 
1990: 104). 
The youth interrogator can determine the outcome of a trial as a whole, sillce tlle impression which he gains of the 
child is relevant evidence and may determine the way in which the court assesses the child 's evidence. n,e role 
of the youtll interrogator tllen is "to reveal tl,e truth , witllOut harming the child's well-being, but yet safeguarding 
the riglns of the accused" (Hamon 1990:88). This has often given rise to the criticism that the youth interrogator 
is "second to God" (Hamon 1990:88). 
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4.5.4 Procedure in Tenus of the 1955 Legislation 
In the vast majori ty of cases involving children, nei ther the police nor the court will have any personal contact with 
Ihe child. Both dIe police and the court in these instances will have to rely completely on the youth interrogator's 
report. The youth imerrogator has to provide dIe police with a detailed description of the perpetrator and dIe 
report , which must include d,e following: the child's evidence which must be written down exactly as the child 
gives it; a description of the child 's behaviour while giving evidence; a general description of the child's behaviour 
while giving evidence; a general description of the child's personality; and the youth interrogator's impression of 
the truthfulness of the child' s evidence (David 1990:99). 
Since a child may only be examined by a youth interrogator in temlS of s4 of the above legislation, the police will 
then request the youth interrogator to examine the child. Once the police have made contact with the yOUdl 
interrogator, the latter will contact the child 's parents and arrange to meet the child. It often happens that this 
inlerview takes place in the home of the child, although recently widl dIe introduction of tape- and video-recording 
ulis has become difficult. 
In lemlS of s5 no person shall be present when the child is examined by the yOUdl interrogator, unless the laller 
gives permission ulat such oUler person be present . David (1990: 100), a youth interrogator, explains Ulat only in 
the few cases where tile children are very young does she allow the mother to remain behind , and then she lets the 
child sit in such a way that she does not make eye contact with the mother. 
The evidence which has been taken down by the youth interrogator will become admissible in tenns of s9 of the 
Act which provides : 
"Evidence as to an offence against morality taken and recorded by a yOUdl interrogator and any 
minutes or report of an examination as to such an offence prepared by a youth interrogator during 
or after dIe examination, are admissible as evidence in court. " 
This section, dlerefore , creates an exception to the hearsay rule. 
As mentioned above, the report must contain information relating to a number of aspects, such as the child 's 
behaviour and personality, David (1990:103) explains how this is done: 
" .. . 1 do take notice of her behaviour uuoughout: when does she hesitate to go on? when does she 
get excited? when does she nOt want to go on talking at all? when does she stammer or weep etc? 
All this J note down, in brackets, the moment it happens and include it in dIe repon I pass on 10 
the police (s8). This report also must include my impression of the truthfulness of the girl's 
testimony. " 
The youth interrogator does have Ihe authority to allow the child to give evidence, although according 10 Hamon 
(1990:83) this only happens in a few cases. Even where the youth interrogator bas given pemlission dIat a child 
be heard as a witness, s2(b) of dIe Act provides that no person shall be present at dIe laking of dIe evidence except 
dIe prosecutor, the accused, the accused's legal representative, the youth interrogator and any person whom the 
218 
court has pemlitled to be present. Even in these cases, dle court can in tenns of s2(c) of the Act order that the 
taking of evidence be discontinued where, after hearing the youth interrogator, the court is of the opinion that the 
continuance thereof may cause psychological harm to the child. 
Section 10 enables a judge to order the yOUdl interrogator, on dle request of the prosecution or the defence, to re-
examine d,e child where the youth interrogator has submitted a report in lieu of dle child 's appearance in court or 
where, in temlS of s2(c) of the Act supra, dle taking of evidence has been discontinued. The re-examination may 
entail the asking of a particular question, but the youth interrogatOr still has dle power to refuse to ask all or any 
questions if be is of dle opinion that asking them is likely to cause physical haml to dle child . 
A contentious issue relates to tbe youth interrogator's impression of the child's credibility . After dle Law first came 
into force, dle Court did not admit the YOUdl interrogator's opinion regarding the child 's credibility, since they 
believed that dlis would usurp dle court's function (Hamon 1988:267). But in Bashiri ( 1978) (IIJ)34 PD 393 dle 
court held that in regular proceedings the court alone has to decide whether to believe a witness or not, since this 
question is based on the witness's behaviour ill the witness box and how he reacts to cross-examination. The 
problem arises, however, when the child does not give evidence in court and dle COUft is, therefore, unable to form 
an impression of the child . Hamon (! 990:86) suggests that the best solution in dlis instance would be for the youth 
interrogator to give dle court an expert opinion on his impression of dle child 's credibility. This question came 
before the COUft in Hajaj (1977) (1)32 PD 548 where the Supreme Court held that dle youth interrogator's opinions 
were not binding on the court since tbe latter has the final deci sion on dle child 's credibility. However, the court 
accepted dlat tbey could be assisted by dle youth interrogator's opinion since this was relevant evidence. At 550 
the court explained the reason as being the fact that "tbere is no stronger or more important evidence d,an the 
impression gained by the yOUdl interrogator and his opinion as to the child 's abilities bodl to discriminate and to 
observe, as to his imagination and his general intellectual developmem". This decision has been followed in later 
cases. In Danino (1983) (IV)40 PD 249 at 259 the court held dlat the youth interrogator's impression of the minor 
consti tutes relevant evidence which the court can refer to , togetber with other evidence, although it is not bound 
to accept thi s evidence. 
A further issue that has arisen in relation to dle procedure introduced by the 1955 Act, is dle admissibility of dle 
evidence taken down by a youth interrogator as opposed to the evidence given by Ule child in coun. A situation 
could arise where the statement recorded by the youth interrogator and the child himself will be before the date of 
dIe trial , for instance where a youdl interrogator initially objected to a child giving evidence and interviewed ule 
child, and dlen at a later stage allowed the child to give evidence. Another example would be where a child is 
under the age of 14 when examined by the YOUUl interrogator but by the time of the lrial , the child is 14 and 
therefore no longer a child in tenns of ule statute. In both dle above instances the later evidence would be 
admissible, bUl how is the earlier evidence given to the youth interrogator to be evaluated (Hamon 1990:86-7). 
In Mimran (1972) (1)26 PD 281 a thirteen-and-a-halfyear old girl alleged Ulat dle accused had raped her. The 
YOUlh interrogator decided against the girl giving evidence in court and examined her himself. By the time of ule 
trial the gi rl was 14 and the accused called her as a witness. The girl changed her version and denied the whole 
story. The Supreme Court held Ulat the earl ier evidence she had given to ule youth interrogator was still 
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admissible. In fact, the court went so far as to prefer ule witness's first version, even though ule second version 
was given in court and was subject to cross-examination. Hamon (1990:87-8) agrees with the reasoning behind 
ulis decision, giving the following explanation: 
"In many cases, ule inconsistent statement is more likely to be true than the testimony of the 
witness at the trial since it was made nearer in time to the matter to which it relates and is less 
likely to be influenced by the controversy that gave rise to the litigation (in ulis case intimidation 
of witnesses). In any event, the trial court has the declarant before it and can observe her 
demeanour and the nature of her testimony as she denies or tries to explain away the 
inconsistency. II 
4.5.5 Appointment of the Youth Interrogator 
Section 3 of Ule Law of Evidence Revi sion (Protection of Children) Law, 5715 of 1955 governs ule appointment 
of the YOUUl interrogator. It provides as follows: 
"3. a)The Minister of Justice shall appoint youth interrogators for the purpose of ulis law. 
b)A YOUUl interrogator may be appointed only after consultation with the Committee. 
c)The Committee shall consist of five members, namely: 
I) a judge of a Magistrate Court currently serving as a judge for the purposes 
of ule Juvenile Offenders Ordinance, 1937, appointed by the Minister of Justice; 
2) a mental hygiene expert appointed by ule Minister of Healul ; 
3) an educator appointed by the Minister of Education and Culture; 
4) a child and youth care expert appointed by ule Minister of Social Welfare; 
5) a superior officer of police appointed by the Minister of Police. 
d)The judge shall act as chairman of the Conmlittee. 
e)The Committee shall prescribe ule rules for its deliberations and work in so far as they 
have not been prescribed by regulations." 
According to Hamon (1988:269), when the Minister of Justice presented the draft law to ule Kllesset he remarked 
that "ule ideal would be for a youth interrogator to combine in his personality a psychologist and a lawyer" but that 
"this is an unattainable ideal ". Some members of ule Kllesset argued that Ule YOUUI interrogator should have legal 
knowledge, but ule general opinion was that they should be qualified psychologists or social workers who had 
experience working with children. However, when the Law was passed in 1955, the section was silent as to what 
qualifications were required before a person could be appointed as a youth interrogator. In the regulations that 
accompany the statute it is provided that a youul interrogator should nOt interview the child while wearing a police 
uniform. It must therefore have been assumed that police officers could fulfill this function, and this is in fact what 
happened in the early years. Soon after ulat youth interrogators were taken from psychologists, educational 
advisers, social workers or youth probation officers. At present almost all Ule YOUUl interrogators are juvenile 
probation officers with at least a B.A. degree, and are almost all graduates in social work (Hamon 1990:89). 
Criticism has on occasion been levelled at the quality of the youth interrogator' s work, and this has often been based 
on ule fact that many of them do not have ule necessary legal or practical qualifications. There have been instances 
where even tile judges have expressed criticism of youth interrogators, although in ule vas t majority of cases uleir 
opinions have been positive (Hamon 1990:89). In Dadun (1987) (III) Psakim Mehoziim (Law ReportS of the 
District Courts) 127 the accused was charged with conmlittillg an indecent act with force . The main evidence in 
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Ule case was the testimony of a young child which had been taken down by the YOUUI interrogator. This evidence 
was very superficial and did not take account of tlle main issues. Consequently tile accused was acquitted, although 
there was strong corroborative evidence. 
Police have criticised the qualifications and skills of youth interrogators, arguing that tiley lack experience and legal 
knowledge. Evidence is sometimes not taken properly, and this hampers the police investigation. It is fu rther 
argued that youth interrogators do not have enough experience with court appearances which has the result that 
when tiley are exposed to intensi ve cross-examination they are incapable of defending their reports in court (Hamon 
1988:270). In response to these criticisms a Committee of Sexual Offences Against Minors was set up, headed by 
Judge A. Malamute. The Conmlittee reconmlended in 1987 that the expertise of youth interrogators be increased, 
with special focus on the following: tlleir legal knowledge, tileir proficiency in interrogation and matters relating 
to tile development and mental healtil of the child (Hamon 1990:90). 
Although there have been tile beginnings of training programmes for youth interrogators, the latter are nevertheless 
appointed without tilere being any requirement ulat they have to undergo any prior training. Hamon (1990:90) 
suggests that there should be a statutory amendment laying down what qualifications a youth interrogator must have 
before he can be appointed as such. He argues furtiler that tlle qualification should place more emphasis on legal 
and investigational requirements, since tile intention of the legislature in creating the office of the youth inte rrogatOr 
was not to provide psychological aid for the victims but rather to establish a method for obtaining evidence from 
child victims for trial purposes. Training of YOUtil interrogators should focus on tile relevant branches of law, 
namely criminal law, procedure and evidence. and Oil methods of interviewing witnesses with special emphasi s on 
children. He adds further tllat youtll interrogators should serve a period of articles, which would be a period spent 
working under the supervision of an experienced yOUtil interrogator before being allowed to interview children 
themselves (Hamon 1990:90-1). 
4.5.6 Rights of the Accused 
Since tlle introduction of the Law of Evidence Revision (Protection of Children) Law, it is evident tllat tlle law gives 
preference to tlle well-being of the child as against formal legal procedure in court , such as the rules of evidence 
in a criminal trial and the right which tlle accused has to a fair trial (David 1990:99) . 
AltllOugh tile Israeli Supreme Court has on a number of occasions stated tllat tile best way to deternlinc credibility 
of a witness is by observing his demeanour and behaviour on tile witness stand, the court has nevertheless 
sanctioned the absence of child witnesses at a trial (see Danino supra). In addition to this, the youth interrogator's 
report can be admitted in lieu of the child 's presence, thus introducing hearsay evidence which cannot be cross-
examined by tlle accused. In an attempt then to balance any harm to tile rights of the accused, section 11 of the 
Law of Evidence Revision (Protection of Children) Law provides that no person lllay be convicted on tile recorded 
evidence of an interrogator unless it is corroborated by other evidence. Corroboration is required botll with regard 
to tlle actual commission of the crime and tlle identity of tile offender (Hamon 1990: 84) . 
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The requirement of corroboration is essential in view of the fact that tile evidence before tile court is a hearsay 
report , and the accused will be entitled to an acquittal if tile corroboration is not " sufficiently cogent or convincing " 
(Hamon 1990:84). The following are examples of corroborative evidence that have been accepted by the courts: 
a blood stain on the child 's body was found to corroborate that the alleged act had taken place; an admission by 
the accused that he had been on the scene of the crime without a reasonable explanation was held 10 be 
corroboration of the perpetrator's identity. This requirement of corroboration is strictly observed by tile courts 
since in these instances the courts have been deprived of an opportunity to gain an impression of the witness and 
the accused does not have an opportunity to cross-examine the witness. Since corroboration is an essential 
requirement "the widely accepted view is that implementation of ule statute has apparently not brought about the 
conviction ofinnocem persons" (Hamon 1990:92). In Yehudai (1957) (JI)11 PD 365 the court at 367 held that the 
requi rement of corroboration must be scrupulously observed where the courts are dealing wi ul the evidence of a 
child which was taken down by a youth interrogator. 
4.5.7 Recommendations 
It has been argued that the introduction of the Law of Evidence Revision (Protection of Children) Law has gone 
a long way to ascertaining the truth , since a lot of infonllation would not have been available to ule court if it had 
not been obtained by the youth interrogators . This is based on the fact that many of tllese children, especially very 
young children, would not have been able to be interrogated in court. In addition, fewer parents would be prepared 
10 lay complaints with the police if uris statutory arrangement did not exist (Hamon 1990:92) . 
However, there are still criticisms that have been levelled at this statute. It has been argued supra that ule accused's 
rights are not adequately protected since the statute admits hearsay evidence which has the effect that the accused 
is deprived of his right to cross-examine evidence which is being led against him. 
Another cri ticism, also addressed supra , is ule fact urat Ule statute does not require any qualification for the 
appointment of a youth interrogator. It has therefore been recommended that minimum prerequisites must be 
determined for YOUUl interrogators. The statute must require a minimum legal knowledge and some skill in 
interviewing before a person can be appointed as a youth interrogator. There is a need to ensure that all YOUUl 
interrogators are of a high professional standard (Hamon 1990: 92) . 
David (1990: 108) explains that tile majority of youth interrogatOrs have over the years been chosen from ule social 
work discipline, and she argues that this is rightl y so : 
"Social workers have the most useful professional background for this task. They are conversant 
with crisis intervention and short-teml therapy . Social workers mostly deal with the ' normal ', 
whereas psychologists, for instance, mainly deal with the 'deviant'. Social workers have a certain 
knowledge of interviewing teChniques which of course have to be applied differentl y when acting 
as a YOUUl interrogator: the youth interrogator has to get at the objective trutll as quickly as 
possible - as therapists we can go along with tile subjective truth of our clients." 
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Although David (1990: 109) agrees that it is necessary for the youth interrogator to have some knowledge about 
police and court procedures, she believes that this can be learnt in a comparatively short course of lectures as 
opposed to the acquisi tion of the practical ski lls involved in interviewing children. But a balance should be 
maintained between the two functions of the youtlr interrogator, namely that of police officer and that of crisis 
intervention. and the youOr interrogator should not be allowed to become too much of a therapist. 
The youth interrogator is required to write down everytlring Ore child says in full and as accurately as possible. 
In April 1989 a new regulation was issued which provided Orat every youth interrogator has to tape-record Ole 
interview procedure, unless Orere are special reasons for not doing so. Since improving the quality of hearsay 
evidence is of primary importance, Hamon (1990:91) argues dlat the next step in dris direction would be the 
adoption of a system of video-recording the interviews. This, he argues, would contribute to overcoming the 
objections to hearsay since the court would be able both to see and hear the child and thus gain an impression of 
the witness. TIris would create a balanced procedure which would cater for the protection of the accused's rights 
as well. 
Despite the above criticisms, Hamon (1990:92) argues that drastic changes to the procedures introduced by the 1955 
statute are not to be expected. In fact, in Israel there has recently been a growing tendency to narrow exclusionary 
rules of evidence, moving in the direction of credibility tests rather than admissibility tests. In fact, he is of the 
opinion tlrat "it is desirable that the law of evidence, like the legal system as a whole, should adapt itself to Ore 
ever-changing social requirements and attitudes, but with caution, without overlooking countervailing interests" 
(Harnon 1990:92). 
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5. PROCEDURES ADOPTED IN SOUTH AFRICA WITH RESPECT TO 
CIDLD WITNESSES 
5.1 Accusatorial System of Evidence 
The South African rules of procedure are based on Ole accusatorial system which implies O,at criminal trials consist 
of two parties placing evidence before a passive judge who , having heard Ole examination-in-chief and observed 
Ole cross-examination, makes a decision as to the guilt of Ole accused. The position has been sunmlarised as 
follows by the South African Law Conmlission (1989:2): 
"A criminal proceeding is in effect aimed at comparing the two contradictory versions, Olat of the 
State and that of the defence, against one another and to put both to Ole test of harsh cross-
examination. " 
5.1.1 Passive Presiding Officer 
In this system the presiding officer plays a passive role , and is compared to "an umpire in a cricket match" (South 
African Law Commission I 989:2). His function is to listen to Ole evidence presented by both parties and to ensure 
O,at Ole rules of evidence and procedure are adhered to. Once all Ole evidence has been presented , he must make 
a finding of fact and apply the law to the facts. His role is a neutral one, and best described in Ole Report of the 
Conmlission of Enquiry, Criminal Procedure and Evidence, as quoted by Laosdown and Campbell (! 982: 490): 
"The judicial officer is not concerned with Ole investigation of the facts which led to the accused 's 
appearance in court. The procedure in both the trial and the preliminary hearing is characterised 
by a confrontation between Ole prosecutor and the accused at which Ole judicial officer acts Illore 
or less as an arbiter, and according to Ole evidence adduced, ensures O,at the rules prescribed for 
Ule trial are observed." 
The presiding officer mUSt remain neutral througbout the trial , and "must keep a perfectly open mind on the 
question of the guilt or innocence of Ole accused until Ole conclusion of Ole whole case" (Lansdown and Campbell 
1982:491). Although it is often said that Ole presictingjudge must not descend into the arena, he must nevertheless 
see that justice is done and for Olat reason has been given the authority to have witnesses subpoenaed if the evidence 
would appear to be essential to the case. This has been provided for by s 186 of the Criminal Procedure Act nO.5 1 
of 1977: 
"The court may at any stage of criminal proceedings subpoena or cause to be subpoenaed any 
person as a witness at such proceedings, and that the court sha!1 so subpoena a witness or so cause 
a witness to be subpoenaed if the evidence of such witness appears to Ole court essential to the 
just decision of the case." 
A presiding officer also has Ole authority to examine any witness and to recall and re-examine any person already 
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examined if such evidence would appear to be esseutial to a just decision. This is also provided for by s 167 of tlle 
Criminal Procedure Act of 1977. The presiding officer will be allowed to examine witnesses where evidence is 
in any way ambiguous or iucomplete (Lansdown and Campbell 1982:491). Section 167 provides: 
"The court may at any stage of criminal proceedings examine any person, other than au accused, 
who has been subpoenaed to attend such proceedings or who is in attendance at such proceedings, 
and may recall and re-examine any person, including an accused, already examined at Ule 
proceedings, and the court shall examine, or recall and re-examine, the person concerned if his 
evidence appears to dIe court essential to the just decision of Ule case. " 
The fact that the presiding officer must remain neutral and not descend into the arena means that he may not 
interfere widl tlle accused's right to cross-examination unless it is offensive, humiliating, misleading or tornleming. 
He may not interfere where dle cross-examination is merely harsh or aggressive or "which consists of leading 
questions or suggestions, or which is prolonged" (SA Law Commission 1989: 3) . Since there is a very fine line 
between cross-examination which is admissible and that which is not, presiding officers are wary of interfering and 
being seen as entering the contest. 
5_L2 Two Opposing Parties 
Since the presiding officer must remain passive, all evidence is then placed before the COUl1 by the two parties 
involved. The existence of two opposing parties is an essential feature of the accusatorial system and creates the 
perception of a fight. In fact, Lansdown and Canlpbell (1982:491-2), in discussing the neutrality of judges and 
magistrates, refer to the trial as "the arena of conflict" and caution presiding officers not to allow their vision to 
become "obscured by the dust of conflict". 
The concept of two opposing parties fighting a battle pervades U,e trial, with each side calling their owu witnesses 
and attacking the witnesses of the other party by means of cross-examination. The purpose of the latter technique 
being to destroy witnesses by attacking their credibility or by proving that they are unreliable. 
5.1.3 Cross-examination 
The right to cross-exanline an opposing party 's witnesses is an essemial feature of the accusatorial system, and is 
therefore a fundamental right of an accused in the South African law of procedure. A party is entitled to cross-
examine all witnesses who give evidence for Ule opposing party , and any refusal to allow such cross-examination 
would anlOullt to an irregularity . For this reason tlle presiding officer is very wary of interfering widl cross-
examination, especially Ulat of the defence, "to avoid any suspicion that the defence is being muzzled" (Lansdown 
and Canlpbell 1982:494). The discretion to control undue or improper cross-exanlination must be exercised with 
caution and "with a full awareness of Ule vital role that cross-exanlination plays in our system of evidence" 
(Lansdown and Canlpbell 1982:495). 
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5.1.4 Rules of Evidence 
The accusatorial system is characterised by a very fomlalistic and rigid adberence to rules of evidence. This toO 
theu is the position in South Africa where the law of evidence is based on strict rules of admissibility. Evidence 
that does nOl fall within the parameters of these rules will not be admissible in cour!. The general rule is Ulat 
hearsay evidence is inadmissible except in certain limited situations as set out in 53 of the Law of Evidence 
Amendment Act 45 of 1988. Of particular relevance to ulis study will be the rules relating to competency, previous 
consistent statements, hearsay and the cautionary rule. 
5.1.5 Inquisitorial Features 
Despite ule fact ulat the South African legal system is based on the accusatorial model, there are a number of 
features which have been incorporated into this system which are of an inquisitorial nature. 
In temlS of s 115(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1977 a presiding officer is authorised to question an accused at 
the beginning of a trial to give the latter an opportunity to indicate the basis of his defence. Section 18 of the 
Criminal Law Second Amendment Act of 1992 enables the Attorney-General to issue a certificate designating 
certain offences to be 'special offences'. These must entail murder, robbery with aggravating ci rcumstances, 
violence or intimidation. In any trial dealing WiUl a special offence, Ule presiding officer is empowered to euter 
Ule accusatorial mode of questioning an accused who pleads not guilty as to the basis of his defence, and may draw 
an unfavourable inference from a failure to give an explanation (Milton et al 1994:413) . 
There are instances where inquisitorial features have been incorporated into the accusatorial model, and serve to 
show that it is possible to introduce amendments to legislation that have an inquisitorial flavour. Since ule 
accusatorial system in South Africa already has some inqui sitorial features, the mere fact Ulat certain suggested 
anlendmentS to legislation involving child witnesses are of an inquisitorial nature should nOl serve as a deterren!. 
5.1.6 The Constitutional Position 
TIle Constitution of the Republic of SOUUl Africa Act 108 of 1996 was adopted on Ole 8 May 1996, and entrenches 
certain aspects of tlle accusatorial system. Section 35(3) grants an accused a right to a fair trial, which includes 
the right to a public trial ; the right to be present when being tried; and Ole right to adduce and challenge evidence. 
These rights strengthen the accusatorial features of criminal procedure by insisting on confrontation and cross-
exanlination, although none of Ole rights are absolute. The impact of Ole Constitution will be discussed under the 
relevant sections when evaluating available options and any possible refomls. 
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5.2 Confrontation 
5.2.1 Introduction 
Section 35(3}(e} of the Constitution provides dlat an accused has the right to be present when he is being tried. 
AldlOugh the wording of the section does not specifically contain the temIS 'confront' or 'face-to-face'. Joubert 
(l995:522) bas argued tbat dlis right encompasses more than simply requiring dlat the trial and the decision of dIe 
court take place in his presence. It would also include confrontation in the sense of being able to see witnesses and 
to observe tbeir demeanour. 
Even before the introduction of the Constitution, it has always been a basic principle of the South African criminal 
procedure that accusations had to be made face-to-face (Zieff 1991:35). TIlis is supported by the SOUdl African 
Law ConIDlission (l989:4) which accords an accused the right to be present during his trial and to hear all evidence 
that is led against him. He is entitled "to demand that accusations against him be made face to face with him". 
This principle is contained in s158 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1977. which reads: 
"Except as otherwise expressly provided by this Act or any other law. all criminal proceedings 
in any court shall take place in the presence of dIe accused." 
In discussing sI56(1} of dIe Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act 56 of 1955, the precursor to this section, Colman 
J in S v Motlalla supra explained at 815F that: 
"[tlhere must be confrontation; he must see them as they depose against him so that he can 
observe their demeanour. MId they for dleir part must give dleir evidence in dIe face of a present 
accused" . 
The denial of dIe right to confrontation would amount to an irregularity, providing a ground for the overturning 
of a conviction, as happened in S v Moilaila supra when a witness gave evidence in the absence of an accused. 
Although an accused is given a right to be present at his trial in terms of statutory law , common law and dIe 
Constitution, dIe right is nevertheless not absolute . There are certain statutory provisions which specifically exclude 
confrontation. For instance, provision is made in certain cases for the accused to be removed from the COurtroom. 
This is governed by s159( I} of dIe Criminal Procedure Act 1977 which reads: 
"(I) If an accused at criminal proceedings conducts himself in a manner which makes dIe 
continuance of dIe proceedings in his presence impracticable, the court may direct that 
he be removed and that the proceedings continue in his absence." 
The Criminal Procedure Act 1977 contains further exceptions to an accused's right to be present at his trial, which 
were discussed supra and which would include evidence given via closed-circuit television (sI70A) and evidence 
given on conIDlission (s I71 ). In Klink v Regional Court Magistrate NO and Others 1996(3} BCLR 402 (SE) dIe 
applicant wanted to know whether s l70A had not resulted in a limitation of his fundanlental right to a fair trial. 
However, it emerges from the applicant's argnment that his main concern was not the physical separation of dIe 
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child witness from the accused. He accepted ulat some form of separation was applied in other coumries and did 
not press this issue (at 408D-E). 
5.2.2 Effect of Confrontation on Child Witnesses 
Since the accused is entitled to be present in court at his trial, a child witness would have to give evidence in court 
in the presence of Ule accused (SA Law Commission 1989:4). This creates untold difficulties for Ule child who 
has, in most cases, to be faced with ule very person who assaulted him or whom he witnessed assaulting another. 
In additi on to ulis, the child has to tell his story in a fomlal courtroom which will be alien to anything he has UlUS 
far experienced (Harnmond arId HanmlOnd 1987:9). 
Tbe traumatic effect of courtroom confrontation on children has been accepted by a number of South African courts. 
In Borsford v De Jager and Another 1959(2) SA 152 (N) a ten-and-a-half year old girl was called to give evidence 
in an application brought by her mother to enforce an order of custody. Fannin J commented as follows at 157D-E 
regarding Ule girl 's experience in court: 
"The elder daughter was called to give evidence. After a short time she broke down and wept 
in the witness box and, with the consent of the parties, her evidence was heard by me in 
Chambers in the presence of counsel only." 
In R v S 1948(4) SA 419 (GW) the court , in assessing a ten year old's evidence, remarked at 422 Utat "[ilt must 
be remembered that he was a child of tender years, was kept in the witness-box for a considerable time, ule strain 
of which, it could be seen, told on him" . And in Jabaar v South African Railways and Barbours 1982(4) SA 552 
(C) King AJ made the following observations at 555E-G regarding the evidence of a twelve year old boy: 
"Having regard to the various factors which must be taken into accoum, his demeanour in the 
witness-box was that of a young cbild; he was obviously nervous, unsure of himself, ill-at-ease 
and reluctant to be giving evidence (it will be remembered that he was called as a witness by the 
defendant); it will also be remembered Utat he was testifying to incidents which had occurred 
several years previously, a long time ago in hi s young life; it was to me quite natural Ulat he 
should have forgotten much of that Ulthappy occurrence. " 
Key (1988:54) refers to a case where a twelve year old boy had been sodomised by his father over a protracted 
period of time. As far as confrontation was concerned, Key had the following to say: 
"Throughout the hearing the boy demonstrated signs of severe anxiety. He held his hand against 
his face to blinker out the sight of his fatber. When asked why he was so upset he said ulat his 
fauler had , on numerous occasions, produced a knife and threatened to kill him if he ever told 
anyone about what his father had done to him. " 
These conclusions regarding the effect of confrontation on children were reinforced in Ule decision S v Basil Simons 
DCLD 84/88, 13 June 1988, (unreported) where Wilson J had the following to say about child witnesses: 
"J propose for a moment to digress and to state that it appears to me that it is time tbat urgent 
consideration is given to a change in the maImer of conducting criminal trials arising out of ule 
228 
sexual abuse of young children. I do not suggest that dlere should be any substantial changes 
made to our criminal procedure as sucb, but it appears to me dlat it would be eminently desirable 
to evolve a system that when a child is called upon to give evidence dlat child is not required to 
do so in a large austere looking court room before judicial officers sitting on a bench above them. 
In other words in circumstances that are completely strange to dle child, and must cause a great 
deal of stress and tension. It would in my view be far fairer, botb to dle State and the defence, 
if arrangements could be made in cases of dlis nature for the child to give evidence in 
circumstances which are not strange to her, so that he or she, depending on the sex of dle child, 
is not subjected to more traumatic experiences than are absolutely necessary." 
In response to these criticisms, the SOUdl African Law Conunission undertook an investigation into the plight of 
the cbild witness . 
5.2.3 South African Law Commission 
In 1989 the SA Law Commission produced a working paper, entitled Protection of the Child Witness, which 
focused on dle position of the abused child as a witness in court. The Commission (1989:3) accepted that 
courtrooms are spartan and severe in appearance, thereby creating a forbidding experience for a witness. They 
furdler accepted that the juxtaposition of dle presiding officer, dle accused and his legal representative as well as 
the prosecutor in tile courtroom, clad in black robes, caused a child to become "afraid, uncertain and confused" 
(SA Law Commission 1989:14). Zieff (1991:21) goes furdler and says that , not only do children suffer serious 
psychological and emotional damage as a result of abuse, but this psychological haml is often perpetuated when 
they are required to give evidence in court. Being forced to confront an attacker in person can result in the child 
refusing to testify or not being able to give evidence effectively (Avery 1983:47). 
Zieff (1991 :35) argues that having to give evidence in the presence of the accused is more harrowing for a child 
witness than having to undergo cross-examination. The SA Law Commission (1989: 14) accepted the contributions 
of researchers, both national and international, who argued that forcing the child to confront the accused while 
giving evidence could result in the child "watering down" evidence or recaming in an attempt to escape an 
unpleasant experience. 
In response to publicity regarding the difficulties experienced by child witnesses, the then Minister of Justice. Mr 
HJ Coetsee, released a press statement on 8 November 1988, which has been quoted by the SA Law Commission 
(1989: 18). The statement set out a sununary of nunlerous investigations which had already been undertaken and 
which had a bearing on family law and related topics. Particular attention was accorded to tile protection of the 
child. In view of further representations made, the following project was submitted to the SA Law Commission 
(1989:19-20): 
"That an investigation be instituted into the giving of evidence by children in litigation inVOlving 
allegations of indecent acts and tllat in particular consideration be given to the following possible 
protective measures and procedures: 
I. That a child giving evidence in a trial be assisted by a representative. 
2. That the identification of a suspect by a child ought not to take place in an open court, 
but from behind a one-way mirror. 
3. That the evidence of a child be heard in an infonnal atmosphere, which includes the 
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hearing of such evidence in a room other than a court of law, and which also 
includes the possibility of hearing the child's evidence whilst the child is 
screened off by a one-way mirror or in the absence of the accused. 
4. That a pre-trial questioning of the child be carried out by a psychologist appointed by the 
court, who must be enti tled to express his opinion in court regarding the child's 
credibility; such questioning to take place in consultation with the accused, the 
prosecution and the presiding officer. 
5. That videotapes relating to interviews between tlle child and a social worker during the 
investigation stages of tlle case ought to be admissible in court and ought to be made 
available to tlle accused before the trial. " 
In an attempt to address Ulese problems, the Commission looked at a number of possible solutions which had been 
snggested both nationally and internationally. 
5.2.3.1 A Child Investigator 
The Conmlission considered the implications involved in the creation of a post such as that of a child investigator, 
referring to the position in Israel. A child investigator, tlley thought, could be taken from the ranks of psychiatrists, 
psychologists or social workers and would function to protect the child against interference and intimidation, to 
evaluate tlle trustworthiness of tlle child and to testify and be cross-examined on behalf of the child where a decision 
was made that tlle child should not testify personally (SA Law Conmlission 1989:20). Hammond and Hammond 
(1987:6) summarise of Ule advantages and disadvantages of Ule Israeli system. Firstly, an advantage would be a 
reduction in Ule number of interviews a child witness would have to undergo, since a single investigator would deal 
with tlle case throughout. In addition, the child would be spared a court appearance and be represented by a well-
trained professional. On Ule other hand, Ule disadvantages would include the fact that corroboration of a child 's 
evidence would stiIJ be required, and the accused would be deprived of his right to confront and cross-examine a 
witness who would be giving evidence against him. 
In evaluating ulis proposal , ule SA Law Conunission (1 989:28-9) emphasised that ule crux of the matter was tllat 
the child investigator would give evidence and be cross-examined on behalf of the child, and found that it conflicted 
with a nwuber of the fundamental premises of our law, namely that a witness must give evidence in person and also 
be cross-examined personally , as well as the fact that hearsay evidence is inadmissible . A danger inherent in this 
procedure, it was argued, was that the child investigator would instinctively "colour the child's story and give it 
a rational image, sometlling which the child would not be able to do himself". It was accepted by the Conmlission 
that Ule trustworthiness and reliability of the child's evidence could not be tested in this way. They added, however, 
that tlle mere fact that the solution proposed was of such a drastic nature would not on its own stand in the way 
of reform if it was in the interests of the entire community, and ulis would include Ule interests of both the child 
and the accused. In conclusion, Ule Conmlission found that , since the proposal conflicted with fundamental 
principles of our law and since the possible dangers would be immense for bOtll defence and prosecution, the 
proposal could not be supported. The only aspect of the proposal which the Commission accepted was that the child 
witness be supported by a qualified child psychologist tllroughout the trial. In accepting this part of the proposal, 
the court suggested that this psychological support be available for "Ule abused child and the child wi tness" . This 
would appear to include all children who give evidence, and would , ulerefore, not be limited to a child who is the 
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victim of an offence . 
5.2.3.2 Special Courtrooms and "tmnslated" Cross-examination 
This proposal involved two issues: tile provision of special courtrooms for child witnesses, and the appointment of 
a person through whol11 cross-examination could be conducted. The latter part of tile proposal will only be discussed 
briefly here since it will be covered in 1110re deptil in tile section dealing with cross-examination infra. 
The essence of this proposal , as outlined by tile SA Law Conmlission (1989:2 1-23) , is that a child witness should 
be allowed to testi fy in a special courtroom, such as a playroom, from behind a one-way mirror with the assistance 
of a trained official. Although the people in the courtroom would be allowed to see the child , tile latter will not be 
aware of tileir presence. The official accompanying the child will be linked to the court by means of earphones. 
This person will hear questions put by dIe defence in the course of cross-examination and will relay them to the 
child in "an objective and non-aggressive manner". The court personnel and defence will hear both the question 
put b.y the official and the child 's reply. An alte rnative procedure would be to put all questions to the presiding 
officer , who would then put d,em to tile offi cial who would in turn convey them to dIe child. 
The Conmtission also referred to the children's courtroom suggested by Libai (SA Law Conuuission 1989:22). Libai 
(1969: 1014ff) urged dlat the State should not ignore dIe opinions of psychological experts who argue that "legal 
proceedings are not geared to protect the victim's emotions and may be exceptionall y traumatic ". At the same time, 
however, an accused's right to a fair trial should be protected. Libai, (1969: 1017) however, is of the opinion that 
the price of protecting dIe child does not have to infringe the constitutional rights of the accused. He refers to his 
proposal as the 'Child-Courtroom' and describes it as follows: 
"The Child-Courtroom is designed to take a victim's testimony in an informal and relaxed 
nlalmer, while the child can see only four persons around him: d,e judge, tile prosecutor, the 
defense counsel, and the child examiner who will all be seated in a 'judge's room' , arranged in 
a way which contributes to the security and psychological comfort of the child . The accused, tile 
jury and dIe audience should be seated behind a one-way glass, separating them frO I11 tile judge's 
room, but enabling them to observe everydling which occurs dlere. In this manJler tile defendant' s 
right to trial by jury is secured and dIe jury can view dIe accused's demeanour whi le the child is 
testi fy ing. In addition, the accused will have microphone and earphones by means of wilich he 
and his counsel, who is in dIe judge's room, will be able to communicate with each other. The 
proceedings are transmitted to the accused's box by suitable electronic methods which would not 
interfere witil the accused' s capacity to communicate with his counsel. " 
The SA Law Commission (1989:22) also referred to the use of the videolink in the United Kingdom as well as the 
United States of America which has "the advantage of keeping the child out of the fomlal atmosphere of tile 
courtroom which many child witnesses find extremely daunting". It should also be noted that the majority of dle 
Pigot Committee in England ill their report favoured the use of a single intemlediary who would question dIe child 
on behalf of bodl parties, but unanimity was not reached. The intermediary , it was suggested in dleir report, would 
be equipped widl an earpiece micro-receiver to receive questions from counsel and the judge (Davies 1991: \ 89). 
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The Commission wished it to be placed officially on record that their provisional impression was that this proposal 
had merit since it protected the child both against a court appearance and against "aggressive and intimidating cross-
examination" while at the same time preserving the fundamental principles of confrontation and cross-
examination (SA Law commission 1989:29). The onJy question that remained was whether in practice this proposal 
could be implemented by the Department of Justice. 111is would involve making a room available which had an 
informal appearance and which was situated next to the courtroom. A one-way mirror would have to be fitted 
through which the court would be able to observe the child, and earphones would have to be installed for the use 
of the child investigator. Despite the financial sacrifices involved, the Commission (1989:30) felt that the interests 
of society demanded such a solution. 
A further potential problem raised by the Conmlission (1989:30) was whether there would be sufficient child 
investigators, preferably educational psychologists, available. Hammond and Hammond (1987:6) did not 
consider this objection as valid, but explained that the focus was actually on reassessing priorities. The Department 
of Health and Welfare had offered manpower from its own officers and tilere were enough trained clinical 
psychologists available . The Conunission (1989:31) accepted this argument, conceding that the child investigator 
did not necessarily have to be an educational psychologist. A clinieal psychologist or a welfare officer could also 
serve as child investigators, thereby erasing the objection that sufficient manpower did not exist. In conclusion, 
the Commission (1989:31) "strongly recommended" this proposal and suggested that a legislative provision be 
drafted as soon as the Department of J ustiee provided proposals regarding the practical implementation of the 
facilities. 
5.2.3.3 Legal Representation for Child Witnesses 
111e position at present is that, because the prosecution of an offence remains the responsibility of the State, the 
child witness will not be entitled to be assisted in court by his own legal representative in regard to tile presentation 
of Ius evidence and any objections that may arise out of cross-examination. A private legal representative of a child 
witness in a criminal case would be tile equivalent of a spectator (SA Law Conunission 1989:6). 
In R v De Kock 1914 EDL 348 the court strongly condemned the appointment of a private legal representative by 
the complainant to assist the prosecutor, and in R v Adam Effendi 1917 EDL 267 the Supreme Court went so far 
as to set the conviction aside because a private practitioner assisted the prosecutor by addressing the court without 
the pennission of the Attorney-General. The procedure was found to be irregular since there was the danger that 
the accused could have been prejudiced. At 353-4 Graham JP explained the situation as follows: 
"I have noticed for some time past that the practice of employing legal advisers to assist the 
prosecution in criminal cases ... is becoming quite conilll0n ... I am convinced that the practice 
is one which should not be tolerated in the interests of justice. A prosecutor appointed by the 
Crown approaches a case in a different frame of mind from that of an attorney or agent 
appointed by and remunerated by the complainant in the case. The Crown prosecutor should have 
no other interest in the case than to lay before the court such facts as may assist the court in 
arriving at the truth. This is his sale and only duty. If private practitioners are permitted at the 
instance of a complainant to take part in a prosecution, the whole object of the enquiry, which, 
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I repeat again, is only to elicit the trutll , may be lost sight of'. 
In SaLusbury v R 1934 (I)PH H83 (T) tile court allowed a private practitioner, who had been appointed by an 
interested party, to provide informal assistance. This would entitle such a practitioner to suggest questions to 
a public prosecutor, but he would nO! be allowed to address the court or take part in the cross-examination of the 
accused. 
However, despite tile court 's objection to tile appointment of legal assistance for a witness, tile Commission 
accepted (1989: 15-6) that various researchers were of tile opinion tllat the appoinUllem of a legal representative for 
an abused child was necessary. It would assist children by giving them a better understanding of what was expected 
of them, tlley would be better prepared and also would be "protected against aggressive cross-examiIlation and 
repeated remands". 
Hammond and Hammond (1987:7), referring to Allwood, support the plea for an appointment of a child 's advocate, 
who is described as the "friend of the child in legal proceedings" . The child's advocate should be equipped willI 
knowledge of botb legal and psychosocial concepts to facilitate conmlUwcation. This proposal was supported by Van 
der Byl (1986:250), a social worker, who reconunended tllat a legal adviser with special knowledge about child 
abuse should be appointed to assist tile child complainant. An alternative approach would be to have legal counsel 
present as part of a multi-discipliIlary case conference. 
The Connnission (J 989: 16) also made reference to the proposal of the Hoexter Comm.ission (1985), in its enquiry 
into family courts, that an office of children's friends be introduced who would have the power to arrange legal 
representation for the child at public expense. It should be noted, however, that tllis proposal was formulated willi 
regard to the family courts and would include matters relating to custody and removal of children from the home. 
In the latter case, tile child's best interests have to be detemlined, and the child is, therefore, a party to the 
proceedings. In evaluating this proposal, the Conunission (1989:31) felt tllat the need for legal representation was 
no longer necessary in view of the fact that they had already reconmlended the appointment of a child investigator. 
They added furtller that the only real advantage in appointing a legal representative would be that "he would be able 
to object against aggressive and unfair cross-examiIlation by the accused or his legal representative". This, they felt, 
did not introduce better protection for tile child tllan the appointment of a person such as a child investigator. 
5.2.3.4 Pl'eparation of the Child Witness 
The Commission (1989: 5) accepted tlta! there was in practice a vast di fference between tile preparation done by the 
prosecutor and that done by the defence . The latter, before appearing in court, prepares 1l1Oroughly by consulting 
with tile accused, and his witnesses are generally well prepared for tile trial. On tile otller hand , "the nonnal 
practice is that the prosecutor does not consult with the complainant or state witnesses; that he does not in any way 
prepare dIem for the trial at all: tllat he does not go over their evidence and clear up obscurities and contradictions 
where possible". 
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In crystallising the problem, the Commission (1989: 15) accepted that prosecutors do not prepare the child witness 
for trial to the same extent as would the defence, which has the inevitable result that "the child witness is totally 
unprepared for what is expected of him or her and what he or she may expect". This leads to the witness appearing 
uncertain, which in turns creates the perception that the child is untrustworthy. The position of the unprepared child 
witness is described succinctly by the Commission (1989: 15) as follows: 
"The witness appears to be uncertain and thus untrustworthy. He or she calUlOt remember 
all the details of the experience about which evidence must be given and he or she has not had 
the benefit of a consultation to refresh his or her memory. There are therefore contradictions, 
lacunae and uncertainties which create the impression of untrustworthiness. As a result of his own 
neglect to consult beforehand, the prosecutor struggles from the outset to place the witness's 
version cogently before tile court. The court immediately calls the value of the evidence into 
question. In practice it is not too difficult for the cross-examiner to 'break' the witness - and 
yet another guilty abuser goes scot free. " 
In conclusion, however, tbe Commission (1989:35) felt that, although the present position was unsatisfactory, it 
was not a matter which could be addressed tilrough legislation since it concerned practical Illatters such as 
availability of prosecutors and adequate time for preparation. It was, nevertlleless, suggested that the 
Departnlent of Justice should supply prosecutors who were specially trained to deal with cases involving sexually 
abused children. 
5.2.3.5 Video Recording of Initial Statement 
The Commission (1989:24) received proposals that the initial statement of the child be recorded on video and used 
as evidence at the trial. Authority for the advantages of using video recordings is found in the decision of S v 
Baleka and Others supra where the court ruled that video recordings are real evidence and admissible. The court 
gave the following reasons therefore at 194-5: 
"Having sat through two weeks of video viewing I am convinced that the video can be a very 
belpful tool to arrive at the truth. It does not suffer from fading memory as do witnesses. The 
camera may be selective, but so is the witness's recollection, even more so. The best word artist 
catlllot draw his verbal picture as accurately and as clearly as does tile cold eye of the camera. 
Not to mention the faltering witness who has difficulty in expressing himself. TIle tape records 
and retains for the benefit of the Court not only the words but also the intimation and emphasis 
of the speaker and the reaction of the audience . A tape sound and video recording can often be 
more reliable than the recollection of a witness. " 
In evaluating this proposal, the Commission (1989:32-3) found that it could not be supported since a video recording 
of a child's initial statement would be inadmissible because it would serve as self-corroboration, be a previous 
cOllsistent statement, and be irrelevant as witnesses must testify in person in court. The Commission did not attempt 
to qnestion any of these grounds of inadmissibility, but simply accepted that the video recording would be 
inadmissible according to our current rules of law. They did not address the issue, for instance, tilat, in tile case 
of child witnesses, previous consistent statements should be admissible as self-corroboration to support the 
credibility of tile child. The Law Commission did, however, acknowledge that such a video recording of the initial 
statement may be of informal and practical use to the police and prosecution. 
I 
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Zieff (1991 :41) argues dlat the Conunission were short-sighted in their approach to alternative video proposals, 
since they did not examine proposals such as dlOse which have been suggested by Williams and Spencer. The 
proposals suggested by dIe latter involved the child being interviewed by a specially trained examiner while tlle 
accused and his representative viewed the proceedings from behind a one-way mirror. The interview is conducted 
in terms of dle ordinary rules of evidence, and the defence would be able to put specific questions to the child via 
the trained examiner. These proceedings would be recorded and the video recording would replace the child 
giving evidence personally at the trial. 
Zieff (1991:41) argues that the Conmlission were further remiss in not considering the possibility of enacting a 
statute that would enable a child to testify via videotape or that would create a hearsay exception in tertns of which 
dlt videotaped statements of children would become admissible. Zieff (! 991 :42) believes that these statutes are 
feasible provided the courtS balance the competing interests of the child and the accused. 
In October 1990 an attempt was made to allow a child witness to give evidence in a separate room. In S v Jurgens 
RC 653/90, 23 November 1990, PietemIaritzburg, (unreported) tlle prosecution applied to the Pietertnaritzburg 
Regional Court for a seven year old girl, dIe victim of a kidnapping, to be allowed to testify by means of closed-
circuit television from a room adjoining the court. The procedure adopted is described as follows by Schwikkard 
(1991:4): 
"The arrangement was that the presiding officer, prosecutor and defence attorney were to be 
present in the courtroom together with the accused. There was a video camera in tlIe witness room 
recording the interaction between the prosecutor's representative (hereafter referred to as the 
intennediary) and dle witness. This record was immediately transmitted onto twO television 
monitors in the courtroom, one facing the magistrate and the other aimed at the well of the court 
for the benefit of the officers of the court, the accused and the public . All sounds emanating from 
dIe witness room could be heard in the courtroom, but the sounds from the courtroom could only 
be heard by the intertnediary who was equipped widl earphones for this purpose. All questions 
would be put to the intemlediary who would then relay the questions to the child." 
This arrangement was very similar to the proposal forwarded by the Law Commission, the only difference being 
that closed-circuit television was used instead of a one-way mirror, and the intermediary was llot a social worker 
or psychologist but a female prosecutor (Schwikkard 1991 :45). The magistrate refused the application on dle 
ground that it conflicted widl s158 of dIe Criminal Procedure Act 1977 which provided that proceedings must take 
place in dIe presence of the accused. It was held dIat dlis right could not be waived since a denial of this right 
would amount to an irregularity. The court relied on S v Motlatla supra where Colman 1 held at 815F that dlis right 
included more than simply hearing what a witness had to say. It included confrontation in the sense that the accused 
be able to observe a witness ' s demeanour. 
Schwikkard (1991:46) distinguished Motlatla from Jurgens on the facts. In dIe fomler the complainant gave 
evidence in the absence of the accused. When the accused appeared in court, the contplaitlant's recorded evidence 
was played back to him. In .lurgens, however, the accused was in a position where he could monitor dlt 
proceedings in exactly the same way as he would if the child was present in the courtroom. The accused would 
be able to observe the child's demeanour as she testified. The court may perhaps have been influenced by the 
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defence's argument that it was important for the witness to see the accused on the ground that it was "easy for a 
person to make a statement concerning anotber behind his back, but will cower if be has to look the person 
concerning whom he is making the statement in tbe eye and to utter it" Cat 52). 
Schwikkard CI991 :48) argues that the model adopted in the lurgen's case does not prejudice the accused since the 
witness's demeanour can be observed and the truth of the evidence tested by cross-examination. In any effect, any 
prejudice that the accused may suffer will be outweighed in most cases by the probative value of the evidence. In 
view of the problems raised in the lurgen's case, Schwikkard CI991 :48) suggests that it would be more prudent 
if tile Commission recommended that legislation be introduced witil respect to any proposal made "to avoid the 
danger of conservative interpretation" . 
5.2.4 Statutory Innovations 
As a result of the above recommendations made by the Commission, the Criminal Law Amendment Act 135 of 
1991 was introduced, which inserted sl70A of tile Criminal Procedure Act of 1977. The section provides as 
follows: 
"Evidence through Intermediaries 
170A. CI) Whenever criminal proceedings are pending before any court and it appears to such 
court that it would expose any witness under the age of eighteen years to undue mental 
stress or suffering if he testifies at such proceedings, the court may, subject to subsection 
(4), appoint a competent person as an intermediary in order to enable such witness to 
give his evidence through that intermediary. 
(2) Ca) No examination, cross-examination or re-examination of any witness in 
respect of whom a court has appointed an intermediary under subsection (I), 
except examination by the court, shall take place in any manner other than 
through that intermediary. 
Cb) The said intermediary may, unless the court directs otherwise, convey the 
general purport of any questions to tile relevant witness . 
(3) If a court appoints an intermediary under subsection (I), the court may direct 
that the relevant witness shall give his evidence at any place -
Ca) which is informally arranged to set the witness at ease; 
Cb) whicb is so situated that any person whose presence may upset that witness, 
is outside tile sigbt and bearing of that witness; and 
Cc) which enables the court and any person whose presence is necessary at the 
relevant proceedings to see and hear, either directly or through the medium of 
any electronic or other devices, that intermediary as well as tilat witness during 
his testimony. 
(4) Ca) The Minister may by notice in the Gazette determine the persons or the 
category or class of persons who are competent to be appointed as 
intenl1ediaries. 
Cb) An intemlediary who is not in the full time employment of the State shall 
be paid such travelling and subsistence and other allowances in respect of the 
services rendered by him as the Minister of Finance may determine." 
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5.2.4.1 The Position in Court at Present 
The general rule is that a child witness will give evidence in court, unless it appears that the child will be exposed 
to undue mental stress or suffering, in which case Ule court will invoke s l70A supra. In terms of this section a child 
is entitled to give evidence in a place other than ule courtroom. In practice ule child witness gives evidence in a 
room separate from the courtroom. This room is usuall y, though not always, attached to the courtroom. In a 
number of instances, the room allocated to the magistrate for his entrance or where he was accustomed to wait. has 
been converted into the room for children to testify from. 
The room is infomtally arranged and equipped WiOl chairs for ule child and the intermediary . In the various centres 
effort bas been taken by a number of organisations to paint and furni sh the room in a child-friendly manner that 
would set a child at ease. A video camera is mounted on the wall opposite Ule chairs and videotapes both the child 
and the intermediary when the child is giving evidence. No other person is allowed in the room with ule child and 
ule intermediary (Muller 1995:53). 
The intemlediary is provided WiUl earphones in order to follow the proceedings in the courtroom. The intermediary 
hears the questions and relays these to the child . The child 's answers will be captured on the live video link and 
relayed to the courtroom. Tbe child does not see the courtroom or any person in the courtroom when giving 
evidence, neither does the child hear anyone from the court (Muller 1995:53). 
The courtroom itself is provided with a television monitor on which the members of the court will be able to view 
the child and Ule intermediary and hear what is being said . The video is live, which means that ule members of ule 
court will see and hear the child and intemlediaryas uley speak. A videotaped recording is nOt made of the child 
giving evidence. The evidence is, however, recorded using Ule normal electronic recording system employed in the 
courts. 
Section l70A does not specificall y refer to the use of cameras to shield Ule child. Subsection 3(c) sets out that the 
court must "see and hear. eiuler directly or through the medium of any electronic or other devices". This would 
include a screen-lype arrangement with one-way glass or a separate room linked with close-circuit television. In 
fact, s170A has been interpreted so widely that in 1995 a young child in East London gave evidence from home 
which was relayed to the court by means of a live video-link (Muller 1995:53). III practice ule Department of 
Justice has set up a closed-circuit television system in most centres which operates from a room next to the 
courtroom. 
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5.2.4.2 Evidential'Y Aspects of the Section 
This section applies to all children, male or female , under the age of eighteen. Section 170A(l) uses the phrase "any 
witness", and is not restricted to charges of sexual abuse or physical abuse. Neither is it limited to witnesses who 
are complainants. In theory , it would apply to a chi ld who has wi tnessed an attack on a parent, and is not llimself 
a victim of the crime. 
5.2.4.2.1 The Discretion of the Court 
Section 170A(l) supra uses the pbrase "the court may " which implies dJat the court has a discretion to allow tlle 
appointment of an intermediary, and that the appointment is not automatic. In practice this means tllat dIe 
prosecution will have to make an application to the court that an intermediary be appointed. In terms of subsection 
(3) the court still has a discretion, once it bas appointed an intermediary, to allow the witness to give evidence in 
a separate room. In effect dlis means that the court must make two applications: an application to appoint the 
inteonediary , and an application to use tbe informally arranged room. Tbe two applications will normally be 
brought together (Miiller 1995:53). 
The manner in which this section is phrased, however, creates an anomaly. Subsection (I) provides dlat the court 
may appoint a competent person as an inteonediary. Subsection (3) provides that if the court appoints an 
intennediary, the court may allow tbe witness to give evidence in a room other than the courtroom. This has the 
implication dlat an inteonediary must be appointed in order for the witness to give evidence in another room. The 
infoIDlal room camlot be used without an intennediary. This creates the situation that a wi tness, who does not 
necessarily require the services of an intemlediary (where, for instance, the witness may be sixteen or seventeen 
years old), but is afraid to give evidence in court, will not be allowed to use the room. 
The effect of this anomaly was mentioned by the court in Klink v Regional Court Magistrate NO and Others supra 
at 407J-408 A-B: 
"The effect is that a witness who reasolJably needs to give evidence in a separate room will also 
have to be examined and cross-examined through an intermediary althougb he may not be exposed 
to undue mental stress and suffering if he testifies without dIe intermediary' s assistance". 
The Regional Court magistrate in this case came to the conclusion on dIe facts tbat the complainant would 
experience undue stress if she testified in open court. It was not contended that the complainant would endure undue 
stress if she gave evidence widlOut ule aid of an inteonediary. It was for dlis reason that Melunsky J commented 
at 408B that "[il t remains to say that the section may well require revision baving regard to possible anomalies dtat 
may arise in its application". 
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5.2.4.2.2 Undue Mental Sh'ess or Suffering 
The court has a discretion to grant an application for the appointment of an intemlediary where it believes that the 
child will be exposed to undue mental stress or suffering. The term ' undue' was used to quali fy Ole phrase 'mental 
stress or suffering' . The choice of olis teml seems to imply Olat it refers to someoling more olan simply mental 
stress or suffering. According to the Conci se Oxford Dictionary (Allen 1990) 'undue' is defined as 'excessive' or 
'disproportionate' . The question to be asked then is how acute must the mental stress or suffering be before it can 
be classified as 'undue'? It would seem from dle wording Olat Ole mental stress or suffering experienced by the 
child will have to be more olan the ordillary stress experienced. 
The American equivalent of undue mental stress or suffering is worded more strongly and reads as "unreasonable 
and serious mental and emotional hann or trauma (Gembala 1992: 19) . The American Constitution has had a 
dramatic effect on the interpretation of what is meant by dle phrase 'emotional haml or trauma' and has led to 
decisions such as Coy v Iowa supra where it was held OIat Ole court must find dlat Ole child will be traumatised not 
simply by giving evidence in court but by giving evidence in the presence of Ole accused. The trauma suffered by 
the child must also be more than mere nervousness or excitement or a reluctance to testify. In Warren v United 
States supra a psychiatrist gave evidence that the victim would experience greater mental anguish than nomlall y 
accompanies giving evidence in court, and a court appearance would lead to severe psychosis and perhaps even 
suicide (at 828). 
The problem that arises here in relation to children is the detennination of when a child 's fear of giving evidence 
has reached the stage where he would be psychologically unavailable and , dlerefore, unable to give evidence in the 
presence of the accused . The fear experienced by dIe child must be "substantially greater" dlan the fear dle child 
nom1ally experiences when giving evidence. In coming to such a decision, the coun muSt take into accoum me 
fo llowing factors: the psychological history of Ole child , dIe nature of dIe crime, the degree of violence involved, 
any psychological haml that might arise if the child gives evidence in court , and the importance of the evidence to 
dIe state' s case (Myers 1987: 3 11). 
In practice the SaudI African courts have not interpreted this phrase as strictl y as have the American courts. In 
terms of s170A it would appear that if the witness is going to suffer any mental stress that is beyond the nortn, then 
Ole application to use the live-link will be granted. In fact , dIe younger Ole child, Ole more likely it will be assunled 
that the child will be exposed to stress or suffering by testifying in an open court in Ole presence of the accused 
(Muller 1995:54) . 
In terms of the Coy v Iowa decision supra the US court must find that the child will experience traunJa, In 
contradi stinction the South African courts do not have to find that the child will in fact experience undue mental 
stress or traunla. It is sufficient if it appears dlat the child will be exposed to mental stress or suffering. The term 
'exposed ' has been employed in this section and suggests a much wider application olan its American counterpart , 
which requires that trauma must be suffered by testifying in the presence of the accused . 
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An illustration of what the courts understand by the phrase ' undue mental stress or suffering ' is found in S v Klink 
1995 case no . RC 6/68/95 (E) (unreported) where the State brought an application to make use of an intemlediary 
and Ole live link. This was opposed by the defence. A clinical psychologist was called to give evidence as to 
whether a sixteen year old girl would be exposed to undue mental stress or suffering if she testified in the presence 
of the accused. The girl was Ole complainant in an alleged charge of rape: 
"State: I see you testified to O,e fact Dlat she should give evidence in Ole little room. Could you 
tell us what W's reaction could be or DIe effects could be of her receiving cross-examination 
without an intemlediary or the court questioning her without an intermediary? 
Witness: I think th is is going to place an enortnous amount of undue stress on her that she will 
not be able to tolerate at Olis stage given her very fragile state. I fear it might precipitate a 
breakdown and that she won't be able to give evidence satisfactorily. That is going to be too 
emotionally taxing for her, and basically what is going to happen if she appears in open court, 
it is going to be a re-traumatisation. I Dlink it will also hamper the prognosis in this case 
and it is going to set her back a great deal. She is a suicidal person and I am frightened for her. 
State: [s it then your option that she sball suffer mental stress if she was due to testify? 
Witness: Yes, it is." 
The application to use tbe intemlediary and the live-link was granted in this case. In Dle course of conducting 
research , interviews were conducted with two magistrates in Port Elizabeth. AIDlOugh Dle small nwnber of 
magistrates interviewed seriously affects the statistical validity of the research and ule infomJation can, therefore, 
not be used in any conclusive way, the replies themselves are of particular interest on a qualitative basis since they 
confirtn a number of the arguments forwarded. The reason why only two magistrates were interviewed was simply 
because onl y two magistrates in the Port Elizabeth Magistrate 's and Regional Courts had been involved in cases 
where intertnediaries had been appointed, the one magistrate having dealt with ten such cases while the oDler 
magistrate had only been involved in one such trial. One of the questions posed in the interview was what the 
particular magistrate understood by the teml ' undue stress'. The one magistrate believed Dlat it equated to 
"excessive emotional stress, intimidation" and depended on the type of evidence D,at had to be given. TIle second 
magistrate's interpretation was given as follows: "stressful circumstances in which a minor has to testify amongst 
strangers in an intimidatory environment like a court of law and reveal intimate or violent conduct against her". 
Despite the fact that only two magistrates were involved in the interviews, the replies are particularly revealing. 
The standard employed between these two magistrates differs vastI y. The first magi strate requires D,at there must 
be "excessive" emotional stress, even intimidation. This interpretation seems to be even stricter than that required 
by section 170A itself which only mentions ' undue'. Excessive implies something more Dlan ' undue' the second 
magistrate employed a standard Dlat seems to be lower than that suggested by the section. In temlS of hi s 
interpretation, any court appearance would amount to 'undue stress' since it would involve a minor testifying 
amongst strangers in an intimidatory environment. Another interesting feature is found in the second magistrate's 
reply - he limits 'undue stress' to complainants. He defines it as being where a child has to reveal the details of 
intimate or violent conduct against her. Although the sample size is too small to make findings, Dle dramatic 
differences in approach between tIlere two magistrates indicates the difficulties that the discretionary nature of this 
section gives rise to . 
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In practice, it would appear that an intemlediary will be appointed without any undue stress having to be shown 
where the defence does not object. In S v Els 1995, SH6/29/95, Port Elizabeth (unreported) the prosecutor at tbe 
begimung of the trial announced to the court that "die klaagster in hierdie aangeleentheid is 'n minderjarige dogter 
en die Staat is van plan am gebruik te maak van 'n tussenganger - fasiliteite wat beskikbaar is. Ek verstaan dat die 
verdediging bet geen beswaar daarteen lue" . The court asked the defence whether they objected, and when no 
objection was made, the intennediary was appointed . From the above exchange it would appear that ule 
intermediary was appointed simply because ule complainant was a minor (aged ulirteen). There was no attempt to 
show undue mental stress and suffering. Interestingly, the State did not apply for the appointment of an 
intemlediary in the case of the second witness, who was only ten. Was this based on ule fact that the first witness, 
although older, was the complainant in the case? 
Kriegler (1993 :433) argues that youth alone is not sufficient to necessitate the use of an intennediary. The court 
has to take into account factors such as intelligence, age, sex, personality of the witness, nature of the evidence and 
other factors . 
In S v Mathebula [1996]4 ALLSA 168 (T) the court came to a different conclusion, based perhaps on the fact that 
the accused in ulis case was unrepresented. The application to appoint an intennediary went as follows: 
"Aanklaer: Edelagbare, op hierdie stadium wil die Staat aansoek doen vir die aanstelling van 'n 
tussen-ganger. Die rede daarvoor is hierin twee dogters betrokke, die een is 10 jaar oud die een 
teen wie die beweerde onsedelike aanranding plaasgevind het. Die beskuldigde is aan beide die 
dogters bekend. Hy is 'n sogenaamde buumlan van hulle, hulle ken sy gesig. Die klaer se vader 
sal oak getuig dat hy bekend is met die beskuldigde. 
Hof: Die hof sal dit toestaan." (170 H-J) 
The court held at 171D that the trial court, in appointing intemlediary, had not heeded the requirement of "undue 
mental stress and suffering" as required by s170A. There was evidence that the complailtant was allowed to sit in 
court after the State had closed its case, and Stafford J argued that it was difficult to allege in these circwnstances 
that the accused's mere presence would have upset her to such an extent as to cause undue mental stress (l7IE) 
In addition, the court found that the accused was unrepresented and had not been given an oPPOrturlity to give input 
on this important aspect (l8IC). 
Section 170A requires that the child be exposed to mental stress or suffering, and does not extend to the language 
difficulties a child may experience. Tllis would mean that if a child experienced no trauma or stress from testifying 
in court, but was unable to understand the language of the court due to the child's age, this section would not he 
applicable and ule child would not be able to make use of an intennediary. Language is the medium of the court, 
and the language that is used in court falls outside the nonnal repertoire of a child (Brelman and Brennan 1988:3). 
Since sI70A(2) (b) gives the intemlediary the right to convey 'tbe general purport' of the question to the child, it 
seems safe to deduce that the legislature were aware of the difficulties tllat a child witness can experience in 
understanding questions addressed to him (Millier 1995:54). According to the proposal recommended by the Law 
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Commission, the intermediary was seen as offering a method of removing any hostility and aggression from the 
questions asked of the child, the CODUnission must also have foreseen the language problems experienced by 
children since it gave tbe intermediary the role of interpreting the questions 10 the child. However, it seems 
illogical that a coun cannot make use of such an intemlediary where the child is 100 young to understand properly 
the questions that are being addressed to him. 
5.2.4.2.3 Expert Witnesses 
In order to grant an application in tenns of s 170A, the court must be satisfied that the child witness will be exposed 
to undue mental stress or suffering. Does this necessitate the calling of an expert witness 10 give evidence regarding 
the possible effect of a court appearance on the child, or would the evidence of a parent be sufficient? It is 
submitted that, in view of Ule fact Ulat the mental suffering experienced by the child must be undue (i.e . more thau 
that ordinarily experienced), the evidence of an expert would be required. A parent of the child may not be well 
equipped in ule eyes of the coun to offer an independent opinion as 10 what would amount to ' undue ' since he or 
she is not an expert in Ule relevant field of child psychology. Relevant expens such as psychologists, psychiatrists 
and social workers would be better able 10 testify as to wheUler the child will experience undue mental stress 
(Muller 1995:54). 
It would appear from Ule American position dlat oilly expert witnesses can be called 10 give evidence on whether 
a child will suffer emotional trawna. Evidence given by lay persons or parents will not be sufficient to establish 
unavailability. In State v Gollon supra a mother gave evidence that her six year old child was too frightened 10 
testify. The court held that ulis evidence, unsupported by expert evidence, would not be sufficient to establish 
unavailability. The following people have been regarded as experts in the field: in the Craig case supra evidence 
was heard from a counsellor who had a degree in child behaviour and a Masters Degree in counselling psychology 
as well as from a psychologist who had a Ph.D. in counselling psychology (Gembala 1992: 19). In People v Guce 
supra the expert was a social worker who specialised in working wiu, sexually abused children, whereas in State 
v Self supra the court relied on the evidence of a psychotherapist. It would seem then Ulat any professional expert 
trained in counselling and treating victims of abuse would qualify as an expert. 
In the interviews conducted with the Port Elizabeth magistrates (referred to supra), a furdler question put to them 
was whether expert evidence had to be led to prove 'undue stress'. The one magistrate replied dlat expert evidence 
would have to be led if the application to use the intennediary was opposed, although he felt that evidence of a 
fatnjly member could in certain instances be sufficient to convince the court that there was undue stress. The other 
magistrate felt d,at expert evidence was not necessary and Ulat the evidence of a family member would be sufficient. 
5.2.4.2.4 Application to Use s170A 
The party wishing to make use of the intennediary will have to make an application to court , and evidence will have 
10 be led to show that Ule child will experience undue mental stress or suffering if forced to appear in court. In mOSt 
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instances this burden will fall upon the prosecution. Since the court has an inherent discretion to protect the interests 
of witnesses, it is submitted that the court could, in appropriate circumstances, suggest that an application be 
brought in temlS of this section. In the intelviews conducted with the magistrates (referred to above), both 
magistrates admitted that there had been instances where they had suggested to the prosecution that an intermediary 
be appointed. It had been suggested in a case where a young girl was called to testify and it became apparent to 
the court that the girl had a very low intelligence factor, and also in a case where the child was five years old and 
had been molested by a member of the household. 
Wllen must this application be brought? In S v Klink supra the State brought an application in terms of sl70A. 
TIle defence, in opposing the application, submitted that dle application could not be brought until the charge had 
been put to the accused. The defence argued dlat the application would affect d,e manner in which d,e actual trial 
was going to be heard i.e. evidence was being led before a plea had been entered. The application, it was argued , 
was an integral part of dle actual trial and could not be heard separately. 
The magistrate, in making his decision, explained dmt sI70A(I) used the phrase "whenever criminal proceedings 
are pending before any court". He compared this to s241 (8) of the Interim Constitution which had similar wording, 
namely "were pending before any court of law". The issue before the court, therefore, was what the true meaning 
of the phrase "criminal proceedings pending before a court of law" was. The court referred to the decision in S v 
SAlE 1994 SACR 517 (D) where it was held that criminal proceedings in the Supreme Court commence widl the 
service of an indictment on the accused and the lodging of it with the registrar. Therefore, proceedings are pending 
before an accused has pleaded. TIle magistrate went on to explain that the proceedings in a summary trial 
commence when the charge sheet is lodged widl die clerk of dle court. The court held dlat for the purposes of 
sI70A(I) criminal proceedings are pending even before an accused has pleaded, once the charge sheet has been 
lodged with dle clerk of the court. An intermediary can, therefore, be appointed before the accused has pleaded. 
5.2.4.3 Criticisms of s170A 
1. The first criticism levelled against this section has already been discussed fully supra, and relates to the 
anomaly created by the fact dlat the court must appoint an intermediary before it can allow a child to give 
evidence in a room other than a courtroom. In dlis way the court's discretion has been limited. It does not 
have dle power to allow a child to use the separate room widlOut an intermediary. It is submitted that this 
section be amended to emble a court to allow a child to give evidence in a separate room widlOut the 
appointment of an intennediary, if circumstances so require. 
11 . The meaning of tlle phrase 'undue mental stress or suffering' is not defined. What will amount to undue 
mental stress or suffering has, therefore, been left to the discretion of the court. This gives rise to dle 
danger of inconsistency. Unless there are well-defined guidelines, one court may find that x factors amount 
to undue mental stress or suffering while another court may not find the same. It was for tllis reason that 
the Scottish Law Commission (1990:46) insisted that their version of mental stress be quantified in some 
way. The Draft Bill on Children and Other Witnesses contained a section which suggested guidelines as 
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to what factors the court should take into account i.e. the age and maturity of the child ; the nature of the 
alleged offence; the nature of ule evidence which the child may have to give; and the relationship between 
the accused and the child. 
III. It is submitted that the grounds on which an application to use s l70A is based needs to be extended to 
include language or communication difficulties experienced by children. As argued earlier, there are 
situations where children, especially young children, have difficulty in communicating but do not 
experience undue mental stress or suffering. These children would, ulerefore, not be able to make use of 
this section. This may give rise to a situation where the State may be forced to contrive grounds to show 
that a child will experience undue stress in order to enable a young child to make use of an intermediary. 
iv. Scbwikkard (1996: 148) argues that the discretionary nature of s 170A as a whole will give rise to problems, 
and appears to be to the detriment of children. The discretionary nature of s 170A means that those children 
who give evidence via an intermediary must be viewed as the exception rather than the norm. Since 
researcb indicates that in ule majority of cases child witnesses suffer significant trauma in testifying in an 
'adult' adversarial environment, Schwikkard (! 996: 148) argues that this section would be more effective 
if subsection (1) was amended to require a court to use an intemlediary in all cases where a child 
complainant has to testify. Schwikkard limits utis to children who are complainants. J subntit Ulat there 
does not appear to be a justification for limiting s170A to complainants. Section 170A itself, in its present 
fonn , does not limit its application to complainants but makes it available to "any witness". A child who 
has viewed Ule murder of a family member, although not a complainant in a case, will ex perience the same 
traumatic effect of giving evidence in an adversarial environment. Nevertheless, the proposal that all child 
witnesses be allowed to give evidence automatically in terms of sl70A is recommended. The court would, 
according to Schwikkard (! 996: 160), only be excused from allowing a chi ld witness to make use of uli s 
section "where it was clear that the child would not be traumatised or where it was impossible to do so". 
v. A furtiler problem uJat has arisen from s 170A is the practical implementation of closed-circuit television. 
Schwikkard (1996: 159) comments that "[tJhe use of intermediaries is by no means conmlon, partly due 
to the fact UJat tile vast majority of courts do not have the necessary facilities" . Since research has shown 
that children do suffer as a result of having to testify in court, it is imperative that "adequate facilities for 
young witnesses be made avai lable on a country-wide basis" (Schwikkard 1996: 159). 
vi. Schwikkard (1996: 156) argues that, although this section has potentially succeeded in reducing tile trauma 
suffered by child complainants, it is nevertheless criticised because it does nOt address tile traumatic effect 
of the adversarial nature of tile trial. Quoting McGough, Schwikkard (1990: 162) explains that nWllerous 
studies have shown "tilat children are more accurate witnesses when their memories are skilfully elicited 
in a non-adversarial mode". 
Section 170A has not succeeded in dealing effectively with those aspects of the adversarial system which 
cause ule greatest problems for children. Cross-examination, despite ule fact that it may be conducted 
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through an intermediary, is still a major hurdle for children, especially the very young. In fact, the Law 
Commission (1989: 11) accepted that "[o]ne of the great repeated complaints against the present system is 
directed against the adversary system and everything it implies: aggressive cross-examination of the child 
witness and the neutral role of the presiding officer". Neither of these issues have been addressed 
successfully by the section 170A. 
Another feature of tlle accusatorial trial is that evidence has to be given at the trial. In tlle vast majority 
of cases the trial will take place a long time after the alleged incident. This means that the child will again 
have to relive the unpleasant experience and the child's recovery is thus impeded. A delay in time will 
have a negative effect on a child's memory (Schwikkard 1991:48). This has been accepted by the courts 
in numerous decisions. 
In Jabaar V South African Railways & Harbours supra a twelve year old had to give evidence about an 
incident that had occurred nearly four years previously. It is hardly to be wondered at that King AI 
remarked at 553A that "[h]e could not remember how the accident happened ... ". This resulted in the child 
maldng a statement in court which differed in a material respect from the statement he made to the police 
nearly four years before . King AI could therefore place no reliance on the evidence and remarked at 55H 
that "in view of the inconsistency between Zair's evidence and his previous statement, I pJaced no reliance 
on his evidence" . 
In R v S supra Bok J conmlented on certain inconsistencies in a ten year old boy's evidence when he was 
uncertain as to whether an alleged assault had taken place inside the barber shop or outside in the yard. 
At 424 he remarked that "in the circumstances it was not at all surprising that the boy was or had become 
somewhat hazy about tl,at or where he was standing when he heard his fatber's knock on the door". In 
Woji v Santam Insurance Co lid 1980(2) SA 971 (SE) tlle court was concerned about the fact that two 
witnesses, both aged ten, gave evidence about an accident that had occurred five years previously (973A). 
According to Schwikkard (1991 :49) it is the adversarial nature of the proceedings that is at the core of the 
problem. Enabling a child to give evidence via closed-circuit television "will not prevent tlle child from 
being traumatized for as long as the trial is viewed as a contest and not as an inquiry into the truth". 
vii There are also a number of criticisms relating to tlle function and appointment of intermediaries, but these 
will be dealt with under the section pertaining to cross-examination. 
Vlll The use of s170A creates problems insofar as identification is concerned. Since the child will be giving 
evidence from another room and will not see the accused, identification of the perpetrator may give rise 
to difficulties. Does this imply that the child will be brought into court to identify tlle alleged perpetrator? 
In S v Olckers, 29 February 1996, A1507/95 (T) (unreported) the witness was an eight year old girl who 
gave evidence via an intermediary. The complainant alleged that she had been assaulted hy a person called 
Attie. Raux J made the following statement: "Of cardinal importance is tl,at the complainant never 
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identified Ule appellant, the person in the accused dock, as her assailant". [n S v Mathehula supra 
identification became a key issue after the accused asked ule witness if she knew him (1721-J): 
"Dit is duidelik dat sy nie ' n instinkmatige venroue in haar eie uitkenning het nie. Toe 
sy onder kruisondervraging deur die beskuldige gevra is 'wil u so u ken my?' was haar 
antwoord 'nee'." 
It is very difficult to detennine wiUlOut a context what the witness meant by her reply. Did sbe say she 
does not recognise Ule accused or does not know him? This, taken together with the fact that the witness 
was nOt afforded an opportunity to identify Ule accused, resulted in the conviction being set aside: 
"Die gevare wat normaalweg ter sprake is by die identifikasie van ' n verdagte word in 
hierdie geval verhoog deur die fei t dat die k1aagster nie die geleentheid gebied is am die 
beskuldigde wat in die hof verskyn het aldaar te identifiseer nie." (173J). 
Section 170A has, however, achieved one of its aims, namely to remove any confrontation between the child and 
the accused and tbereby to reduce the trauma experienced by the child. In the interviews conducted wiul tbe two 
magistrates, they were asked if s170A had any advantages. Both believed that s l70A reduced for children the stress 
of having to appear in a formal courtroom among strangers, with one explaining: "The biggest advantage is that 
young victims are isolated from alleged perpetrators, thus spared humiliation and possible intimidatory tactics." One 
magistrate even suggested that the section be amended to enable any witness to give evidence out of the sight of 
Ole alleged perpetrator, aWlOugh not necessarily WiOl the aid of an intemlediary. 
5.2.4.4 Amendment of 5158 
It seemed logical to extend Ule use of closed-circuit television to witnesses other than children, and in 1996 the 
Criminal Procedure Amendment Act 86 of 1996 amended s158 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1977 . This section 
came into effect on I September 1997. 
Section 158 (1 ) now provides U1at all criminal proceedings in court must take place in tbe presence of the accused , 
except where expressly provided for by any other law. This authorises statutory exceptions to an accused's rights 
to confrontation. 
Subsection (2) provides that the court, on its own initiative or on application by the prosecution, may order a 
witness or an accused to give evidence via closed circuit television or similar electronic media. An application can 
also be brought by the witness and the accused himself (subsection 2(b)). [n terms of this it is not onl y witnesses 
who may now give evidence via this medium, but the accused himself. [n addition, the court may only order the 
use of this method of giving evidence if the wi tness or the accused consents to it. 
The court can only make an order for a person to give evidence via closed circuit television if such faci lities are 
readily avai lable or obtainable, and if to do so would : 
• prevent unreasonable delay; 
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• save costs; 
• be in the interest of the security of the state or of public safety or in the interests of justice or the 
public; or 
• prevent the likelihood dlat prejudice or harm migbt result to any person if be or she testifies or 
is present at such proceedings. 
In addition , the court has been given a wide discretion to impose conditions on the giving of evidence in these 
circumstances in terms of subsection (4), provided that the prosecution and the defence are not deprived of dleir 
right to question a witness nor to observe a witness's demeanour. The discretion must be exercised in order to 
ensure a fair and just trial. 
This section does not refer to s170A at all, nor does it mention child witnesses . It provides only for a witness or 
accused to give evidence via closed circuit television. AltllOugh s I58 does not provide for dIe appointment of an 
intemlediary, subsection (4) does give dIe court wide powers to impose conditions . However, it is submitted that 
where the appointment of an intermediary is required, dIe courts would proceed in tenns of s170A. 
Does this mean that it is possible for a child to give evidence in terms of either sl58 or sl70A, or is s l70A limited 
to wimesses under eighteen whilst s l58 caters for those excluded by sl70A i.e. those over eighteen? Although 
sl70A expressly limits its application to children under the age of eighteen, there is no similar limiting provision 
in s158. It is, therefore, assUllled dlat a child may be allowed to give evidence in tenns of sl58 as well. This will 
be particularly useful for older children, perhaps aged fifteen or sixteen, who do not require the use of an 
intermediary. This resolves the anomaly created by s170A. An added advantage of this section is that an 
application can be brought by dIe witness himself if he wishes to make use of dlis provision. 
A disconcerting fact, however, is that the test that must be complied widl in order to make use of this section is 
not nearly as stringent as dIe test applied in s170A. In the latter section, dIe child must experience ' undue mental 
stress or suffering', whereas in s l58 closed circuit television can be used where it would be convenient to do so, 
or where it would save costs. This distinction seems indefensible, since once again it makes it more difficult for 
a child to make use of these provisions than adults or even the accused. 
Section 158 will not in practice be able to be used for young children, since they will not be able to give evidence 
via an intermediary. It would not be possible for a young child to give evidence alone from another room, not only 
because dIe child would be isolated and alone but it would also be very difficult , if not impossible, to capture a 
young child 's attention dtis way. The witness, it is assUllled, will be linked by earphones as in the present system. 
This would not assist a young child , and may necessitate the use of two-way monitors. For these reasons. it is 
assumed dlat dIe legislature did not intend s l58 to be used for young children. 
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5.3 Cross-examination 
5.3.1 Introduction 
The accused has a right to cross-examine witnesses who give evidence against him. This is provided for by the 
Constitution as well as the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. Section 166 of the latter reads as follows: 
"An accused may cross-examine any witness called on behalf of the prosecution at criminal 
proceedings or any co-accused who testifies at criminal proceedings or any witness called on 
behalf of such co-accused at criminal proceedings. and the prosecutor may cross-examine any 
witness, including an accused, called on behalf of the defence at criminal proceedings, and a 
witness called at such proceedings on behalf of the prosecution may be re-examined by the 
prosecutor on any matter raised during the cross-examination of that witness, and a witness called 
on behalf of the defence at such proceedings may likewise be re-examined by the accused." 
The SA Law Commission (1989:2) accepted that the right to cross-examine a State witness was a fundamental right 
of the accused, and went so far as to say that "[blut for this rule, many an accused would daily be wrongfully 
convicted". Failure to allow cross-examination to take place is a serious irregularity at common law since there will 
almost always be prejudice to a party (Hoffmann and Zeffertt 1988:456). In R v Ndawo 1961(1) SA 16 (N) an eight 
year old was called to give evidence. Having been warned by the court, he burst into tears and was then abandoned 
by the prosecutor as a witness. The magistrate did not consider it necessary for the accused to cross-examine the 
child as the latter had not given any evidence in connection with the case. On review the Supreme Court held that 
not allowing the accused to cross-examine the witness was an irregularity and the conviction and sentence were set 
aside. 
Although the accused has a right to cross-examine witnesses who give evidence against him, tilis right is not 
absolute. According to Melunsky J in Klink v Regional Court Magistrate NO and Others supra at 410A tile trial 
court retains a discretion to disallow questioning which is irrelevant, unduly repetitive, oppressive or otilerwise 
improper. This is supported by the decision in S v Cidi and Another 1984(4) 537 (C) where the court at 5391-540B 
explained as follows: 
"A proper cross-examination does not permit the gratuitous intimidation of an accused. A 
prosecutor should not bully an accused by insulting him, brow-beating him or adopting an 
overbearing attitude ... A prosecutor should not umlecessarily ridicule an accused or taunt him 
or offend his sensibilities or provoke him to anger, or play upon his emotions in order to place 
him at an unfair disadvantage and incapacitate him from answering questions to the best of his 
ability. " 
In addition, s166 of tile Criminal Procedure Act 1977 has been amended by tile Criminal Procedure Amendment 
Act 86 of J 996, and s166(3) now reads as follows: 
"(a) If it appears to a court that any cross-examination contemplated in tilis section is being 
protracted uureasonably and thereby causing the proceedings to be delayed unreasonably, 
the court may request the cross-examiner to disclose the relevancy of any particular line 
of examination and may impose reasonable limits on the examination regarding the length 
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thereof or regarding any particular line of examination. 
(b) The court may order that any submission regarding the relevancy of the cross-examination be 
heard in the absence of the witness." 
Although the courts have always had the discretion in temlS of the conunou law to interfere in cross-examination 
which is being protracted unreasonably, the problem has always been that the courlS have been wary to intervene 
lest it be thought they are descending into the arena and losing their objectivity. The court's have now been 
authorised to do so by legislation. The subsection focuses on two aspects of cross-examination only: the lengdl 
and the relevancy. Of particular interest is the provision contained in subsection (3)(b) which allows argument 
regarding relevancy to be heard in the absence of dIe witness. This provision would provide protection for children 
who are often intimidated and confused by legal arguments that take place in the course of their giving evidence. 
5.3.2 Effect of Cross-examination on Children 
Perhaps the most serious complaint to be levelled agaillSt the accusatorial system is the importance accorded to 
cross-exanlination, and dIe inability of children to deal therewidl. The Law Commission (1989 : II) accepted this 
complaint widlOut any argument, commenting dlat "[t)he complaint is so often repeated that it is necessary to cite 
only a few wi tnesses". They added that nearly all the researchers referred to the "brutal cross-examination" children 
were forced to endure. 
Key (1988:54) described the cross-exanlination of a twelve year old boy who had been sodomised by his father as 
follows: 
"Had I known dlen what I know now I would have doubted the wisdom of laying charges which 
would result in this young boy being subjected to dIe horrendous secondary abuse he received in 
court .. . He was subjected to one and a balf days of persistent and detailed cross-examination about 
the appalling sexual abuse to which he had been subjected by his father for as far back as he could 
remember. .. The case was remanded for two months and dlen remanded again because of a 
change in defence counsel. Finally in October 1986, fourteen mondls after the original charge 
was laid, (his unfoftUllate child once again was required to stand in the witness box for hour upon 
hour of gruelling cross-examination. Widlin ten minutes on the first day he was in tears. As 
before he held his hand against his face to avoid seeing his father. He was bullied about details 
be could not remember. He was accused of being a liar and making up dle whole story . At this 
stage he broke down completely and pleaded to know why the defence did not believe him." 
To support his views, Key (1988:12) refers to a report compiled by Dr J HanmlOnd , who was also in court with 
dIe child during his evidence, and reported dlat "in the 'cause of justice' he is being completely broken down again 
by the court procedure which is not only pelmitted but apparently demanded by our judicial system". 
Hammond and Hanunond (1987: 10) , in dleir report on research carried out on child witnesses, emphasise that in 
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the course of their work uley "heard time and again from people who have been called to court in ulCir professional 
capacities, (policemen, paediatricians, social workers and others), of the horrors of observing a child witness under 
cross-examination". They are of Ule opinion that the child's credibility is deliberately broken down in Ule course 
of cross-examination which is designed to confuse and upset. The Law Commission (1989: 12), quoting from Key 
accept that "[tJhe object of the cross-examination is to establish that the child is lying". 
Since the presumption of imlocence applies in SOUUI Africa, ule accused is presumed not to be guilty until Ule 
contrary is proved. TIle burden rests on the State to prove the accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. One 
method of showing reasonable doubt is to expose the State's evidence as defective, and this can be done by showing 
that Ule evidence of the witness called by the State is incomplete, illogical, contradictory or unconvincing. It 
therefore follows that "the object of cross-examination is to establish Ulat ule child is lying (Zieff 1991: 34). The 
Law Conunission (1989:4) in their report explained that the task of the defence was "aimed at destroying 
incriminating proposi tions , and showing its falsehood , to elicit contradictions and deficiencies, and exposing 
improbabilities" . 
The underlying assumption of the accusatorial system is that cross-examination of a witness in the presence of Ule 
accused is a guarantee of arriving at ule truth. It is this assumption which must be attacked as being incorrect wheu 
applied to children (Zieff 1991 :34). Children find the process of cross-examination traumatic and, in the case of 
children, it does not produce accurate evidence. 
Cross-examination is stressful for witnesses, and even more so for children. In R v S supra the COurt mentioned 
at 422 that the defence had put ule ten year old witness "through a lengthy and searching cross-examination which 
must have been very trying" . TIle Stress is induced not only by having to give evidence in court but also by Ule 
fact that ule child will be called upon to reveal very intimate details. In the course of the cross-examination "the 
child will be bullied for placing events, often months after uley occurred, out of sequence and at times when they 
could not have occurred and for not being able to remember important details concerning an event" (SA Law 
Commission 1989: 12). The adversarial nature of the trial places the ch.i ld in a position where he finds h.imself 
under attack. The defence is obliged to attack ule child 's credibili ty in an attempt to highlight inconsistencies and 
discredit the child's evidence. 
It is also alleged that cross-examination, insofar as child witnesses are concerned, does not produce accurate 
evidence. The medium of exchange in ule courtroom is a particular foml of language so steeped in legal tradition 
that it falls outside ule nom,"1 language repertoire of adults and, even more so, of children (Brerman and Brennan 
1988:31). The questioning of a child witness is a very specialised task, and prosecutors and defence counsel are 
not trained in ulese methods. In addition, a number of techniques employed in cross-examination give rise to serious 
difficulties with comprehension for the child witness (Millier and Tait 1997:521 ). These would include the use of 
leading questions, hypothetical questions, age-inappropriate vocabulary , complex syntax, general ambiguity and a 
focus on peripheral detail. Many children, therefore, experience difficulties with conmlUnication, either because 
their language is not understood or because they cannOl be heard. This inability of children to cOlmnUlllcate has 
raised the issue of whether it would be possible for children to be assisted by an interpreter (Zieff 1991:43). 
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Robertson (1986) delivered a paper at which he commented on his experience of child abuse cases: 
"I have watched with interest in the courtroom as tile proceedings are interpreted for accused or 
witnesses, from tile presiding language to the tongue of tile accused or witness. I believe t1lat until 
maturity , the child has an impaired or limited verbal ability , obviously more acute when the child 
is very young. It should be allowed t1lat all addresses to the child be made t1lrough an interpreter 
who is qualified in the sphere of child counselling. Questions might be rephrased , under scrutiny 
and open to objection by the Court, the prosecutor or defence. The aim would not be to change 
the truth in any way but an endeavour would be made to enable the child to answer tile questions 
asked of it more accurately and explicitly witilOut the humiliation of a tirading lawyer's aWick." 
These factors will be discussed in greater detail when cross-examination, as an aspect of tile accusatorial model, 
will be evaluated. At present it suffices to say that the use of these techniques make it impossible for child witnesses 
to communicate trutllfully and effectively. This was accepted by Melunsky J in Klink v Regional Cowt Magistrate 
NO and Others supra at 411E: 
"It is sufficient to say t1lat 1 am quite convinced t1lat a child witness may often find it traumatic 
and stressful to give evidence in the adversarial atmosphere of the court room and that tile forceful 
cross-exanlination of a young person by skilled counsel may be more likely to obfuscate t1lan to 
reveal the truth. " 
5.3.3 Proposals of the Law Commission 
Wl,en proposing that a child be allowed to give evidence in a special room through tile medium of a child 
investigator, the Commission (1989:29) was of tile opinion that any proposal would only be effective where the 
child was protected from having to appear in court and face the accused as well as being protected against 
aggressive and intimidating cross-examinatioll. 
The purpose of the child investigator would be to introduce a procedure of " translated " cross-examination, in terms 
of which the defence would put their questions in cross-examination to the child investigator by way of earphones 
and this person would in turn put the questions "tactfully" to the child. The purpose of t11is would not, according 
to the Law Commission (1989:29), be "to take ule sting out of intelligent and even sharp cross-exanlination" but 
rather to limit aggressiveness and intimidation. 
This proposal was justified on the basis that the interests of society need to be protected and this can only be done 
by ensuring that the guilty be convicted and the irmocem acquitted. In order to do this the witness must be treated 
fairly to enable him to testify to uie best of his ability. According to the Connnission (1989:29) this proposal was 
necessary to ensure Ole above since "[a]ggression towards Ole witness, intimidation, eliciting contradictions, shrewd 
word-play and setting traps have in our practice got out of control, particularly as far as children are concerned". 
The Commission (1989:29) went so far as to say Olat Ole normal protection afforded witnesses in the fonn of 
objections by the presiding officer was of little use to child witnesses. This is supported by Hammond and 
Hannnond (1987 : 10) who state that, although the court is entitled to intervene in cross-examination, "[tJhere is 
seldom felt to be enough intervention from the court to suggest moderation from counsel". 
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The Commission (1989:36), therefore, reconmlended that the child witness be allowed to give evidence from a 
special room. The child would be accompanied only by the child investigator, whom they suggested could be an 
educational psychologist, a psychologist, a clinical psychologist or a welfare officer. Any questions from the 
prosecution, defence or court would be directed to the child investigator who would then relay the questions 
tactfully to the child. It was felt that ideally child investigators should be educational psychologists since the latter 
are trained in the techniques of interviewing children and extracting information from them. A practical problem 
that could create difficulties was felt to be the availability of child investigators, and whether there were sufficient 
appropriately trained persons available? 
5.3.4 The Intelmediary 
Consequent to the recommendations of the Law Conmlission, dle Criminal Law Amendment Act no. 135 of 1991 
was passed which introduced the persona of the intenmediary in s170A. Although the COImnission referred to dlis 
person as dle child investigator, s l70A used the term 'intermediary' . The teml 'child investigator ' is perhaps 
misleading and would account for the change to 'intermediary'. A child investigator suggests somebody who will 
be involved in dle investigation, similar to the position of dle YOUdl interrogator in Israel. In fact, the role envisaged 
by dle Commission was closer to that of an interpreter, and perhaps explains the choice of the teml 'intermediary ' 
in the section. 
5.3.4.1 Who can be an Intermediary? 
In their report the Conunission (1989:36) originally suggested that an intemlediary would be an educational 
psychologist, a psychologist, a clinical psychologist or a welfare officer. Educational psychologists were regarded 
as being the ideal intemJediary since they were trained in the techniques of interviewing children. 
Section 170A(4)(a) provides that the Minister may by notice in the Gazette detemline the persons or the category 
or class of persons who are competent to be appointed asintemJediaries. The list of people who are able to be 
appointed as an intermediary was set out in dle Government Gazette no. 15024, 30 July 1993. The following is 
a summary of the people who qualify: 
(a) medical practitioners who specialise in paediatrics; 
(b) medical practitioners who specialise in psychiatry; 
(c) family counsellors appointed in ternlS of s3 of the Mediation in Certain Divorce Matters Act, 1987 and 
who were registered as social workers or who were classified as teachers in category C to G or who were 
registered as clinical, educational or counselling psychologists; 
(d) child care workers who have successfully completed a two·year course in child and youth care; 
(e) registered social workers who have two years experience in social work; 
(f) teachers qualified in category C to G and who have four years experience in teaching and who have not 
been dismissed or suspended from teaching; 
(g) psychologists who are registered as clinical, educational or counselling psychologists. 
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In the interviews conducted with the two Port Elizabeth magistrates , the one believed that in order to be appointed 
as an intemlediary a person had to fall within these categories set out in the Government Gazette. The second 
magistrate, on dIe otber hand, believed that a suitably qualified person may be appointed even dlOugh they did not 
rail specifically widlin the listed categories. The actual wording used in the Government Gazette does not appear 
to suggest any discretion. It simply states: "I ... Minister of Justice, hereby determine dIe fo llowing categories or 
classes of persons to be competent to be appointed as intemlediaries". 
From dIe li st of people who have been appointed as possible intermediaries, the emphasis appears to be on people 
who are presumed to be skilled at conmlUnicating with children. This is in line too widl the comments of tbe Law 
Commission. 
When dIe application to appoint an intermediary has been granted, the court must then appoint the speci fic 
intermediary. The following appointment is quoted from dIe unreported case S v Els supra: 
"Hof: Mevrou wat is u volle naam? 
Hester SusarUla Nel, v.o .e. 
Hof: Mevrou wat se kwalifikasies het u? ---
Ek is 'n geregistreerde maatskaplike werker met 10 jaar ondervinding. Ek bet oak opleiding 
ontvang om as tussenganger op te tree. 
Hoeveel ondervinding bet u? --- 10 jaar. 
1O? --- Ja 
Wat se kursus bet u deurloop? --- Ek het ' n kursus deurloop wat die Departement van Justisie in 
samewerking met die Universiteit van Pretoria aangebied is in Febmarie 1994. Ek het oa k ' n 
opleidingkursus aangebied in Port Elizabeth in salllewerking Illet Mnr Martin Ie Raux se 
personee!. " 
Both parties were offered an opportunity to cross-examine the intermediary , after wbich the magistrate found her 
competent to act as an intemlediary. 
5.3.4.2 Functions of the Intennediary 
SectionI70A(2)(b) provides that the said intermediary may, unless the court directs odlerwise , convey dIe general 
purpOrt of any questions to the relevant witness. It would seem then that the function of the intemlediary is simply 
to convey dIe question of dIe prosecution or the defence to the child in a rnallller which is understandable to the 
child. The section is worded relatively widely. The intermediary is mandated to convey the general meaning of the 
question and is, dlerefore, not limited to repeat the exact words d,at the question was originally franled in . It is 
sufficient d,at dIe intermediary convey the meaning. In the interviews conducted wi th the magistrates supra, they 
were asked what they understood by the phrase 'to convey dIe general purport of a question'. The one was of tlle 
opinion that dIe intermediary must ask what dIe questioner actually seeks to know whereas the adler said tllat the 
illtermediary must relate the question to the witness in a manner ulat the witness will understand. 
The intermediary must, therefore , convey the content and meaning of the question to the child in a maimer that dIe 
child understands. In carrying out this duty , dIe intemlediary has two very distinct functions. Firstly, he is able to 
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remove all hostility and aggression from the questions, as was recognised by the Law Conm1ission in their report. 
Tllis is especially important when conveying the questions of defence counsel, as these questions are often phrased 
in a mamler which aims to intimidate and confuse the witness. (MOller and Tait 1997:526). This "ulterior" purpose 
of cross-examination was accepted by the courts in S v Gidi and Another supra where Judge Rose-Innes had the 
following to say at 540B: 
"In the case of many a witness it calls for no skill to intimidate or confuse or distress a witness 
who does not have the resources of intellect, language or personality to defend himself against a 
bullying prosecutor." 
The intermediary , therefore, can and does act as a form of protection for the child against any hostility implicit in 
certain questions. This has been accepted by the courts in the Klink case supra at 411I-J: 
"It is true that it is not only the contents of the questions that forms part of the armoury of tile 
cross-examiner. The successful cross-examiner may employ intonations of voice and nuances of 
expression to drive his point home and, perhaps to cause discomfort to tlle witness. It is therefore 
possible ti1at the forcefulness and effect of cross-examination may, to some extent, be blunted 
when an intermediary is interposed between the questioner and the witness." 
Secondly, the intem1ediary has in terms of sI70A(I)(b) tlle power to change the question in such a way tl1at the 
child understands what is being required. The meaning of tile question may not be changed, as the parties will have 
u1e right to object that tlleir question was not asked, and may put it to the witness again. This interpretation was 
accepted by the Supreme Court in Klink's case supra where it was argued that it was in the interests of justice that 
the cllild comprehend tile question that was being put to him, so that he could answer it properly: 
"There are sound reasons why the conveyance of the general purport of the question might enable 
a child witness to participate properly in the system. Questions should always be put in a form 
understandable to the witness so that he or she may answer them properly. Where the witness is 
a child , tllere is the possibility that he may not fully comprehend or appreciate the content of a 
question formulated by counsel. The danger of this happening is more real in the case of a very 
young child. By conveying ' the general purport' of the question, the intermediary is not permitted 
to alter the question. He must convey tl1e content and meaning of what was asked in a language 
and form understandable to the witness ." 
The intermediary, as mentioned by tile court in the above excerpt , may only convey tlte question in a way that the 
child understands. He may not cltange the meaning, nor may he comment on whether a child will be able to grasp 
a particular question or not (MOller and Tait 1997:527) . He is, in fact, nothing more Ulan an interpreter. Thi s was 
accepted by tile court in Klink supra where the court at 411I said: "The intem1ediary acts, in a sense, as an 
interpreter, " 
The function of the intem1ediary is therefore twofold: to protect the child against hostile cross-examination and to 
assist the child in understanding the questions posed. Since an intem1ediary has been compared to an interpreter, 
does this person have tile necessary powers to carry out the above functions. Firstly, in respect of the function to 
protect the child against hostile or aggressive cross-examination , no additional powers would be required. In 
repeating or rephrasing the question, tl1e intem1ediary will be able to remove any aggressive nuances that were in 
254 
the original question. Insofar as the intemlediary's function in regard to rephrasing questions is concerned, the 
powers are limited. The court can, for instance, insist that the intermediary repeat the question exactly as it was 
phrased, since the relevant section makes provision for this. In S v Klink supra the defence addressed the following 
question to the court after the intermediary was appointed: whether the court was prepared to make a ruling as to 
whether the intermediary could convey the general import of the questions or whether she had to convey the exact 
questions as they were put to her. The magistrate replied that each and every question had to be decided on its 
own. He further explained: 
"I do not know what tile kind of questions will be, it might be a pertinent question that you do 
not want to be altered at all and then you can ask the court for an order on that point that tile 
question not be altered tilfough the intermediary." 
Since, according to the Klink case supra, the intermediary is nothing more tilan an interpreter, the authority to 
rephrase questions is very limited. Although the intemlediary does not have to use the exact words that the question 
was originally framed ill and only has to convey the meaning, this might in certain circumstances give rise to certain 
problems. For instance, in order to convey a question to a child, especially a very young one, quite drastic changes 
to the question itself may be necessitated. The original question might have to be rephrased into two or three 
questions, but it is doubtful whether the intermediary wonld be allowed to go off on an examination of his own. 
If the defence were, for example, to put the following question to the child: 'I will put it to you that the accused 
is impotent?' In order for an intermediary to accomplish his task effectively, he would have to ask firstly whether 
tile child understood the word 'impotent'. If not, he would have to attempt an explanation, find out whether the 
child understands the explanation before going on eventually to put the question to the child. It is doubtful whether 
the intermediary will be allowed to do this. This would depend on the context of the question and the discretion 
of the presiding officer. 
The intermediary also does not have tile authority to comment on a question and give his opinion as to whether a 
child understands a question or not. For instance, where the prosecution or defence ask a question that on the face 
of it appears to be simple, the intermediary will have to repeat the question. If a prosecutor were to ask a five year 
old child: 'Why did you do that?' the intemlediary will no t be able to point out that a five year old child cannot 
be expected to answer a 'why' question. In this way the powers of an intermediary are limited by the questions that 
are asked, and if prosecution and defence lawyers are not trained to interview children, then tile intennediary will 
not be effective in assisting the child. A good illustration of this point would be the order in which questions are 
asked. In order to give evidence effectively young children need to tell their story in sequence from begintling to 
end. They become confused when questions dart from one occasion to another and then back again. TIlis is one 
of the techniques employed in cross-examination, and tile intennediary will be powerless to intervene and argue 
that questions should not be asked in a particular sequence, especially if the questions are phrased simply. TI,e 
intemlediary is Dot an expert witness, but only an interpreter. 
The intermediary is also not seen as representing the child in a guardian ad litem capacity, and would therefore not 
be allowed to insist that the child be given a break. In the interviews conducted with the magistrates supra, they 
were asked whether an intemlediary could infoml the court that the child needs to take a break. One of the replies 
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given was that the intennediary would be allowed to infonn the court, but the court would decide the matter itself 
after reasons were given and the defence was afforded an opportunity to address the court as well. 
However, tile intennediary can playa very important role in filtering difficult questions . In order to rephrase the 
question to the child, the intermediary himself must be able to understand the question. When the question is too 
long or involved, tile intemlediary can ask that the question be put again as he himself does not understand what 
is required. An example of this was found in S v Els supra: 
"Prokureur: Nou maar ek gaan die polisieman roep indien nodig om te kom getuig hierso of jy 
het vir hom dit gegee en hy dit neergeskryf het en of hy vir jou geleentheid gegee het om dit self 
te lees en of hy dit neergeskryf het en jy kon self gelees het voordat jy geteken het. 
Tussenganger: Kan u net die vraag 'n bietjie duideliker vra. Dit was nie 'n vraag nie. " 
And again later in the same case: 
"Prokureur: Ek gaan dit aan jou stel, ek gaan dit bewys dat jy moes met jou maatjies gepraat het 
oar hierdie saak. Want in die eerste instansie, Jelmy, ek wil he jy moet dit verklaar, vir Sy 
Edelagbare se hoekom jy belangrike goed uitgelaat het am aan die polisie te vertel onder andere. 
Tussenganger: Kan u net stukkie-vir-stukkie vra assebIief. 
Prokureur: Goed, ek wil he u moet die volgende verklaar aan sy Edelagbare. 
Tussenganger: Kan u net daar stop asseblief. " 
From these exchanges it can be seen that the intermediary can effectively protect a child witness from a barrage 
of questions, especially those tIlat are long and involved. 
5.3.4.3 Qualifications of the Intermediary 
Neither s170A nor the Govenmlent Gazette, which sets out who may act as an intermediary, require any additional 
qualification in order for a person to act as an intennediary nor does it require that an intermediary undergo any 
training before being appointed as such. 
In order for intemlediaries to carry out their functions as described above, tIley would need to have a knowledge 
of the following disciplines. Firstly, they would need to have an understanding of the developmental stages through 
which children pass so that they would be able to deal with children at specific ages. Secondly, an intennediary 
would require knowledge of the critical framework of a child's ability to understand language so tIlat he will be able 
to conmlUnicate witIl a child at a particular age in a mamler which the child will understand. Thirdly, an 
intermediary requires training with respect to tile psychological affects of testifying and the stress which the child 
is experiencing, in addition to tile effects of abuse where the child witness is a victim of abuse. Fourthly, it is 
essential that an intennediary has some insight into the law. He would have to understand the features of a legal 
(investigative) interview as opposed to a therapeutic interview. For instance, he would have to know what leading 
questions are, how to guard against them, their effect in law, what suggestion is and the devastating effect it can 
have on a trial (Muller 1995:55). 
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From the list of persons who have been appointed by the Minister in dle Govenmlent Gazette as being capable of 
acting as an intemlediary, it would seem that they were chosen on the basis that dley are people who come into 
contact with children. For instance, paediatricians, family counsellors, teachers and even some psychiatrists and 
psychologists are not trained to communicate with children, unless they specialise in dlis field. A paediatrician is 
a medical doctor. He is not qualified to interview children. Some social workers have no experience of working 
with children. 
With respect to the knowledge and training that is required of an intennediary, none of these individuals comply 
widl these requirements. None of the individuals who are listed in the Government Gazette have any legal training 
or would have knowledge of how to conduct a legal interview. In the interviews conducted with the two Regional 
Court magistrates in Port Elizabeth, bodl were of dle opinion dlat intennediaries should have experience with 
children, some qualification in the social sciences andlor psychology and knowledge of the law and court 
proceedings. Many of the people, therefore, who are deemed competent to act as intenllediaries do not, in fact, 
have this training or these skills and would not be able to carry out the functions assigned to them. 
5.3.4.4 Evaluation of the Intennediary 
1. The first problem relating to the intennediary is the lack of any training that is required. Intennediaries 
are not required to have any particular qualification or to undergo any training before dley can be 
appointed as an intemlediary. Consequently persons are appointed to act as intennediaries and they have 
no training or experience to carry out tile functions required. This proved to be a problem as well in Israel 
with regard to the youth investigator (supra). 
It is submitted that section 170A should set out the training which an internlediary must have undergone, 
namely knowledge of developmental psychology, acquisition of language by children, psychology of abuse, 
and a knowledge of law and procedure insofar as they are relevant to the conducting of a legal 
(investigative) interview. 
ii. The second criticism relates to the list of persons mentioned in the Govermnent Gazette as being capable 
of acting as intennediaries. The fact that certain professions have been categorised as being competent to 
be intemlediaries means that other persons who may be qualified will not be allowed to perfoml these 
functions. For instance, in the Jurgens case supra the intennediary was a prosecutor. In addition, the 
professions listed do not necessarily have the necessary training to carry out the functions of an 
intemlediary. As mentioned above, none of these professionals have any training on how to conduct legal 
interviews and some of them do not necessarily have training to communicate with children. Because 
intennediaries are not trained, they have difticulty in perfonning the duties assigned to them. In the 
interviews conducted willi the magistrates, they explained that in practice intennediaries were mostly just 
repeating the questions. Only widl very young children were they prepared to go further. In workshops 
conducted widl intennediaries by the author, the intermediaries complained that they were ahaid to change 
questions as they had received no training and were unsure how much leeway tlley would be allowed. 
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Ordway (1981:139-140) also proposed the existence of an official like the imemlediary and was of the 
opinion that this person should have dual qualifications: he should be qualified to deal with victims of child 
sexual abuse as well as be familiar with legal practices: 
"In order to be truly helpful in this role, the expert should understand the importance of 
objectivity and be familiar with pretrial and trial procedures. Such training could be 
provided by court persOlmel or through experience. The expert must realize the dual 
purpose of dIe job: to aid the child and to help the trier of fact rationally decide whether 
to believe dIe child." 
It is submitted that this list should be repealed. If the qualifications of an illlemlediary are set out in the 
section as suggested in (i) above, it is not necessary to list the persons who would qualify. At present, the 
court, when appoillling an intemlediary, has to detemline whether dIe person before them can be appointed 
in temlS of the list published in the Government Gazette. Instead , at this inquiry , the court can detennine 
whether dIe person has the necessary qualifications. This would not result in the exclusion of persons who 
would otherwise comply . 
Ill. An intermediary should perhaps, it is submitted, be seen as more of an expert than a mere interpreter. He 
should be given the power to offer an opilllon as to whedler a question can be understood by the child and 
also be allowed to represent the child's interests as to ensure that the child is given a break and taken care 
of. However, this will sti ll not address the fundamental problem that, unless dIe prosecution and defence 
know how to conduct an interview widl a child, dIe intemlediary is unable to structure the interview in dIe 
way in which a child will best understand. The onl y way in which dlis can be addressed is by allowing dle 
intemlediary to conduct the entire interview under dIe watchful gaze of the Court. 
IV. Generally , there is confusion as to what the role of an intermediary encompasses. [s the intermediary 
allowed to meet dIe child before the court appearance to give dIe child an OPPOrtulllty to become familiar 
widl him? This may give rise to allegations by the defence that the child has been prepared and dlat there 
is the danger of suggestion. However, why should the child be prepared to speak to the intermediary if 
he is also a stranger. What difference does it make dlat dIe child is talking to dIe intermediary or the 
prosecutor? The idea was surely to enable the child to speak to someone whom the child felt at ease with. 
In order for this to happen, dIe child will have to meet the intermediary before the trial. 
In fact , Spencer (l987b:447) argues that the insistence on courtroom questioning by strange adults is one 
of the many factors which combine to make it impossible for a young chi ld 's accoum of an incident to be 
placed before the court. As a possible recommendation he says that: 
" ... the prosecution must be given the option of putting questions through a person who 
has already gained the child's confidence. " 
In evaluating the appointment of a person such as an intemlediary, Davies (1991: 189) argues that the Pigot 
Committee foresaw that an intemlediary "would be a person known to and trusted by dle child " since dils 
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would protect the child from having to be questioned by a variety of strangers. In order to rule out any 
confusion, it is suggested that rules of practice be fomlUlated and implemented as to tbe procedure to be 
followed by intemlediaries. It would have to address issues such as: whetber the intermediary may meet 
with the child before tbe court appearance; whether thi s meeting can take place, for instance at the home 
of the child; whether the intermediary may take the child to court in preparation for the trial so Olat the 
child is not confronted with an alien environment on the day o f the trial ; and whether, the intennediary 
is responsible for taking care of Ole child during breaks and ensuring that Ole child gets something to drink 
etc. 
v. A further possible criticism was raised by one of the magistrates WiOI wbom an interview bad heen 
conducted. He was of Ole opinion Olat the use of an intemlediary was time consuming and U1mecessary in 
cases where Ole witness was not very young. He proposed that children twelve years and older should 
generally testify out of tbe accused's presence but without Ole aid of an intermediary. Intermediaries should 
only be used in exceptional cases of youngsters. He only found intermediaries to be beneficial in Ole case 
of very young wi tnesses or witnesses of very low intelligence. 
5.3.5 Constitutional Implications of s170A 
In Jurgens supra the magistrate refused the application to allow Ole cbild to give evidence from another room and 
to make use of an intermediary on the grounds that they conflicted with the accused's fundamental rights to 
confrontation and cross-examination and would amount to an irregulari ty. In Canada a trial judge in R v H (B. C.) 
(1 990) 58 C.C.C. (3d)J6 (Man. C.A.) allowed Ole use of closed-circuit television and appointed an intennediary 
to conduct Ole examination at the trial because Ole accused had insisted on representing himself. On appeal Ole court 
held tbat the trial judge erred in allowing Ole questions to be asked olfougb an intemlediary since the right to cross-
examination was fundamental and Olat it was not only a right to frame questions but also to express them in a way 
which was consistent witl) the examiner's choice. Often the way in which a question is framed is as important as 
the question asked. 
The constitutiollality of s l70A came before dIe court for decision in Ule Klink case supra where the applicant 
alleged that this section limited his right to a fair trial. In order to detemline whedler Ole applicant's right to a fair 
trial has been lintited, it is necessary first to detemline the scope and content of his right and then to ascertain 
whether section 170A interferes with ulis fundamental right (Cachalia et al 1994: 107). This entails a balancing act 
between competing values, as explained by Chaskalson J in S v Makwanyane 1995(6) BCLR 665(CC) at 709C-F: 
"The limitation of constitutional rights for a purpose Olat is reasonable and necessary in a 
democratic society involves Ole weighing up of competing values, and ultintately an assessment 
based on proportionality ... In the balancing process, the relevant considerations will include the 
nature of Ole right that is limited, and its importance to an open and democratic society based on 
freedom and equality; the purpose for which Ole right is limited and Ole importance of Ulat 
purpose to such a society, Ole extent of dIe limitation, its efficacy, and particularly where the 
limitation has to be necessary, wheUler the desired ends could reasollabl y be achieved dlfough 
other means less damaging to the right in question. " 
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In this process the right of the accused to a fair trial and the interests of the child witness must be balanced. But 
ultimately it is the interest of discovering the truth and the fundamental principle of justice for all that must be 
decisive. 
The applicant in the Klink case supra alleged that sl70A went too far in protecting child witnesses and resulted in 
an unreasonable and unnecessary limitation of dle fundamental rights of an accused person to a fair trial. His main 
concern related to the appointment of an intemlediary and he argued that this appointment limited, or even 
excluded , a proper cross-examination of the complainant and dlUS amounted to a violation of his right to a fair trial 
(40SE-F). 
The court at 409C referred to s25(3) of the Interim Constitution which guaranteed an accused the right to a fair 
trial. Although dlis section contained a list of specific rights, the list was not exhaustive but included in the concept 
of a fair trial adler cormnon law rights which were not included in the section. In S v Rudman and Another; S v 
Mthwana 1992(1) SA 343 (A) tbe Appellate Division at 377 held that the right to a fair trial involved an inquiry 
into: 
"whether dlere has been an irregularity or illegality, that is a departure from the fornlalities, rules 
and principles of procedure according to which our law requires a criminal trial to be initiated or 
conducted. " 
It must be detemlined whether a trial was fair in accordance with "the notions of basic fairness and justice" or with 
tile "ideas underlying the concept of justice which are the basis of all civilised systems of criminal administration" 
(at 377). 
AltllOugh s25(3)(d) of the Interim Constitution, in terms of which the Klink case had to be decided, and s35(3) of 
the final Constitution do not mention the right to cross-examination, the right to challenge evidence includes the 
right to cross-examine. At common law the right to cross-examine is regarded as a fundamental right, the denial 
of which will amount to an irregularity. This right is also enshrined in sl66 of the Criminal Procedure Act of 1977. 
The issue that had to be decided in Klink therefore was whedler cross-examination by means of an intemlediary 
was inconsistent with the right to a fair trial because it violated the right of an accused person to challenge or cross-
examine a child witness. Section 170A does not exclude the right to cross-examine. In fact s170A(2)(a) expressly 
says that cross-examination must take place via an intermediary. The emphasis of tilis application was based on tile 
fact that the cross-examination has to take place through the mediwn of tile intermediary. It was the use of tile 
intermediary which it was felt unduly fettered tile right to cross-examination for "questioning tiuough an 
intemlediary may destroy tile effectiveness of cross-examination" especially as the intermediary has the power to 
convey only the general purport of the question unless tile court directs otherwise (at 4091). 
Accepting that cross-examination was a powerful weapon which often plays an important part in a trial court 's 
decision (409J), the court, however, emphasised that the object of cross-examination was twofold, namely to elicit 
information that was favourable to the party conducting tile cross-examination, and also to cast doubt upon the 
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accuracy of evidence given against the party. The court is entitled to intervene to prevent counsel from "conducting 
a bullying or intimidating form of cross-examination" or if the questioning appears to be calculated at confusing 
the witness (41OD-E). Therefore a deteonination whether a limitation of tile accused's right to cross-examination 
has resulted in tbe denial of a fair trial will depend on the circumstances of the particular case. 
This right which the accused has to a fair trial must be balanced witll the protection of a child's interests. In 
examining the latter, the court accepted that ule incidence of crimes involving tile abuse of children had risen 
significantly in recent years. Other factors tllat had to be taken into account included the following: fear of 
investigation and trial seriously impeded tile combating of tllese crimes; child witnesses experienced sigluficant 
difficulties in dealing with the adversarial environment of a court room, especially tile aspects of confrontation and 
cross-examination; and children experience great difficulty in understanding the language of legal proceedings and 
the ro le of the personnel involved (410G-H) . The court accepted that children have difficulty in conununicating 
in tbe court context where tile manner in wluch questions are asked may distort tile meatung attached to tile child 's 
language. The court experience amounts to a second victimisatioll, where the victim must relate in graphic detail 
ule abusive acts perpetrated upon them. Tlus all occurs in the presence of the alleged perpetrator, after which the 
victim is subjected to intensive, often protracted and aggressive, cross-examination by the accused or his 
representative. Tbis secondary victimisation may be as traumatic and as damaging to the emotional well-being of 
Ule cbild as the original assault was. Having dealt WiOl the effect of confrontation and cross-examination on child 
witnesses, the court at 411 D-E came to ule following conclusion: 
"It is sufficient to say that I am quite convinced tllat a child witness may often find it traumatic 
and stressful to give evidence in tile adversarial atmosphere of the court room, and tllat the 
forceful cross-examination of a young person by sldlled counsel may be more likely to obfuscate 
than to reveal the truth. Moreover, crinunal prosecutions may be tllwarted because of tbe 
unwillingness of yowlg witnesses to subject themselves to tile ordeal of tile court hearing, even 
if the proceedings are in camera. From these remarks it seems to me to be obvious tllat the 
ordinary procedures of the criminal justice system are inadequate to meet tlte needs and 
requirements of the child witness . " 
Tbe court accepted tllat s l70A was designed to address tile imbalance and to provide protection for Ule young 
witness. Tltis question raised in this case, therefore, was whether in protecting the child in tllis wayan accused 
person's rigbt to a fair trial was violated. In evaluating s l70A the Court highlighted the fact tllat the section did not 
preclude an accused from representing himself or from being represented by counsel. The accused also is nOt 
prevented from asldng questions in cross-examiItation eitller personally or through his representative. The cross-
examiner's questions are put to the witness by the intermediary. The court at 4111 held: 
"Tlus does not appear to me to be a limitation of the right to cross-examine. The intermediary 
acts, in a sense, as an interpreter: and interpreters are widely used in all of tile trial courts in this 
country. " 
The court further accepted at 411J-412A that it was not only the content of a question that was important in cross-
examination but also the "intonations of voice and nuances of expression". It was therefore possible tlIat the 
forcefulness and effect of cross-exanlination could be blunted when an imemIediary was used, but tllis did not mean 
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that the accused would be denied the right to a fair trial, since the court also had to take into account the interests 
of the child witness. 
An important point raised by Melunsky J at 412B-C was that , although criminal proceedings should be 
"scrupulously fair" , it did not follow by implication that a modification to the accepted rules of evidence and 
procedure would automatically be open to objection. He used the Canadian decision in R v Levogiannis (1993) 18 
eRR (2d) 242 to support this point. Judge L'Heureux-Dube explained at 250 that the criminal process must enable 
a presiding officer to get at the truth of a case while simultaneously providing the accused widl an 0PP0rlUIUty to 
present a proper defence. Rules of evidence and procedure were evolving rules and dle trend in Canadian courts 
was to remove those procedures which created barriers to ascertaining the trudl. This was supported by the decision 
in Regina v Toten (1993)16 CRR (2d) 49 (Ontario C.A. ) where Doherty JA explained at 58: 
"The public adversarial process is, however, a means to an end - the ascertainment of truth - and 
has virtue only to the extent that it serves that end . Where the established process Ilinders ule 
search for truth, it should be modified unless due process or resource-based considerations 
preclude such modification." 
Applying these principles, Melunsky J at 412E-F held that the use of an intermediary did not affect the fundamental 
fairness of the judicial process, since the witness could be questioned on all aspects of his evidence while at dle 
same time dle intemlediary could playa role in balancing dle interests of the accused widl dlOse of the child witness 
"by allowing dle latter to be integrated into the criminal justice system without disturbing the fundamental fairness 
of the process". In fact , MelUilSky J held at 415G-H : 
"A proper balance between the protection of a child witness and the rights of the accused to a fair 
trial can, in my view, be achieved by permitting dle witness to testify in congenial surroundings 
and Out of sight of ule accused." 
A further issue which dle court had to address was whether the audlOrity given to an internlediary to convey the 
"general purport " of any question resulted in such unfairness to an accused that it interfered with his fundanlental 
rights. The applicant argued (at 412G-H) that this right of the internlediary unreasonably restricted the accused's 
rigbt to cross-examination. A cross-examiner, he argued , had the right to decide how he wished to phrase his 
questions and, by allowing dle intemlediary to "filter" dle questions, the plamled line of cross-exanlination could 
be completely frustrated and derailed. 
The COurt held at 412H-J that there were sound reasons why the imemlediary was entitled to convey only the 
general purport of the question since it enabled a child witness to participate properly in the system. According to 
S v Gidi and Another supra at 540E, questions should always be put in a form dlat is understandable to ule witness. 
There is the danger that a child , especially a very young one, may not understand or appreciate dle content of a 
question. It is, therefore, in the interests of justice for questions to be posed to children in a way appropriate to their 
development. This assists the court in their function of establishing the truth without depriving the accused of his 
right to cross-exanline. In addition, dle role of the intemlediary is very limited . He is not permitted to change dle 
question. He must convey the content and meaning of the question in a language and form that is understandable 
262 
to the child. A furtiler control is provided by the presence of tile presiding officer who monitors the proceedings 
and can see whetiler the intermediary carries out this function properly and without any prejudice to the accused. 
In ternlS of s l70A tile court has tile power to intervene and insist that the intermediary should convey the actual 
question and not just its general purport. 
It was accepted by the court that tile application of this section could ill certain installces give rise to unfairness to 
an accused person, but it was the duty of tile presiding officer to guard against this (at 413E) . Du Toit et al 
(1997 :22-31) also emphasise that Ule court must ensure tilat the fundamental purpose of cross-examimtion is not 
frustrated. The accused must be given an opportunity to present his case by putting pertinent and probing questions 
to those who give evidence against him. The controlling factor should always be tile right to a fair trial. 
The fiml decision of the court at 41 3 G was that tile provisions of section 170A did not violate tile fundamental 
rights of the accused to a fair trial. 
The applicant in the Klink case, an eighteen year old male, was charged with tile rape of a sixteen year old girl. 
He contended tilat "he was entitled to equal protection before the law and that the complainant (whom he submitted 
lived a life of a young adult) would be protected as if she was a child while he, a scholar, would be treated like 
all adult" (408D-H) . The applicant did not pursue this contention in argument, but it will nevertheless be pursued 
here to detennine whether it would have assisted him in any way. 
The right to equality does not mean that all must be treated identically (Cachalia et al 1994:25). Most legal rules 
do differentiate between people - who may vote, who has to pay tax and what anlOunt, who must go to school et 
cetera . The minimum content to be given to the phrase 'equal before the law' is that of equality of process, meaning 
that each person is to be accorded equal concern and respect in the fornlUlation and application of the law. 
Differential treatment does nOt necessarily mean (unconstitutional) unequal treatment. Differentiation will be 
unjustified if it is based on a persoml quality which has no relation to the purpose or object of the differentiation 
(Du Plessis and Corder 1994:141). This is supported by tile comments made in the matter of AK EntertainmenL 
CC v Minister of Safety and Security 1995(1 ) SA 783 (E) at 7891-J: 
"In my view, however, and where the application of a law is in issue a transgression of section 
8(1) or (2) will arise only if Ule organ of State intends to apply the law unequally or if a law is 
enforced according to a principle which has a discriminatory effect due to some parti cular 
characteristic of the discriminatee. N 
This view is to be found in other jurisdictions as well. For instance, the European Court of Human Rights has found 
that a violation of ule equality provi sions arises if tilere is differential treatment in circumstances where there is no 
objective and reasonable justification tilerefore or, where tilere is such a j ustification. there is a lack of 
proportionality between tile objective of the measure and tile means employed. Based on this approach the court 
has found that a progressive tax system is not discriminatory , provided that tile system is proportioml and can 
contribute to a fairer distribution of income (Van Wyk et al 1994:201). The Indian Supreme Court has held that 
a classification of people must have a rational basis in ternls of the object which the legislation seeks to achieve. 
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The equality provision in the Indian constitution does not forbid classification between citizens as long as the 
differentiation is intelligible and has a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute (Van Wyk 
et al 1994:203). 
From the aforegoing discussion on the reasons for the introduction of section 170A, it is clear that there is a 
sufficiently rational basis for tile 'classi fication' contained in section 170A. It should fllrthennore be clear that there 
is a rational relationship between the 'classification ' and the object sought. This contention of tile applicant would, 
therefore, not have assisted him. 
It is further submitted that tile applicant's argument of a classification (discrimination) contained in s l 70A is 
fundamentally flawed, since an accused caJUlot compare himself with a witness for the purpose of detennining 
discrimination or not. The applicant should rather have argued that he was treated di fferently to other accused, who 
are not subject to the prescriptions of section 170A and are not witnesses. The accused is nOt a wilDess and vice 
versa. Witnesses are treated in a panicular way and accused are treated in a panicular way and each is distinct 
from the other. Since s l70A refers to "any witnesses under 18", it is therefore foreseeable that the accused, if he 
is under eighteen and asswnes the role of a witness , must also be afforded the protection of s170A, as in the case 
where he gives evidence against a co-accused. 
Although it has been argued that s170A does not interfere with tile fundamental right of an accused person to a fair 
trial , tilis does not mean that tile way in which U,e section is applied in a specific case cannot be unconstitutional. 
Thi s could very well ari se, but then U,ere are available procedures to attack the application of the section. The 
presiding officer is always under a duty to ensure that the procedure is conducted fairly and that the intemlediary 
perfonns his function properly and without prejudice to the accused, as explained in Klillk supra at 41 3A-B. 
5.4 Public Hearing 
5.4.1 Basis of the Right to a Public Hearing 
It is a general rule of Soutil African criminal procedure that such proceedings take place in an open coun (SA Law 
Commission 1989:3) . Section 35(3)(c) of the Constitution Act of 1996 provides that an accused person has the right 
to a public trial in an ordinary coun of law. The basis of this right is explained by Lord Diplock in HarowlI v 
Home Office [1983 1 AC 280 as follows at D: 
"Publicity is the very soul of justice. It is the keenest spur to exenion, and tile surest of all 
guards against improbity. It keeps the Judge himself, wllile trying, under trial. " 
Firstly , tile reason for making judicial proceedings public is to ensure trustworthiness and completeness of evidence. 
This is further explained by Wigmore, as quoted in S v Leepi/e alld Others (1) supra at 338D-F: 
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"Its operation in tending to improve the quality of testimony is two-fold. Subjectively, it produces 
in the witness's mind a disinclination to falsify; first, by stimulating the instinctive responsibility 
to public opinion, symbolised in the audience, and ready to scom a demonstrated liar; and next, 
by inducing the fear of exposure of subsequent falsities through disclosure by infomled persons 
who may chance to be present or to hear of the testimony from others present. Objectively, it 
secures the presence of dlOse who by possibility may be able to furnish testimony in chief or to 
contradict falsifiers and yet may not have been known beforehand to the parties to possess any 
information ... the same advantage gained and mucb relied on in modern times when the publicity 
given by newspaper reports of trials is often dle means of securing useful testimony ." 
Secondly, Wigmore lists the following further advantages of having a public hearing, as quoted in S v Leepile and 
Others (1) supra at 338 H-J: the court, in acting under the public eye, is forced to "a strict conscientiousness in 
the performance of duty" ; persons who, although not parties in a dispute, may be affected by litigation and should 
be afforded an opportunity to find out what is going on; by allowing the public to be present at a trial the respect 
for law is increased and a strong confidence in judicial remedies is gained. This was explained by Brennan J in 
Richmond Newspapers Inc. supra at 1001: 
"Secrecy is profoundly inimical to this demonstrative purpose of the trial process. Open trials 
assure dIe public dlat procedural rights are respected and that justice is afforded equally . Closed 
trials breed suspicion of prejudice and arbitrariness which in tum spawns disrespect for law. 
Public access is essential , therefore, if trial adjudication is to achieve tbe objective of maintaining 
public confidence in the administration of justice. " 
This requirement that a trial must be public amounts to the constitutionalisation of a long-recognised principle of 
transparency in criminal proceedings. The purpose of insisting on a public trial is to enable dle public to be full y 
informed of the evidence so dlat tbey are properly able to evaluate the judgment (Du Plessis and Corder 1994: 176). 
The enshrinement of this right ensures that secret trials employed by to talitarian states will not be acceptable under 
the Constitution. In Klink v Regional Court Magistrate NO supra Melunsky J pointed out at 414H d,at "it is of 
the essence of a democratic society tbat dle criminal law sbould be administered publicly and openly". 
This principle is enshrined in s l52 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1977 wbich provides that criminal proceedings 
must be conducted in open court except where otherwise expressly provided. Section 16 of dle Supreme Court Act 
59 of 1959 also provides that all proceedings take place in open court unless the court orders odlerwise. 
5.4.2 Exceptions to the Right to a Public Hearing 
AldlOugb an accused person has a right to a public trial, this right is not absolute and exceptions to this right are 
to be found in s153 of the Criminal Procedure Act of 1977. The first exception relates to the interests of the state. 
If it appears to the court dlat it would be in the interests of the security of the state or of good order or of public 
morals or of the administration of justice that proceedings be held behind closed doors, the court may so direct 
(Botha v Minister van Wet en Orde en Andere 1990(3) SA 937 (W)). The second exception relates to witnesses 
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generally, and provides that if it appears to the court that Olere is a likelihood that a person may be hamled if he 
testifies in public, the court can direct that evidence be given behind closed doors and Olat Ole identity of such 
person not be revealed. In S v Leepile and Ot"ers(1) supra the court explained at 340A that this section 
presupposed an enquiry which would "involve!s] a careful weighing up of all the factors in the two scales, namely 
those favouring the open trial and those favouring the protection of Ole witness against hann" . In S v Baleka and 
Others (2) supra the court held that, when exercising its discretion in an application for a witness to give evidence 
in camera, Ole guiding principle was that the courts are open to the public and should always be so, except in 
exceptional circumstances. The greater principle, however, is that justice must be done, and. therefore, when the 
right to public trial conflicts with justice being done, the fanner will have to yield to the latter. 
The Olird exception in tenns of s I53(3) grants the court the discretion to allow a complainant to give evidence 
behind closed doors where the charge relates to an act of indecency or extortion. This exception has relevance to 
children who are the complainants in cases of indecency. The final exception relates to children and is provided 
for by sI53(5) of Ole Criminal Procedure Act 1977 which reads: 
"(5) Where a witness at criminal proceedings before any court is under the age of eighteen 
years, the court may direct Olat no person, other than such witness and his parent or 
guardian or a person in loco parentis, shall be present at such proceedings, unless such 
person' s presence is necessary in cOlmection with such proceedings or is authorised by 
the court. " 
A trial ill comera means that all spectators are excluded from the courtroom. This would not include Ole accused, 
his legal representative, the court personnel and the child 's parem or guardian, who are pemlitted to be present (SA 
Law Commission 1989:7). Minors automatically give evidence in camera. In S v Els supra the magistrate, after 
conducting the competency examination of a thirteen year old girl, made the following order: 
"Aangesien die getuie minderjarig is word aile persone wat nie teenwoordig hoef te wees nie 
aangese am die hofsaal te verlaa!. Die getuie sal in camera getuig." 
The attorney thereafter applied for pennission to allow Ole accused's wife to remain behind as well as rhe attorney's 
articled clerk. The court granted pennission. 
In Klink v Regional Court Magistrate NO and Others supra the physical separation of the complainant was raised 
in support of the contention that the applicant was denied the right to a public trial. He contended that s 170A 
violated his right to a fair trial since it deprived him of his right to a public trial (408G-H). Tllis argument was 
based on Ole submission that the applicant would be deprived of his right to a public trial if the complainant gave 
evidence in a separate room. He argued that if an accused and the witness are not in the same room there is no 
public trial (41 31-J) . 
The court was referred to Olfee US Supreme Court decisions: Richmond Newspaper Inc v Commonwealth of 
Virginia supra; Coy v Iowa supra; and Maryland v Craig supra. The latter two cases had to decide issues of 
confrontation rather than a right to a public hearing, but the Richmond Newspaper Inc case was concerned with 
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the rights of the public and the press to observe judicial proceedings. The American court held that a blanket order 
which closed the criminal trial to the public violated the First Amendment to the US Constitution. The applicant's 
argument here appears to be fundamentally flawed. He appears to have confused ule right to a public trial WiUI 
the right to confrontation. The right to a public trial ensures that trials are held openly, in ule sense that the public 
have access to the trial and the proceedings. Confrontation, however, is the righl to face the person who is 
accusing you. In the Klink case the applicant argued that he was deprived of his right to a public trial on the basis 
that the witness was not in the same room as him. Melunsky J addressed the issue of a public trial , although he 
did in passing refer to confrontation. He accepted that the right to a public trial was enshrined in the Constitution, 
but held that this did not guarantee the right of the accused and the witness to be physically present in the same 
room (414G). In coming to this decision, Melunsky J referred to R v Levogiannis supra where the court had to 
determine whether a section of the Canadian Criminal Code violated the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. This 
particular section allowed a judge, in certain instances, to permit a complainant under the age of eighteen to give 
evidence out of the presence of the accused if the judge was of the opinion that this was necessary to obtain a full 
and candid account of the acts complained of by the complainant. It was argued that this section violated an 
accused's rights to be presumed innocent until proven guilty in a fair and public hearing by an independent and 
impartial tribunal. The Supreme Court of Canada rejected both of these argnnlents. As far as confrontation was 
concemed, they held that this section did not deprive an accused of his right to face accusers, ratller it limited the 
right. The second contention, that the use of tlle screen undemlined the presumption of itIDocence, was also 
rejected since a jury could follow judicial instructions and would not be biased by a screen. In the Klink judgment 
at 415E Melunsky J noted tllat in R v Levogiannis "ulere was no suggestion that the use of a screen deprived tlle 
trial of its public character". In holding that s170A of the Criminal Procedure Act was not unconstitutional, 
Melunsky J held as follows at 415G-H: 
"For the reasons which I have given I anl convinced that the accused's right to a public trial is 
not violated merely because the complainant gives evidence in a separate room. II 
Since s170A does not apply automatically to all children, there are still many instances of children giving evidence 
in court. These sections will still have an important role to play in protecting those children from Ule 
embarrassment and humiliation of having to reveal intimate details to a room full of strangers. Despi te tllis. the 
SA Law Commission (1989: 16) was of the opinion that the present rules relating to trials in camera do nOt 
sufficiently protect the child witness because the accused and his counsel are still present "and it is indeed their 
presence and conduct which, as far as the child witness is concerned, lie at tlle root of the evil". 
5.4,3 Restrictions on Publicity 
Section 154 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1977 provides that where a court has excluded tlle public in tenns of 
s153, the court may also further direct that no information relating to the proceedings held behind closed doors may 
be published. Section 154 goes even further and provides that insofar as complainants in cases of indecency are 
concerned, no information which might reveal the identity of the complainant may be published. In addition sI54(3) 
provides: 
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"(3) No person shall publish in any maImer whatever any information which reveals or may 
reveal the identity of an accused under tile age of eighteen years or of a witness at 
criminal proceedings who is under the age of eighteen years." 
Section 154 provides three possible restrictions on the right to a public trial: firstly. a presiding officer may order 
that any information relating to a trial held in camera may not be published; secondly, no infomlation which may 
reveal Ule identity of a witness under the age of eighteen years may be published. This section makes it an offence 
to publish any such material and provides that any person who contravenes this offence can be liable to a fine or 
a sentence of imprisomnent. 
The constitutionality of sl54 will have to be addressed. To what extent does sI5(I)of the Constitution afford the 
public and the media a right of access to judicial proceedings in the context of freedom of expression? According 
to Chaskalson et al (1996:20-34) access to the courts may be inherent in the freedom of speech and expression 
enshrined in the Constitution, as well as being a component of the right of access to infollnation protected by s23, 
and a separately protected right under s22. The probable effect of these sections of tile Constitution is that, 
although restrictions on access may be based upon reasonable grounds, these will no longer be assumed. These 
restrictions will tilen require justification through a balancing of the various interests involved. For instance, in 
Canadian Newspapers Co v Canada (A-G) [1988J2 SCR 122, 52 DLR (4th) 690 the court held that a mandatory 
ban on the publication of the names of complainants in sexual assault cases violated the relevant section of the 
Freedom Charter, but did constitute a reasonable limit in furthering the interest of having complaints reported by 
allowing tile identities of complainants to be protected. 
5.5 The Competency Requirement relating to Child Witnesses 
5.5.1 Introduction 
A witness is regarded as competent if he is lawfully allowed to give evidence. The general rule, contained in sl92 
of the Criminal Procedure Act of 1977, is tilat everyone is presumed to be a competent and compellable witness. 
The section reads: 
"Every person not expressly excluded by this Act from giving evidence shall, subject to the 
provisions of s206, be competent and compellable to give evidence in criminal proceedings.' 
To detemline whether a witness is competent or not, a trial-witilin-a-trial will have to be held at which witnesses 
may be called to give evidence as to the competency of the witness whose competency is in question. The latter 
may himself be questioned by the judge and the parties (Hoffulann and Zeffertt 1988:372). 
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5.5.2 The Competency Requirement for Children 
A child will be considered to be a competent witness if, in the opinion of the court, tile child understands what il 
means to tell the truth (Zieff 1991:22). Section 162(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1977 sets out the general 
rule, namely that every witness must give evidence under oath or admonition. The section reads as follows: 
"(I) Subject to the provisions of section 163 and 164, no person shall be examined as a witness 
in criminal proceedings unless he is under oath, which shall be administered by tile presiding 
judicial officer or, in tile case of a superior court, by tile presiding judge or the registrar of the 
court, and which shall be in tile following form: 'I swear that the evidence I shall give, shall be 
tile truth, tile whole truth and notiling but the truth, so help me God.'" 
The first step then is for the presiding officer to detemline whether the child witness understands tile nature of the 
oath. According to Hoffmaml and Zeffertt (1988:376), the child must understand "the meaning and religious 
sanction of the oatll". This understanding is tes ted by questioning the child. The questioning is usually done by 
the judge or the magistrate, but could also be done by counsel. 
It used to be tile position that children, who did not understand the nature of the oath, were incompetent witnesses. 
However, in 1861 sl2 of Act 4 of 1861 was introduced which enabled children to give unsworn evidence. This 
provision was echoed in sl64 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1977, which provides: 
"Any person who, from ignorance arising from youth, defective education, or other cause, is 
found not to understand the nature and import of the oath or the affirmation, may be admitted to 
give evidence in criminal proceedings without taking tlle oath or making tile affimlation: 
Provided that such person shall , in lieu of the oath of aftimlOtion, be admonished by the presiding 
judge or judicial officer to speak the truth, tile whole truth and nothing but the truth." 
In terms of this section a witness may nevertheless be competent even if he does not understand the nature of the 
oath , provided that he has been admonished or warned by the COUft to speak the truth. In De Beer v Rex 1933 
NPD 30 the complainant, a six year old girl, did not understand tile nature of the oath and was, therefore, warned 
to speak the truth. Grindley-Ferris J at 33 held the following: 
"It is clear, I think, tllOt the complainant was a competent witness if she understood the nature of 
the warning or admonition given her by the magistrate ... " 
In S v Eli 1978(1) SA 451 (E) an eleven year old boy was considered too young to understand the implications of 
taking the oath and was therefore admonished to speak tlle truth (452G). Also, in R v Dikant and Others 1948(1) 
SA 693 (0) the Supreme Court bad the following to say about a twelve year old witness at 696: 
" ... the witness was a child of such tender years that he was admonished to speak the truth and 
nOt sworn, thereby showing that in tile opinion of the presiding officer he did not appreciate the 
moral and legal sanctioll~ of tlle oath ... " 
In practice the presiding officer will question the child to determine whether the child understands the nature of dIe 
oath. If the presiding officer is not satisfied that the child understands the mture of the oath, he must then inquire 
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whether the child is competent to give unsworn evidence (Zieff 1991:22). He does this by satisfying himself that 
Ole child underslJlnds what it means to speak the truth . In Rex v Bell 1929 CPD 478 Gardiner JP explained at 478 
that "the law may allow the testimony of a child of 4'/, years to be taken if the magistrate is satisfied that she is 
competent to tell Ole truth ". The child must, therefore, have dIe ability to distinguish between the truth and lies 
and must be able "to recognise dIe danger and wickedness of lying" in order to be able to be competent to give 
unsworn evidence (HoffmanJl and Zeffertt 1988:376). 
In S v T 1973(3) SA 794 (A) dIe Appellate Division found that a five year old child was incompetent to give 
evidence since she did not have the ability to distinguish between the truth and lies (at 796C). This decision was 
based on the fact that, after dIe trial judge allowed dIe child to testify , it became apparent in the course of her 
evidence that dIe child was afraid and therefore unwilling to speak. The child spoke so softly that eventually her 
mother was approached to assist. The child then whispered the answers to her mother, who in turn repeated them 
to the court . The conviction was set as ide on dIe grounds that an irregularity had occurred in allowing the mother 
to repeat the child ' s evidence since dIe modler had not been sworn to repeat correctly and she was herself a witness 
with a subSlJlntial interest in dIe case. Of particular interest is the fact that dIe child 's competency (or lack dlereof) 
was based on her fear and her inability to speak lOUdly. No cogniscence was taken of the content of her replies 
(although whispered) and whedler she was able to answer dIem adequately. 
In Chaimowilz v Chaimowitz (1) 1960(4) SA 818 (C) dIe court accepted at 820A that the test for competency was 
whether dIe child "knows the difference between right and wrong and trudl and untruth ". The court accepted dlis 
test as the basis of competency even after quoting the more delJliled test set out by Scobie at 820A: 
"Obviously, a child whose intellect is so immature that he is incapable of giving any rational or 
coherent account of his observations, or is unable to appreciate the distinction between fact and 
fancy, or cannot realise dIe necessi ty of te lling dIe truth , must be regarded as an incompetent 
witness. " 
The test, according to Scobie, requires more than a simple distinction between truth and lies. in fact, it requires 
that a child should be capable of making observations and giving a coherent account of these observations. In 
addition, dIe child must be able to distinguish between fact and fantasy and underslJlnd the Obligation to tell dIe 
truth. 
Al though, in terms of the SlJltutory requirement, the inquiry into whether a child understands dIe nature of the oadl 
is still obligatory, it has, according to Hoffmann and Zeffertt (1988:376), lost much of its imporlJlnce. There is 
no difference between sworn and unsworn evidence, the latter not necessarily regarded as being any less trustworthy 
dIan sworn evidence. In R v Manda 195 1(3) SA 158 (A) at 163A-B Schreiner JA explained that dIe COurt is 
empowered: 
"to admit the unsworn evidence of a child where it 'is found not to understand the nature, or to 
recognise dIe religious obligation, of an oadl or affirmation', but it would be difficult , in dIe face 
of the silence of the slJltue on dIe subject, to insist on corroboration in all cases where dIe court 
considers that the child should be athnonished to speak the truth rather dIan be sworn. A child 
1 
270 
may not understand ule nature or recognise the obligation of an oath of affinnation and yet may 
appear to Ule court to be more Ulan ordinarily intelligent, observant and honest." 
There is no fixed age at which children become competent witnesses. Rather, ule courts deal WiUI each case on 
its merits. For instance, in S v T supra the court found a five year old to be incompetent, whereas in S v Manda 
supra a three year old was found to competent and in Rex v Bell supra a four-and-a-half year old girl was the 
principal witness in the case. In R v J 1958(3) SA 699 (SR) Ule court found a four year old girl to be competent, 
and remarked at 70lA that "Ule complainant was a bright little girl who gave her evidence readily without 
prompting or leading. " 
It would appear that the age of a child is rtitvanL to credibiiity raiher than competency. In De Beer v Rex supra 
the coun referred to the unreported Transvaal case of Rex v George which was decided in 1921 . In the latter case 
Wessels JP remarked: 
"To convict upon the uncorroborated testimony of a child of three years is such a dangerous thing 
that I cannot imagine any magistrate doing it under any circumstances ... " 
In Rex v Sideropoulos [1910J CPD 15 Laurence J said that, in regard to the evidence of a five year old, it was 
unsafe to convict upon the mere evidence of a child of Ulat age. From these cases it would seem that age has more 
effect on credibility than competence. In a number of ulese cases the child was found to be competent, but not 
credible without the assistance of corroboration. 
5.5.3 The Inquiry 
In each case the presiding officer must determine wheuler a child has the intelligence to distinguish between what 
is true and what is false. In order to do so , the presiding officer will have to hold an inquiry. This can be done 
by simply questioning the child himself or by bolding a trial-wictlin-a-trial at which witnesses can give evidence 
regarding the child's mental capacity (Hoffmann and Zeffent 1988:376-7) . 
It is the duty of a presiding officer to conduct an inquiry into whether a child understands the duty to tell the truth. 
If ulis inquiry is not carried out, it may amount to an irregularity and the conviction being set aside. This is 
precisely what happened in S v L 1973( I) SA 344 (C) where Ule appellant was convicted of indecently assaulting 
a six year old girl. He appealed on the grounds that the magistrate had erred in not inquiring whether the child 
could distinguish between the truUl and lies and that he had not warned her to speak the truth in terms of s222 of 
the Criminal Procedure Act 56 of 1955. It was argued on behalf of Ule State that it was not necessary for a 
presiding officer to determine whether a child can distinguish between the truth and a lie before the child gives 
evidence. They argued UIat if it became apparent in ule course of giving evidence that the child is unable to make 
such a distinction, then it would be the duty of the magistrate to ignore ule evidence or to attach very little weight 
to it (at 346 G-H). Van Winsen J , in giving judgement, explained that, since it is tbe duty of a judicial officer to 
determine whether a child can distinguish between truth and lies in order for him to decide competency, there would 
therefore be a duty upon bim to inquire whether the child does have the capacity to understand ule distinction (at 
2 71 
349 G-H). Since such an inquiry did not take place, the conviction and sentence were accordingly set aside. 
There are no rules relating to the content of this inquiry. The presiding officer muSt deteDnine whether the c1,i1d 
witness is able to understand the distinction between tile trutil and lies. The content of the inquiry remains in the 
discretion of tile presiding officer. In S v T supra the court , in detennining the competency of a five year old girl, 
conducted the following examination at 796A-C: 
"Hof: Jy moenie bang wees nie. Jy moet net praat wat jy weet wat gedoen is en wat jy gesien 
bet. Kan jy verstaan , J? Kan jy verStaan jy moet net praat wat die waarheid is wat iemand 
gedoen het wat j y gesien bet en wat gese word. Ek kry die indruk dat sy nie verstaan wat die 
aard van haar getuienis is nie. 
Staatsaanklaer: Op hierdie stadiwn deel ek daardie indruk. 
Hof: Ons kan maar sien wat sy antwoord maar ek dink sy het nie ' n begrip wat bedoel word deur 
die waarheid of enigiets van die aard , sy is te jonk. Is dit nie u indruk oak nie? 
Staatsaanldaer: Die is die indruk wat ek oak kry. " 
Based on this exchange, the Appellate Division found that, since the child did not have the ability to distinguish 
between the truth and lies, she was not a competent witness. 
The following competency examination was conducted on the thirteen year old complainant in S v Els supra: 
"Hof: Hoe oud is jy Jelmy? --- 13. 
Weet j y wat is dit am die waarheid te praat? --- Ja. 
As iemand nOll vir jall Sf jy en mev . Nel sit aIleen in 'n kamer, is dit die waarheid of is dit 
leuens? --- Waarheid. 
Weet jy waar jy nou is en wat die doel is waarvoor j y hier is? --- Ja. 
Waarvoor is jy hier? --- Omdat ek verkrag is. 
Goed , ek bevind dat die getuie bevoeg is am getuienis af te Ie. Jenny jy moet net die waarheid 
te praat wat jy self ondervind het en lue wat ander mense vir jou vertel het lue. Kan jy dit doen? 
--- l a. " 
The court decided tilat the girl was competent to give evidence under oath. However, in the case of the second 
witness, a girl of ten, the court only warned her to tell the tru th : 
"Hof: Hoe oud is jy Desire? --- 10. 
Desire weet j y wat is dit am die waarbeid te praat en weet jy wat is di t am leuens te vertel? Weet 
jy nie wat is dit am te jok nie? --- Ja. 
Weet jy? --- Ja. 
As iemand vir jou se dat hierdie ligte dood is, is dit die waarheid of is dit leuens? --- Waarheid. 
Kyk na die Iig? --- Leuens . 
Jy moet net vertel wat die waarheid is wat jy self ondervind het, lue wat ander mense jou vertel 
het am te so nie. Kan jy dit doen? --- Ja. " 
The third witness called in tilis case was a tilirteen year old girl , and the court found her competent to give unsworn 
evidence: 
"Hof: Wal is u naam? --- Jo-amle. 
Jo-arule? --- Jeruungs. 
Jo-anne gaan jy skoal? --- Ja. 
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Walter standerd is jy? --- 4. 
St 4. In watter skoal is dit? --- Diaz. 
la-anne weet jy wat is dit am die waarheid te praat en weet jy wat is dit am leuens te vertel , 
wanneer ' n mens jok? As iemand vir jou so hierdie ligte is dood. Kyk maar na die ligte. Wat 
is dit? Die waarheid of jok hy? --- Jok. 
Dit is 'n hof die. In die hof moet ons die waarheid praat wat jy self gesien het en gehoor het, 
nie wat ander mense vir jou vertel het wat gebeur het nie. Sal jy dit kan doen? --- (Geen 
hoorbare antwoord). " 
Of tlle three competency examinations conducted in tllis case, one resulted in tlle girl (aged 13) being allowed to 
give evidence under oath, while tlle other two girls (aged 10 and 13 respectively) were allowed to give unsworn 
evidence. No reasons for these distinctions were given. 
In S v Nozakuzaku 1995 case number SH 6/84/95 (E) (unreported) tlle following examination of a thirteen year 
old girl was conducted: 
"Court: Howald are you at present? --- 13 years of age. 
Are you a scholar? --- I am a scholar. 
What standard are you? --- Standard IV. 
Do you know what it means to tell the tmtll or don ' t you know? --- I know. 
Do you know what it means to take the oatll or don't you know? --- I do know. 
You are now warned to tell the tmtll, the whole trntlt and notlling but tlle tmtll. --- Yes." 
Here again the court warned tlle witness to tell the tmth , thereby enabling her to give unsworn evidence. 
Four boys, aged between eight and eleven, gave evidence relating to alleged indecent assaults in S v Cilliers, 1991 . 
SH2/334/9 1 (E) (unreported) . The following competency examinations were held: An eight year old was warned 
to tell the tmth after the following examination: 
"Hof: Voor ons nou begin, kan jy net vir my so hoe oud is jy? --- 8. 
In watter skoal is jy? --- Snrnmerwood. 
In watter standerd is jy? --- Standerd I. " 
The other eight year old witness was also warned to tell the tmth after the following examination: 
"Hof: Hoe noem die mense jou, Frans of Nicolas? --- Frans. 
En hoe oud is jy nou Frans? --- 8. 
Is jy 8 jaar oud? --- Ja. 
Gaan jy al skoal? --- Ja. 
Watter standerd is jy? --- Sub B." 
The eleven year old was found to be competent to take the oath after the following examination: 
"Hof: Hoe oud is jy nou? --- 1 I. 
Standerd 3? --- Ja." 
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5.5.4 Evaluation of the Competency ReguiI"ement 
In evaluating competency, there are two components which need to be separated. The first component is the 
'eyewitness ability' i.e. the ability to report the details of an observed event accurately and completely. This relates 
to the cognitive development of the child which includes not only the individual abilities of a particular witness but 
also to general factors which influence the acquisition, retention, retrieval and verbal communication of information. 
The second component of competency relates to the witness's willingness to tell the truth i.e. the motivational 
aspect. This component concerns the truthfulness of the statements made (Undeutscb 1984:5 1). 
5.5.4.1 Cognitive Aspects of Competency 
In order for a witness to give evidence effectively, tile witness must have adequate cognitive skills both to 
comprebend tile event witnessed and to be able to communicate his memories of the event (Melton 198 1:75) . 
Therefore, if a child is to be an effective witness, he must have tile cognitive abili ty to observe tile event, tile ability 
to remember, tile abili ty to conununicate and the capaci ty to understand the distinction between trutil and lies 
(Stafford 1962:313) . 
In Woji v Santam Insurance Co Ltd 1981(1) SA I021 (A) tile court accepted tilese principles, although they found 
tilem to be indicative of trustwortiliness and tllerefore relevant to credibility rather tban competency: 
"Trustworthiness ... depends on factors such as the child 's power of observation, his power of 
recollection, and his power of narration on the specific matter to be testified. In each instance 
the capacity of the particular child is to be investigated. His capacity of observation will depend 
on whether he appears ' intelligent enougb to observe'. Whether he has the capacity of 
recollection will depend again on whether he has sufficient years of discretion 'to remember what 
occurs' while the capacity of narration or conm1unication raises the question whether the child has 
' the capacity to understand the questions put, and to frame and express intelligent answers'." 
(1028B-D). 
Using this infomlation to evaluate the competency examinations set out above, it becomes clear tilat tbe courts only 
focus on one aspect of competency, namely tile distinction between trudl and falsehood. The questions are not 
aimed at discovering the capacity of the child to observe, remember and relate an event. In the case of a young 
cbild , simple questions aimed at enquiring what the child got for Christmas or a birthday will assist dIe court in 
discovering whedler the child can remember an event and relate information regardi ng the event. Instead, the focus 
of our competency examination is aimed at discovering whether dIe child can distinguish between truth and 
falsehood. In the competency examination conducted in S v T supra the magistrate made the following Conmle11l : 
"ek dink sy het nie 'n begrip wat bedoel word deur die waarheid of enigiets". 
The first criticism levelled against the competency examination then is that it does not test the real basis of 
competency, namely the child 's ability to observe, remember and conununicate. The examination is aimed at only 
one aspect, the ability to distinguish between truth and lies. 
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The second criticism relates to the marmer in which the competency examination is conducted. Children have great 
difficulty in understanding abstract concepts, and would be unable to answer questions framed in the abstract, [t 
would be difficult for an adult to answer the question 'what is truth?', how much more then for a young child . [n 
S v T supra the magistrate explained to a fi ve year old cbild "jy moet net praat wat die waarheid is". The Appellate 
Division found the child to be incompetent , but was she , in fact , incompetent, The competency examination did 
nOt attempt to discover what the child 's ability was. The examination was cursory, statements were put to the child 
witllOut framing them in a manner that a five year old would understand as a question, and abstract concepts were 
used without an attempt to explain them. 
[n S v Els supra the magistrate, in conducting dIe competency examination of the thirteen year old girl transcribed 
above, attempted to explain abstract concepts in concrete terms. For instance, after asking dIe girl whedler she 
k.new what it meant to tell dIe truth, he dlen asked her the following question: "As iemand nou vir jou se jy en 
mev. Nel sit aileen in ' n kamer, is dit die waarheid of is dit leuens?" This is quite an effective method of giving 
the child an opportunity to demonstrate an understanding of dIe truth. If this technique had been adopted in S v 
T supra, would the finding regarding competency not perhaps have been different, 
In the Els case the magistrate used the same technique widl dIe other child witnesses, nanlely framing abstrac t 
concepts in concrete terrns . However, the one question he asked appeared to cause some confusion: "As iemand 
vir jou se dat hierdie ligte dood is, is dit die waarheid of is dit leuens?" The child , aged ten, did not seem to 
understand dIe question. When he came to conduct the next competency examination , the magistrate rephrased the 
question in simpler segments: "As iemand vir jou se hierdie ligte is dood. Kyk maar na die ligte. Wat is dit? 
Die waarheid of jok hy? " 
In S v NozakUZIIku supra dIe presiding officer simply asked the child whether she knew what it meant to tell dIe 
truth and what it meant to tell an untrudl. The child , also thirteen, replied that she did know, and this was accepted 
as sufficient to show competency. No test was conducted to determine whether she really understood the concepts. 
The competency examinations conducted in S v Cilliers supra did not refer to the concepts of truth and lies at all. 
[t simply consisted of questions detemlining dIe child 's age and whether dIe child was at school. 
The third criticism relates to dIe language employed by the person conducting the competency exanlination. I f dIe 
competency examination is to be effective, children must be questioned in an age-appropriate maImer so that they 
are able to understand dIe content of dIe questions. For instance, in S v Els supra the magistrate asked a ten year 
old girl: "weetjy wat is dit om leuens te vertel?" When this question el icited no response, he quickly rephrased 
the question to: "weet j y nie wat is dit om te jok nie?" The child was able to answer the latter question. 
Questions should be as simple as possible. [n S v T in the competency examina tion of dIe five year old the 
following question was put to her: "Kan jy verstaan jy moet net praal wat die waarheid is wat iemand gedoen het 
wat jy gesien bel en wat gese word." ft would take a very intelligent five year old to understand what that questi on 
meant. 
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5.5.4.2 Willingness to Tell the Truth 
The second component of competency relates to the witness's willingness to tell the truth . If a chi ld is judged to 
have the cognitive capacity to testify , the next concern is whether the child will do so truthfully (Melton 1981:79). 
This gives rise to a further criticism of the competency examination. This examination is aimed at detemlining 
whether the child understands the distinction between truth and lies. However, even if a child does understand ulis 
distinction , uli s is not a guarantee that ule child will be truthful. This is a moral concept, as explained by Melton 
(1981:79): 
"Similarly, asking a cltild to tell the meaning of ' truUl ', , oath' , or 'God ' probably tell s more about 
his or her intellectual development Ulan about Ule child 's propensity to tell Ule truth ". 
In Woji v Santam Insurance Co Ltd 198 1(1) SA 1021 (A) Diedmont JA at I028D explained: 
"There are other factors as well which ule Court will take into account in assessing tile child 's 
trustworthiness in the witness-box. Does he appear to be honest - is there a consciousness of the 
duty to speak the truth?" 
The present competency examination does not address this issue and since, according to Melton (1981 :79), a child 's 
behaviour is influenced primarily by ule rewards, punishments and lllodels available in a given situation, the gravity 
of speaking the trutil wi ll have to be impressed upon the child. 111e competency examinations transcribed earlier 
from American and British cases included questions aimed at trying to discover the importance to the child of telling 
ule truth e.g. 'What happens if you lell a lie'. 
5.5.4.3 Distinction between Sworn and Unsworn Evidence 
Section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1977 enables a child to give evidence witilOut taking tile oath , provided 
tile court has warned tile child to speak tile truth . As mentioned supra , Hoffmann and Zeffertt (1988:376) argue 
tilat the distinction between sworn and unsworn evidence has lost much of its importance. Unsworn evidence is 
not necessarily regarded as being any less trustworthy than sworn evidence. There are also no statutory provisions 
requiring corroboration in the case of unsworn evidence as was the case in tile United Kingdom. 
The only possible effect of giving unsworn, as opposed to sworn evidence, would perhaps re late to credibility. 
There is tile implication tilat a child who is capable of understanding the oatil will be developmentally more 
advanced (and tilerefore a better witness) than a child who does not understand what it means to give evidence under 
oath. This may not necessarily be true, as was pointed out in R v Manda supra where Schreiner JA at 163B 
explained that a child may not be able to understand what is meant by the oath, but lllay nevertlleless "appear to 
the COurt to be more than ordinarily intelligent, observant and honest. " However, this perception can be created , 
as can be seen from the case R v Dikant and Others supra where on appeal it was argued at 696 that: 
"the witness was a child of such tender years that he was admonished to speak the truth and not 
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sworn, thereby showing that in the opinion of the presiding officer be did not appreciate tbe moral 
and legal sanctions of the oaUl and that such evidence could only be acted upon if corroborated;" 
If there is no distinction between sworn and unsworn evidence in the case of children witnesses, it is submitted that 
all child witnesses then be allowed to give evidence unsworn. This will remove any confusion as to what weight 
is to be accorded to sworn, as opposed to unsworn, evidence. 
On what basis does a presiding officer decide that a child will give sworn rather than unsworn evidence? In order 
to give sworn evidence, a witness must be able to understand the nature of the oath and the obligation to tell the 
truOl. To give unsworn evidence the witness must be warned of the duty to tell the truUl. The difference between 
Ole twO would appear to be that sworn evidence requires an understanding of the nature of Ule oath. How is Ulis 
deternlined? In the competency examinations transcribed above, none of the presiding officers asked questions 
about the oaOl. For ins tance, in S v Els supra the magistrate used almost identical examinations for Ole three 
witnesses and found one witness (aged thirteen) to be competent to give sworn evidence while the other two (aged 
ten and thirteen respectively) were allowed to give unsworn evidence. On the face of the examinations conducted, 
U,ere appears to be no reason why the one thirteen year old was allowed to give Sworn evidence while the other 
thirteen year old was warned. None of the questions used in Ule examination related to the oath. They all focused 
on Ule distinction between truth and lies . 
The competency examinations conducted in S v Cilliers supra illustrate Utis problem very well. n,e two hays, aged 
eight, were asked the same questions (and even more) than the eleven year old. All Ule answers were correct yet 
Ule eight year aids were warned to tell Ule truth while Ole eleven year old was allowed to take the oath. 
As can be seen from the above arguments, U,ere are a number of difficulties with the competency examination 
presently used in the courts which need to be addressed. 
5.6 The Cautionary Rule relating to Child Witnesses 
5.6.1 The Conunon Law Position 
Traditionally there have been certain types of evidellce which the courts have approached WiUl caution. These 
included single witnesses, accomplices, complainallts in sexual cases and young children. According to Hoffmann 
and Zeffertt (J 988:572) the purpose of the cautionary rnle "is to assist the court in deciding whether or not guilt 
has been proved beyond reasonable doubt". The cautionary rule functions as a warning to Ule court O,at it must 
be careful in evaluating Ole evidence before it. If the evidence proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, Olen the 
court may convict. The warning itself does not assist the court in making the actual evaluation, but simply serves 
as a reminder of the dangers involved. As Hoffmarlll and Zeffertt (1988:579) explain: "[tlhe cautionary rnle is nOt 
an inflexible rule of evidence, but a practice, tested by time and experience, that is aimed at avoiding a possible 
injustice to the ill110Cem" . 
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The cautionary rule, according to Hoffmann and Zeffertt (1988:580), lays down how a court should approach 
evidence. They caution that it should never be applied "in a rigid and formalistic manner". The rule itself works 
as follows: in certain cases where falsehood or untrustworthiness is, according to general human experience 
extremely great, the court must warn itself of the dangers inherent in the evidence (SA Law Commission 1989:7). 
Once the court has cautioned itself against the dangers of accepting the evidence, it may convict on the evidence 
if it is satisfied that the witness is reliable. However, if the court is still not satisfied with the evidence once it has 
warned itself, then the court must find corroboration before it can convict (Hoffinann and Zeffertt 1989:572). 
This study will look at the effect of the cautionary rule on child witnesses as well as on complainants in sexual 
offences, since child witnesses are very often complainants in sexual offences. 
5.6.2 Young Children 
The courts have frequently emphasised that the evidence of children should be scrutinised with great care. This 
rule was explained in S v Eli supra at 453F: 
"Evidence of such young children, it has been pointed out, must be 'accepted with great caution' and must 
be scrutinised with care amounting, perhaps, to suspicion." 
There is no particular age below which the cautionary rnle applies, although in S v Artman 1968(3) SA 339 (A) 
the cautionary rule was held inapplicable to a sixteen year old girl. In R v Sikurlite 1964(3) SA lSI (SR) Fieldsend 
J mentioned that he had referred to a nllll1ber of cases to determine what was meant by the phrase 'tender years', 
but had found little assistance. It would appear to be a question of fact in each case. He concluded at l55H by 
saying that he had found no authority dealing directly with the evidence of children as old as the ones in the present 
appeal (aged fourteen and fifteen), and held that the C0llll110n sense approach would be to decide the matter on the 
facts of each particular case. 
However, the younger the child, the greater the danger. According to Hoffmann and Zeffertt (1988:581), the courts 
have usually required "substantial confirmation when very young children were concerned". In R v Bell supra 
Gardiner JP at 478 held that: 
"while the law may allow the testimony of a child of 4 '/2 years to be taken if the magistrate is satisfied 
that she is competent to tell the truth, it is exceedingly dangerous to convict upon snch evidence unless 
strong corroboration is supplied." 
Although corroboration is not essential, the younger the child, tile more likely the court is to find corroboration 
necessary. For instance, in tl1e Bell case supra the Supreme Court overturned a conviction based on ti1e evidence 
of a four-and-a-half year old because there was no corroboration, despite the fact that the trial magistrate was 
impressed by the child's demeanour and was a magistrate of considerable experience . This is supported by ti1e 
unreported case of R v George where Wessels JP remarked ti1at convicting upon ti1e uncorroborated evidence of 
a three year old was so dangerous that he could not imagine any magistrate doing it under any circllll1stances. Also 
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in R v Sideropoulos supra Laurence J at 15 said that it would be unsafe to convict upon the evidence of a five year 
old unless the evidence was corroborated. 
This approach has given rise to confusion since it has been interpreted to mean that the evidence of a young child 
must be corroborated. In De Beer v R supra the appellant appealed against a conviction of indecent assault , alleging 
tiJat he should not have been convicted on tile evidence of the complainant unless it was corroborated. Grindley-
Ferris J held at 33 that there is no statutory requirement titat tile evidence of a child must be corroborated. 
However, referring to the above cases, he came to tile conclusion that the ratio decidendi of tilese cases was that 
because of their tender age the children could not be regarded as credible witnesses . He, therefore, held that in 
the present case tile evidence of a six year old should not be regarded as credible, and corroboration was therefore 
necessary. In R v S supra Bok J also confimled at 422 that it was dangerous to convict ani y on the evidence of 
a child of tender years and it was, therefore, the established practice to require corroboration . 
In R v W 1949(3) SA 772 (A) tile accused was convicted of statutory rape in that he had sexual intercourse witil 
a fourteen year old girl. The trial magistrate approached tile problem on tbe basis that a conviction could not be 
based upon tile evidence of tile complainant alone because she was only fourteen. Her evidence could , therefore, 
not be accepted unless it was corroborated. He neverdleless found the girl to be a satisfactory witness, and was 
impressed by her manner of giving evidence, going so far as to say he believed her evidence. The Appellate 
Division admitted at 779 that the question whether a woman 's testimony against a man in seduction and paternity 
cases required corroboration was an old problem which had been dealt with by the courts in a long line of cases. 
Watermeyer CJ held at 780 that the rule did not require that there had to be corroboration. He explained the 
position as follows: 
"I am satisfied that in criminal cases of the kind now in qnestion the true rnle does not insist tilat 
there must be corroboration of the complainant's evidence before the accused can be legally 
convicted. " 
This is supported by the decision in R v J supra where Young J held that corroboration of tile evidence of children 
of tender years is not required by any positive provision of the law. Their evidence must simply be treated with 
great caution (70 lE-F). In R v Sikurlite supra the court upbeld a conviction based on the evidence of three boys, 
altilOugh in this case they were aged fourteen and fifteen . The court found tiJat in such a case there was no scope 
for youthful fantasy and the boys were intelligent and remained unshaken during cross-examination. 
In R v J 1966(1) SA 88 (SR) tile court went furtber and said tiJat, where tilere was no possibility of conscious or 
unconscious fabrication, the presiding officer should not allow his judgement to be swayed by fanci ful and 
unrealistic fears (90F). Once the court has warned itself of the dangers, it may convict if it is sati sfied with the 
witness 's evidence. According to Holmes JA in S v Artman supra at 341B, all that is required for tile court to be 
satisfied with a witness is that the testimony should be clear and satisfactory in all material respects. In S v Gandu 
1981( I) SA 997 (Tk) , for ins tance, tile Supreme Court accepted the evidence of a ten year old boy , who two years 
previously had been the sale witness of his mother's murder. Munnik CJ commented as fo llows at 998H with 
respect to the boy's evidence: 
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"we are satisfied that this young boy, although young in years, is an extremely intell igent witness 
and was telling uS the truth, We are aware of the fact that he is a single witness and that he is 
a child and ye t, even if there had been certain features corroborating his evidence and discrediting 
evidence of the accused, which in itself constituted corroboration of some of his evidence, we 
would still have believed him." 
In criminal cases the court must be satisfied beyond a reasonable of the accused's gnilt, whereas in a civil case the 
guilt must be proved on a balance of probabilities. In Woji v Santam Insurance Co Ltd 1980(2) SA 971 (SE) the 
court had to decide the effect of the cautionary rule relating to child witnesses in civil proceedings. Kamlemeyer 
J held at 974H that a similar cautionary rule had to be applied in civil cases, although the difference in onus had 
always to be borne ill mind. This would have the effect that in criminal cases a court may come to the conclusion 
that the guilt of an accused has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt when the evidence relied upon is that 
of young children. In civil cases such evidence may be sufficient when evaluated on a balance of probabilities. 
The judge, appreciating the dangers inherent in the uncorroborated evidence of tbe two young children in this case, 
came to the conclusion that he could not rely on dleir evidence. His decision was heavily influenced by the fact 
that the two children, both aged ten, were testifying about events that had taken place five years previously. This 
matter came before the court on appeal in Woji v Santam Insurance Co Ltd 1981(1) SA 1021 (A). The Appellate 
Division found the evidence of the two boys to be clear, simple and straightforward . The court looked at dIe record 
of the children'S evidence and remarked as follows at 1026D: 
"Again this is not evidence which is contrived or imagined; it is simple, direct and sounds 
truthful. " 
DiedmontJ, examining the trial judge's reasons for finding he could not accept the children's evidence on a balance 
of probabilities, came to a different conclusion. He argued that dlere was no statutory requirement demanding 
corroboration, nor was dlere any rigid common law rule requiring that corroboration had to be present before a 
child 's evidence could be accepted (1028A). He held further that where an action was a civil one in which the 
burden of proof was not so onerous, there was even less cause to insist that the child's evidence be corroborated. 
All that was required was that the witness's evidence be trustwordlY. This did not mean that the danger of believing 
a child should be underrated, however. In conclusion, the Appellate Division held that they were satisfied with the 
boys' evidence, finding it to be trustworthy and that the trial judge had erred in rejecting it on the grounds that he 
could find no corroboration of their evidence (1029B). 
TIle most recent case dealing with the evidence of children is S v S 1995(1) SACR 50 (ZS) where the court 
remarked that a new and more specific approach to cases involving children was called for. One of the grounds 
of appeal alleged that the magistrate had failed to observe the cautionary rule in respect of the eleven year 
complainant. The court at 54D accepted that it was a well-established principle that it is advisable to require 
corroboration of the evidence of young children since their youdl indicated an "i!l1!l1ature mind which may cause 
tbem to give ill-considered or misleading evidence". TIle court surrunarised the cautionary rule , explaining that lhe 
court had to be fully appreciative of the risks involved in the evidence of children. In attempting to discover 
precisely what risks are involved, Ebrahim JA listed six of dIe main objections to relying on children's evidence 
at 54H-I: 
280 
"(a) children's memories are unreliable; 
(b) children are egocentric; 
(c) children are highly suggestible; 
(d) children have difficulty distinguishing fact from fantasy; 
(e) children make false allegations, particularly of sexual assault; and 
(I) children do not understand the duty to tell the truth. " 
Ebrahim JA then proceeded to evaJuate the complainant's evidence in terms of these categories, and held at 60B 
that a rational decision as to the credibility of a witness (especially a child witness) can only be arrived at after a 
proper analysis of the evidence by means of testing it against the shortcomings as outlined above. In order to reach 
an intelligent conclusion, the court held that it was necessary to apply a certain amount of psychology and to be 
aware of recent advances in this field . It was accepted that this would mean an increase in a judicial officer's 
workload, but "it is the price to be paid for professionally administering justice in an increasingly complex society" 
(60C). 
This judgement, it is submitted, is extremely progressive. Instead of focusing on what courts have previously had 
to say about the risks involved in accepting the evidence of a child, the court looked for a scientifically acceptable 
basis from which to examine these risks. Of special importance is the court's decision that it was necessary to 
apply a certain amount of psychology in these cases and that courts had to be aware of recent advances in 
psychology. This is one of the first decisions to emphasise the need to integrate psychology and law where child 
witnesses are concerned. This judgement was described as "refreshingly pragmatic" by Schwikkard (1995: 93) and 
will provide useful guidelines for South African courts in the evaJuation of children's evidence. The sensitivity of 
this judgment is evident in the criticism directed at the malmer in which the trial had been conducted. ltamely that 
all persomlel involved were male. Ebrahim JA emphasised that attention had to be given to the fact that 
embarrassment was likely to be experienced by a little girl when relating the details of rape. 
The facts of the case themselves highlight the progressive nature of the judgment. The accused was charged with 
raping a nine year old girl. There were a number of difficulties in the case. The complainant did not report the 
incident at the first avai lable opportunity. When she did tell her mother, she simply said that the accused had 
touched her breasts, her buttocks and the front of her body. Several months after the alleged rape it was discovered 
that the complainant was no longer a virgin when she was examined by her aunt to whom she had been sent for 
instruction in sexual matters. When questioned by her mother, the complainant initially remained silent and only 
gave details about the rape after her mother threatened to report her to the police. Despite these difficulties the 
accused was convicted or rape. 
The judgment in S v S supra comes as a welcome altentative to the approach currently adopted by the South African 
courts and is an illustration that the time has come to re-evaluate our existing notions about the unreliability of child 
witnesses. As Combrinck (1995:330) argues, it is not suggested that children will always be reliable and accurate 
witnesses. It is submitted that children sometimes are inadequate witnesses in the same way that adults sometimes 
are inadequate witnesses. In such cases convictions will obviously not follow. Rather, what is advocated is that 
the courts be aware of tile recent advances in psychology in order to reach "an intelligent conclusion" insofar as 
the evidence of children is concerned (at 60B-C). 
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In giving judgment Ebrahim JA explained at 59H-I that be adopted this method of analysing the child witness's 
evidence because he believed that a new and more specific approach to cases involving children was called for. 
It was not that there was anything intrinsically wrong with tlle present approach of looking for corroboration of a 
child's evidence. In mOSI cases tlle approach was correCI, but the problem arose where courts, in approaching these 
cases with a "single-minded eye towards corroboration", tended to lose sight of tlle reason for seeking it. 
This danger was also highlighted in S v MupJudza 1982(1) ZLR 271 (SC) where Baron ACJ explained tlle position 
as follows at 273E: 
5.6.2.1 
"But - perhaps precisely because of the search for corroboration - trial couns frequently forget 
that the court must decide whether tlle witness is credible... If (he is) not, tlle matter is at an 
end, and the question of corroboration of, or support for, his testimony does not arise ... " 
Basis of the Cautionary Rule 
Hoffmann and Zeffent (1988:581) explain tllat tlle dangers involved in the evidence of children are twofold: 
children are highly imagimtive and very susceptible to suggestion. In R v Bell supra the court explained al 478-9 
dIe reasons why the courts need to employ the cauliomry rule when evaluating tlle evidence of children: 
"One knows from experience tllat children of that age are apt to be imaginative, and apt to be 
persuaded by people, and apt to give answers to questions sometimes au the liues on which the 
questions are put ... " 
It is frequently alleged that children make up stories or fantasise , and are generally categorised as being 'highly 
imaginative' . In Bell supra at 480 Gardiner JP was of the opinion that children mighl make up allegations of 
sexual acts: 
"tllere remains the possibility tllat tlle child might make up tlle story. Children see animals having 
connection with one anotller: they sometimes mix witll children badly broughl up and are apt to 
bear such things talked about, and il is not uncommon for children, even of Illis age, to imitate, 
or have some knowledge of sexual aCls". 
Bok J in R v S supra held tllat the court had to warn itself of the dangers of suggestion where child witnesses were 
concerned, although he found at 422 on the particular facts before him that there was not the sl ightest suggestion 
thaI the child's parents might have prompted him to tell tlle story he did. This danger was highlighted in Woji v 
Santam Insurance Co Ltd 1980(2) SA 971 (SE) where Kannemeyer J at 975H explained Ihal the temptation to 
implicate an innocent person may relate not only to the child , but also to a parent. It is tllen tbat tbe suggestibility 
of children becomes particularly important. In S v Manda supra tbe Appellate Division cautioned at 163C thaI 
reliance upon the uncorroboraled evidence of a young child must not be underraled: 
"The imagimtiveness and suggestibility of children are only two of a number of elements tllat 
require tbeir evidence to be scrutinised witb care amounting, perhaps, to suspicion. " 
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R v J supra supported this perception of children, finding that the tendency of a child to romance was so marked 
tilat corroboration was in practice essential. Lewis AlA in R v J 1966(1) SA 88 (SR) held at 92D that the main 
purpose of applying the cautionary rule in cases involving young children was to guard against the danger of 
invention. In S v B 1976(2) SA 54 (C) the court was faced with the evidence of three boys, aged thirteen and 
fourteen, who were the complainants of alleged indecent assaults. The trial court held that the cautionary rule 
needed to be applied since boys of that age were subject to influences by other people, they lived in a world of tileir 
own, they imagined things and suffered from hallucinations (57H) . 
The South African Law Commission (1989:34) was of the opinion that there was no justification for changing the 
existing position relating to the cautionary rule and corroboration, since it had been developed over many decades 
and was founded on the practical experience of generations of legal professionals. They based this decision on the 
fact that children are often umeliable witnesses and are unable to interpret events, even though they may be good 
observers. Furthemlore, fbey can easily be manipulated and intimidated and are frequently influenced during cross-
examination. 
The dangers inherent in a child's evidence were summarised in S v S supra. The first allegation is that a child's 
memory is umeliable. In looking at fbe available research, Ebrahim JA explains at 55B-E that children generally 
have a good recall of central events but their memory is poorer with respect to peripheral details. This principle 
was then applied to the facts of the case with which he was dealing where the complainant gave a clear account of 
tile alleged assault but was unsure when questioned about who was in the next-door classroom when the assault 
occurred. 
Secondly, children are accused of being egocentric. Preschool children, it is argued, may be so concerned Witll 
themselves that they may be unable to be objective about the truth. The ability to infer what others are feeling or 
thinking develops at ages four to five. As far as the argument that a child may pay disproportionate attention to 
evidence which relates to himself is concerned, this is not regarded as being a characteristic peculiar only to 
children. All witnesses do so in differing degrees (55F-G). 
Thirdly, children are alleged to be suggestible. Research has shown that this is certainly true, but not only of 
children. Adults are also suggestible. Courts will have to scrutinise the evidence of witnesses to see whether there 
is any evidence that a witness may have been influenced in some way (551-561) . 
The fourth accusation is that children have difficulty in distinguishing fact from fantasy and are therefore liable to 
tell the court of their fantasies rather than give a factual account of what happened. The court, however, 
emphasised that children do not fantasise over things that are beyond their own direct or indirect experience (578). 
The fifth allegation suggests that complaints of rape, especially by children , are fundamentally suspect. Ebrahim 
JA held at 571 that tile over-emphasis of possible fantasy was not justified. In each case it remained a question of 
tile credibility of the specific witness. 
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The last objection to chi ldren as witnesses is that they do not understand the duty to tell the truth. This, it is 
argued, is a sweeping statement which ignores differences in age, intelligence and morality between children (59F). 
5.6.2.2 Criticism of the Cautionary Rule 
Despite the criticisms that have been levelled against children as witnesses, there are a number of cases where the 
courts have praised young witnesses. In R v S supra Bok J commented on the evidence of the complainant, a ten 
year old boy, as being favourable. He believed that the boy stood up to cross-examination "exceptionally well , 
never giving the impression that he was trying to fabricate stories." At 422 the court said: 
"I hardly think that a child of his age could, on the spur of the moment, make up the story he told 
his maUler on the 12Ul June and then come into court and tell the same story in detail ... " 
In R v J 1958(3) SA 699 (SR) Ule trial judge found a four year old girl to be "a bright little girl who gave ber 
evidence readily without prompting or leading" (701A). In R v W supra the trial judge was very impressed with 
the detailed evidence of a ten year old girl , especially the observation she made Ulat she could not see the church 
door because the wall was higher than she was, but later she saw the complainant coming out of the doorway 
because she had in the meanwhile moved her position and was standing higher up where Ule wall was not so high. 
The trial judge remarked that it was" [mJerkwaardige getnienis van 'n kind van 10 jaar" (777) . Ironically, this was 
the very reason that the Appellate Division found Ole chi ld's evidence to be suspicious: 
"The magistrate was impressed by the fact that Carol ine Muggles was able to give a detailed 
account of what was supposed to have happened, down to her precise changes of position while 
the complainant was in the church ... But it seems to me that the claim made by this little girl 
of 10 to be able to remember all these details, to her so utterly unimportant, after an interval of 
seven or eight months should have suggested to the magistrate doubts as to whether she was really 
speaking to what she could remember and wbether Olerefore she was a reliable witness." 
It would seem Olat tbe perception of children as being unsatisfactory witnesses is so ingrained that when a child does 
give a detailed account of events this in itself is regarded as highly suspicious, even where no foundation has been 
laid for this suspicion. The standard, therefore, applied to the evidence of children is much higher than Ulat applied 
to adult witnesses. This was expressly stated in S v Manda supra where the State's case was based on the evidence 
of three boys, who appeared to be aged eleven. five and three respectively. The one boy said that the appell ant 
was wearing shoes wbile the others said he was not. At 164A Schreiner JA made tbe following comment in 
response to this: 
"Such discrepancies might in other circumstances seem to be of little importance but wbere the 
evidence of young children is in question proved uncertainty of observation or recollection 
reinforces the generally accepted need for caution in relying upon uleir evidence". 
In tbe same case the judge went so far as to say at 163D Ulat the evidence of children should be scrutinised with 
care amounting to suspicion. 
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Even though the courts have accepted that corroboration is not essential , the standard employed in the case of 
children makes it almost impossible to convict where the only wi tnesses are children. In R v J supra it was alleged 
that the accused had indecently assaulted a four year old girl. The child gave evidence and created a very good 
impression on the trial judge. Her elder sister, aged eight, gave evidence that she had looked through the window 
and witnessed the assault. The feasibility of tile alleged view was confirmed by a test. The elder sister's evidence 
supported the complainant's in all respects. Yet, the appeal court held that the state' s case depended primarily on 
tile evidence of the two gi rls and since children are imaginative and suggestible, the conviction could not stand 
witilOut corroboration. This decision creates the impression that , although corroboration is not essential , tile fact 
that the evidence of children is to be viewed as suspicious results in corroboration becoming necessary in every 
case. 
A further criticism tilat can be levelled against the warning is dIe fact tilat it accepts the perceived dangers of child 
witnesses as being true in every case. For instance, in R v J supra dIe court does not warn itself that there is a 
possibility that a young child may be imaginative and suggestible, and tilen attempt to find evidence of this. Rather, 
the court assumes as fact that a child of four is imaginative and suggestible to such an extent dlat corroboration "is 
in practice essential" (702A) . 
The decision in R v J 1966(1) SA 88 (SR) cautions against this approach. MacDonald AlP stated at 90E-F dlat, 
aldlOugb there was a need to scrutinise and weigh up the evidence of children, this should not be allowed to displace 
the exercise of common sense: 
"If a j udicial offi cer , having anxiously scrutinised such evidence with a view to discovering 
whether there is any reasonable possibility of conscious or unconscious fabri cation, is satisfied 
that there is no such possibility and that dIe evidence of a single Crown witness may , due and 
proper weight being given to dIe whole of tile evidence, be safel y accepted as proving the guilt 
of the accused beyond reasollable doubt, he should not allow his judgment to be swayed by 
fanciful and unrealistic fears. " 
Although Lewis AlA explained tilat the main purpose of applying the cautionary rule in the case of child witnesses 
was to guard against dIe danger of invention (92D), he nevertheless went on at 94G to say that there was no basis 
for alleging that a child would imagine some other (innocent) person to be the perpetrator: 
"I know of no authority which suggests that there is an inherent danger that a child, who has heen 
wronged and injured in this way by a person known to her and who feels genuinely hurt and 
aggrieved by what has been done to her, will ilmllediately thereafter either imagine tilat the 
wrongdoer is someone else or maliciously blame someone else for the wrong done to her. On 
dIe contrary, conunon sense and human experience suggest that dIe spontaneous reaction will be 
to name the real offender. " 
The emphasis on a conunon sense approach was again reiterated in S v Artman supra where Holmes lA warned 
against the dangers of formalism at 34B-C: 
"I would add dlat, while tilere is always need for caution in such cases, the ultimate requirement 
is proof beyond reasonable doubt; and courts must guard against thei r reasoning tending to 
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become stifled by formalism. In otiler words, the exercise of caution must not be allowed to 
displace the exercise of common sense;" 
Evidence of this approach is to be found in Woji v Santam Insurance Co lid 1981(1) SA 1021 (A) where the 
Appellate Division found the evidence of two ten year old boys to be clear, simple, straightforward and truthful , 
despite the fact tilat tile boys were testi fying about events that had happened five years before the trial. At 1025A 
Diedruont JA admitted that young children can give good evidence: 
"Despite his youth - or perhaps because of his youth - Sibonde's evidence was clear, simple and 
straightforward. " 
The Appeal Court dealt with the fact that the children were giving evidence about an event that had taken place five 
years previously, and accepted that a child's memory was often reliable: 
"A complicating factor in tllis case was, as was emphasised by the trial Judge, tilat these two 
children were speaking of an incident which had happened five years before and the question must 
be asked whetiler tileir capacity of recollection may not be wholly umeliable. I think not. It is 
well known that children often have a vivid memory of an unusual or exciting incident" (1028H-
\o29A). 
In sharp contradiction, Smalberger J in Damba v A A Mutual Insurance Association Ltd 198 1 (3) SA 740 (E) found 
tl,at a child of eleven could not give an accurate and reliable account of what took place three-and-a-half years 
earlier , and was tilerefore not prepared to accept his evidence without corroboration: 
"I do not consider it likely that a child of his years can project back more Ulan three and a half 
years and provide an accurate and reliable picture of Ius intelligence, knowledge and maturity at 
that time" (744H) . 
It has been argued tl,at the cautionary rule has been based on common sense and experience, yet the above two 
cases indicate that these principles are not applied unifomlly . In fact, other than ensuring that the evidence of 
children is treated WiUl suspicion, ulese principles do not assist in any way in evaluating tile reliability of tllis type 
of evidence. There is no scientific basis in terms of which evidence can be evaluated , and tltis task is left up to 
tl,e discretion of individual judges, ule opinions of whom differ vastly as to ule reliabili ty and accuracy of children's 
evidence. 
In Jabaar v South African Railways and Harbours supra, for instance, King AJ hypothesised as to possible reasons 
why the child witness, aged twelve, could perhaps be open to suggestion. Although a court is not supposed to 
hypothesise as to probable causes without an evidentiary basis being laid, the courts neveruleless do so when 
applying the cautionary rule. In evaluating ule evidence of a child, the courts do nOt look only at the evidence laid 
before them regarding possible dangers in tite specific witness's evidence, but go further and look at any feasible 
influence that may perhaps have been exerted on the evidence. This can be seen from the following statement by 
King AJ at 555G-H: 
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"The fact that he was able to maintain in the witness-box that he and his brother had been sitting 
on the pavement could very well have been due, not to a deliberate attempt on his part to lie, but 
to the fact that he must have been susceptible, consciously or unconsciously, to the influence of 
the adults nearest and dearest to him who in their turn could, deliberately or otherwise, have 
influenced him in his recollection of the accident. " 
In S v F 1989(3) SA 847 (A) the court at 854! in fact stated that "[ilt is true that these possibilities are speculative 
and that a court is not usually required to speculate on possibilities having no foundation in the evidence placed 
before it." 
The above criticisms relate to the arbitrary manner in which the cautionary rule is applied to children and the 
conflicting decisions it gives rise to. Other criticisms levelled against this rule relate to the basis upon which the 
principle rests and which was questioned in S v S by the Zimbabwean Supreme Court. Combrinck (1995:328) 
voices the problem succinctly as follows: the most urgent question to be addressed is whether tile objections against 
the evidence of children can still be said to hold true. Recent research, accepted by the court in S v S, has 
concluded that children are no less credible than adults insofar as suggestibility, memory and the distinction between 
fact and fantasy is concerned (Hammond and Han1I11ond 1987:3). Since there is strong empirical research available 
that children are no more unreliable than adults as witnesses, the South African Law Con1I11ission's (1989: 34) vague 
belief in the cantionary rule as having been developed over many decades and having been founded on the practical 
experience of legal professionals will have to be re-assessed . 
5.6.3 Complainants in Sexual Cases 
The cautionary rule must also be applied when evaluating the evidence of a complainant in a sexual offence. Sexual 
offences would include charges of rape, indecent assault, sodomy and criminal inju.ria. It is irrelevant whether the 
complainant is male or female. The court must warn itself of the dangers inherent in the evidence of a complainant 
of a sexual offence. If the court, despite the warning, is satisfied with the witness's evidence, the court may 
convict. Where, however, the court is still unsure, corroboration will be necessary (Hoffmaml and Zeffertt 
1988:579-580). 
In H v Rex 1937 NPD 1 the accused was convicted of common assault in that he touched the breasts of a young 
girl travelling on a train. She was the only witness in the case and the court at 3 explained that "[tlhis is obviously 
one of those cases in which a court must be very slow to convict on the uncorroborated evidence of the 
complainant." It would appear from this judgement that the standard to be applied to a complainant in a sexual 
matter is to be much higher than that applied to a complainant in an ordinary case. Feethanl JP conmlented at 4 
that ti,e trial magistrate had accepted the evidence of the complainant and rejected the evidence of the accused and 
he had commented favourably on the demeanour of the former and unfavourably on the demeanour of Ole latter. 
[n response to this Feetham JP made the following observation at 4: 
"But, as I have said, this is a case in which we have to look critically at a conviction for an 
offence of this sort based solely on tile evidence of the complainant without any corroboration, 
and, in considering whether we should accept the magistrate's conclusion and allow the conviction 
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to stand, we have to ask ourselves whether the story told by the girl is a story which, on the face 
of it, is a probable story." 
The appeal court then looked at the facts of the case and found that the evidence was insufficient to support tlle 
conviction, since the girl should have left the comparunent when assaulted and not simply moved to another seat 
and she had failed to report the matter to someone timeously. TIlis decision was "based on the probabilities, 
coupled with the consideration that the Court must observe extreme caution in accepting uncorroborated evidence 
in cases of this nature. " 
In R v M 1947(4) SA 489 (N) tlle Supreme Court went so far as to hold that corroboration was essential . The 
defence argued at 492 that a court could not convict an accused person of indecent assault unless there was physical 
evidence of the act and there was corroboration of tlle complainant' s evidence that such an indecent act was 
committed by the accused. Based on this, the court found that the accused could not be convicted of indecent 
assault since there was no corroboration of the indecent assault, despite the fact tilat tile trial magistrate nOt only 
regarded the story of the state witnesses as being more probable than the story told by the accused, but that he also 
considered that the state witnesses gave their evidence in a straightforward and convincing maIU1er whereas the 
accused's demeanour was not conducive to being believed. At 495 Milne AJ held: 
"In tile absence, therefore of corroboration ... it must be held that the charge of indecent assault 
was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt ... " 
The court based this finding on the decision of Hawthorn JP in Papla v Rex 1946 NPD 308 where the court held 
the following at 310: 
"There must be no conviction unless the evidence of the complainant is corroborated. The 
corroborative evidence must be of such a nature as to induce in the mind of the Court sufficient 
confidence in the complainant as a witness to enable it to conclude from his evidence that the deed 
was done and tl,at the Appellant did it, is true". 
However, the Appellate Division in R v Rautenbach 1949(1) SA 135(A) referred only to tlle fact that a warning 
must be given, and did not require corroboration. At 143 Schreiner JA held that it is the duty of the judge to wal1l 
the jury of the danger of convicting upon the uncorroborated evidence of the complainant. And in R v W supra 
the Appellate Division held tllat corroboration was not essential in cases of this nature. The rule is succinctly set 
out by Waternleyer CJ at 780: 
"In rape cases, for instance, tlle established and proper practice is not to require that tlle 
complainant' s evidence be corroborated before a conviction is competent. But what is required 
is that the trier of fact should have clearly in mind that these cases of sexual assaults require 
special treatment, that charges of tlle kind are generally difficult to disprove, and tltat various 
considerations may lead to their being falsely laid". 
In R v J 1966(1) SA 88 (SR) tbe court went even further and said that tlJe exercise of caution should not be allowed 
to displace tlle exercise of common sense : 
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"while there is always the need for special caution in scrutinising and weighing the evidence of 
young children, complainants in sexual cases, accomplices and, generally, the evidence of a single 
witness, the exercise of caution should not be allowed to displace the exercise of conunon sense" 
(at 90D). 
Watemleyer CJ in R v W supra introduced a new aspect into tile rule which gave rise to some difficulty in 
application. At 781 he explained that it is permissible for a court to convict in sexual cases where the complainant 
is not corroborated and even where the accused, having given evidence, has not been proved to be a lying witness. 
He went on to say fhat fhis would only be tile position where the court was fully appreciative of the risks involved 
and where tile merits of tile complainant and the demerits of the accused as witnesses were beyond question. 
Lewis AlA, however, in R v J 1966(1) SA 88 (SR) did not accept this approach, arguing that the difficulty in tile 
above formula was determining precisely what Wateruleyer CJ had in mind when he said that the merits of the 
complainant and tile demerits of fhe accused as witnesses must be beyond question. Watemleyer CJ said that this 
forumla was to be applied even where the accused was not found to be a lying witness. Demerits of the accused 
as a witness would, therefore, seem to include unsatisfactory features in his evidence other than those which prove 
him to be a lying witness. His comments could also be interpreted to mean tilat the merits of the complainant as 
a witness must be beyond reproach and that there are no material inconsistencies or defects in her evidence. Lewis 
AJ A, however, did not believe this approach would assist tile court in any way: 
"It seems to me, with respect, that it is undesirable to lay down any fixed forumla as to how fhe 
evidence must be approached at tlle verdict stage, apart from the general rule fhat the court, from 
tile outset, must be fully conscious of the dangers inherent in such cases and treat them with 
special precaution" (94C-D). 
At 94H he added that the special formula laid down by Wateruleyer CJ supra would only be appropriate where the 
case was one that involved the complainant's word against that of tlle accused, where the surrounding circumstances 
offered no real assistance and where tile danger of false identification had not been eliminated. 
In S v Snyman 1968(2) SA 582 (A) the Appellate Division held that tile cautionary rule requires, firstiy, a warning 
by the Court of tile dangers inherent in the evidence and, secondly, the existence of some safeguard which will 
reduce the risk of a wrong conviction. The latter could include corroboration implicating the accused or the absence 
of any evidence to the contrary from the accused or lying on tile part of the accused. 
Nevertileless, tile standard employed in evaluating the evidence of a witness in a sexual case is higher tilan that used 
for otiler witnesses . 111is distinction was emphasised by tile court's decision in S v F supra where the Appellate 
Division held that, altJlOugh the trial magistrate had warned himself of the dangers involved in accepting the 
evidence of a complainant in a sexual case, he was simply paying lip-service to the cautionary rule and had not 
subjected tile complainant's evidence to the requisite critical evaluation. Grosskopf AJ found that the trial 
magistrate had approached tile case like any other criminal case. He had accepted the complainant's evidence and 
that of the State witnesses and had rejected the appellant's evidence and on that basis had come to tile conclusion 
that fhe appellant was guilty of rape. If the magistrate, it was held at 853A-C, had applied the cautionary rule 
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properly, he would have approached the complainant's evidence critically and come to the conclusion that the 
complainant was not such a satisfactory witness. It would appear from this judgement that the complainant would 
have been a satisfactory witness in an ordinary criminal case, but applying the caution necessary for sexual 
complainants she no longer becomes a satisfactory witness. 
TillS difference in standards was also referred to in S v D 1992(1) SA 513 (Nm) where Frank J, in applying the 
cautionary rule in a rape case, added that: 
"Had the charge against the appellant been, for instance, one of theft, requiring no more than the 
ordinary high but not exceptional standard of careful scrutiny ... the verdict of guilty must have 
stood" (SISA). 
Despite these statements by the courts, S Du Toit AJ in S v M 1992(2) SACR 188 (W) simply stated that dJe onus 
of proof in sexual cases was not heavier and remained the same as in other criminal cases. 
S v D supra severely criticised the use of the cautionary rule in sexual offences, holding that it served no purpose 
other dJan to discriminate against female complainants and was, therefore, contrary to article 10 of the Namibian 
Constitution which provides for the equality of all persons before the law regardless of sex (516F-G): 
"To sum up, in my view, the cautionary rule evolved in cases of rape has no rational basis for 
its existence and should therefore not form part of our law and is probably contrary to the 
provisions of the Namibian Constitution." 
The court did, however, add that this judgment did not mean that the nature and circumstances of the alleged 
offence need not be considered carefully. Where the court is faced with a single witness, the cautionary rule in 
this regard will obviously apply, and where any motive for a false charge is suggested by the accused or appears 
from the evidence, this will have to be carefully considered. The final test will always be that the accused's guilt 
must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, and this test must be the same whedJer the crime is theft or rape. 
The judgment is applicable to Namibia, and is therefore not binding on our courts. In fact, this decision was almost 
immediately criticised in S v M supra and the court held that the cautionary rule in sexual offences is not a legal 
rule but is rather an admonition for the cautious application of common sense. The caution that is needed to guard 
against wrongful conviction is based upon "normal and sound logic" (188H), and its purpose is not to discriminate 
against women. The role of the cautionary rule, it was held, is to ensure that the accused is protected against a 
possible false charge and to remind the court that it is dealing with a situation dJat from experience carries the risk 
that a mistaken conclusion can be reached. 
It is, however, the decision in S v D supra that has received much praise. Olckers (1992:428) finds the judgement 
encouraging for the following reasons: the judge considered the issue of the cautionary rule without it specifically 
being put to the court; the judge was not inhibited from confronting the issue despite the fact that it was potentially 
controversial; the court was prepared to look to new and critical sources and to evaluate these for their merit and 
worth; the court did not hesitate to deconstruct some of the myths relating to rape; and the judge's reliance on dJe 
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equality of Outcome criteria in order to find discrimination shows progressiveness and enlightenment. 
5.6.3.1 Basis of the Cautionary Rule 
The dangers involved in accepting the evidence of a complainant in a sexual case would include the following: tile 
charge may have been falsely laid, motivated by spite, sexual frustration or "other unpredictable emotional causes " 
(Hoffmann and Zeffertt 1988:579). Sexual offences, it is alleged, are difficult to disprove since tiley usually take 
place in private, leave no outward traces, and proof depends on the word of the complainant against that of the 
accused. There is the danger too that a complainant may wisb to protect a friend or implicate someone richer. 
Hysteria may cause a complainant to imagine things which did not in fact bappen. 
In R v M supra Milne AJ focused on the possibility tbat sucb a charge may be brought for the purpose of 
vengeance: 
"As a mode of obtaining vengeance for any affront to a woman's pride or dignity, the bringing 
of a charge of this kind is probably witilOut equai. The very fact that the charge is calculated to 
damage the man even if he is eventually acquitted" (494). 
Schreiner J A at 143 in R v Rautenbach supra emphasised the fact tilat frightened women may become hysterical 
and imagine that things have happened , whicb in fact bave not: 
"It is not only the risk of conscious fabrication that must be guarded against; tbere is also the 
danger that a frightened woman, especially if inclined to hysteria, may imagine tilat things have 
bappened which did not happen at all". 
In R v W supra Watemleyer CJ explained at 780 that a furtiler danger may be created where the girl becomes 
pregnant. Tbere may be the possibility that the girl may want to shield tile actual perpetrator and implicate someone 
of relatively sound financial standing who may be better able to maintain the child. 
Lewis AJA in R v J 1966(1) SA 88 (SR) at 92A-C enumerates, in tilis well-known passage, tbe possible dangers 
associated with complainants in sexual cases: 
"In tile case of all females alleging sexual assaults, the need for similar caution, in tbe ahsence 
of corroboration flows from the fact that such charges are easily laid and difficult for the accused 
to disprove, and a multiplicity of motives may exist for tbeir being falsely laid. This has been 
recognised since time immemorial , and a classic example of such a false cbarge can be found in 
the Biblical story of Potipbar' s wife and Joseph. Apart from the danger of maliciously false 
charges, it is also recognised tbat, even with adults, one may encounter cases of unfounded 
allegations of sexual assault whicb owe tileir origin to fligbts of fancy". 
At 92D the court held that tbe main purpose of applying tile cautionary rule in sexual cases was to guard against 
the danger of invention. As far as children who were complainants in sexual cases was concerned, tbe court felt 
that there was tile potential danger that tbe child might have willingly indulged in some foml of sexual experience 
with another child or adolescent of the opposite sex and when forced to explain this, she might endeavour to cover 
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up the real truth by maidng a false allegation of rape against an iIllocent person (93G). 
In De La Rouviere v S A Medical and Dental Council I 977(l) SA 85 (N) Van Heerden J wanted at 100F against 
accepting the uncorroborated evidence of complainants in sexual cases, since charges of ulis nature may be 
motivated by spite, sexual frustration or other unpredictable emotional causes. In addition, cases of ulis nature are 
difficult to refute because uley take place in private and usually depend entirely upon the word of the complainant 
against that of the accused. 
It is obvious from the many reasons forwarded for tile existence of the cautionary rules tilat there are a wide variety 
of possible motives for laying fal se charges in cases of sexual assault. In Balhuber v The State, case no .3011985, 
25 September 1996 (A) Botha AJ refers to Glanville Williams' discussion of the reason for ulis rule: 
"There is a sound reason for it , because these cases are particularly subject 10 the danger of 
deliberately false cbarges, resulting from sexual neurosis, fantasy, jealousy, spite or simply a 
girl's refusal to admit ulat she consented to an act of which she is now ashamed. Of ulese various 
possibilities, ule most subtle are those cOIUlected WiUI mental complexes". 
One of the motivations for women bringing false charges against men was explained by Wigmore and referred to 
by Botha AJ in this case: 
"The unchaste (Jet us call it) mentality finds incidental but direct expression in tile narration of 
imaginary sex-incidents of which tile narrator is tile heroine or tile victim. On ule surface the 
narration is straightforward and convincing. The real victim, however, too often in such cases 
is the innocent man;" (at 43). 
The wide variety of possible motives for invention was mentioned in Balhuber's case. Botha AJ explained ulat the 
complexity of such motives and the difficulty of perceiving them lie at tile very foundati on of the cautionary rule. 
The following further reasons were proffered by the Judge of Appeal at 45: !be complainant may have been 
overcome by shame, disgust or remorse (even alcoholic remorse) at having consented to intercourse; she may have 
been sexually frustrated; she may have been filled witll revulsion at what she did ; or she may have become afraid 
WiUI tile coming of day. 
The motivation and basis for the cautionary rule, !berefore, appears to be threefold: charges of a sexual nature are 
easily laid; there are a multiplicity of motives; and charges of tilis nature are easily laid and difficult to disprove 
(Olckers 1992:427). 
5_6_3_2 Criticisms of the Cautionary Rule 
This rule has been criticised since it discriminates against !be victim and implies Ulat the evidence of women must 
automatically be approached with suspicion (Hoffmann and Zeffertt 1988:579). This suspicion has been reinforced 
by tile comparison of complainants in sexual cases with accomplices. This comparison was highlighted by the 
Appellate Division in S v Snyman supra at 585C-D: 
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"Unlike an accomplice in a criminal trial, a complainant in a sexual case is not ex hypothesi a 
criminal. Neverdleless in respect of bodl of them there ex ists an inberent danger in relying on 
dleir testimony. First, various motives may induce them to substitute the accused for the culprit. 
Second , from dleir participation in events which actually happened, each has a deceptive facility 
for convincing testimony, the only fiction being the deft submission of dIe accused for the real 
culprit. " 
This rule , according to Burchell and Milton (1997 :448), has been characterised as a "lingering insult" since it seems 
automatically to approach dle evidence of women with suspicion and appears to attribute ulterior motives to any 
person who alleges rape without the evidence of other witnesses. 
The cautionary rule canle under severe criticism in the Namibian case of S v D supra where Frank J referred to 
dle approach in the BaLhuber case supra as "stunningly imaginative". He argues at 5 151 that it is not clear why 
sexual assaults should be treated on a different footing from adler cases. There is no empirical data to support the 
contention that in cases of tllis nature more false charges are laid than in any other type of crime. In fact, according 
to Frank J, tbe available evidence indicates the contrary. Olckers (1992:428) argues that the rule is illogical since 
tllere is no evidence to support the contention that charges of a sexual nature are easily laid. She refers to an 
empirical study conducted in America where it was shown that the incidence of false reports in cases of rape was 
2 % - exactly the same as that for other crimes. Studies conducted by NICRO support the American study since 
tlley indicate that nineteen out of every twenty rapes are unreported. The judge in S v D then went on to question 
the reasons on which this rule has been based: 
"Why should tile Court not speculate as to possible defences in other cases as well? Why is the 
ordinary burden of proof applicable to all other criminal offences not applicable to cases such as 
the present? Surely, whatever tile offence, the trial court mUSt take tbe nature of the evidence into 
accowlt ... The trial court must, of course, consider the nature and circumstances of the 
particular offence, but why must a different ultimate test be applied ... " (5 16A). 
Wilmot (! 992:2 12) asks why a cautionary rule over and above tllat applicable to sing le witnesses is not applicable 
to an unwitnessed assault , or to a burglar caught red-handed by a single witness. 
The Namibian case accepted dlat different motives may exist for laying false charges, but it was argued that this 
could apply to any offence and not only to offences of a sexual nature. The court referred to the reasoning of the 
judgment in R v J supra and said that the only relevance to the story of Potiphar and Joseph in that judgment was 
simply to indicate male bias: 
"It would appear, however, that the reasoning in tills regard is as follows . As the story appears 
in the Bible it is the truth. As it is the gospel truth it does not relate to a single incident but is 
of universal application. Thus all women are prima facie deceitful and ac t wi th hidden motives 
and all men are prima facie incorruptible and act witllOut hidden motives. " (5 16C) 
Frank J went on to say that whether such hidden motives are found by the trial court would depend to a large ex tent 
"upon the fecundity of dle presiding officer's imagillation" (5 16D). 
OIckers (1992:428) summarises dle multiplici ty of motives dlat have fomled the basis of the cautiOllary rule: tlley 
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range from shame, disgust, sexual frustration, being fill ed witll revulsion, fear, to sexual fantasies, neuroses, 
jealousy, revenge, spite, wounded vanity , explaining pregnancy and hysteria. She quotes as follows from Hubbard: 
"It is hard to think of any other area of law in which the courts would be so willing to indulge 
in amateur psychology, WitllOut any supporting evidence from expert witnesses". 
The court also found the cautionary rule to be unconstitutional since it discriminated against women. Frank J 
accepted that in strict theory the cautionary rule relating to cases of sexual assaul t was applicable to all cases 
irrespective of tlle sex of the complainant. However, he went on to argue that in at least 95% of the cases of this 
nature in Namibia tile complainants are female. In view of this, the court was of the opinion that the cautionary 
rule had no other purpose than to discriminate against women complainants (516F). Here Frank J has employed 
the equality theory of outcome of effect, using the contextual approach. He found tilat despite the fact that the rule 
itself was technicall y gender neutral , in the vast majority of cases the complainants are female and the effect of the 
rule, therefore, is in practice to discriminate against women. 
In S v M 1992(2) SACR 188 ON) the South African courts argued that to say Ule cautionary rule existed only to 
discriminate against women was a harsh statement. However, they did not provide any arguments to counter this, 
simply reiterating the statement that complainants in sexual cases can also be male . The court did not address the 
argument of Frank J U,at at least 95 % of complainants in sexual cases were female. The judgment in this case, 
aldlOugh distancing itself from the decision in S v D supra, does not offer any valid reason for retaining Ule 
cautionary rule . In fact, tile decision entrenches a perception that has come under a great deal of criticism, namely 
that rape and crimes of an indecent nature are seen as crimes of sex rather than crimes of violence. The court at 
190J admits that, if rape is to be viewed as a species of aggravated (and repulsive) assault, then there would not 
be a need for the cautionary rule. But if rape is seen against the background of relationships between dle sexes, 
then the matter is complicated and one has to be aware of the nuances involved. This is precisely the argwnent 
which has been levell ed against the present defittition of rape, namely d,at it is perceived as being a sexual crime 
whereas it is in fac t a crime of violence. 
Tbe South African Law Conunission in its report on Women and Sexual Offences in SOUdl Africa (1985:57-62) 
noted the following objections to Ule cautionary rule: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Ule nonnal incidence of dle onus in criminal cases gives Ule accused adequate protection; 
this rule is not applicable to odler kinds of violent crime; 
a high degree of caution has the effect of reducing the conviction rate; 
U,ere is insufficient empirical data to show Ulat a large number of fal se complaints are laid in rape cases . 
However, the Coonnission were not persuaded by U,ese objections. They based this decision on tbree factors : a 
woman may bave ulterior motives fo r bringing false cbarges against a man (including spite, sexual frustration etc); 
a woman may bave financial motives for making a false cbarge, especially where tbe woman is pregnant; and rape 
is especially difficult to disprove since it takes place in private. 
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Olckers (1992:428) argues tllat there exists absolutely no empirical evidence to suggest tllat more people are falsely 
convicted of rape than any odler crime. In fact, the available data does not support this. Nineteen out of twenty 
rapes remain unreported and there is only a 50-55 % successful prosecution rate in rape cases ; there is no 
disproportionate number of false rape charges; there is dle proven trauma of a rape trial and the cautionary rule. 
All these factors contribute very heavily towards making rape extremely difficult to prove. 
It is submitted dlat dle ordinary onus of proof employed in criminal cases is sufficient security against wrongful 
convictions (Labuschagne 1992:136). He argues dlat the fact that the court needs to prove a conviction beyond 
reasonable doubt means that there is no need for the cautionary rule. It affords adequate protection for the accused. 
A look at the facts in S v D indicate bow tillS would work in practice, using dle ordinary rules of onus. 
Two girls, the complainants iu the case, were allegedly raped by the appellants . Each complainant was allegedly 
raped by one of the appellants, more or less simultaneously but not in dle sanle area. The complainants were, 
tberefore, each single witnesses in regard to tlle respective rapes. TIle appellants admitted intercourse, but raised 
the defence of consent. In looking at tlle evidence before the court, Frank J canle to tlle conclusion tl,at tlle state 
had Dot proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt against the first appellant. This decision was not based on dle 
application of dle cautionary rule, but rather on dle fact dlat the state had not discharged dle onus. It was not the 
fact that the complainant was a single witness in a sexual complaint and that ber evidence was uncorroborated on 
that aspect, but radler tlle fact that the evidence was actually contradicted by odler witnesses. Insofar as the second 
complainant was concerned, the court found d,at dle state had proved its case beyond a reasonable ground. As 
pointed out by Wilmot (1992:213-4), tile outcome of this case illustrates how utmecessary dle cautionary rule reall y 
is. If the complainant is unreliable in any way, this will become evident as tile case proceeds, especially in regard 
to the incidence of dle onus of proof. 
In conclusion, the judge rejected the cautionary rule in sexual cases, arguing d13t it had no rational basis for its 
existence and should tllerefore not fonn part of Nanlibian law (146G). The nature and circumstances of each case 
must be considered, including whether dle complainant is a single witness or whether dle evidence suggests a motive 
for laying a false charge. At the end of dle day , bowever, the test mUSt be the same wbether dle crime is one of 
theft or rape (146H-I) . 
5.6.4 Corroboration 
In temlS of the cautionary rule, the court must warn itself of dle dangers inherent in certain types of evidence . Once 
Ole court has warned itself of tile dangers applicable to the particular evidence before it, it Dlay convict if it is 
satisfied that the evidence is reliable. If the court is not satisfied with tbe reliability of tbe evidence. it must find 
corroboration before it can convict. 
Corroboration is defined by Hoffmatm and Zeffertt (1988:584) as "evidence which confimls dle testimony of a 
witness". In R v Kilbourne 1973 AC 529 Lord Reid explained tile concept of corroboration as follows at 750G-H: 
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"There is nodling technical in the idea of corroboration. When in the ordinary affairs of life one 
is doubtful whedler or not to believe a particular statement one naturally looks to see whether it 
fits in with other statements or circumstances relating to the particular matter; the better it fits in , 
the more one is inclined to believe it. The doubted statement is corroborated to a greater or lesser 
extent by the other statements or circumstances with which it fits in." 
Widl respect to complainants in sexual cases and young children, corroboration is more fully defi ned in S v C supra 
at 109B-C as "some evidence, in addition to dIe complainant' s, which is consistent wi th his story and in some 
degree inconsistent Witil the innocence of the accused". The evidence will not be regarded as corroboration if it is 
"wholly consistent witil the accused's innocence". 
The legislature has moved away from "fomlalistic proof" in d,at tile Criminal Procedure Act 1977 ordy contains 
one mandatory provision relating to corroboration. Section 209 requires that confessions must be confinlled in a 
material respect or there must be some evidence aliunde that the offence was conl1l1itted. The Criminal Procedure 
Act of 1955 required d,at there had to be corroboration in cases of treason, perjury , accomplice evidence and 
confessions (Hoffmalm and Zeffertt 1988:567). However, only the provision relating to confessions remained in 
the new version of the act. 
In order to determine what corroboration is required, the common law position will have to be examined. The 
purpose of corroboration, as explained in S v S supra, is to guard against false implication as far as possible (54C). 
According to Hoffmann and Zeffertt (1988:580), in sexual cases corroboration must therefore inclnde evidence 
which cOllfinlls the complainant on a point which indicates guilt on dIe part of dIe accused . It must show the 
cOllllnission of the alleged offence, d,e identity of the accused, or the absence of consent. 
In R v Bell supra the court held that a report made to her grandmother by dIe four-and -a-half year old complainant 
could not serve as corroboration. At 479 Gardiner lP explained that a previous consistent statement was not 
corroboration since it was not independent testimony showing that the crime charged had been committed. It served 
to show the truthfulness of the complainant and strengthened credibility by repelling the suggestion that the story 
had been made up, but it did not provide corroboration in the sense of supplying independent evidence that the 
offence had been committed. The court in De Beer v Rex supra came to tile same conclusion at 34 where dley held 
that the evidence of a complaint made by the six year old complainant to her mother was not corroboration. It 
merely tended to show consistency on the part of the complainant and thus affected her credibility. Evidence by 
the district surgeon that tilere had been recent interference widl tile complainant 'S private parts was also held not 
to be corroboration because it was not necessarily inconsistent wi th tile innocence of the accused. The fact that the 
accused chose not to give evidence was also not regarded as corroboration. 
In R v Dikant and Others supra the court explained that corroboration had to include some credible evidence which 
was in some degree consistent wi th the evidence to be corroborated although it did not have to go to the extent of 
continning it or establishing the guil t of the accused. At 701 the Suprente Court held the following: 
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"In general there must be some credible evidence in addition to the child's which, ill the necessary 
degree, is consistent with the child's story and inconsistent with the ilmocence of the accused, 
though it need not necessarily implicate the accused." 
It would seem then that corroboration is evidence which is consistent with the witness's and inconsistent with the 
accused's evidence. The evidence only has to be consistent with the witness 's evidence and does not actually have 
to confinn it. In addition, the corroboration does not have to implicate the accused. Bok J expanded on this in R 
v S supra at 422-3 and explained tllat in certain circumstances it may be necessary to insist that the corroborating 
evidence implicate the accused. These circumstances would depend on the facts in each case. He argued that, in 
the case of a six year old complainant, for instance, it may be necessary to insist on evidence which implicates the 
accused, whereas in the case of an intelligent, ten year old complainant who has testified convincingly, a lesser 
degree may be sufficient to satisfy the Court. 
In R v W supra the accused was convicted of statutory rape in that he had sexual intercourse with a fourteen year 
old girl. The trial magistrate believed (incorrectly) that he could not accept the evidence of a child without 
corroboration. He further held that corroboration could include tile following: tile fact that the complainant is a 
credible witness; that from the circumstances her evidence was trustworthy; and that she was honest when testifying. 
This decision does not accord with the findings in Bell and De Beer supra where the courts held that these factors 
relate to credibility and not to corroboration. On appeal the Appellate Division held that the magistrate had 
misdirected himself by insisting that there had to be corroboration. However, having decided that corroboration was 
necessary, the trial magistrate found corroboration in evidence that was not indicative of the accused's guilt: 
"He apparently thought that if the complainant's evidence was corroborated in any respect tlJat 
might lead him to think that she was a trustworthy witness this was sufficient, even tilOugh the 
corroboration was wholly consistent with the accused's innocence and did not in any way, other 
than by its supposed effect on tlle complainant's credibility, render his guilt more probable." (781) 
It would seem then that the corroboration must be in some degree inconsistent with the accused's iYll1ocence. In 
reaching this conclusion, Waterrneyer CJ accepted tile Transvaal decision in MacKay v Ballot 1921 TPD 430 that 
the corroborative evidence had to be inconsistent with tile accused's evidence, although the court was aware tiJat 
tile latter case was civil in lJature. In S v Snyman supra the Appellate Division held that corroboration could be 
found in evidence corroborating the complainant in a respect which implicated the accused, or in the absence of 
evidence to the contrary from him, or in his mendacity as a witness (585D-E). However, Holmes JA concluded 
that the ultimate requirement always remained proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and this would depend on the 
totality of the evidence and tile degree of corroboration available (585F). 
Holmes JA also presided in S v Artman and Others supra where he set the rule out more clearly at 340H. He held 
that in temlS of the cautionary rule, the court must warn itself of the dangers inherent in the evidence and must 
require some safeguard which will reduce the risk of a wrong conviction. He stated here that if corroboration is 
relied upon, it must implicate the accused in the commission of the offence: 
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"The safeguard need not consist of corroboration, but if corroboration is relied upon as the 
safeguard, it must go the lengdl of implicating the accused in the conmlissioD of the crime." 
In S v B supra the court held at 59B that corroboration was independent evidence which confirmed dle testimony 
of a witness. Such confimlation could either be "in a material respect" or on a point tending to prove dle accused's 
guilt. Corroboration, according to Vas J, can be afforded by d,e admissions of the accused eidler by words or 
conduct. Corroboration can also be afforded by the fact dlat an accused has not testified or that he bas given fal se 
evidence in court or has made false statements of an incriminating nature out of court. Similar fact evidence, where 
admissible, would also amount to corroboration. On the adler hand Van Heerden J in De La Rouviere v SA Medical 
alld Dental Council supra held at lOOG that: 
"The demeanour of the complainant in the witness-box or her apparent social standing in 
particular should never be relied upon as a substitute for corroboration. " 
It would appear from dle above cases d,at what amounts to corroboration has given rise to difficulties. Confusion 
has been created, I submit, from dle terminology employed . The courts talk about safeguards, confirmation and 
corroboration. Are these to be seen as synonyms, or do dley refer to different concepts? This confusion relating 
to temlinology arises in the following way. In temlS of the cautionary rule it is alleged that corroboration is not 
essential. What is required is that dle court warn itself of the dangers inherent in the evidence before it. Having 
warned itself, the court must dlen detennine whether it is satisfied with the witness's evidence. [n order to do so, 
the court must look at the merits of dIe witness as opposed to the demerits of the accused. In evaluating the witness 
in dlis way, the court will have regard to matters such as whedler the accused has been a lying witness, or has 
refused to give evidence. Tbe courts have described these as safeguards, but are tbey not in effect a fonn of 
corroboration. It is surely evidence which confirms the evidence of the witness i. e. corroboration. 
Tbe cautionary rule goes on to say that, if the court is not satisfied with the witness's evidence beyond a reasonable 
doubt, then there must be corroboration and dlis corroboration must implicate the accused. [s thi s corroboration 
different from the safeguards required above in evaluating the witness's evidence? In the first part of the enquiry 
(i.e. safeguards necessary) the credibility of a witness would aOlount to a"safeguard " but not to corroboration as 
required in the second part of the enquiry. 
I submit tbat corroboration is actually required in both parts of the enquiry. When the court evaluates dIe evidence 
of a witness to determine whedler it is prepared to convict on the evidence, it must evaluate the merits of tlle 
witness as opposed to the demerits of the accused. [n order to do so, it has regard to corroboration relating to the 
credibility and trustworthiness of the witness and the accused. If the court has not been persuaded beyond a 
reasonable doubt, it then requires further corroboration which must implicate dIe accused. it would then seem that 
corroboration, in one fornl or another, is essential before an accused can be convicted on the evidence of a witness 
to whom the cautionary rule applies, which is exactly what tile courts have consistently denied. 
One further question needs to be addressed , and dlat is whether one child can be used to corroborate another or 
whether one complainant in a sexual case can be used to corroborate anodler. According to dle decision in S v 
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Avon Bottle Store (Pty) Ltd and Others 1963(2) SA 389 (A) Botha ] held at 393 that one accomplice can 
corroborate another provided that the cautionary rule is applied to each accomplice. This was also accepted by the 
court in S v Vreden 1969(2) SA 524 (N) where it was explained Olat one accomplice could be used to corroborate 
another provided that the cautionary rule was applied to each of them respectively. In line with this approach tlle 
Appellate Division in Woji v Santam Insurance Co Ltd 1981(1) SA 1021 (A) allowed one ten year old boy to 
corroborate the evidence of the other ten year old, and dIe court applied Ole cautionary rule to the evidence of bOtil 
boys. 
In conclusion, it would appear that one child can be used to corroborate another, provided that the court has warned 
itself in respect of each witness. FurtilernlOre, although tile rules relating to corroboration appear at face value to 
be clear, on closer examination the case law indicates that there is difficulty in detennining what exactly would 
amount to corroboration. I submit that this difficulty relates to the use of varying ternlinology (safeguards, 
confirmation) for the same concept. Clarity needs to be reached as to what constitutes corroboration in respect 
of the initial evaluation relating to credibility as opposed to the further corroboration required in the second part 
of the enquiry. 
5.7 The Rule against Hearsay and Child Witnesses 
5.7.1 Introduction 
The English common law rules relating to hearsay evidence applied in South Africa up until 1988. Hearsay evidence 
was defi ned as oral or written statements made by persons who are not called as witnesses to prove the trutil of tile 
contents in S v Holshausen 1984(4)SA 852 (A). The general rule was tbat hearsay evidence was inadmissible. 
The most important reason for excluding hearsay evidence relates to its untrustwortlliness. It is untrustworthy 
because it cannot be tested by cross-examination. There is the danger that tile maker of the statement may be 
deliberately lying or he may simply have made a mistake or the statement may have been misnnderstood by the 
witness testifying in court. According to Hoffmann and Zeffertt (1988: 125), the pnrpose of cross-examination is 
to expose tllese defects. If the maker of the statement is not available for cross-examination, tllen tile evidence can 
not be tested in this way. Tbe court accepted this reasoning for the exclusion of hearsay evidence in S v Mpofu 
1993(3) SA 864 (N): 
"The maker of the statement is by his absence not amenable to cross-examination. His limitations 
as a witness, whether by reason of falsity , inadequate opportunity for observation, suspect 
memory, faulty rendition or the like, cannot be tested." 
The court went further in Harnischfeger Corporation and Another v Appleton and Another 1993(4) SA 479 (W) 
where it was held at 483 that the major factor against admitting hearsay evidence is normally the haml or risk of 
barm to the process of reaching an accurate conclusion if Ole objecting party cannot test dIe reliability of the hearsay 
inforrnation. In Mnyama v Gxalaba and Another 1990(1) SA 650 (C). ConradieJ held Olat a court should ideally 
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be in a position to establish as closely as possible the mood of the speaker, the interests he was attempting to serve, 
and any reason he might have had for concealing his true sentiments from the witness or for exaggerating them. 
This, however, was very difficult when the court was examining not the speaker himself but only an account of 
what he is supposed to have said (654A). 
Despite the dangers inherent in hearsay evidence, the common law rule was nevertheless criticised as being too 
rigid. All hearsay evidence that did not fall within established exceptions was excluded, irrespective of how reliable 
the evidence may have been (Hoffrnann and Zeffertt 1988: 126). This was acknowledged by Schreiner JA in Vulcan 
Rubber Works (Pty) Ltd v SAR&H 1958(3) SA 285 (A) at 296H: 
"There is no doubt that the exceptions to the rule against hearsay have come into existence mainly 
because there was felt to be a strong need for such exceptions if justice was to be done." 
5.7.2 The Statutory Position 
TIle common law relating to hearsay evidence was replaced by the introduction of s3 of the Law of Evidence 
Amendment Act 45 of 1988 which came into operation on 3 October 1988. In terms of this section, hearsay is now 
defined as "evidence, whether oral or in writing, the probative value of which depends upon the credibility of any 
person other than ule person giving such evidence". The statutory definition of hearsay evidence differs from the 
common law definition set out in Holshausen's case supra. It does not have to be tendered to prove the truth of 
the contents to be hearsay. The test for hearsay now is whether the probative value of the evidence depends on ule 
credibility of a person other than the witness testifying. According to Hoffmann and Zeffertt (1988: 127), ule 
probative force of ule evidence must at least be controlled by the credibility of the non-witness. 
Section 3 has introduced three main exceptions to the rule against bearsay. Hearsay may be admitted where the 
party against whom it is adduced agrees that ule evidence can be admitted. In Great Shipping Inc v Sunny/ace 
Marine Ltd 1994(1) SA 65 (C), for instance, the court conunented that " [cJounsel were agreed that I should have 
regard to all the evidence, despite some of it being hearsay" . Secondly, hearsay evidence may be admitted where 
the original maker of the statement subsequently testifies at the same proceedings . If ule original maker of the 
statement does not testify subsequently, the hearsay evidence will be excluded unless it becomes admissible under 
one of ule oUler exceptions. 
The third exception relates to the wide discretion which has been given to the court to admit hearsay evidence if 
it would be in the interests of justice to do so. Comadie J in Mnyamax Gxalaba and Another supra described it 
at 653 C as an "immense discretion". In detemlining whether it would be in the interests of justice to admit hearsay, 
ule court is entitled to take into account a nnmber of factors. These tactors would include the nature of the 
proceedings and the nature of ule evidence; the reason why the evidence is being tendered; its probative value; the 
reason why the maker of the statement is not giving evidence; any prejudice that might be experienced by the other 
party; and any other factors which the court might need to take into account. In analysing these factors mentioned 
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in this section, the courts have made the following comments. In Mllyama v Gxalaba and Allother supra Conradie 
J explained that hearsay evidence could be excluded where the probative value is low. According to him (653F), 
the evidence would have to be just about worthless for it to be excluded on this ground. It would probably have 
to amount to no more than idle chatter or empty gossip or fuzzy rumours. 
According to the same judge, the mere fact that hearsay evidence is against the interest of the opposing party does 
not mean that it would on dlat account alone be prejudicial. Prejudice in this context means that the party offering 
the evidence would obtain some unfair advantage by its admission. Conradie J illustrated the point widl the 
following exanlple at 653E-F: 
"for example, if a party , for fear of having him cross-examined , failed to call the person on 
whose credibility dle probative value of the evidence depended despite the fact that he was 
available and otherwise competent to testify dlis might be gravely prejudicial." 
In Metedad v National Employers ' General Insurance Co Ltd 1992(1) SA 494 (W) Van Schalkwyk J looked at that 
part of the section which required dle court to have regard to the purpose for which the evidence is tendered. 
According to him (at 498), this implied that evidence tendered for a compelling reason would stand a better chance 
of admission dIan evidence tendered for a doubtful or illegitimate purpose. Hoffmaml and Zeffertt (1988: 131) 
submit dlat the court 's reception or rejection of hearsay should be subject to attack on appeal where the discretion 
bas nor been exercised judicially or where it has been based on a misdirection as to the facts. In McDonald's 
Corporation v Joburgers Drive-Inn Restaurant (Pty) Ltd 1997(1) I (A) it was argued that, when a trial court 
refused to admit hearsay in temlS of s3(1)(c), the court was exercising a discretion with which an appeal court could 
not interfere unless it considered that the discretion had not been judicially exercised. However, the Appellate 
Division did not accept this argument and held that a decision on the admissibility of evidence was, in general, one 
of law, not of discretion, and that a court of appeal was fully entitled to overrule a decision by a lower court if the 
appeal court considered the court a quo 's decision to be wrong (27D-E) . 
In temlS of subsection (1)(c) the court has been given a wide discretion to admit hearsay evidence. The question 
of how this discretion is to be applied has given rise to difficulty. In Hlongwane and Others v Rector, St Francis 
College, and Others 1989(3) SA 318 (DCLD) Galgut J admitted certain hearsay evidence in terms of this section 
on the basis that it would be in Ole interests of justice to do so . The court came to this conclusion despite the fact 
dlat Ole hearsay evidence was "fundamental to the respondents' defence; indeed the success of the defence depends 
entire ly upon it " (324F). The court canle to a different decision in S v Cekiso and Another 1990(4) SA 20 (E) 
where Zietsman J held at 22A-8 that the discretion afforded Ule court in s3(1 )(c) should not be exercised in favour 
of allowing hearsay evidence on controversial issues upon which conflicting evidence has already been given since 
it would not be in dle interest of justice to allow such evidence which cannot be tested in the nomlal way. The 
question of the court' s discretion was again raised in Aetiology Today CC tla Somerset Schools v Van Aswegall 
and Another 1992(1) SA 807 (W). Here Cloete AJ examined the decisions in Cekiso supra and Hlongwane supra, 
and came to the conclusion that the decision in Cekiso should be followed . He held that where dle evidence relates 
to one of thejacta probanda in regard to which dlere is a dispute, Ole bearsay evidence should be excl uded. 
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Two decisions following after the Aetiology case have argued that the discretion afforded tile courts to admit bearsay 
evidence should not be used sparingly or re luctantly. In Metedad v National Employers' General Insurance Co 
lid supra Van Schalkwyk J at 498 argued that tile purpose of amending the bearsay law had been to allow hearsay 
evidence in certain circumstances where the application of rigid and somewbat archaic principles might frustrate 
the interests of justice. At 499 he commented as follows: 
"The exclusion of the hearsay statement of an oOlerwise reliable person whose testimony calillot 
be obtained might be a far greater injustice than any uncertainty which may result from its 
admission. Moreover, the fact Olat the statement is untested by cross-examilIation is a factor to 
be taken into account in assessing its probative value." 
In Hewan v Kourie 1993(3) SA 233 (T) the court held that tllis subsection introduces into the hearsay rule a 
flexibility which should not be negated by introducing, in addition to the requirements of tile subsection, reliability 
as an overriding requirement, or by falling back on tbe conilllOn-law rule against bearsay: 
"By the same token it would not be in accordance with the intention of the legislature to categorise 
certain cases or certain issues and to bold that s3(1)(c) should be applied only sparingly or 
reluctantly n such cases or to such issues. " 
It is important to note as well that certain con11110n law exceptions to the hearsay rule have fallen away by the 
introduction of tile Law of Evidence Amendment Act 1988 . Section 9 of tile Act has repealed s223 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act 1977 which dealt wi th dying declarations and applied the CODIl1lOn law. By repealing s223 the Act 
has explicitly done away with the common law. This would imply that the admissibility of dying declarations will 
be governed by s3, altbough tile court would obviously be guided by tbe con11110n law when evaluating the evidence 
in ternlS of subsection 3(1)(c). Hoffmalill and Zeffertt (1988: 130) argue that other conilllOn law exceplions, sucb 
as declarations in tile course of duty, declarations against interest, declarations as to public and general rights, 
pedigree declarations, declarations as to the contents of wills and Ole reception of public documents at common law 
fall away by implication in criminal cases by the fact Olat s9 of Ole Law of Evidence Amendment Act 1988 has 
repealed s216 of the CrimilIal Procedure Act 1977, which applied the conmlOnlaw. Thi s has been accepted by the 
courts. In Mnyama v Gzalaba and Another supra Conradie J, in referring to Ole hearsay exception relating to a 
person's state of mind, stated at 652J-653A: 
"The Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988 (' the Act ') which came into operation on 3 
October 1988, has made all of this obsolete but not irrelevant." 
The court held further at 653C that this did not mean that hearsay evidence which was historically admissible under 
one or oOler of the exceptions would automatically become admissible in temlS of the new hearsay law. However, 
il should also not lightly be held that traditionally acceptable evidence should in the exercise of discretion be 
excluded. 
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5.7.3 Hearsay and the Child Witness 
In terms of tile common law , hearsay statements by child witnesses were excluded OIdess they fell within the clearly 
defined exceptions. This would arise most frequently in the situation where the child was the complainant of an 
assault and made a report to his motiler or guardian. At tile trial the child is unable to give evidence, either because 
he is found to be incompetent or because he is afraid. The report made to the motiler or guardian will then be 
inadmissible as hearsay. The facts in S v T 1973(3) SA 794 (A) are relevant. It was alleged that the five year old 
complainant had been raped. At dle trial the child was frightened and unwilling to speak. Eventually tile court called 
tile mother and the child whispered the answers to her mother, who in turn repeated them to the court. These 
statements were found to amount to hearsay. 
The dangers associated with hearsay evidence have already been discussed supra . As far as hearsay evidence 
emanating from children is concerned, there is a further danger relating to the competency (or lack of it) of the 
child . In Chaimowitz v Chaimowitz (I) supra the court was presented with the hearsay statements of a child in an 
application for custody. Rosenow J highlighted the danger in respect of children at 819: 
"In the first place we are asked to accept at face value, may I say, what appears to amount to the 
hearsay ramblings of an infant and we are asked to do that without having an opportunity of 
satisfying ourselves as to whether the infant is a competent witness at all. Before we allow a child 
to give evidence in this Court that child must eidler be sworn, or warned to speak dle truth , and 
dle Court must be satisfied that it has a sufficient degree of intelligence before any value can be 
placed on its evidence at all." 
For tilese reasons he held tile hearsay evidence to be inadmissible. 
What effect does s3 of tile Law of Evidence Amendment Act have on dIe hearsay statements of children? In terms 
of dle exceptions created by subsection (I), these statements would be admissible where both parties agree. It is 
submitted tilat dlere would be very few, if any, instances where an opposing party in a criminal case will consent 
to the admission of the hearsay statements of a child, especially where the child is the complainant. 
The second exception afforded by s3 is not applicable, and the dlird grants the cOurt a wide discretion to admit 
hearsay in the interests of justice. The question to be addressed then is whether it would be in the interests of justice 
to admit the hearsay statements of a child who is a complainant in a criminal matter and who is unable to testify . 
In making such a decision dle court would have to examine the nature of the proceedings, dle nature of dle 
evidence, the reason why the evidence is being tendered, dle probative value of the evidence, dle reason why the 
child is not giving evidence, any prejudice which the accused may suffer as a result , and any other relevant factors. 
A factor that the court would have to take into account when determining whetiler tile hearsay statements of a ch.ild 
complainant should be admissible, is the fact that the conviction rate is particularly low in cases of child abuse . 
The South African Law Conmlission (1989: 9-11) accepted tilat in SOUtil Africa the existing criminal procedure and 
rules of evidence made it exceedingly difficult to convict child abusers . They referred to a submission by tile 
Regional Court Presidel1l of Natal who stressed that, as a result of problems regarding tile rules of evidence, guilty 
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child abusers were acquitted, "possibly to conmlit a second more serious aberration with other children" (SA Law 
Commission 1989: 10). The Commission's Report also provides details of a survey that was conducted on the 
incidence of convictions in cases of child abuse which were investigated by Addington Hospital during the period 
1985 to 1986. According to these results, there were only 3 convictions out of 42 cases where the child witness was 
under dle age of six. Dr Key of the Addington Hospital is quoted as follows: 
"My experience leads me to believe that except in the unlikely event of an adult witness being 
able to testify to having seen a child being abused, it is almost impossible to secure a conviction 
in cases of abuse involving a child who is younger than six years." 
In cases where the child witness was between six and twelve years, there were only II convictions out of 49 cases, 
mainly due to lack of corroboration. Where the child witness was between twelve and sixteen years, the conviction 
rate rose to 73 %. In conclusion, the Commission (1989: II) posed the question whether the State's burden of proof 
was not too high, considering all the problems pertaining to a conviction on the evidence of a child: 
"Does ulis high burden of proof still serve Ule interests of society in tbe case of child abuse?" 
The court, as the upper guardian of children, has a duty to protect children. This duty has been entrenched by the 
Constitution Act 108 of 1996 whicb provides that a child bas a right to be protected from abuse and neglect. This 
places a positive duty on the state - it is not only the right not to be abused, but goes furth er and includes the right 
to be protected from abuse. In addition, it provides tlJat in all matters relating to children, the child's illterest shall 
be paramount. Therefore, it can be argued tlmt the coun, in deciding matters relating to children, must have access 
to all relevant infommtion. This approach has already been followed before the introduction of Ule new hearsay 
provisions. [n Zorbas v Zorbas 1987(3) SA 436 CVV) the coun was called upon to make an order of custody in 
favour of the mother. The accused (the cb.ild's father) alleged in a set of hearsay evidence that the man with whom 
the modler was co-habiting was a man of bad character who allegedly had murdered his wife and whose business , 
a bar-restaurant, was a source of drugs. Van Schalkwyk AJ made the following commellts at 438F-G: 
"All Ule evidence supporting the defendant 's allegation dmt Mr Moumtzis is a man of bad 
character is unquesti01mbly inadmissible. To that extent dlere is no evidence before me upon 
which a finding adverse to Mr Moumtzis's character can be made. But does that mean that these 
allegations, vague and inconclusive as they are, are to be ignored altogether? If, for instance, 
inadmissible evidence were to be placed before a Court that one of the parties to a custody action 
had been convicted of infanticide would the Court, sitting as upper guardian, ignore such evidence 
on the grounds of its inadmissibility? I dlink not. It seems to me dmt the concept of guardianship 
involves a responsibility which transcends the Structures of the law of evidence." 
Although tllis case relates to a civil matter and to a custody dispute where the courts are bound to find in the best 
interests of tile child, tile Constitution has extended the standard of best interests to all matters concerning children. 
In Shawzin v Laufer 1968(4) SA 657 (A) Rumpf!· JA also came to the conclusion that the court as upper guardian 
in issues of CUStOdy applied ollly olle noml, namely "the predomilJallt interests of the child". He went ou at 662H-
663A to find tlJat in cases relating to Ule predominant interests of tile child, the court was not bound by the 
contentions of the parties and could depart from the usual procedure and act mero motu in calli ng evidence, 
irrespective of the wishes of tile parties. Accordingly van Scbalkwyk AJ held in Zorbas v Zorbas supra timt it 
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would be undesirable for him to make an award of custody where there was "the merest hint of serious 
misdemeanours" (439E), even if these were based on hearsay. 
If, in deciding the best interests of children, the concept of guardianship is more important than the rules of 
evidence, as found in the above two cases, tilen this line of tilinking should be extended to criminal proceedings 
since the court'S role as upper guardian has been reinforced by the Constitution. The court's role as upper guardian 
of children would now, in tenns of the Constitution, entail protecting children from abuse and neglect and ensuring 
dlat children's interests are paranlOunt. This role of tile court in protecting a child's best interests should then also 
"transcend!s] tile strictures of the law of evidence" as has been tbe case in civil matters. Cachalia et al (1994) has 
even gone so far as to say that the exclusion of the hearsay statements of children may be unconstitutional since 
the interests of children are paranlOunt in all matters relating to children. 
However, despite this argument, tile admission of hearsay remai ns within the discretion of tile presiding offi cer, 
and courts may be very wary of adntirring hearsay statements, especially those which emanate from children, due 
to issues of competency and the cautionary rule. For instance, tbe decisions in S v Cekiso and Another supra and 
Aetiology Today supra held that where the hearsay evideuce relates to controversial issues, it should be excluded. 
For this reason Zieff (199 1 :32) argues that an additional statutory provision should be introduced, creating a general 
exception to tile hearsay rule in the case of the statements of children in sexual abuse cases. In making this proposal 
Zieff refers to similar legislation in the United States which has been introduced in an attempt to make the criminal 
justice system more sensitive to tile child victim. Zieff (1991:32) explains that since 1982 there has been a rapid 
adoption of new hearsay exceptions for statements made by child victims of abuse in the United States, based on 
the fact tilat tilese statements are often the only evidence available and also that a child 's early statements are 
considered to be more reliable than in court testimony since they are made closer in time 10 tile event. He uses the 
Washington Stamte (discussed above under the USA position) as a model. In temlS of tiJi s statute, if the child is 
unavailable as a witness, the hearsay can ollly be admitted if the evidence is reliable and there is corroborative 
evidence of tbe act. 
In view of the above, Zieff (1991 :33) proposes tilat the South African legislamre create an additional statute 
regulating the admissibility of the hearsay statements of children. He suggests the Washington Statute provides a 
sound model. When the hearsay statements of children are tendered as evidence, tile court must conduct a full 
inquiry into tile statement' s reliability. In so doing, tile court must consider all relevant factors, including tile reason 
why the child is not testifying and tile possibility that otiler external influences might be the source of the child's 
allegations. Only reliable hearsay should be adnJitted. 
The weighing up of all relevant factors in evaluating the reliability of tile hearsay evidence in temlS of the 
Washington statute, r submit, sounds very familiar to the factors the court must take into account when exercising 
its discretion in terms of s3( 1)(c) of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 1988. I have already attempted to point 
out tile difficulties tilat the courts have experienced in exercising this discretion and deternlining what is meant by 
probative evidence and prejudice caused etc. Therefore, introducing a Statutory provision which will enable the 
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hearsay evidence of children to become admissible in certain circumstances will no doubt give rise to the same 
problems that have arisen from s3(1)(c). The only real advantage of the introduction of such a statutory provision 
would be the emphasis on the admissibility of children's hearsay statements i.e. the intention of the legislature 
would be tllat the hearsay statements of children should , where reliable, be admissible. There will be a stronger 
duty on the court to make these statements admissible. According to Milton et al (1994:431 ), the fact that an 
accused is accorded a right to cross-examine in tenms of s25(3)(d) of tile Constitution could possibly impact on the 
admission of hearsay evidence. However, tllere are already exceptions to the hearsay rule where the accused is 
deprived of his right to cross-examine. These exceptions have also been held, in the United States for instance. nOt 
to interfere with an accused's rights to cross-examine provided the hearsay evidence is reliable. Milton et al 
(1994:431) makes the furtller statement: 
.. Although tile admission of hearsay obviously makes severe inroads into the right of cross-
examination, it is penmitted in many jurisdictions where it is sufficiently reliable and does not 
prejudice the accused . It is submitted tllat tile present fomlUlation of the exceptions to the hearsay 
rule accords with tllese principles and its application is likely to remain unchanged." 
The accused's right to cross-examine will , therefore, have to be borne in mind when evaluating hearsay exceptions. 
However, the accused will nevertheless be entitled to cross-examine tile person in court who is giving the hearsay 
evidence and can then raise any doubt or inconsistencies regarding possible ntisunderstandings or mistakes rela ting 
to the hearsay evidence. 
What is needed, it is submitted, is a common sense approach. In order to convict an alleged perpetrator in a 
criminal case, the accused 's guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. To detemline whether the guilt has 
been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the court evaluates tile evidence tllat has been placed before it. If the 
evidence is uureliable, the court will be unable to convic t. Surely, in order to detemline whether guilt has been 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt, all relevant evidence should be placed before tile court. The court, in evaluating 
the evidence, will accord the necessary weight to tile evidence. It is unforeseeable tllat a court could cOllvict an 
accused on the basis of a hearsay statement made by a child without any other evidence to corroborate tllis. 
However, where tile court is faced with medical evidence that a child has been assaulted, there is evidence from 
a witness tllat the accused was seen witll tile child at tile appropriate time, a child 's hearsay statement would be 
relevant and carry more weight. Obviously, in assigning tile weight to be attributed to tile evidence, the court would 
look at the source of the evidence , tile age of the child , his possible competence, why he is not giving evidence etc. 
My submission, therefore, is tI,at all hearsay statements emanating from child victims should be admissible. This 
is tile posi tion in other inquiSitorial countries, and it has not been alleged that accused are wrongfully convicted in 
this system as opposed to the accusatorial. The ordinary rules of evidence would apply . The evidence would have 
to be relevant in order to be admissible. The mere fact that the evidence will be admissible does not mean that the 
accused will automatically be convicted. There will have to be evidence before tile court which proves the accused's 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The fact that evidence is hearsay is a factor which should go to weight and not 
to admissibility. Tlus approach has already been hinted at by Van Scl13lkwyk J in Metedad v National Employers' 
General Insurance Co Ltd supra at 499: 
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"the exclusion of the hearsay stJItement of an otherwise reliable person whose testimony cannot 
be obtJIined might be a far greater injustice than any uncertJIinty which may result from its 
admission. Moreover, the fact that dIe statement is untested by cross-examination is a factor to 
be tJlken into account in assessing its probative value." 
5.8. Previous Consistent Statements 
5.8.1. Introduction 
A previous consistent statement is a stJItement made on a previous occasion which supports wbat the wi mess later 
says. The general rule is that Illese statements are inadmissible. In R v Stephen Rood 1949(1) SA 298 (GW), a 
case relating to a paternity dispute , Ille witness made the following statement in reply to questions put to ber by tbe 
magistrate (299): 
"Na die kind gebore was, bet beskuldigde se moeder gekom na my tante se buis en gevra wie se 
kind dit was. Ek het gese dis beskuldigde se kind." 
This was held to be a previous consistent stJItement and , therefore , to be inadmissible. 
Previous consistent stJItements are excluded because tlley are not sufficiently relevant. In R v Mack 1969(4) SA 
55 (R) Greenfield J, with reference to a previous consistent statement, held that the reason for exclusion was based 
on irrelevance (55F) . They do not add anything further to the witness's evidence. It has been argued dlat a 
witness's evidence is assumed to be consistent, unless contrary evidence is produced . In addition, previous 
consistent statements have the disadvantJIge Illat they can be easily manufactured. According to Hoffmann and 
Zeffertt (1988: I 17), a witness "would be able to create allY amount of evidence by repeating his story to a number 
of people" . De Wet JA explained this at 473 in R v Rose 1937 AD 467: 
"The idea that the mere repetition of a story gives it any force or proves its truth is contrary to 
conllIOn observation and experience that a falsehood may be repeated as often as the truth ." 
It would appear that these stJItements could be excluded in terms of the general rules relating to relevance. If the 
evidence was not sufficiently relevant, it would be inadmissible in terms of s210 of the Criminal Procedure Act 
1977 which provides that no evidence which is irrelevant or immaterial shall be admissible in criminal proceedings. 
However, dIe English decisions have developed it into a rigid rule, which excludes all previous consistent 
stJItements, subject to a list of exceptions, irrespective of how relevant the evidence may in fact be (Hoffmann and 
Zeffertt 1988: 117-8). The rigidity of this rule has led to criticism since in certain instances highly relevant evidence 
is being excluded. Because highly relevant evidence was being excluded, a list of common law exceptions grew 
which have developed into well recognised exceptions. TIlese exceptions have specific requirements that must be 
complied with in order for a previous consistent stJItement to be admissible. 
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5.8.2. Complaints in Sexual Cases 
In ancient Hebrew law, if a man raped a virgin inside the city walls, both would be stoned to death "for the elders 
reasoned that if the girl had screamed she would have been rescued" (Brownmiller 1975:20). If she was raped 
outside the city, the rapist had to pay an amount as compensation and marry the girl because " for all her screaming, 
no one might hear". This concept of 'making known' a rape is also found in early Engli sh law. lnunediately a 
woman was raped, she would have to make a 'hue and cry' and show her injuries, as described by Bracton ("DlOrne 
1968:4 15): 
"She must go at once and while the deed is newly done, with the hue and cry, to the neighboring 
townships and dlere show the injury done to her to men of good repute, the blood and the clothing 
stained with blood, and her torn garments. And in the same way she ought to go to the reeve of 
the hundred , the king's serjeant, the coroners and the sheriff. And let her make her appeal at the 
first county court , unless she can at once make her complaint directly to dIe lord king or his 
justices, where she will be told to sue at the county court." 
By the eighteenth century , if the raped woman did not make a complaint and an outcry immediately after being 
raped, this was considered to be strong (although not conclusive) evidence that her charge was false. Brownmiller 
(1975:30) quotes the following comment made by Blackstone (1787) : 
"if she concealed dIe injury for any considerable time after she had dIe opportunity to complain, 
if dIe place where the act was alleged to be committed was where it was possibl e she might have 
been heard and she made no outcry, these and the like circumstances carry a strong but not 
conclusive presumption that her testimony is false or feigned. " 
It was, dlerefore, required of a raped female dlat she make an early complaint to show dlat she had not consented 
to dIe rape. This was accepted by our courts in Guttenberg v R 1905 TS 207 at 2 11: 
"It arises from old-established custom and practice in England . "Dlat custom appears to have 
originated from the old English rule that where a woman wished to lay a complaint of rape it was 
necessary that she must have raised dIe hue and cry within a reasonable time after dIe alleged 
offence. She was to raise dIe alaml and to exhibit the marks of violence and iluury to her person 
or ber clothing to those to whom she would naturally be expected to exhibit them under dIe 
circumstances. " 
According to Hoffmann and Zeffertt (1988: 11 8-9) dIe practice of having to prove dlat an early complaint had been 
made to disprove consent "was so deeply established in dIe law that it survived the growth of the hearsay rule and 
the prohibition of self-corroboration" . 
Traditionally then, complaints made in sexual cases have been admitted provided that certain requirements have 
been complied with. The purpose of admitting these complaints is twofold: to show consistency and to negative 
consent. It is, therefore, a matter which relates to the credibility of dIe witness . In S v Bergh 1976(4) SA 857 (A) 
Rumpff AJ explained at 866 dlat the purpose of such evidence was to support the credit of a witness by sharing a 
consistency in his account which adds some probative value to his evidence in the box. 
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The reasons for the admission of previous consistent statements gave rise to problems for Hiemstra CJ in S v M 
1980(1) SA 586 (B). He argued at 587H that it would have made more logical sense if a previous consistent 
statement was admissible exclusively to prove ule absence of consent in a sexual offence, because someone who 
had consented would not go and complain. As far as he is concerned 'proof of consistency' amounts to self-
corroboration. Steenkamp J agreed that ulere ought onl y to be one ground of admissibili ty in cOlmection with a 
previous consistent sta tement, but he disagrees with Hiemstra CJ by stating that UJat ground should be 'consistency'. 
His reason for this is ulat these reports would otherwise become inadmissible in other sexual offences where consent 
was not necessary , such as sodomy , statutory rape and cases of children under sixteen who cannot consent (592D-
E). 
Previous consistent statements are not an exception to the hearsay rule since the witness must give evidence. These 
complaints can also not be used as corroboration , as discussed supra when dealing with the cautionary rule, since 
corroboration must come from an independent source (Hoffmann and Zeffertt 1988: 120). Tn R v Rose supra De 
We, JA explained the position at 473: 
"In certain exceptional cases a previous similar statement made by the witness is admitted not to 
prove dIe truUI of ule facts asserted but merely to show that the witness is consistent with himself, 
but ule general rule is that a wi tness Calmot be corroborated by proof of prior similar statements." 
In order for a complaint in a sexual case to be admissible, ule foll owing requirements must be complied with : 
5.8.2.1 Sexual Offence 
To be admissible in terms of this exception, ule offence involved must be of an indecent nature. This would include, 
all10ngst others, rape, indecent assault , statutory rape, incest and any oUler offence that would include an assault 
of an indecent nature. In Westermeyer v R (1911)32 NLR 197 it was held not to apply to a case of indecent 
language and a complaint made by a woman to her husband shortly after his return was beld to be inadmissible. 
Nor did it apply where a charge of soliciting or enticing for immoral purposes was involved , as decided in 
Guttenberg v R supra. ltmes CJ explained at 211 that this exception originally related to charges of rape, but was 
later extended to oUler cases of physical assault upon the chastity of women, such as indecent assault. The court 
held that ule all1bit of the exception should not be extended beyond dlis. Here dIe charge is one of using language 
which would only be employed in the presence of the woman alone. At 212 Innes CJ commented that "to extend 
ule doctrine in that way would be extremely dangerous". 
In Lutehman v Rex (1915)36 NLR 205 Dove Wilson JP held at 209 ulat dIe exception extended to incest and a 
previous consistent statement in this regard would be admissible. In R v Bezuidenhout 1946 CPD 190 ule court 
accepted that ulis exception included cases of incest. In R v Dray 1925 AD 553 a previous consistent statement was 
held to be admissible under this exception where ule charge was one of assault. Solomon ACJ held at 554 that, 
aldlOugb dIe accused was only charged with an assault, from the facts the assault appeared to be of an indecent 
nature. The accused was alleged to have grabbed and pressed ule breasts of ule complainant. 
I 
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In J 922 Ole Court of Appeal in R v Camelleri [192212 KB 122 held O,at his exception also applied to indecenl 
offences where the complainant was male. This decision has been followed in South Africa in R v Burgess 1927 
TPD 14. In this case the accused was charged with the commission of an UfmJltural offence upon a thirteen year 
old boy . The court held Olat they were bound by the decision in R v Camelleri and the exception was therefore, 
extended to male complaimnls as well. In R v S supra Ole complainant was a ten year old boy and Ole court 
admitted a complaint he made to his mother. 
5.8.2.2 First Opportunity 
The complaint must be made at the first reasonable opportunity that affords itself. This requirement is listed in the 
Conlllents of Bracton (quoted supra) where he explains that the complainant "must go at once and while the deed 
is newly done". Blackstone, also quoted supra, adds that "if she concealed the injury for any considerable time after 
she had the opportunity to complain", Ous would amount to suspicious behaviour on the part of Ole complaimnt. 
In R v C 1955(4) SA 40 (N) Caney J described Olis requirement as follows at 40G: 
"it must have been made, without undue delay but at the earliest opportunity which, under all the 
circumstances, could reasonably be expected, to the first person to whom the complaimnl could 
reasonably be expected to make it." 
What amounts to a reasomble time will depend on the circumstances of each case, and lies within the discretion 
of Ole presiding officer. This will depend on the age and understanding of the complainant and the opportunity 
avai lable to speak to someone in whom the complainant can confide (Hoftinann and Zeffertt 1988: II 9). For 
instance, in R v Gow 1940(2) PH H148 (C) it was held that it was not unreasomble for a girl, who was alleged 
[0 have been assaulted on a train, not to make a complaint to the ticket examiner, but to wait until she saw her 
mother. The court admitted Ole complaint to her moO,er. In R v Gannon 1906 TS 114 the complaimnt, an eight 
year old girl , made a complaint to her mother ten days after the alleged assault. The court admitted the complai nt 
on Ole basis O,at Ole girl was too young to realise what had happened and, in addition, she had been bribed by the 
accused not to say anything. In R v C supra the court regarded as reasonable a delay of five days in the case of 
a five year old. At 41F the court made allowance for the fact that the child was too young to understand the mture 
and significance of Ole act alleged to have been committed upon her. In R v Du Plessis 1922 TPD 153 on the other 
hand, the complaint was not admitted where it was made tune days after Ole assault and the complaimnt was sixteen 
years old . Wessels JP held at 154 O,at a complaint will only be admissible if Ole complainant makes her statement 
immediately after sbe was raped on the very first occasion on which she can make the statement. 
In R v S supra Ole complaimnt, a ten year old boy, was assaulted on two occasions, namely in May and June of 
Ole same year. His moOler gave evidence Olat on Ole second occasion (June) she was armoyed because she had sent 
the complaimnt to the shop and he stayed away longer than necessary. She Olen rebuked him and he explained what 
had caused the delay and told her what the accused had done. She then asked him if this had happened before and 
he tOld her about the incident that had taken place ill May. The court held at 423 that for a previous consistent 
statement to be admissible , the report must be made within a reasonable time. The complaint relating to the second 
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incident was made timeously (within an hour) and was therefore admissible. 111e complaint relating to the first 
incident was made two months later "and then only in reply to the question put by his motIler", and was, therefore, 
inadmissible. In S v S supra a repon made by an eleven year old complainant to her mother several months after 
she was allegedly raped was held to be inadmissible. 
5,8.2.3 Voluntary Complaint 
The complaint must be made voluntarily, and must not be made in response to questions of a "leading and inducing 
or intimidating character " , according to Ridley J in R v Osbome [19051 1 KB 551 at 561. In S v T 1963(1) SA 484 
(A) a mother noticed that her daughter had been sexually assaulted and threatened to beat her with a stick if she 
did not name the perpetrator. 111e child ulen named her stepfather. Hoexter J A held at 487E that Ult report was 
inadmissible since it had been made in response to intimidation: 
"In Ult present case the mother of the complainant actually took a stick and was about to beat ule 
complainant when the latter slJlrted crying and said she would tell what happened. In my opinion 
ule complaint made by ule complainant in these circumstances was wrongly admitted in evidence 
at the trial. " 
What will amount to volunlJlry will depend on ule circumstances of each case, and remains in the discretion of the 
presiding officer. The complaint does not have to be spontaneous, provided it is not induced by leading questions. 
According to R v Osborne supra at 556, questions such as 'What is the matter?' or 'Why are you crying?' will 
not affect the admissibility of the complaint. It is unclear what amount of prompting will render a complaint 
inadmissible. In R v S supra, for inslJlnce, the boy made a report (relating to the second assault) after his modler 
demanded an explanation for his delay. This was found to be admissible. He then made a second report (relating 
to the first assault) after his mother asked him if this had ever happened before. The court held that this report was 
inadmissible because it was not made timeously and because it was made "only in reply to dle question put by his 
mother" (423). The latter statement is confusing, because the first report was also only made in reply to a question 
put by his maUler, yet ulis was held to be admissible. The second question also did not appear to be of a leading 
or au intimidating nature. In R v C supra ule motber noticed the child had a discharge and was walking with 
difficulty. She asked her the cause of the hurt, in response to which the child made a complaint. The modler gave 
evidence that she had not threatened the child, but spoke to her quietly, not crossly. She said she did no more than 
insi st upon being told ule truth. 111e court found ule report to have been made voluntarily, holding at 4ID-E that 
the mere fact that a statement was made in response to questions did not make ule complaint involunlJlry unless the 
questions were of a leading or suggestive nature. 
In S v S supra the complainant, an eleven year old girl, made a report to her mother after she was questioned by 
her modler as to how she had lost ber virginity . Tltis had beell discovered by a female relative to whom the gi rl 
had been sent for instruction in tile facts of life , in accordance with custom. The girl , at first , remained silent and 
the motIler then tIlreatened Ulat she would report her to the police if she did not tell tile truth (a t 53B-C). Although 
the court did not bave to decide whedler the report had been made volunlJlrily as it was already found not to have 
been made wiutin a reasonable time, the court , nevertheless, found that the fact that the girl believed her mother's 
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threat indicated her naIvety and boosted her credibility (at 53C): 
5.8.2.4 
"The fact that thereafter the complainant told her story tends to confiml her naIvety, which in turn 
lends transparency to the truthfulness of her evidence. " 
The Complainant must Testify 
In order for a complaint to be admissible in tenllS of Ulis exception, U,e complainant must testi fy. If she does not 
testify, the report will be hearsay and , therefore, inadmissible. The purpose of atlmitting the complaint is to show 
consistency on the part of the complainant. If she does not testify , Ulen U,e complaint cannot be used to show 
consistency (Hoffmarm and Zeffertt 1988: 120). Where the complainant does not testify, nei ther the contents of the 
complaint nor the fact that it was made may be admitted. 
In R v Kgaladi 1943 AD 255 the complainant, a feeble-minded child of 12, was not called as a witness . The trial 
judge admitted evidence of a previous consistent statement made by the complainant. On appeal Centlivres J A found 
the previous consistent statement to be inadmissible, holding at 261 that: 
"when the evidence of a complainant is not before the court, neither the particulars of a complaint 
made by her, in the absence of U,e accused, nor the bare fact that a complaint was made, can be 
given in evidence. t1 
The interpretation of this requirement was somewhat stretched to atlmit U,e report in S v R 1965(2) SA 463 (W) 
where the complainant was raped. The complainant was a recovering chronic alcoholic who had a relapse. She 
called her psychiatrist who arranged for her to be fetched by ambulance and taken to a nursing home. On roUle to 
the nursing bome, sexual intercourse took place in the back of the ambulance between U,e complainant and one of 
tbe ambuJance attendants. On arrival at the hospital, the complainant was very distraught and accused the ambuJance 
attendalll of raping her. At U,e time of the trial, the complainant was suffering from amnesia and had no recollection 
of the rape. Although the complainant was in fact tes tifying, she did not remember the rape, and therefore. her 
report could not be used to show consistency WiU, her evidence in court. However, Troll ip J held U,at U,e 
complainant' s report and condition were relevant to show her state of mind at the time of the incident and to rebut 
the accused's defence U,at she had consented. Her evidence was simply that she would never have consented. 
5.8.3 Criticisms of the Rule 
The logic upon which tins exception has been based is fundamentally fl awed. Exceptions to the rule against previous 
consistent statemems have developed in order to admit evidence which is highly relevant, but which would have 
been excluded by the rule. Therefore, reporrs of sexual offences have been admitted because Uley often provide 
evidence which is highly relevant. However tile requirements tilat must be complied with in order to fi t wi tilin the 
exception are so rig id that tirree-quarters of tile complaints are excluded anyway. It makes no sense to create an 
exception in order to atlmit evidence, if that evidence becomes inadmissible due to the requirements of that 
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exception. Hiemstra CJ in S v M 1980(1) SA 586 (B) at 587H refers to the rule against previous consistent 
statements as "een van die minder duidelike en lukrake erfenisse uit die Engelse bewysreg . " 
The requirements that need to be complied with also give rise to difficulties. They are extremely rigid and often 
exclude highly relevant evidence, without any justification for so doing. The complaint must be made at the first 
reasonable opportunity. Why? Is this based on any scientific evidence that these complaints are more trustworthy 
than those made at a later stage. In fact , this requirement does not accord with research findings. Olelcers 
(1992:428) quotes figures that seventeen out of nineteen rapes go umeported. Sorenson and Snow (1991: 15) 
examined 116 cases of children who had been treated for sexual abuse. For the majority of children , tbe disclosures 
were accidental , and at some point 75% of the children had denied that abuse had occurred. Ceci and Bruclc 
(1995:35) surmnarise tlle position as foll ows: from the available data there are a number of children wbo 
immediately disclose their abuse, whether accidentally or deliberately, but dlere are also a number of children who 
delay dlei r disclosures for long periods of time. In S v S supra Ebrahim JA had the foll owing to sayan this point 
at 52G-I: 
"The evidential requirement that a rape victim should report the crime as soon as possible after 
its occurrence proceeds from the assumption that she is aware that a wrong has been committed 
against her. Now, it is abundantly clear from her evidence that the complainant was in a state of 
confusion over whether what had happened was wrong . . . The incident occurred during a period 
when the appellant was punishing the complainant, among others. To an immature and 
inexperienced mind what was done to her is likely to have seemed to be merel y a particularised 
form of punishment. " 
Since what will amount to a reasonable time within which a complaint ought to be made lies widlin dIe discretion 
of the presiding officer, tlIis gives rise to difficulties in application. In R v S supra a little boy made a report to his 
mother of two assaults , one that had happened within the bour and the adler two months previously . The report 
relating to dIe former was held to be admissible, but not dIe latter. On what grounds can such a distinction be 
justified? How can one report be trustworthy and the other not? 
In order to admit relevant evidence, the courts are often forced to strain the original ambit of the requirements. In 
R v T 1937 TPD 389 the accused was charged with cormnitting an act of gross indecency upon a five year old boy. 
The little boy made a report 6 weeks after the act, and the court was called upon to determine the admissibility of 
this report. Tidall JP held tile foll owi ng at 392: 
"There is no doubt that the period in the present case is unusually long; I know of no case in our 
Courts where the complaint has been admitted after so long a lapse of time. But on the other hand 
the circumstances of the present case are very unusual. There is the fact that dIe child was only 
five years of age and could not have appreciated the moral impropriety of the experience to which 
he was subjected . " 
The court goes on to explain that in the circumstances of this particular case the facts explain away the delay, and 
accordingly the report was held to be admissible. The major difficulty of this exception is that it does not accord 
with modern psychological findings that complainants in sexual cases do not make di sclosures soon after being 
assaulted . 
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This exception is also limited to offences of a sexual nature. Other tilan the fact that this exception has a long 
history in which it has been limited to sexual cases, Illere seems no justification why Illis should be so. If a child 
has been physically assaulted by a parent, and makes a report to a teacher, surely that report will be highly relevant. 
Since the evidence of child witnesses is treated with caution , any evidence that will assist the child 's credibility 
should be placed before Ille court. This orlly seems fair in view of the fact tilat at common law a witness's previous 
inconsistent statements are admissible as being relevant to the witness's credibility (Hoffmann and Zeffertt 
1988:452). 
The rigid requirements have forced the courts to stretch their interpretation as in S v R supra in order to admit 
evidence which is obviously relevant. In R v C supra Ille court was faced with Ille complaint made by a fi ve year 
old. It was argued that , since a child under twelve years could not consent, there was no basis for admitting such 
evidence, because Ille reason for its admission was that it tended to show absence of consent. Caney J held at 40F 
dlat tbis complaint was relevant to whether she had invented the story: 
"When evidence of the terms of a ' complaint' is admitted in cases such as the present, tilis is not 
to rebut auy suggestion of consent, nor as proof of the complainant's allegations against tbe 
accused or as corroboration of her evidence, but as showing consistency on her part and as being 
relevant on the question whetiler she has invented tile story she has told before the Court. " 
Once again, it would seem that what is needed is a commonsense approach. If the evidence is relevant, which it 
would appear to be since it forms Il,e basis of creating this exception , then it should be admissible. Whether the 
complaint was made a very long time after tile event, the reasons therefore, whether it was made in response to 
leading questions - these are all matters which should go to weight and not to admissibility. A presiding officer is 
trained to evaluate evidence, in so doing he will determine what weight should be accorded to the report. [f the 
evidence is very weak, then very little weight will be given to it. 
I submit that the reasons for excluding previous consistent statements do not have a valid basis. They are excluded, 
firstly , because they are insufficiently relevant. However, a number of exceptions have been introduced to admit 
previous consistent statements which are, in fact , relevant. Secondly, it is argued that it is easy to manufacture 
previous consistent statements . This may be so, but it is a factor which goes to weight and depends on the 
circumstallces of a particular case. In view of this , I submit that the common law rule against previous consistent 
statements be repealed by a statutory provision. The normal rules of evidence, i.e. relevance, should remain the 
guiding principle for admissibility. If tile previous consistent statement is relevant, then it will be admissible. All 
other factors will go to the weight to be accorded to the individual report before Ille court. If the previous 
consistent statement is not relevant to the matter before the court , then it will be inadmissible in terms of s210 of 
the Criminal Procedure Act of 1977. 
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6. THE CHILD AS WITNESS 
6.1 Introduction 
Since the infonnation relating to child witnesses is to be viewed in an ecological perspective, it is now necessary 
to look at tbose aspects of a cbild that will be relevant to the overall study of child witnesses in an accusatorial 
system of evidence. 
We bave already examined the macrosystems (constitutions and procedural systems) and microsystems (conunon 
law and legislation) of law. This section will attempt to look at the microsystems of Ule child and certain exosystems 
that exercise an indirect influence upon Ule child. 
An investigation of the microsystems of Ule child will include the latest research findings relating to child 
development , memory, the distinction between fantasy and reality , the ability to tell the truUl , suggestibility and the 
perceptions which children have of the courts and legal procedures. An exosystem which is of particular relevance 
to a child's capacity to give evidence relates to the manner in which children are perceived by legal personnel. 
6.2 Child Development 
6.2.1 Cognitive Development 
Tbe study of cognitive development is based on the fundamental assnmption that children show similar mental , 
emotional and social abilities, and that they undergo similar cbanges in capacities at rougbly comparable ages 
(Bukatko and Daehler 1992:53) . An understanding of cognitive development is important to recognise and explain 
the inconsistencies and confusions in children'S reports. Saywitz (1990:343-4) offers ule following example to 
illustrate this point: where a four year old witnessed a crime that took place at tbe paternal grandmouler's sister' s 
house, the child will be unable to understand ule questions relating to kinship relationships. The child would be able 
to identify those present (sister, mother, grandmother, grandmother's sister etc.) only by name and not by 
relationShip. The name Granthlla Ann is no different from ule nanle Mary-Jo. Knowing the lJanle used to refer to 
ule grandmother does not mean that the child can imagine that her father was once a baby and had a mother who 
happens to be the grandmouler. This would require Ule mental operation of reversibility, which she would not yet 
have acquired by the age of four. Therefore, although she may know ulat she has a sister , she will deny that she 
is a sister to her sister. This has the effect that ber credibility will be compromised by developmentally inappropriate 
questioning. 
The most well-known cognitive development theorist is Jean Piaget, whose ideas have had a momnnental impact 
on developmental psychology. He proposed ulat development proceeded ulrough four stages: sensorimotor, pre-
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operational, concrete, and formal. Each stage is seen as a progression and is defined by ule appearance of a 
different level of thinking i. e. an increasingly sophisticated form of knowledge. Each stage develops into the nex t, 
involving ule integration and incorporation of earlier ways of thinking (Bukatko and Daehler 1992:55). 
According to Piaget, all children progress through the stages of cognitive development in ule same order, without 
any stage being skipped. AWlOugh Piaget did provide age nomlS for the acquisition of each stage, some children 
may reach a particular stage more quickly or more slowly, depending on the child 's environmental experiences. 
What follows is a very brief summary of ule four stages through which children develop, based on that set out in 
Bukatko and Daehler (1992:3 18-324): 
The Sensorimotor Stage: According to Piagetian theory, ulis is the first stage of cognitive development and lasts 
from birth until approximately two years of age. In the beginning an infant's movements are reflexive, not 
deliberate or planned. As the child progresses through this stage, the actions become more goal-directed with 
behaviour deliberately being employed to attain a goal. The second aspect of this stage is ule child' s gradual 
separation of sel f from the external envirolmlent. The child becomes less focused on sel f and more oriented to Ule 
external world. The third accomplishment of this stage is the realisation Ulat objects exist even when they are not 
in view. The end of the sensorimotor stage and the beginning of ule next stage is reached when the child is able 
to imitate a model that is no longer present. To do so the child must have developed !lle ability to represent the 
model 's overt behaviour in an internal foml and then to draw on that representation later. It is this ability to 
represent events and objects internally that marks ule transi tion to the second stage. 
The Preoperational Stage: The second stage of development lasts approximately from two to seven years of age, 
and thought is now symbolic in foml. Tlus is Ule child 's ability to use a symbol , object or word to stand for 
something . This is a powerful cognitive ability because it enables a child to think about past and present and to 
employ language. Language would not be possible wiUlOut this stage of cognitive ability. Tilis ability is also a 
prerequisite for imagery , fantasy, play, and drawing. 
This stage has a number of distinct limitations. Firstly, children in this stage are said to be egocentric. They are 
unable to separate uleir own perspective from ulat of oUlers. This is illustrated by the ulree year old who uunks 
he is hiding when he crouches beltind an object, despite the fact that his legs or feet are sticking out. The child 
believes that he calmot be seen because he himself carUlot see. TIlis has the effect that children under the age of 
seven have poor referential communication skills and are unable to appreciate the perspectives of others. 
The second limitation relates to the child 's inability to solve problems logically. This would include Ule tendency 
of Ule child to focus on only one aspect of a problem, Ule inability to reverse mentally an action and ule tendency 
to treat two or more connected events as unrelated. This is best illustrated by Ule use of an experiment. If a liquid 
is poured from one beaker (A) to a different shaped beaker (B), perhaps a thimler but taller beaker, Ule child will 
believe the second beaker (B) has more water. This is because the child is only able to focus on one aspect of the 
beaker, namely its height, to the exclusion of all OUler information. The child does not have dle ability to reverse 
the action, nanlely reverse the pouring from B to A, because then he would realise that the containers contain Ule 
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same amount. Thirdly, the child will see the liquid in beaker A and the liquid in beaker B and will not see the 
connection between the two, namely the sequence of events. 
The Concrete Operational Stage: 111e third stage of development lasts from approximately seven to eleven years 
and is the stage in which thought is logical when stimuli are physically present. The child will now be able to solve 
the problems mentioned in stage two supra. This is because he has the ability to perform the mental actions such 
as reversibility. For instance, using the previous illustration, the child will be able to think about events i.e . he can 
pour the liquid back from beaker B to beaker A ' in his head ' . The child is less egocentric, enabling him to 
understand the perceptions and beliefs of other people. 
The Formal Operational Stage: The last stage of cogni tive development extends from approximately eleven to 
sixteen years, and is the stage in which thought is abstract and hypothetical. Thinking is logical and abstract. The 
child is able to reason hypothetically. 
According to Piaget, these are the four main stages through which a child must pass in cognitive development. 
Piaget' s findings have given rise to a wealth of research on thi s topic . Many of the researchers agree with Piaget's 
findings, but disagree with his interpretation. His description of dIe ages at which cognitive skills are acquired has 
been challenged, as well as whether development does occur in stages, and whether there are alternative 
explanations for the behaviours he observed amongst children (Bukatko and Daehler 1992:358) . 
6.2.2 Moral Development 
Moral development relates to dIe ways in which children reason about moral problems. The concept of moral 
development is important for legal purposes since part of the competency examination relates to whether a child 
is capable of understanding the duty to tell the truth (Saywitz 1990:349) . The two most prominent cognitive. 
developmental dleorists who worked on dIe moral development of children are Piaget and Kohlberg. They were 
of the opinion that children reason about moral issues in different ways depending on their level of development . 
In moral development, as in cognitive development, children are presll1lled to pass through stages in a sequence, 
which implies that children across different cultures will show similarities as they pass dlfough the various stages 
(Bukatko and Daehler 1992:540). 
In conducting his research on moral development, Piaget used two methods to explore children' S understanding of 
morality. He first focused on children'S understanding of rules (of games) since rules are essential in constructions 
of morality. He concluded that a child's appreciation for rules developed through several stages. The behaviour 
of young children is not guided by rules. They engage in acts for the pleasure of performing dIem or out of habit. 
AItllough pre-school children may be aware that there are rules , they do not incorporate dIem into their play . By 
the age of six children regard the rules (of their games) as "sacred and inviolable". The majority of the children 
do not understand dIe details of the rules, but they respect them unquestioningly. According to Piaget, adult 
authority is respected and regarded as the source of all rules. The final stage is reached at approximately ten years 
of age and here children understand dlat the rules are a result of agreement anlOng the participants. Rules are not 
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obeyed blindly but can be modified since they are the result of co-operation among Ole participants (Bukatko and 
Daehler 1992:541). 
The second method used by Piaget in his study of moral development was the observation of children' s responses 
to a series of moral dilerrunas. He would provide them with stories in which the central character did something 
wrong but the intentions and consequences varied. He concluded that children under the age of ten are in a stage 
of moral realism in which their moral judgments are based on the consequences of the act. The rightness or 
wrongness of an act is based on the visible consequences. The intention of dIe central character is not taken into 
account. According to Piaget, rules are viewed as unbreakable in this stage. When rules are broken, punishment 
is Ole inevitable consequence. Children at dUs stage believe in expiatory punishment i. e. the punislmlent does not 
have to be related to the transgression as long as the punishment is severe enough to teach a lesson. Adults are seen 
as being the authorities on moral standards (Bukatko and Daehler 1992:541 -2). 
In the second stage of moral development (moral relativism) children begin to take account of the wrongdoer 's 
intention and Illative. The child no longer believes that every violation of a rule will result in pUIushment. 
Purushment must be related to the transgression. The authority of adults is no longer Ole sale reason for obeying 
rules. Rather, mutual respect and co-operation with peers underlies the child 's reasorung about moral issues . The 
movement from the stage of moral realism to moral relativism is related to the child' s cogrutive ability. The less 
egocentric a child becomes Ole more he is able to appreciate the point of view of another person's as distinct from 
hi s own. This enables him Olen to understand the intention of another person (Bukatko an Daehler 1992:542) . 
Research subsequent to Piaget has confinned many aspects of his Oleary. It is accepted that children progress from 
a belief in innninent justice, expiatory punishment and obedience to audlOrity to an increasing consideration of 
intention when judging acts. Also accepted is Piaget' s belief that cognitive development underlies a child's 
development in moral reasoning. Piaget has, however, been cri ticised for underestimating young cltildren's ability 
to respond to intentionality. In research carried out on a sample of children, ranging from kindergarten to fiftll 
grade, even dIe youngest children took the intentions of the actor into account wben making moral judgements 
(Bukatko aud Daebler 1992:543). 
Lawrence Kohlberg was heavily influenced by Piaget's emphasis on the link between cognitive development and 
moral development. Koblberg's theory of moral development is also based on the belief dlat development consists 
of passing through stages in a luerarchical order. He identified three stages or levels of moral orientation. The 
following is a brief sunnnary of these stages, based on the work of Bukatko and Daehler (1992:544-548): In die 
fi rst stage of moral reasoning (pre-conventional level) the child 's behaviour is motivated by Ole avoidance of 
purushment, Ole attairmlent of rewards, and the preservation of his own self-interests . The second stage is dIe 
conventional level. Here the child conforms to Ole nonns of the majority and wishes to preserve dIe social order. 
The child considers dIe point of view of oOlers, including intention and motives. A sense of responsibility to uphold 
the rules develops. The final stage is the post-conventional stage. Here the child has developed a full er 
understanding of the basis for laws and rules. Laws are seen as the result of a social contract widl individual 
principles of conscience emerging. 
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Kohlberg and Piaget differ in their approach to moral development in a number of respects. Kohlberg does not place 
as much emphasis on the role of adult authority as Piaget does. His emphasis is on rewards and punishment. 
Kohlberg is of the opinion that the movement towards autonomy occurs towards the end of adolescence, which is 
much later than that envisioned by Piaget (Bukatko and Daehler 1992:546). AltllOugb psychological theories differ 
in the emphasis they place on various aspects of moral development, all theories portray the child as moving 
through various stages from self-orientation to other-orientation. 
6,2.3 Language Development 
In order to participate in the legal process, a child must have ule ability to communicate in a maImer that is 
understood by the adult listeners. Conununication in this context, according to Saywitz (1990:345) , is an interaction 
between what the speaker (child) and Ole listener (adult) bring to Ole context (courtroom) in which the interchange 
occurs. To give evidence successfully, a chi ld must have reached a certain level of intelligibility, vocabulary and 
conversational skill. 
An understanding of language development in a child is vital for conducting successful interviews with children. 
Studies have shown Olat children learn to communicate through a gradual sequence of phases. It is, therefore, 
important to be able to assess at what stage a particular child is, so that the adult can ask questions that are matched 
to the child 's stage of comprehension and can interpret Oleir responses in accordance with their level of 
development. For instance a child who is capable of understanding simple sentences of six to eight words long will 
not be able to respond accurately to a sentence that has twenty words and contains complex clauses (Saywitz 
1990:346). 
As in the other areas of development, studies indicate that children learn to communicate ulfough a series of stages: 
"When one compares the empirical findings of language acquisition studies, in fact, it is surprising 
how similar dates of predominant development of Ole various syntactic structure turn out to be. 
Onset time may indeed vary, but means display a remarkable correspondence." (Crystal et al 
1976:31) 
At birth a child's linguistic capabilities are limited to crying, clicks and sighs. Between the ages of six and eight 
weeks the child begins to coo. As the weeks progress, the coos become longer and begin to include certain 
consonants (Bukatko and Daehler 1992:277). 
Most children begin to babble between ule ages of utree and six months and refine their skills in Ole succeeding 
months so that by the age of nine or ten months Ole babbling includes more numerous and more complex consonant-
vowel combinations. From approximately twelve months children begin to utter their first words. In this stage most 
children only speak one word at a time. They acquire their first ten words very slowly , adding approximately one 
to three words to their repertoire every month. From eighteen months many children show a rapid acquisition of 
new words, although the majority of these words are nouns (objects, people or events). They also use verbs (action 
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words), such as give, go etc., and some adjectives (dirty) with some personal-social words (please) occurring 
(Bukatko and Daehler 1992:28 1). 
Stone and Lemanek (1990:23) refer to the findings of studies which reveal that children between eighteen and 
twenty-four months begin to refer to themselves by name and by twenty eight months they demonstrate the ability 
to describe their own mental states, for instance 'see', 'thirsty', 'scared' etc . Singleton (1989: 14) concludes that 
as far as the early emergence of language is concerned, there is good evidence of a stable sequence of stages which 
occur at relatively similar age-ranges. 
From the age of two years children are able to produce sentences containing at least two words, which consist of 
combinations of nouns, verbs and adjectives witilout any conjunctions ego more juice; mummy sit. By two-and-a-
half years children's speech exceeds two words and includes more connective words, adjectives and pronouns. 
Between tile ages of three and five the granunaticai structures in a child's speech become more sophisticated and 
they use different tenses, singular and plurals as well as more articles and conjunctions. Negatives, questions and 
passives are also gradually introduced (Bukatko and Daehler 1992:286-8). 
Even when children have mastered tile basics of simple sentences, certain concepts still give rise to problems in 
communication. Studies have shown tilat even when children think they understand a word , they may not have tile 
same meaning in mind as the adult. An example given by Saywitz (1990:346) illustrates this point: children only 
understand tile concept of 'jury ' by the age of ten or eleven, but tiley frequently mistake it for the more familiar 
word 'jewellery'. A case is something you carry books in, a court is a place where you play basketball , a minor 
is someone who digs coal, and parties are where you get presents. If an adult misjudges the child's level of 
knowledge, tllis can create a great deal of confusion in communication. 
An understanding of dle norms for the acquisition of certain words is very relevant to interpreting a child' s 
language. For instance, children generally do not use dle concepts 'frontwards ', 'sideways', or ' backwards' 
accurately until they are about seven. Another frequent misunderstanding is tile use of relational tern,s to describe 
tile size and shapes of people and tllings. These terms may have different meanings for children. For example, if 
a child is asked whether an unfamiliar object is big or small , he will use himself as tile standard . If the object is 
small enough for him to hold , it is little; if it is too big for him to hold , tilen it is big (Saywitz 1990: 347) . 
TIlerefore, if a child is asked whether somebody is fat, what may appear large and fat to him , could appear fairl y 
slim and small to an adult. 
There are a few common errors in children' s communications which will be mentioned here for the sake of 
completeness. Firstly, young children sometimes extend the meaning of a word in their small vocabularies to include 
aclions or objects for which tiley have no word (overextension). Although this practice violates the rules of adult 
language, it makes logical seuse to children to apply a word to objects ti13t resemble each adler. For exampl e, all 
four-legged furry animals may be referred to as 'doggies'. The lesson for courts then is ti13t they have to be careful 
to decipher the specific meanings of words used by young children (Perry and Wrightsman 1991: 126). 
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A second error found in children's communications is referred to as underextension. By this is meant that they 
attribute to a word only part of the meaning the teml has for adults. A good example of this error is provided by 
Goodman and Helgeson (1985:197-8) : 
"if a child were asked, 'Did the man take off his clotiles?' he or she might respond , 'No ,' but if 
asked, 'Did the man take off his pants?' he or she might respond' Yes. ' In tile questioner 's mind , 
the first question migbt subsume the second, but for tile child , clothes and pants may be two 
distinct ideas. Thus, the child' s testimony may appear to be inconsistent when it really is not." 
A further possible error in communication relates to syntax. In Englisb the order in which words are spoken 
partially detemline their meaning. A typical English sentence follows a subject-verb-object sequence. This has the 
implication, supported by research, that cbildren have difficulty understanding passive sentences. Young children 
assume Ulat the subject of the sentence is always tbe actor. For instance, if a child was told 'Jane was hit by John', 
he will understand it to mean that Jane is the one doing the hi tting . Therefore, when talking to children, adults 
should use simply-phrased, active-voice sentences with only a few adjectives and adverbs (Perry and Wrightsman 
1991: 128) . 
Of particular relevance to the interviewing of children is their understanding of when, who, what, why and how 
questions. Initially children can only answer what, who and where questions, because these questions require 
concrete infomJation they can understand - agents, objects and locations (Saywitz 1990: 346). However, as far as 
when-questions are concerned, a child under the age of eight will have difficulty providing accurate infomJation. 
The understanding of time and dates is very limited in young children, although they will be able to say if an event 
took place during the day or at night or if it is related to an important event such as a birthday or Chrisullas. A 
why-question is generally nOt understood before the age of eight or ten (Brennan and Brennan 1988:56) 
The difficulty in understanding why-questions is related to a child ' s difficulty in understanding evaluative questions. 
An evaluative question is one that requires tile child to think about and interpret facts. According to Perry and 
Wrightsman (1991: 60), as a child 's brain develops a fatty substance (myelin) begins to coat and protect Ule neural 
fibres which bave the function of reducing the random spread of impulses from one fibre to another. The last 
structure to myelinate is the corpus callosum, which is the band of fibres connecting tile right and left hemispheres 
of the brain. One of the major functions of Ule corpus callosum is to transfer information from one hemisphere of 
the brain to Ille oUler, which would enable children to evaluate and make inferences. Myelination of the co/pus 
callosum is not complete until after a child is ten years old. However, tilis does not mean that children under the 
age of ten cannot give evidence. AJtilOugh ule left and right hemispheres of tbe brain function autonomously in very 
young children , communication improves greatly by the time the child is five years old (Perry and Wrightsman 
199 1:60-61). 
"The corpus callosum of most fi ve-year-olds likely is not mature enough for the transfer of more 
complex infomlation, e. g., tilat involving complicated decisions and evaluation, such as making 
inferences and drawing conclusions. Thus, while young children may well be capable of 
accurately perceiving events and of conununic3ting simple infom1ation about those occurrences, 
uley are not able to engage in inferential thinking about the events. It is only as children approach 
adolescence that their maturing brains pemlit them to evaluate their perceptions with a degree of 
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sophistication approaching that of adults." 
In fact, Perry and Wrightsman (1991:61 -2) suggest that this may result in younger children actually being better 
witnesses, since they report details of what they have witnessed without evaluating dIem , while adolescents and 
adults may commit errors because they think about the details. The following example illustrates dlis point: an 
eleven year old girl and her nine year old sister were out walking when dley met a young man on a bicycle who 
called out to them and exposed his petus. The girls provided separate reports to dleir modler. Initially dley both 
provided similar reports widl both of them saying that the man had worn cut-off jeans and had exposed his penis 
tbrough the leg opening. Later, the older girl changed her statement, saying that the man had not worn jeans but 
loose-fitting blue shorts. When the child's mother asked her why she had changed her mind , the girl replied dIat 
be could not have been wearing jeans because jeans are too tight for him to have put his pelus dnough the leg. 
Therefore, younger children are often capable of describing simple events but they may have difficulty 
comprehending or interpreting these events until dley are older. 
A lawyer's verbal skills are very well developed, but it is this very skill which sometimes creates a sigluficam 
barrier to communication with children. This means that when lawyers (or even other adults) work with children, 
they must be aware of children'S linlited linguistic abilities and choose their words with great care. In order to 
communicate effectively widl children, it is important that interviewers are Imowledgeable about the stages of 
language development and of connnon errors in language usage (Perry and Wrightsman 1991: 129-130). 
6.3 Memory and Snggestibility 
6.3.1 Introdnction 
Two issues will be addressed here. The first is whether children are capable of remembering stressful evems 
accurately. The question of memory is relevant to competency. As discussed supra, dIe American courts have held 
that competency relates to a child's ability to observe an event, remember it and then relate it at a later stage. An 
attempt will be nIade to examine scientific findings in dIe field of psychology to investigate whether dley can be 
of any assistance in determining whether children can remember stressful events accurately. 
The second issue is whether young children are more suggestible than older children and adults. Are children 
influenced by suggestive questioning techniques? In other words, do children incorporate assumptions contained in 
the interviewer'S questions into dleir own reports" This will have an important effect on dIe credibility of a child 
witness and is relevant to the cautionary rule which must be appl ied to child witnesses. When the courts are 
presented widl dle evidence of a child, they have to warn themselves of tbe dangers inherent in a child 's evidcnce. 
One of dlese alleged dangers is the supposed suggestibility of children. What needs to be addressed is whether dlis 
assumption is in keeping with scientific research. 
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6.3.2 Memory 
6.3.2.1 Introduction 
Memory involves the acquisition, storage, retention and retrieval of infomlation. The abili ty, therefore, to 
remember depends on the skill with which a complex set of processes are executed, beginning with the event in 
question and ending with its retrieval at a later stage. 
The three main stages of the system are: encoding, storage and retrieval. The first phase is called encoding and 
refers to tile process by which a trace of an experience becomes registered in memory. There is selectivi ty as to 
what gets encoded in the storage system at tile initial stage since in most cases attention is given to certain aspects 
of an event while other aspects are ignored. The foll owing are some of tile factors that could influence what enters 
ule memory system and how strongly it becomes encoded: prior knowledge of the event, interest value of the event, 
duration and repetition of the original event, and the stress level at the time encoding takes place (Ceci and Bruck 
1995:41 -2). 
The second phase is known as the storage phase, and in this phase encoded events enter a short-teml memory store. 
Not all memories survive short-term storage, but ulOse that do then enter long-term storage. It is important to be 
aware that information can be transfortned , strengthened or lost while in storage. The strength and organisation of 
stored information is dependent on a number of factors: the length of time that has passed, the number of times tile 
event has been re-experienced, and the number and type of intervening experiences Ulat have been encoded and 
stored (Ceci and Bruck 1995:42) . 
The final stage is the retrieval stage and involves the retrieval of memory from storage. Not all memories are 
reuieved perfectly. In fact, some are not retrievable at all . This will depend on ule condition of the original memory 
trace, as traces Ulat have undergone decay will be more difficult to retrieve. In otller cases retrieval will be aided 
when ule conditions for retrieval parallel IllOse of encoding, for instance when the interviewer makes use of cues 
that reinstate the encoding context, accuracy of recall improves (Ceci and Bruck 1995:43). 
In surnmary, what a person ' remembers' does not always come directly from storage. Memory is highly 
constructive and, tllerefore, memories are added to, deleted and shaped by experiences. These transfortnations can 
occur at any stage. The result is that what is retrieved is rarely a direct match of Ille original event. 
6.3.2.2 Memory in Children 
Research studies have shown Ulat storage capacity does not change greatly with age . Once infortnation has been 
successfully stored in memory, a preschooler will probably remember it as well as an adult (Werner and Perlmutter 
1979:56). The problems which young children encounter relate to the encoding and the retrieval processes. It is 
difficult for young children to encode tile infonnation i.e. to get the infortnation into long-term storage. They also 
1 
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experience difficulties in retrieving infomlation from long teml memory. These problems seem to result from the 
fact that most of the processing space in children's active, working memory is filled by the instructions for encoding 
and retrieving information. With time, children become more efficient at processing infomlation because the 
instructions become automatic (Myers 1987:487-8) . 
In order to remember an event, the first steps are to perceive dle event and to pay attention to it. Perry and 
Wrightsman (1991: 108) argue d,at children can be very effective witnesses because they tend to concentrate on 
observing rather than interpreting their observations as adults do. Children sometimes fail to notice certain 
peripheral details because they lack significance, but on the other hand some children may give peripheral details 
exaggerated importance. This depends on the circumstances of each panicular case. For instance, a young child 
who is fascinated by cars may notice more details about the cars involved in an event than would an adult. 
Once a child has perceived an event, he must be able to remember and report dle infonnation. Children may be 
able to perceive an event accurately but have difficulty translating dlis perception into words. The eveDl may be 
stored in dle child's memory in some representational foml but the child does not have the ability to conmlUnicate 
Lhe content of the memory . Therefore, in order to be effective witnesses, children must be able to demonstrate their 
retention of material in one of three ways: recognition, reconstruction or recall (Perry and Wrightsman 1991: 108). 
Recognition memory is the simplest form of remembering, and entails only that an object be recognised as 
something dlat was perceived previously. Recognition is widlin the capacity of very young infants and improves 
rapidly as children mature. For instance, a study conducted by Myers and Perlmutter (1978:218) found that two 
year olds recognised 81 percent of dle objects presented to dlem correctly while four year olds were correct 92 
percent of the time. Other researchers found that on photo-recognition tasks, six year olds had higher mean 
identification accuracy dlan three year olds and even adults (Myers 1987:489). It is generally accepted that by the 
time children begin school , dleir recoglution memory is very good for simple stimuli widl five year olds being as 
proficient as adults in recoglusing pictures of commonplace objects. But children do not perfonn as well with more 
complex stimuli and this limitation is important in dle legal context (Perry and Wrightsman 1991 : 109-110). 
Reconstruction memory is a specialised method of retrieving material from storage which involves reproducing dle 
fonn of infonnation that was seen in tbe past, as in reconstructing the scene of dle crime. Piaget believed thaL 
children's reconstructive memory was superior to their free recall because children intentionally repeat the natural 
order of events when marupulating concrete objects. Myers (1987:490) refers to research studies conducted by 
Cohen and Perlmutter where two and three year olds demonstrated up to 75 percent accuracy on simple 
reconstructions. 
Recall is the most complex foml of memory requiring that previously observed events be retrieved from storage 
with few or no prompts. This is the foml of retrieval most often required of witnesses, and is strongly age-related. 
Perry and Wrightsman (1991: 111-2) refer to research studies where subjects, ranging in age from five years to 
adulthood, observed an unexpected, staged event. The subjects were then asked to use recall memory to relate what 
they could remember about the incident. A number of the younger children did not volunteer any infonllatioll. 
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However, although the youngest group was able to recall less, what they did say tended to be correct (only 3 
percent error) while the other age groups had error rates of between 8 and I 0 percent. The subjects were then asked 
twenty simple questions about the incident and asked to select tile man they had seen from an array of photographs. 
The results indicated that children of all ages were as capable as adults of answering simple, direct questions, and 
the children were as adept as the adults at recognising the person they had seen from tile photographs. Perry and 
Teply (1984/5 : 1389) interpreted the results of this research as follows: 
"In the context of a legal interview or examination, this research suggests that wben children are 
simply asked to tell what they can remember about an event , tile qual ity of the narrative of older 
children will be better than that of younger ones, but neither will give as full a narrative as an 
adult. It also suggests, bowever, that even young children (kindergarten - first grade) bave 
sufficiently developed ability to remember past events and that simple, direct (non-leading) 
questions or recognition recall [i.e., cued recall] appear to be viable means of finding out factual 
information from tllem. Using those methods, tlleir answers apparently are no less credible than 
those of an adult , absent other influences." 
Certain trends are evident in the development of recall ability. Infants, generally, are poor at recall. Preschoolers, 
although beginning to organise their memories around concepts, have poorly developed recall memory. When 
children enter school their recall improves with six or seven year olds recalling a story much as an adult would. 
Gaps do, however, remain in the children's version. Although most of the important features are recalled, incidental 
facts may be forgotten or not reported (Myers 1987:492). In conclusion , Perry and Wrightsman (1991: 113-4) 
sununarise the position as follows: 
"It would be erroneous to assunle tllat younger children necessarily have poorer recall than do 
older children or adults. In some cases, younger children can provide more accurate information . 
The important point is that because of their limited ability to use memory strategies, children often 
know more than tbey can freely recall." 
6.3.3 Suggestibility 
6.3.3.1 Introduction 
Traditionally, suggestibility has been defined as "the extent to which individuals come to accept and subsequently 
incorporate post-event infomlation into their memory recollections" (Gudjonsson 1986: 195). Ceci and Bruck 
(! 995:44-5) suggest that a broader defilution of suggestibility be used which follows tile legal and everyday usage 
of the term. Suggestibility tllen would refer to "the degree to whicb the encoding, storage, retrieval , and reporting 
of events can be influenced by a range of intemal and external factors ". The broadened definition implies that 
suggestibility can result from social as well as cognitive factors, which would include infornlation unwittingly 
incorporated into memory , subtle suggestions, expectations, stereotypes, leading questions as well as explici t bribes, 
threats and other forms of social inducement. 
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6.3.3.2 Early Research on Children's Suggestibility 
Althougb there were many researchers who conducted studies on the suggestibility of children and adults, only the 
four researchers who had the greatest influence on subsequent psychological research will be discussed here. They 
are Binet, Varendonck, Stern and Lipmann. 
In 1900 Alfred Binet published the results of a series of studies on the suggestibility of school children between the 
ages of seven and fourteen in wbich he maintained tbat suggestibility was induced by two broad classes of factors. 
The first class related to the influence of tbought that developed within the individual and was not caused by the 
influence of another, while the second class included factors which were external to the child and reflected mental 
obedience to anodler person. He argued that the second class included manifestations of suggestibility which were 
the result of attempts to please powerful audlDrity figures and did not actually always reflect genuine incorporation 
of the false suggestion into the memory (Ceci and Bruck 1995:51-54). 
Binet attempted to apply his findings to the courtroom context and recommended that French judges be aware of 
forcing their own questions into the child' s memory . His work, however, was never used in French courts and , 
although Binet wanted to extend his research into the courtroom by studying the transcripts of criminal cases, he 
was never allowed to do so . This was then taken up by other researchers like Varendonck and Stern (Ceci and 
Bruck 1995:55). 
Varendonck was a Belgian psychologist who began to publish his research on the memory of child witnesses in 
1911. He bad been approached for assistance in the course of au investigation into a murder which was alleged 
to have been witnessed by a chi ld. As a result he conducted a series of experiments on the suggestibility and 
accuracy of children's memory. Varendonck was of the opinion tllat the memory of children could not be trusted 
since they did not have tlle ability to observe and were highly suggestible. His reports , as translated by Hazen, are 
reproduced in Selkin and will be briefly summarised below. Varendonck believed that "[tlhose who are in the habit 
of living with children do not attach the least value to their testimony because children cannot observe and because 
their suggestibility is inexbaustible" (Selkin 1991: 38). 
One of his most faulDus experiments was conducted in 1912 and focused on tbe suggestibility of children aged 
between seven and nine years. Tbe actual experiment involved a teacher addressing a class of students, in the course 
of which he referred the students to anotller male teacher (M r H) whom the children knew well and saw many times 
a day. The teacher then rubbed his chin and said the word 'beard' . He then wrote d,e following question on tlle 
board: 'What is dIe colour of Mr H 's beard?" Amongst tbe seven year aids, sixteen of the eighteen children wrote 
d,at Mr H had a black beard. In fact, Mr H did not have a beard. The question posed to the eight year a ids was 
'What is the colour of Mr T's moustache?' when in fact Mr T did not have a moustache. Only one out of twenty 
students observed that Mr T did not have a mouslache. Amongst dle nine year a ids, sixteen out of the twenty were 
of the opinion d,at Mr T did have a moustache. Varendonck, dlerefore, made the finding that children are more 
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suggestible than adults, and younger children are more suggestible than older children (Selkin 1991 :39). Since 
Varendonck had originJilly been approached in Ule course of a murder investigation, he compiled a report in which 
he set out his finding ulat "we camlot set the least value in their [children's] declarations". 
Stern, A German psychologist, also focused on suggestibility in his researcb. He developed two types of 
experiments in this field, which are still used today. In the first, subjects were shown a picture, asked 10 study it 
for a while and then asked to recall what they had seen. They were then asked questions, amongst which were 
included some misleading questions which requested infornlation about objects dlat had not appeared in the picture. 
In one of the studies he conducted, be tested children between the ages of seven and eighteen, and found that free 
recall produced fewer errors whereas the misleading questions produced dle most errors. He found that, although 
the younger children were more suggestible, even the eighteen years olds were misled by the suggestive questions 
(Ceci and Bruck 1995:56-7). This finding is important wiul respect to Varendonck's findings. He found cbildren 
to be suggestible but only tested chi ldren aged between seven and nine. Stern also found children to be suggestible, 
but his study was conducted on subjects aged between seven and eighteen and be found that even tbe eighteen year 
old were suggestible. 
Tbe second type of experiment developed by Stern was referred 10 as the 'reality' experiment and it aimed at 
mimicking situations which were closer to real life. Thi s paradigm has been adopted by a nwnber of later 
researchers in dleir studies on child witnesses' memory of events. Stern's findings are briefly surnmarised as 
follows: be cautioned dlat subjects should not be questioned repeatedly about an event; he claimed that a subject's 
original verbal answers were better remembered than the actual event; and he believed dlat the questioner was in 
many cases responsible for tbe unreliable evidence of witnesses because of the way in wbich a question was phrased 
(Ceci and Bruck 1995:57). 
Another German psychologist, Lipmann, concluded that children were less reliable than adults as witnesses because 
children pay attention to different attributes of stimuli dlan adults and this plays a role in wbat they encode. This, 
togedler with certain social factors, was responsible for children being more suggestible than adults. Children are 
questioned in most cases by adults who have great authority over them about events wbicb are neither essential nor 
sal ient 10 the child. Lipmalm (1 911 :253) believed that in this situation children will attempt to revise their memory 
to comply widl the autbority figure . 
These early studies of children's evidence dealt almost exclusively with children's memory and suggestibility. 
Today, however, understJlnding of cognitive ability is much greater and it is recognised that a child 's knowledge 
of, or familiarity with, an event profoundly affects memory perforn13llce. A child who is knowledgeable in a certain 
domain may remember events in that domain better than an unknowledgeable adult. Memory is also related to 
coglutive development. Tbese issues bave only recently been recognised . In addition, early researchers tended to 
make categorical statements about dle abi li ties of children. For instance, they stated that children are always more 
suggestible tban adults or that a child always remembers less. These studies were designed to demonstrate the 
inaccuracies rather lhan the accuracies of memory. In addition, standards for scientific research have improved 
considerably since the early I900s (Goodman 1984:1 8). 
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The conclusion to be reached from dlis , however, is dlat the present laws relating to children's competency and 
credibility are based on questionable assumptions and standards from the past, and need to be re-evaluated in the 
light of recent research. 
6.3.3.3 Modern Research on Children's Suggestibility 
In the 1980s there was a revival of interest among developmental researchers on how reliable children's reports 
were. Although it is commonl y believed that children are more suggestible dIan adults, psychological research has 
shown that children are not as suggestible as many adults would believe them to be (Myers 1987:496) . Studies of 
suggestibility among children and adults have provided mixed findings. Some studies support the finding that young 
children are no more suggestible dIan adults. A number of studies have demonstrated that children as young as five 
can answer objective questions about simple events as well as adults can (Perry and Wrightsman 1991: 115). 
Duncan et al (1982) conducted a series of studies on subjects , ranging from six years to college students, in which 
subjects were shown slides and later questioned about the contents. The results demonstrated dlat children and adults 
were influenced equally by dIe questions asked. A second analysis, based upon only dlOse instances in which there 
was correct memory , showed that the younger subjects appeared to be less influenced dIan dIe older subjects! A 
follow-up experiment obtained a similar pattern of results. In 1979 Marin et al ( 1979:295-304) also conducted a 
study on the recall memory of children widl subjects ranging from kindergarten to college age. Tbe results indicated 
that children were not more easily swayed into incorrect answers by the use of misleading questions than adults. 
They found that children were as capable as adults of answering direct questions about an incident. Children in the 
study were no more easily swayed into incorrect answers than were adults by the use of leading questions. 
On the other hand , some studies bave found that under certain circumstances, children may be more suggestible 
dIan adults. One such study was conducted by Cohen and Harnick (1980:208-9) on ulird-grades, sixth-grades, and 
college-age adults. The results showed that dIe third-graders had poorer memories than the older groups, and the 
younger participants had a greater tendency to accept fal se suggestion , although all dlree groups were influenced 
to some extent. Of importance was the fact that the analysis of results attributed dIe inferior performance of dIe 
youngest group regarding suggestion to their inferior encoding of dIe film in memory. The effect of suggestion upon 
the material dlat had been encoded well was not Significantly different for the three age groups. Goodman and Reed 
(1986:317) conducted similar studies and found that adults were more likely to answer suggestive questions correctly 
than were six year aIds, and six year aIds in turn were better than three year olds. It is important to note, however, 
that when asked accurate but leading questions, dIe six year aIds answered with the greatest accuracy, fallowed by 
the three year a Ids and then the adults. In addition, adults made more intrusion errors than the other subjects i.e. 
they allowed inaccurate information to intrude on their memory of an event. Altllough the three and six year a Ids 
were found to be more suggestible than the adults, this finding did not hold true for central infonllation that had 
been encoded properly in memory. 
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Tucker et al (1990: 117) also conducted a study to deternline the effect of multiple interviews on the reliability of 
a child 's evidence. They found that , consistent with the above findings , children provided minimal infomlation 
spontaneously but gave relatively accurate responses, and were often able to resist suggestion. 
Rudy and Goodman (1991:538) conducted a study to detemline whether there were any differences in the accuracy 
of children's reports if they were participants in an event as opposed to bystanders. The older cbildren were found 
to be more accurate than the younger children. However, an important finding in this study was that, although the 
responses of older children were more accurate tllan those of tlle younger children, tllis did not apply to misleading 
questions suggesting abuse. For tllese questions there were no age differences in accuracy. This finding has been 
used to support tlle argument that , although there may be age differences in suggestibility and children may be 
misled, these conclusions do not apply to suggestions concerning sexual abuse. 
Saywitz et al (1991:682) also conducted a study tl,at took tlle above experiment even further. In this research rhe 
reports of five and seven year old girls who visited a paediatrician were examined. Half of the girls had had their 
spines examined while the other half had had a genital examination. The older girls were more accurate tllan the 
younger girls in response to the misleading non-abuse questions. There was essentially no age difference for 
misleading abuse questions. The seven year aids made no false reports of abuse , while five year a ids were misled 
into making fal se statements of abuse in three instances only (out of 215 opportututies). These findings again 
support tbe argument tl,at children cannot easily be misled into making false allegations of abuse. A furtller 
significant finding in this study was that when the children'S inaccurate reports were examined tlley were found to 
involve mainly omission errors . The children left out infomlation rather then included false infonnation. For 
illStance, most children who had had the gelutal examination did not disclose gerutal contact unless they were 
specifically asked. 
A review of the above results appears to lead to the conclusion that adults spontaneously recall more about incidents 
they have wi tnessed than children do. They do not, however, support the idea tllat children are always more 
suggestible than adults. The possible reasons for the discrepant findings in the above studies are explained by Loftus 
and Davies (1984:63) as follows: 
"Probably no single factor can by itself explain the discrepant findings of these studies. This 
points to a possible resolution of tlle discrepancy . Perhaps age alone is the wrong focus for tllese 
studies. Whether children are more susceptible to suggestive infonnation than adults probably 
depends on the interaction of age Witll other factors. If an event is understandable and interesting 
to bOtll children and adults, and if their memory for it is still equally strong, age differences in 
suggestibility may not be found. But if the event is not encoded well to begin with, or if a delay 
weakens the chi ld's memory relative to an adult's, then age differences may emerge. In tllis case 
tlle fragments of the event that remain in the child's memory may not be sufficient to serve as a 
barrier against suggestion, especially from authoritative others. Of course, if the child's grasp of 
the language is so weak as to make him or her oblivious to tlle subtle implications in the 
suggestive information, then the child may be inmlUne to the manipulation regardless of the 
interest value or memorability of the stimuli, or the loss of an accurate memory record. " 
The belief that children are more suggestible tlJan adults pervades legal thinking despite the fact that tllere is lack 
of scientific evidence to support tills belief. Recent studies have failed to uncover any simple relationship between 
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suggestibility and age (Zaragoza 1987:53). It would appear that a number of factors interact with age in influencing 
a person's respollse to suggestion, and this is not limited to children. What does, however, appear to be clear is 
that legal rules and procedures are based on an inaccurate or outmoded knowledge of developmenUlI psychology . 
For this reason, eSUlblished research findings need to be made available to legal practitioners and policy makers 
(Flin 1991:23). 
6.3.3.4 Factors affecting suggestibility 
Several factors appear to interact with age in influencing a person's response to suggestion. These factors include: 
degree of suggestion, centrality of the infofUlation to be remembered, strength of the memory, linguistics, the 
questioner's sUltuS, and intimidation of the witness (Perry and Wrightsman 1991: 120). The degree of suggestion 
employed wi ll obviously playa role in whether a chi ld succumbs to the suggestion or not. Strong suggestion is more 
likely to elicit fal se agreement from a child than mild suggestion. Goodman and Helgeson (1985: 181) explain tI,at 
questions like 'Did Uncle Henry touch your penis?' (mild suggestion) would be less likely to lead to a fa lse or 
inaccurate report than 'I bet Uncle Henry touched your penis, isn' t that right?' (strong suggestion). The problem 
with tllis, however, is that children may not offer information sponUlneously, and leading (often suggestive) 
questions may be required, as in the studies conducted by Saywitz et al (1 991 :682) supra where the children did 
not report geniUlI touch in the medical examination until they were specifically asked. 
The dangers associated with leading questions are clearly illustrated in the foll owing extract from Dent (I982 :29 1) 
where S.K. , a police officer in an experiment, was interviewing a child about a woman's appearance: 
"S.K. 
Child 
S.K. 
Child: 
S.K. 
Child 
S.K. 
Child 
S.K. 
Child 
S.K. 
Child 
S.K. 
Child 
S.K. 
Child 
S.K. 
Child 
Wearing a poncho and cap? 
I think it was a cap. 
What sort of cap was it? Was it like a beret, or was it a peaked cap, or -? 
No, it had sort of, it was flared with a little piece coming out (demonstrates 
wi til hands) . It was flared with a sort of button thing in the middle. 
What - sort of - like that - was it a peak like that , that sort of thing? 
Ye-es. 
Like a sort of orange segment thing, like that, do you mean? 
Yes! 
Is that right? 
Yes .. 
That's tile sort of cap I'm thinking you're meaning, witll a little peak out there. 
Yes, that 's top view, yes. 
That sort of thing, is it? 
Yes. 
Smashing. Um - what colour? 
Oh! Oh - I think it was um black or brown 
Think it was dark, shall we say? 
Yes- it was dark colour I think, and I didn't see her hair. " 
In fact, the woman was not wearing anytlting on her head , nor was she wearing a poncho. 
Children are more likely to adopt suggestion when it is related to peripheral information rather than central details. 
This, however, applies to adults as well. It follows logically that tile more attention one pays to central information, 
I 
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the less one is able to concentrate on peripheral detail. Children under the age of five scan events starting with the 
point of greatest action, which often results in children missing peripheral detail (Myers 1987:500). 
Children, like adults, may be more prone to suggestion if their memory is weak. Where a memory is weak, 
misleading infomlation can sometimes replace original memories. This means that a child whose memory for an 
event is relatively weak may be more suggestible than a child whose memory is strong for the same event (Myers 
1987:501). As far as the interview of the child witness itself is concerned, the most obvious method of suggestion 
is dIe use of leading questions. Dale, Loftus and Rathbun (1978:274-5) conducted research on whedler dIe foml 
of me question would influence dIe evidence of a child, and they found that if dIe question asked was about an 
entity which was present in dIe film shown, the fonn of the question did not matter. However, if dIe question asked 
was about an entity which was not present, dlen dIe form of the question had a sigrtificant affect on the child's 
response. These results are of particular importance for the courtroom since the way in which a question is phrased 
may determine dIe accuracy or inaccuracy of the response. 
Ceci and Bruck (1995: 123) provide a very good illustration of the effects of leading questions. The following is 
from the trial evidence of Jennifer F, a nine year old girl who had witnessed the murder of an elderly couple, in 
State v Macias, 1984: 
"Interviewer 
Jemlifer 
Interviewer 
Jennifer 
Interviewer 
Jermifer 
What kind of shirt was M r. Macias wearing? 
It was blue shirt. 
Was it a solid blue shirt? 
Yes, dIal's what it was. Solid blue. 
Are you sure it didn't have a check pattern on it, like a cowboy shirt? 
Yes , that's it. It had a large check on it. .. ". 
A furdler instance of Jemtifer F. incorporating leading questions into her evidence follows: 
" Interviewer 
Jennifer 
Interviewer 
Jemtifer 
What time was it? 
It was nearly dark, around 6 o'clock, T guess. 
Are you sure it was nearly dark or was it in dIe afternoon? 
Yeah, I guess it was around 2 or 3 o'clock." 
A further factor influencing suggestibility relates to the interviewer, and is termed 'interviewer bias'. This occurs 
where interviewers have previously decided beliefs about dIe occurrence of certain events and then proceed to mould 
the interview to elicit statements from the child that are consistent with these prior beliefs . TIle most obvious 
example is where the interviewer is convinced that abuse has taken place and dlen only gathers infonnation to 
support dlis belief and fails to gather any infomlation that may disprove this belief (Ceci and Bruck 1995:79). 
An interviewer's bias will affect dIe entire interview and will reveal a number of features dlat are highly suggestive. 
For instance, to confiml their suspicions interviewers may not ask children open-ended questions, but radler use 
a number of very specific questions, many of which are repeated or leading. Another form that interviewer bias 
can take is when the interviewer provides much encouragement during the interview. This happens when the 
interviewer selectively reinforces dIe child 's response when it is consistent widl the interviewer'S belief (Ceci and 
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Bruck 1995:80-1). Tbis is explained succinctly by Campbell (1992:31) as follows: 
"Via their own self-fulfilling prophecies, anxious parents convince themselves that their child has 
been sexually abused. Govermnental agencies and treatment facilities respond to the genuine 
convictions of these parents and endorse the apparent legitimacy of their concerns." 
Ceci and Bruck (1995:87-93) evaluated U,ree studies which were conducted to detemline whether interviewer biases 
influenced an adult or a child's behaviour. The data provided by this research indicates Ulat an interviewer' s bias 
or beliefs can exercise an influence on the accuracy of children's evidence. 
Repeated questioning can also influence Ole suggestibility of children. When children become witnesses Uley are 
oftcn subjected to a number of interviews. Repeated interviews are not necessarily to be regarded as negative , as 
is so often UlOught to be, since they serve as a form of rehearsal Ulat prevents memories from decaying. Research 
studies have also shown U,at when given a number of opportunities to remember an event, bOUl children and adults 
remember new items with additional interviews. Therefore, the repeated interviewing of a child can have beneficial 
effects (Ceci and Bruck 1995: 108). 
However, repeated interviewing can also be responsible for suggestion, but research has showu that this is 
particularly the case where the interviews have contained misleading information. This misleading infomlation then 
becomes incorporated into the memory. This is even more dangerous because WiUl each additiOllal suggestive 
imelview tile delay between the original event and the interview becomes greater, and the memory weaker so that 
suggestion becomes so much easier (Ceci and Bruck 1995:108-119). 
Not only is repeated interviewing dangerous as far as suggestion is concemed, but the use of repeated questions 
creates hazards of its own. A number of studies have demonstrated that when young children are asked O,e sanle 
question again and again within an interview, they change Oleir answer. Siegal et al (1988:453) found in a series 
of experiments that young children were sensitive to repeated questioning. It conveyed anlbiguity and misled 
children to be inconsistent. The following is an example from the transcript of the case State v Kelly J nr 1991 -
1992, as quoted by Ceci and Bruck (1995: 121): 
"Prosecutor 
Bobby 
Prosecutor 
Bobby 
Prosecutor 
Bobby 
Prosecutor 
Bobby 
And when you were laying on top of Bridget, where was your private? 
I forgot. 
Do you remember telling Miss Judy that you bad to put your private 
next to her private? Did you have to do tbat, Bobby? 
No Sir. 
What did you say? 
No Sir. 
Did you say No or Yes? 
Yes Sir." 
There are a number of possible reasons why young children may be sensitive to repeated questioning. It may be 
as a result of lack of experience or confidence or simply that the child becomes tired and changes his answer in the 
hope that Ole interview will end (Siegal 1988:453-4). 
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Repeated interviews and repeating questions within an interview may decrease the accuracy of a child's report and 
increase the possibility of suggestion when tilese interviews are conducted by biased interviewers. Poole and White 
(1995:42) caution against any sweeping recommendation that repetition be avoided. They argue that it is not the 
repetition which is dangerous, but the manner in which it is done. Repetitioncan, in certain instances, be beneficial, 
as pointed out above, provided that interviews are conducted in a non-leading, non-suggestive manner. An 
understanding of the factors that cause suggestibility can assist in devising methods that will guard against these 
dangers. For instance, Myers (1987:503-5) suggests tilat children should not be questioned in a suggestive way. 
Leading questions should be avoided since there is the danger that inaccurate statements may be elicited . Where 
children under the age of seven are being questioned , questions should focus on the central aspects of the event 
rather ti,an peripheral details. The importance of understanding the reasons for possible inaccuracies is best 
explained in the words of Lindberg (1991:55): 
"that knowledge of the psychology of eyewitness testimony and suggestibility can aid in that 
process by showing what tilings lead to accurate testimony and what things will lead to inaccurate 
testimony for different witnesses in different situations. " 
In conclusion, tile body of the research conducted on tile accuracy of a child 's evidence appears to agree that if 
children have personally experienced a significant event and if they are given an opportunity to reconstruct their 
experience shortly thereafter, and if tilis interview is conducted in a supportive enviromnent by a ski lful interviewer 
focusing on central detail, then children's accounts will be highly reliable. However, in reality the legal system does 
not recreate the conditions which are conducive to eliciting a reliable account from children. In an adversarial 
system, the role-players are not neutral. With an autilOritarian interviewer (police, prosecution, parent, defence) 
who may consciously or unconsciously be motivated to influence the child 's account; with multiple pre-trial 
interviews; witil a substantial delay in time between the event and the trial; with the fact that memory-fade increases 
over time, it is inevitable that there will be substantial impairment to the child's memory (McGough 1991: 115-6). 
Even Wexler (1995: 337-8), who delivers a scathing attack on tile so-<:alled 'child savers' and alleges ti13t they are 
biased in favour of trying to prove tilat all allegations of sexual abuse are always true, concedes that children can 
be reliable witnesses provided they are not influenced in any way : 
"This does not mean that a child can never be a reliable witness. It just reinforces tile need to 
question children with extreme care, and tape record every interview. " 
6.4 Distinguishing Fact from Fantasy and False AUegations 
6.4.1 Distinguishing Fact from Fantasy 
The ability to distinguish reality from fantasy or to distinguish memories of actual events from memories of 
imagined events is termed reality monitoring (Ceci and Bruck 1995 :212). The belief that children are unable to 
distingnish between fact and fantasy has its origin in a nnnlber of sources. According to Spencer and Flin 
(1993 :309-310), tilis is in part due to the fantastic evidence given by some children in tile witchcraft trials and ill 
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part due to the views propagated by early developmental psychologists. They refer as an example to the Salem witch 
trials of 1692, where people were convicted of witchcraft almost exclusively on the evidence of children. In fact, 
these trials were cited as a caution against accepting the complaints of children unquestioningly in R v Norfolk 
County Council Social Services Department, ex parte M [19891 QB 619. In 1697 seven people were executed for 
witchcraft in Scotland, based upon the evidence of an eleven year old girl. Nine women were convicted and hanged 
in 1619 at a trial for witchcraft in Leicester on the evidence of a single child. 
Spencer and Flin (1993:310-311) caution that these cases have to be examined in the context in which they lOok 
place. They occurred in a society where nearly everyone believed in witchcraft, and evidence in these cases did not 
come exclusively from children but from adults as well: 
"If some of the evidence that children gave in those cases seems bizarre to us. it was often only 
what everyone at the time said and believed happened. The children were retailing what was 
common rurnour and gossip, rather then demonstrating that children have superbly fertile 
imaginations. 11 
In addition, children were often dragged unwillingly into proceedings, and gave their evidence after long 
interrogations and under pressure. They refer to Bodin's treatise of 1593 where he explains that the daughters of 
witches were promised immunity if they in return provided "the names of Ole people involved, tile times and places 
of Ole meetings, and what went on there". 
Early developmental psychologists also contributed to the impression that children have difficulty in distinguishing 
fact from fantasy. Piaget, for instance, suggested tilat children have difficulty discriminating between tilOughts and 
tile things thought of, and tilat they mistake memories of dreanls for memories of waking events. He concluded that 
children do not reliably discriminate between tile internal (psyche) as opposed to tile external (material) until they 
are aboUl eleven or twelve years old (Johnson and Foley 1984:37). Werner and Perlmutter (1979:395), proposed 
that objective reality and fantasy are clearly separated in the adult but not in the child. Werner suggested that 
children only become aware of the distinction between reality and fantasy when they are between six and eight years 
of age. 
Freud bas also been accused of contributing towards tile attitude that children should not be believed. Originall y 
Freud argued that the basis of the neuroses suffered by his female patients related to childhood sexual trauma. He 
then altered that view and based his patients' neuroses upon their/antasies of childhood sexual activity. It has since 
been contended by a number of researchers that he made tilis shift because it was personally and/or professionally 
more acceptable to disbelieve his patients than to accept that the sexual abuse of children was widespread (Berliner 
and Barbieri 1984: 127). Freud did not actually claim tilat pre-school children believe their fantasies are real, rather 
he suggested that their tendency to fantasise reduced their ability to be accurate and reliable . He helieved that young 
children were aware of tile unreality of tileir fantasies when they were engaged in tilem, but were prone 10 confuse 
memories of fantasies with memories of reality (Lindsay and Johnson 1987:95). 
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In the 1970's this view of children began to change with a number of researchers demonstrating that even three year 
olds could classify real and pretend figures correctly and could understand the distinction between fact and fantasy . 
The predominant view tllen shifted towards the belief that children do not confuse fact with fantasy (Ceci and Bruck 
1995:212). 
Johnson and Foley (1984:38) argued that , while Piaget described many examples of children 'S confusion between 
fact and fantasy, there is very little evidence which compares children with adults since it is known that adults 
sometimes confuse fact witll fantasy as well. They conducted a number of experiments to investigate tile influence 
of imagination on certain events in children and came to the conclusion that tile children in the study did not appear 
to be more likely to confuse what they had imagined or done with what tlley had perceived. They describe their 
findings as follows, concluding that further investigation in tllis fi eld is required (Johnson and Foley 1984:45) : 
"The belief is pervasive tI,at children have more difficulty than adults in discriminating what tlley 
perceive from what they imagine, but it has little direct experimental support. Children in our 
studies did not appear to be more likely to confuse what tlley had imagined or done Witll what 
tlley had perceived. On tile other hand, young children did have particular difficulty discriminating 
what they had done from what they had only thought of doing. This difficulty, though not part 
of a generalised confusion in children about fact and fantasy, is nonetlleless important. " 
Nurcombe (1986:476-7) admits that some children "spin such an intricate web of deceit, fantasy and fact tlJat tlley 
forget where one begins and the other ends", yet he goes on to say that it is an overstatement to contend that normal 
preschoolers are so prone to fantasise that they camlot distingui sh between imagination and reality. He argues 
furtller tlJat children's fantasies are generally rehearsals for , or attempts to assimilate, real events. He illustrates 
this by explaining tI,at when a five year old provides a clear verbal or pictorial description of an erect, discharging 
penis, or of vaginal or anal penetration, it is unlikely that such a memory would be spontaneously invented. 
Young children have always been described as being enchanted by fantasy and make-believe play , to such an extent 
tI,at the study of children's play has become a field on its own. Researchers agree tlIaI fantasizing is a cognitive 
ability that develops from approximately eighteen months to tile early school years. There has been very little 
experimental research tI,at has focused specifically on a child 's ability to distinguish fact from fantasy, but the 
current research does suggest that fantasy and make-believe are important parts of tile young child 's mental life, 
and young children are believed to be less likely tllan older children to differentiate clearly and consistently between 
fact and fantasy (Lindsay and Johnson 1987: 100- 101 ). 
Ceci and Bruck (1995:212-3) refer to experiments conducted by Harris et al in 1991 which have modified tile 
conclusions reached in the seventies and eighties. In support of the previous studies it was found that preschool 
children had a firm grasp of tile distinction between fact and fantasy and were able to say tlJat witches, monsters 
and ghosts were not real. However, when the children were told to imagine that a pretend character was sitting 
in a box, many of them began to act as though the pretend character was real. In the one experiment, half (he 
children were told that the pretend character was a rabbit while tile other half were told it was a monster. All the 
chi ldren agreed that it was a pretend character and that tile box was really empty, but when the experimenter said 
that she had to leave the room for a few minutes, 4 out of 12 four year aids would not let ber go. None of the six 
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year olds acted this way. When the experimenter returned , almost half of the children in both age groups said dley 
wondered if there was an imaginary creature in the box after all. Upon further questioning some magical and 
unrealistic thinking emerged. The results of dlese studies suggest dlat when young children with fragile fantasy -
reality boundaries are asked to pretend about some events, dley may eventually become confused about what is real 
and what is pretend. 
The procedures used in these experiments were mildly suggestive since children were encouraged to pretend dlat 
there was an imaginary character in the box. However, as Ceci and Bruck (1995: 2 13) point out, dlis is very 
relevant since a number of therapeutic procedures and interviewing techniques are suggestive because dley induce 
fantasies. 
Ceci et al also conducted a series of experiments in 1994 where preschoolers were asked repeatedly to dunk about 
events, some were actual events they had experienced in dIe past (e.g. an accident that required stitches) and others 
were fictitious events they had never experienced (e.g . getting their hand caught in a mousetrap and having to go 
to hospital to get it removed). Each week for ten to eleven consecutive weeks dlereafter, dIe children were 
interviewed by a trained adult who questioned the children about the events (dIe real and the imaginary one) wi th 
prompts to visualise each scene. After ten weeks dIe children were interviewed by another adult and 58 % of tile 
preschool children produced false narratives to at least one of the fictitious events. What is also important is the 
elaborateness of the narratives revealed in the final interview with internally coherent accounts of the context and 
emolions associaled widl dIe accident (Ceci and Bruck 1995:218-9). For instance, one of the four year olds claimed 
correctly at the first session that he had no memory of ever having had his hand caught in a mousetrap and that he 
had never been to a hospital before . By dIe tenth interview he gave dIe following richly detailed, plausible account: 
"My brother Colin was trying to get Blowtorch (an action figurine) from me, and I wouldn't let 
him take it from me, so he pushed me onto the wood pile where the mousetrap was, and then my 
finger got caught in it. And then we went to the hospital , and my mommy, daddy and Colin drove 
me dlere, to the hospital in our van, because it was far away. And the doctor put a bandage on 
this finger (indicating)." 
It would appear that the above studies on children's abilities to distinguish fact from fantasy have not focused on 
fantasies generated by the children themselves , but radler on false memories that have been encoded by suggestion. 
Once a false memory has been encoded, young children accept the memory and are unable to detenlline from where 
the memory was assimilated. The real issue, therefore, is to determine what are the possible causes of fal sely 
encoded memories, and whedler a child wi tness has been influenced by any of these factors. 
Ceci and Bruck (1995:222-4) offer duee possible sources of false memory. The first relates to any therapy which 
a child may have undergone. Since it would appear dlat young children may create false memories when tlley are 
repeatedly encouraged to dlink about or visualise events that never occurred, this is particularl y relevant to the 
evidence of a child who has been in a certain type of therapy for a long time. Counselling very often forces some 
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fonn of 'memory work' . Children are urged to think hard and are given encouragement to enact events with props, 
such as dolls. Therapy in young children often takes the fonn of games or play therapy, because a young child 's 
language skills are, as yet, not very well developed. 
The second possible source of fal se memories, tlley suggest, could involve parents/adults reading books with abuse 
themes to their children. TIlese books usually depict situations in which a fantasy character has a bad secret that 
he is afraid to tell , but once he tells he feels better. Ceci and Bruck (1995:223) analysed tlle contents of some of 
these books and raised their concern that when suggestions are couched in books that parents read to their children, 
some of the children may eventually come to believe that the suggested infonnation actually happened to them. 
The tllird possible source of fal se memories could be interviews conducted by police offi cers and social workers, 
and even parents when dley first question their child. Of course, this will depend on the degree to which suggestion 
has taken place, and whedler the questions were detailed enough fo r a false memory to be created. 
Ceci and Bruck (1 995:225) furtller point out that even if children are vulnerable to suggestion, tllis does not mean 
tllat their reports are inevitably fal se, but only that they could be. Tn addition, they emphasise tllat, aWlOugh young 
children are most prone to making reality monitoring errors, adults also display similar memory problems. They 
discuss available research on adults which indicates that adults too can come to believe false memories. 
It is also important to note that none of tlle above research has dealt with tlle creation of false memories of sexual 
abuse by dle child himself, and one would have to distingnish between fact and fantasy in general and fantasy which 
leads to false allegations of abuse. Nurcombe (1986:476) is of the opinion that children very rarely fantasise that 
abuse has taken place: 
"Children rarely, if ever, have delusions of a type involving a false, immutable conviction of 
having been physically or sexually abused. Such a symptom would be more feasible during 
adolescence as part of a schizophrenifonn, paranoid or manic psychosis. However, even in such 
adolescents , delusions of sexual abuse are rare and would always be associated witll characteristic 
signs of psychotic tllOught disorder, derangement of mood or social eccentricity. " 
TIus view has been endorsed by a number of researchers who believe that children do not make up fantasies of 
being abused. Whether cluldren deliberately lie is an issue to be addressed next. 
6.4.2 False Allegations 
In evaluating the credibility of child witnesses, it is important to know whetller children consciously and deliberately 
distort the truth with the deliberate purpose of deceiving their interviewers. Although tlle traditional approach by 
the courts has been to warn itself against tlle danger tllat children tend to lie, this has nOt been the positi on as far 
as the study of psychology is concerned . Historically young children were believed to be incapable of lying 
because, according to Piaget, tllis required a level of cognitive sophistication tllat young children did not have (Ceci 
and Bruck 1995:262) . 
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After Piaget a great deal of research was done on understanding the development and features of lying. There is 
now evidence that even young children sometimes do lie. One of the more well known studies was conducted by 
Jones and McGraw in 1987 in which they reviewed 576 reported cases of child sexual abuse in Denver in the course 
of one year. In 6 % of these cases there were deliberate andlor malicious attempts to make a false accusation. Of 
particular importance was the fact that these allegations were made by parents on behalf of their children and were 
related to custody disputes (Ceci and Bruck 1995:3 1). In 1989 Everson and Boat estimated ulat the number of false 
reports (8 %) was greater in the case of adolescents than children under the age of six (only 2 %). Ceci and Bruck 
(1995:31) caution ulat these figures may be higher since fal se reports in these studies refer to deliberate and 
intentional lying and do not include reports ulat may be false due to suggestive interviewing techniques or coaching. 
Berliner and Barbieri (1984: 127) explain that according to their clinical experience many children who report assault 
actually underreport the amount and type of abuse. Exaggeration is rare. In fact, children often fail to report or 
actually recant their reports because the consequences of telling are worse than Ule consequences of being victimised 
again. 
Many of the studies have highlighted the fact that false allegations appear to arise in disputed custody cases . 
Research has shown that reported sexual abuse is six times greater in families involved in custody disputes than that 
observed in the National Incidence Study (Thoennes and Tjaden 1990:151). A uumber of studies have produced 
results that support ule hypothesis tllat there are high rates of false reports in divorced families. These findings are 
supported by Vizard and Tranter (1988: 97) who explain that most fal se accusations occur in custody dispute cases: 
"The available evidence suggests that false allegations do indeed occur, more often involving older 
children, frequently in the context of an access dispute, and most frequently when the child is 
used by one or other parent in dispute to make a false allegation of sexual abuse to strengthen 
uleir legal case". 
After reviewing tile data provided in tile different studies, Ceci and Bruck (1995:33) conclude that up to 50% of 
reports of abuse iu divorced famili es may be false . However, these reports in divorce disputes should not 
automatically be discounted since the studies have indicated that as many as 50 % of the reports are valid. 
Schudson (1992: 112-3), a judge of the Wisconsin Circuit Court, accepts that false allegations of abuse are more 
likely to occur in family court battles and tllat , consequently , these are viewed more sceptically. But, he argues 
that false allegations remain relatively rare even in family courts and he warns against adopting tile approach ulat 
in cases of custody disputes the allegation of abuse will often be false. He points out that in the majority of cases 
where intra-family abuse has occurred, divorce (and often custody proceedings) will follow. Therefore, all 
allegations of child sexual abuse should be evaluated in a ulOrough and sensitive manner to separate "ule few 
allegations that are false from the many that are true" (Schudson 1992: 113). 
Since it has been accepted ulat children do lie , it is relevant to examine the conditions UIat foster lying. Ceci and 
Bruck (1995:262) identify five possible reasons for lying : avoiding punishment; sustaining a game; keeping a 
promise (of secrecy); achieving personal gains; and avoiding embarrassment. Children will lie if there is a 
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sufficiently important reason to do so. The most frequent motivation forwarded for four year a ids to lie was the 
desire to avoid punishment. Lewis et al (1989:442) conducted an experiment to determine whether this was in fact 
so. A group of three year a ids were told not to peep at a toy. When tlle experimenter left the room , 88 % of tlle 
children peeped at the toy. On being questioned whether they had peeped, only 38 % of children admitted that they 
had , indicating that children as young as three were able to adopt deception strategies. 
Children can also be induced to tell a lie in the context of a game. Tn one experiment dIe adult experimenter 
pretended to find a watch that had been left behind by the teacher and told dIe children to play a game and hide 
it from the teacher. Only 10 % of dIe preschoolers lied, but when the context was changed and an adult, well-
known to tile child , asked the child to tell a lie about playing with a toy, 35% of the children lied. The degree to 
which children wi ll lie would appear to be context-dependent, and stronger coaching will result in higher rates of 
deception (Ceci and Bruck 1995:263). 
There is also evidence tllat children as young as tllfee will omit infonnation about transgressions if adults ask tllem 
to do so. In one study an adult spilled ink over gloves the child was wearing and told the child tl,at she (the adult) 
would get into trouble if anyone found out. When questioned, 42 % of tile fi ve year olds denied knowing who had 
spilled the ink and 25 % maintained t1lis ignorance even when questioned two montlls later. It fOllows logically that 
if a child will lie to protect an adult, they wi ll do so even more readily when protecting a loved one. In fact, in 
a study where tlle mothers of three and five years aids broke a doll, only lout of 49 children mentioned it. When 
asked specific, and even leading questions, tlle five year olds did not tell the secret (Ceci and Bruck 1995:264-5). 
There is some argument as to dIe exact meaning of the term 'lying' . This is of particular relevance to coun 
proceedings where dIe implications of lying are so important. Morton (1988:36) argues that lying is more complex 
since it involves a belief tbat the listener is capable of being deceived and, quoting relevant studies, he concludes 
that three year olds cannot lie. Although he admits that it is commonplace for dlfee year olds to make claims that 
are manifestly untrue, he argues that this behaviour is not lying since it differs from lying in respect of intention . 
A child of three who denies a breakage does not intend dIe listener to believe him or her. The intention is simply 
to avoid the consequences of such actions . Morton (1988:36) concludes as follows: 
"The claim that a three-year-old child cannot lie is only a small step. It is, however, a clear 
beginning. Three year aids may be malleable, compliant or mistaken. To know that dley call110t 
be intending to deceive make things a little simpler". 
Ceci and Bruck (1995:264-5) suggest tllat children will also lie to avoid embarrassment, guilt or shame. To support 
this comention they refer to studies, the results of which indicate d,at children do occasionally distort the truth about 
events which are perpetrated against tlleir bodies. 
Given d,at children do make fal se allegations, Nurcombe (1986:477-8) suggests dlat tile veracity of a child 's 
allegations can be assessed according to the following criteria: 
a. Extenlal consistency: statements to police and other agencies must be checked to see whether there are 
any serious inconsistencies as to the incident. 
339 
b. Internal consistency: it must be determined whether the details of the event remain consistent with regard 
to time, location and other descriptive details. 
c. Internal detail: it must be determined whedler the child's account provides sufficient detail regarding the 
actual incident e.g. furniture, clothing worn by the perpetrator, any music playing etc. Does it contain 
any convincing, idiosyncratic details of the accused's personality? 
d. Child's affect: the child must be observed to determine whether the emotion he displays is congruent with 
the material discussed. 
e. Susceptibility to suggestion: the transcript of previous interviews should be checked, if available, to see 
whether the child has been influenced. 
f. Reaction to challenge: the interviewer should, towards the end of the interview, gently suggest the 
possibility dlat the child's report might perhaps not be real , the possibility of fabrication and dle possibility 
that someone may have induced the report. 
g. Histrionic, malicious or escapist motivation: this type of motivation will only be revealed after one or 
more of the previous challenges and further explanation is possible. 
Children and adults both tell lies, but there is no available evidence to support the belief that children are more 
prone to lie than adnlts. Spencer and Flin (1993:329) refer to a survey of professionals who interviewed child 
witnesses, including police, social workers, judges and prosecutors. 93 % of the respondents were of the opiIuon 
that children were not more likely to lie than adults. Many experts also believe that it is much easier to detect lies 
in young children than older children or adults and, according to Feldman and White (1980: 128), this would account 
for the belief that they lie more frequently. 
6.5 Perceptions of Children 
The credibility of children as witnesses is direc tly related to the perceptions held by dIOse persons assessing the 
child. If presiding officers perceive children to be umeliable, then tllis perception will playa major role when they 
assess a particular child 's credibility. It is, therefore, important to detertnine what perceptions are held by those 
officials who work with children. 
In 1983 a study was conducted by Yarnley and Jones (1983:33) to detertnine how credible children'S evidence was 
perceived to be. Several groups of people, including law students, legal professionals, potential jurors and experts 
in eyewitness testimony, were asked to judge the rel iability of a hypothetical eight year old's evidence. Less than 
fifty percent of the participants in each group believed that the child would respond accurately. Oates (1990: 129) 
refers to a study conducted by Sheehy and Chapman in 1982 which compared adult's and children's accounts of 
road accidents. Given the option of choosing between the evidence of an adult and that of a child , most people 
favoured tile evidence of the adult. Tbe findings of this study highlighted that tbere is a widespread belief that the 
immaturity of children severely limits their competence and reliability. 
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Goodman et al conducted a series of studies to investigate the perceptions which mock jurors hold about child 
witnesses. In the first two experiments college students were given written transcripts of a fatal car accident which 
included the evidence of five witnesses. The only eyewitness to the accident was a child. All the subjects received 
the same transcripts except that the ages of the eyewitness was varied as being either 6, 10 or 30 years old. The 
results were tile same in both experiments with the 6 year old witness being seen as less credible than the \0 year 
old who, in turn, was perceived less credible than the 30 year old (Ross et al 1987:145). The third experiment 
made use of the same age-of-eyewitness manipulation as the otilers, but differed in three important respects: a more 
representative sample of jurors was used rather tilan college students, the trial description was presented in 
videotaped form rather than written fornI, and after each juror had made his decision as to guilt and credibility, he 
was assigned to a 12 member jury and they had to reach a verdict (Ross et al 1987: 146). The findings were 
consistent with the other two experiments Witil the 6 year aids being seen as significantly less credible. A second 
analysis was done to detemline the degree to which witness credibility is predictive of guilt. The analysis showed 
that the credibility of tile 30 year old witness sigluficantiy predicted guilt ratings. The credibility of tile 10 year 
old eyewitness was still relatively influential , but the 6 year old's credibility did not correlate witil the guilt rating 
any more than the other witnesses, who had only given circlUJlstantial evidence (Ross et al 1987: 146). 
These experiments indicate that the age of the eyewitness may have a sigluficant impact on the perceived credibility 
of the witness. A summary of all the above studies indicates that the child witness is perceived as less reliable in 
terms of remembering events, more suggestible and prone to matupulation and generally less credible thatl an adult. 
Witil this background, Ross et al (1987: 146-8) conducted a further study on whether jurors perceive children to be 
credible witnesses, and strikingly different results emerged. Here college students watched a videotape of a 
simulated court trial relating to dealing in cocaine. There were three versions of the trial , all identical except for 
the age of the eyewitness in each case which differed, being eitiler 8 years, 21 years or 74 years. The findings in 
tilis study were that tile 8 year aIds were viewed as equally credible compared to the 21 year aIds and 74 year old 
witnesses. Generally tile child witness was viewed more positively tilan the 2 1 year old , and the ratings of tile 
elderly witness were more similar to those found for tile child witness, tilan those found for the 21 year old witness. 
The child witness was viewed "as more accurate, more forceful , more consistent, more truthful , more intelligent, 
and more confident" tilan the 21 year old witness (Ross et al 1987: 148). 
In attempting to explain these findings in relation to those of earlier studies, Ross et al (1987: 148-9) suggest tilat 
tilis difference could be attributed to "perceptual adaptation hypothesis". In tenns of this principle, jurors interpret 
the same stimuli using different standards depending on the age of the witness. For instance, if an adult witness 
describes a fairly complex event witil a moderate level of detail , jurors may find tile witness average in terms of 
intelligence and accuracy. If tile child gives the identical description the jurors are likely to rate the child as being 
extremely intelligent and having an excellent memory. However, when a second analysis was performed to 
determine to what degree tile credibility of an eyewitness affected the guilt of tile accused, tile results showed tilal 
the child's testimony was not weighed heavily in making the final decision of guilt, whereas there was a signi fi cant 
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positive correlation between the credibility of the 21 and 74 year olds and the guilt ratings. This gives rise to ule 
ironic resul t that , although a child witness may be viewed as more credible, the evidence will not carry as much 
weight as dlat of an adult (Ross et al 1987: 149-50): 
"These findings tell an interesting story. Although the child witness was viewed more positively 
than either ule young adult or elderly witness, the child's testimony was not weighed heavily. It 
may be that independent of the positive impressions dlat jurors may form of a child witness, it 
is very difficult for ulem to convict a person on the basis of a child 's testimony . Jurors simply 
may Dot place the sanle trust in the testimony of a child as they do an adult's testimony ". 
n,is impression is supported by a comment made by a member of the jury after acquitting ule defendant which was 
recorded by Beach (1983:58) about a cbild sexual abuse case d,at took place in Maryland: 
"It is very difficult to put someone in prison for something so serious, based on a child 's story". 
Further experiments conducted by Leippe and Romanczyk (1987: 172-4) confirmed tbe findings by Goodman. The 
6 year aids were perceived as being less credible Ulan dIe adult witnesses and the 10 year aids were rated as only 
slightly below the adult eyewitnesses. Their findings are surmnarised as follows (Leippe and Romanczyk 
1987 :1 72): 
"Numerous inconsistencies during the course of his testimony appeared to tarnish Ule credibili ty 
of a young child, but not of an older child or adult. Thus, we can give a tentative nod of support 
to the hypothesis that jurors are particularly sensitive to a young child 's inconsistency, and 
perhaps tend to take it as a confirmation dlat the child has questionable credibility. Inconsistency 
on the part of 6 year old children in any case, is not 'excused"' . 
Further research conducted by Leippe et al in 1992 and 1993 probed the perceptions of mock jurors with respect 
to the accuracy and believability of child witnesses. The results indicated that the younger children were viewed 
as less believable Ulan adults even when uleir reports were more accurate. The mock jurors were fair ly good at 
discerning accurate from inaccurate reports given by the older children, but when evaluating the reports of ule 
young children, mock jurors underbelieved the accurate cbildren and overbelieved the inaccurate children (Leippe 
et al 1993: 184): 
"When they gave testimony about a novel, participatory event that they acttlally experienced , child 
witnesses - especially younger ones - were less believed on average than adult wi tnesses to dIe 
same event. This was true even when their testimony was quite accurate" . 
From ulese studies it can be tentatively inferred dlat adul ts have difficulty discerning the accuracy of reports, 
especially when given by younger children. Research has shown that jurors rely beavily on witness confidence even 
though confidence has been found to be a weak indicator of accuracy. Therefore, an adult 's evidence will be 
perceived to be credible because they are able to organise their evidence in an ordered and rational way, while a 
child's evidence is often poorly articulated and lacks cohesion. This has the result dlat an adult' s accoum will 
appear more credible, although it contains factual inaccuracies, than a child 's account (Sheehy and Chapman 
1989:314). This reasoning is supported by Leippe et al (1993: 194) where they argued that the reason younger 
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children were not regarded as accurate witnesses related to the manner in which they gave evidence. Their reports 
were more fragmented , less smooth and they appeared less confident. This concurs with empirical research which 
shows that young children may appear to be inconsistent because certain of their communication skills are not fully 
developed. From these findings it would appear that it is not only important what children conIDlUnicate, but how 
they communicate. 
Luus and Wells (1992:88), in the studies they conducted, found that the children recalled dIe witnessed events with 
the same degree of accuracy as dIe adults, but that they only report the event with the same degree of accuracy as 
adults if they are questioned in a direct, straightforward mamler. The eight year olds in the study experienced more 
problems with cross-examination, which had an effect on dleir perceived credibility. An important factor would 
then appear to be the way the child's evidence is presented . 
Brighanl and Spier (1992: 106-7) studied the perceptions of professionals in dIe legal arena towards child witnesses . 
Prosecuting attorneys, child protection workers, and law enforcement personnel (despite differences in level of 
education, gender and professional duties) viewed child witnesses in the sanle way. They had more cOIlfidence in 
a child witness's ability to remember accurately, to testify appropriately, and to resist suggestion. Defence 
attorneys, on the other hand , believed dlat children were likely to give completely inaccurate or distorted evidence 
about sexual abuse almost one fifth of the time. 
The dilenuna experienced by dIe law is dIe difficulty it has in reconciling the image of children as victims 
("vulnerable, unfornled , dependent creatures in need of protection") widl dlat of an accurate, reliable child witness. 
This dilennna is explained as foll ows by King and Piper (1995:67): 
"In countries which operate an adversary, day-in-<:ourt trial system of criminal law dlis image of 
children as unreliable is clearly at variance with the need to bring children into the courtroom to 
give evidence and face cross-examination just like any other witness". 
In order to address this problem, the image of children as witnesses will have to be reconstructed. The 
reconstruction must aim at enhancing the perceived reliability of the evidence of children, removing dIe asswllption 
dlat children are unreliable and suggestible as witnesses. This will have to be achieved by re-evaluating rules of 
evidence such as competency rules and cautionary rules, and training legal professionals with regards to scienti fic 
findings of children as witnesses (King and Piper 1995:70). 
6.6 Children'S Perception's of the Legal Process 
6.6.1 Introduction 
In order to partake effectively in dIe judicial process, a witness needs to be equipped widl some knowledge of the 
procedure that is to be applied in that process as well as an understanding of dIe role he or she is to play dlerein. 
Since children frequently appear in court as witnesses, dIe question that needs to be addressed is whether children 
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have the necessary knowledge to enable them to take part in a court process with competence and credibility 
(Saywitz and Snyder 1993: 121). 
Research has shown that the quality of a child's evidence in legal proceedings is dependent upon three interacting 
factors: the child, the court personnel involved in the trial, and the environnlent (Cashmore and Bussey 1990: 177). 
As far as the child himself is concerned, his evidence will depend on his cognitive ability (the ability to remember 
and to conIDmnicate) as well as his perceptions of the court proceedings and the role he plays dlerein. Much 
research has been done on children as witnesses, as can be seen tram what was discussed supra, but this research 
has focused mainly on the child's competence to give evidence, more specifically the child's ability to recall events 
accurately and the allegations of suggestibility that have been made against children. As far as the court 
environment is concerned, a number of reforms have been instituted in various countries enabling children to give 
evidence outside the courtroom by means of closed-circuit television and videotaped statements. However, this 
research has been conducted on the premise that children give evidence in a vacuum. It has not taken account of 
the fact that children give evidence in a particular environment and that their perceptions of that environment as 
well as that of their own role in the procedure will have an affect on their ability to give evidence (Cashmore and 
Bussey 1990:177). 
6.6.2 The bnportance of Children's Perceptions of Court 
It is important to understand how children perceive the legal process for a number of reasons, two of which will 
be llighlighted here. Firstly, it is necessary to establish from cllildren themselves what aspects of the judicial 
process they experience as traumatic. A number of reforms have taken place in courtrooms in order to alleviate 
the stress experienced by child witnesses when dley give evidence. It is, therefore , necessary to find out what 
children find stressful and whedler the reforms introduced actually address these stresses (Caslunore and Bussey 
1990:178). 
Secondly, a child's perception of legal concepts and procedures will affect his performance as a witness. Fear of 
the unknown leads to stress . Many experts believe that appearing in court is stressful for a child. A recent study 
conducted by Goodman et al (1988:51) to find out what impact a court appearance had on children giving evidence 
has found that child victim's of sexual abuse do find it stressful to give evidence and this may give rise to long-tenn 
effects. 
As Myers (1987:417) explains: "Ask a young child to describe a courtroom. The reply is often 'It's a scary 
place'''. The anxiety is caused by a lack of understanding of the trial proceedings and the child's role as witness . 
TIlis is confirmed by the following statement made by Myers (1982: 15): 
"We knew from listening to kids that they didn't understand what the court process was all about 
or how it related to dleir faruily. Nor did dley know who all the players were. They were very 
much non-participants in a process that was designed to make decisions about their lives" . 
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Yates (1987:476) reports dlat one fi ve year old witness thought that the judge would put her in prison for being 
'bad' because she was not able to answer all the questions. This fear is sometimes compounded by confusion and 
misconceptions regarding the process and the people involved. Birch (1 992:275-6), for instance, reports that some 
children believe that dley may be punished if they tell dle truth but are disbelieved. 
As Dziech and Schudson (1989: 170) explain, for children "the courtroom can do more dlan encourage civic 
responsibility - it can terrify and silence". In State v Phelps supra a five year old giving evidence in court 
explained dlat "he dlOught he was in a police station and that the robed judge was a karate expert" (at 453). 
Ignorance of dle procedures followed in conrt and the inability to nnderstand dle langnage employed prevents the 
child from being an effective witness and from taking part effectively in the judicial process. 
According to Saywitz (1995: 135), generalised anxiety which is most often associated with fear of the unknown could 
lead to avoidance. TillS would reduce the child 's motivation and effort to remember details to such an extent that 
the event might not even be mentioned in spontaneous free recall, dlUS causing the child to 'forget' essential 
infonnation. Generalised anxiety also leads to disorgatllsed retrieval efforts which result in "frantic, illogical 
searches". This causes children to recal! things incorrectly; to confuse events and details, and has a dramatit,; effect 
upon their credibility. It would, therefore, not be unreasonable , according to Saywitz, to suggest that dle quality 
of a child 's evidence is affected by his (mis)conceptions about dle legal system. Saywitz (1995: 134) illustrates a 
number of ways in willch this lack of knowledge could affect a child's evidence. For instance, the fact that children 
believe that a judge is omniscient will lower their motivation to remember details, since the judge would 'know' 
these details. On dle odler hand, if children believe dlat they will go to jail if they make mistakes, dlis will 
dramatically increase their motivation to remember details, and this could make dlem far more accessible to 
suggestion. 
Since children' s knowledge of and perceptions about the court have such all important effect on the quality of dleir 
evidence, a few studies have been conducted abroad with the purpose of investigating what children krlow and feel 
about the court process. Some of these studies will be referred to in order to discover what children think about 
the judicial process and then to compare these perceptions with the results of a study conducted by the present 
author as part of this research (MUller and Tait I 997a). 
One of the earlier studies, conducted by Cavenagh in 1959, was aimed at assessing the legal knowledge of juvelllie 
defendants in the English courts. He discovered dlat many children did not understand the meaning of words such 
as 'charge', 'summons', 'prosecution' and 'defence' (Cavenagh 1959). This study served to highlight the fact that 
at a trial children may be subjected to language which dley do not understand. According to Stevens and Berliner 
(1980:254) children in the legal system "are regularly subjected to legal jargon and terminology that even dleir 
parents do not comprehend". In 1985 a similar study was conducted by Feben in Victoria , and focused on 
children's understanding of the words that fonned part of dle competency examination, such as 'truth ' , 'promise', 
'God' etc. She found that the majority of five year olds and half of dIe seven year olds did not have sufficient 
knowledge of these concepts to answer questions relating to the competency examination. It was, therefore, 
concluded Ulat the oath test was not a valid indicator of a child's competency to give evidence since children did 
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not have a knowledge of the terms employed in tbe examination. Saywitz and Jaenicke carried out similar studies 
in the Uni ted States of America in 1987, assessing children's understanding of legal tenninology . Tbey found that 
some words were easy for children to define, such as police, judge, li e, whereas oOlers created more difficulty , 
such as oatil , lawyer, and witness (Flin et al 1989:287). 
These findings were supported by studies conducted by Warren-Leubecker et al (1988:31) in 1988 who also 
concluded that the majority of young children had very little knowledge of the role of court persOimel and 
procedure. In addition to this, the perceptions of children with regard to the court was found to be very negative, 
witb the majority of children believing that the court was a bad place for bad people. 
A study was conducted by Flin et al (1989 :291 -2) in Scotland in 1989 to determine the legal knowledge of children 
between the ages of 6 and 10 years. They found that the roles of tile different professionals were often 
misunderstood with children not knowing what a lawyer or a judge did. A misconception tila t was consistent 
throughout the various age groups was the role of tile prosecutor. As far as the children were concerned, being 
prosecuted meant being hung, killed or jailed. 
Viewed from a qualitative basis, the perceptions of tile children in tile aforementioned study were also generally 
very negative towards tile court. The cbildren were convinced that if tbe court did not believe them, they would 
be sent to jail, or they feared that tile court migbt believe that they were bad people and send them to prison. The 
court was also described as a place where ' people tried to force answers out of you', where ' they did not trust 
children', or where ' they wonld be annoyed with you if your forgot' (Flin et al 1989:293-4). 
Misconceptions about the role played by judges, lawyers and prosecutors may create difficulties for children who 
have to go to court, and could contribute to the fears which children have about going to court as a witness. These 
negative emotions seem to be related to their perception that courts are places for bad people and tilat tiley would 
go to jail if tbey were uot believed. From these results it would appear tilat there is au underlying misapprehension 
for children that it is the witness who is on trial and not the accused (Fliu et al 1989:295). 
This study dealt with twO furdler factors that are very relevant to children in court: what fears they experienced 
about going to court , and what they understood about the duty to tell the truth. Children in the study expressed 
the following fears: not understanding what would happen, not knowing what to do, fear of being all their own 
in court, having to speak to an adult audience, fear of seeing the accused and concern that they might not 
understand or be able to answer questions posed (Flin et al 1989:295). The findings in tilis study supported those 
of Feben supra. Very few of the children knew the meaning of the word 'oath', but they did understand Ole 
concepts of promising and of truth telling. There was very little doubt that children appreciated the importance of 
telling tlle truth. The younger children (under eight) were unanimous in oleir belief tilat lying in court would be 
punished by imprisomnent (Flin et al 1989:295). 
Davies and Westcott (1995: 199-201) identified the tilfee most acute fears children have of giving evidence. Firstly, 
a significant fear is experienced by having to give evidence in tile presence of the accused, especially in cases of 
346 
sexual abuse. Secondly , children are afraid of the unfamiliar setting of dle courtroom. The third set of fears are 
associated with examination and cross-examination. 
Cashmore and Bussey (1990: 180) also carried out a study to investigate the perceptions of children aged between 
6 and 14 regarding the criminal process. In this study the younger children described court as a jailor a police 
station whereas the older children were aware that some sort of dispute resolving role was involved. The judge 
was most frequently referred to as the person who asked dle questions , with several children believing that dle judge 
asked questions to determine whedler they were lying or whether they had done something wrong. In fact, Perry 
and Wrightsman (1991: 102) found that young children described the judge in terms of irrelevant details, for 
instance, as the person who wears a black robe or someone with a hammer. 
In the Caslnnore study children viewed defence lawyers in more negative temlS as being people who shouted at you, 
asked you questions you did not understand and tried to make you say somedling you did not mean to say. There 
was also a strong perception dlat the aim of dIe defence lawyer was to implicate dle child witness (Cashmore and 
Bussey 1990: 181). Children under the age of seven were found not to have knowledge of the function of a lawyer. 
In the Warren-Leubecker study children described lawyers as people who "play golf', "sit around" and "lie " 
(Warren-Leubecker, 1988:32) . 
The reason for going to court also raised a nwnber of misconceptions in the Cashmore study. Going to court was 
regarded as punishment for not telling the police what dley had seen when they were first interviewed, and the aim 
was to determine whether dle child witness was telling the truth and whether he was involved in the crime 
(Cashmore and Bussey 1990: 181). The younger children believed that if they did not tell the trudl in coun dley 
would go to prison, which seems to suggest dlat younger children are less likely to lie in court due to their fear of 
the harsh imagined consequences. Children believed dlat they would have to prove their own innocence in court 
and that they would be implicated in the crime. Generally, the children equated going to court widl getting 
punished, even though they were witnesses. This seems to be related to children's perception dlat they wi ll be 
guilty and will be punished if they do something wrong or are not believed. The study concluded that children do 
not have knowledge about the court process and this gives rise to a nwnber of umealistic concerns (Cashmore and 
Bussey 1990: 182). 
In Callada a three year project was launched to investigate the position of child wi messes in the Canadian criminal 
justice system. Que of the aspects of dlis project was a questiomlaire designed to measure the child 's understanding 
and knowledge of court personnel and their role. The findings supported previous studies that children were fairly 
ignorant about court proceedings and had gross misconceptions which would obviously place them at a disadvalllage 
if dley were to give evidence in court (Dezwirek-Sas 1992: 195). 
Finally , Saywitz (1995: 134) conducted interviews with forty-eight children ranging from 4 to 14 years to assess 
dleir knowledge of the judicial process. Many of dIe children did not understand what dle role of the judge was 
and believed that the jury members were in fact friends of the accused . The children had no concept of what a trial 
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was, believing dlat they would go to jail if they made a mistake. They assumed dlat judges were omniscient and 
would know if tiley told a lie, giving weight to the suggestion tilat young children are less likely to lie d,an adults. 
From the above studies the hypothesis emerges that children have very little knowledge about the court process. 
The distorted perceptions which they have regarding the legal system has much to do wi til tile source from which 
they glean this knowledge. The depiction of court on television is argued as being simplistic with a conscious 
avoidance of the so-called "grey areas" which are inherent in legal cases (Perry and Wrightsman 1991: 100). It is 
argued that television misrepresents the nature of crime and the role of persoIDlel in the legal system. Since 
television is a source of knowledge for children, it has important implications on children's perceptions of the court 
and their role as witnesses, and should be taken into account when evaluating results on a qualitative basis 
(Macauley 1987: 197). 
6.6.3 The Perceptions of South African Children 
Internationally very little research has been conducted on children's understanding of the legal process and in South 
Africa, specifically, none at all. Based on tile premise that a child's understanding and perceptions of tile criminal 
justice system will have a critical effect on his performance in the courtroom, exploratory research was conducted 
to establish how children in the SOUtil African context perceive the court process by testing their knowledge of legal 
ternlS and procedures. The research specifically incorporated two different cultural groups in order to deternline 
not only the knowledge whicb the children had of the judicial process, but also to establish whether there were any 
differences in tile perceptions of children from diverse cultural backgrounds. 
6.6.3.1 Methodology of Studies 
Subjects: 
The research was carried out in two phases, referred to hereafter as Study 1 and Study 2 for ease of reference. 
In the first study 286 children, between the ages of 8 and 14, took part. There were approximately equal numbers 
of males and females in each group, giving a total of 146 males and 140 females. The children were recruited from 
two schools, both of which were si tuated in a traditionally white area, although the schools did have a few black. 
coloured and Asian pupils. The schools were chosen on the basis of language , Witll the medium of instruction in 
the one being Englisb and the other dual-medium English and Afrikaans. Socially the children could roughly be 
categorised as falling into a middle to upper-middle class social background. 
180 children took pan in the second study widl tllose children being recruited from a single primary scbool in a 
black township. The children tested were between the ages of 7 and 16 years, the ratio of boy to girl being 4:5 
with 80 boys and 100 girls taking part in the study. These children could roughly be categorised as falling within 
a low socio-economic grouping, with Xhosa being their first language. 
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In evaluating the differences in perceptions between the different cultural groups, it would have been ideal to use 
samples from similar socio-economic backgrounds. However, it is not very easy to find children widl similar socio-
economic backgrounds from different cultural groups widlin the context of the South African society at large, and 
virtually impossible widlin Ule Port Elizabeth area where the research was conducted. OUler constraints, such as 
financiallimitatiolls, also prevented the testing of more samples. 
Procedure : 
The children were asked to complete a questionnaire which was aimed at assessing their knowledge of legal terms 
as well as certain aspects of procedure. In compiling dIe questionnaire, the choice of the terms used was based on 
twa studies, one conducted by Flin et al (1989: 185) in Scotland and the other by Saywitz (1996) in California. The 
final choice of terminology was dependent on whedler the word would form pan of the vocabulary that a child 
witness would be confronted with in the event of giving evidence in court. Terms that children were not likely to 
come into contact with, such as hearsay, plea etc, were not included . 
Tbe questionnaires in Study 1 were drawn up in English and Afrikaans. For Study 2 dle questionnaire was 
translated into Xhosa, giving the black children the option to complete it either in English or Xhosa. For dIe latter 
study research assistants, who spoke Xhosa as a first language, were employed to assist with tile fieldwork. The 
assistants were well briefed as to tlle procedure so tl,at tlley did not in any way attempt to assist dIe childreu with 
tbe answers . The children were allowed to complete the questionnaire in the language they preferred. Except for 
one, all the children in Study 2 completed tbeir questiolUlaires in Xhosa. The answers supplied by the chi ldren were 
then translated by the same assistants, who were once again briefed to translate exactly what the child had written, 
irrespective of whether it made sense or not. 
The questiOllllaire itself consisted of two main sections: the first section contained a list of legal tenns which the 
cuildren were asked to explain, such as 'court', 'prosecutor', 'judge' , and the second contained five very general 
questions which were aimed at assessing their knowledge of procedure, for instance, 'what does a witness do in 
court?' 
6.6.3.2 Results of the Studies 
The results showed a clear developmental trend with increased knowledge of ternlinology and procedures in older 
children. Tbe study especially highlighted the fact that there were definite defici encies in children's knowledge of 
lhe legal process as well as gross misconceptions of certain terms and procedures (Milller and Tait 1997a). This 
replicates earlier findings carried out in Scotland (Flin et al 1989:291-2) and the United States of America (Flin el 
aI, 1989:287). 
In analysing the results it became clear that the use of questiolmaires did have certainlimilalions when dealing with 
children. Since young children have difficulty in expressing themselves in writing and are not proficient readers, 
it was not possible to clarify certain answers. This can be illustrated by tile response which a number of children 
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gave to the word 'trial'. It was regularly explained as 'when leaving footprints', indicating that the children had 
perhaps misread the word as 'trail'. Perhaps, if the children had heard the word expressed aloud, they may have 
answered differently (Mtiller and Tait 1997a). 
Since one of the main purposes of tltis study was to investigate children's perceptions of certain legal concepts, the 
results were predontinantly studied on a qualitative basis. It should be stressed that the perceptual findings reported 
here are preliminary in nature, enabling certain initial conclusions to be reached which will serve as a point of 
departure for a more comprehensive study. When evaluating the perceptions of the children, general trends were 
able to be drawn from the answers supplied , witll tile more significant trends being reported below: 
i. Policeman 
There was a quite dramatic contrast between the two studies as to tile perceptions which tile children held towards 
policemen. The children in Study 1 had extremely positive feelings towards policemen, who were seen as people 
who help you and protect you . A policeman was described as 'somebody who protects you' or 'a person who helps 
you when you need it '. 
TIle children in Study 2 saw policemen in tertns of their capacity to arrest criminals, describing them as 'somebody 
who arrests people', who 'takes thieves to the charge office', 'chases people' and 'puts them in jail'. The 
perception of this group, however, was generally negative towards policemen with a nUlllber of children describing 
a policeman as a 'person who shoots people' ; as one who 'arrests and shoots a thief witll a gun'; he ' harasses 
otllers'; 'arrests tile wrong people'; 'doesn't care for tile people'; and 'drives a car and beats people'. The main 
focus of tile thoughts of the latter group of children was directed at crime and violence. Policemen are seen as 
people who combat crime, they wear guns and they shoot people. 
The difference in perception between tile two groups may perhaps be attributed to tile political upheaval that South 
Africa has experienced over tile last decades and tile role which the police are alleged to have played tllerein. This 
becomes even more noticeable when analysing tile examples the children used when referring to criminals. The 
children in Study I referred most often to murder and theft as crimes with a large proportion of them explaining 
tllat it was a crime not to pay your television licence. Of particular note as well was the fact that only two children 
used rape as an exanlple of a crime. The children in the second group, however, had a far more detailed 
knowledge of crime and frequently used the following as examples when referring to criminals: thieves, drug 
abusers, murderers, car ltijackers, child rapists and people who sell drugs illegally. Again, seen in tile context of 
the South African political situation, the cllildren in this group have been exposed to violence to a far greater 
degree, and tllis may account for tlleir knowledge. 
II. Court 
Generally the children in Study 1 had a negative impression of tile court with the younger children believing that 
if you have to go to court you are in trouble, anlongst bad people and that sometlling awful will happen to you. 
A number of tile children equated court with jail and described it as 'a place where bad people go'; 'a place where 
people are executed'; and'a place where people go if they Idll'. 
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The children in Study 2 had a more positive approach to the concept of a court and saw it as a place where cases 
were heard and where an argument or discussion took place. The word 'debate' was frequently used in dle 
descriptions. A great deal of emphasis was attributed to the fact that it was a place 'where truth is told' widl one 
eight year old believing that it was a place 'where questions are answered'. A certain amount of solemnity was 
attacbed to the court widl one child describing it as a church and a thirteen year old explaining that a court is a 
place where, 'if there is a problem, old men are called to discuss the matter and come up with a solution'. Anodler 
believed that a court was 'an important place in U,e community'. Very few children amongst this group confused 
the court with a prison or believed that people were detained there. Rather it was perceived as being a place where 
solemn decisions were made regarding people who break the law. 
An observation of particular interest that should perhaps be mentioned here was the fact that many children 
interpreted words in terms of their own experiences . For instance, court was defined as 'when the judge chooses 
who lives widl the children' and 'when a person goes to court it means that 'either you've killed a person or you 
want to get divorced'. An eleven year old from Study I who had been to court, defined it as being'a place where 
people are very strict to people Uley don't know'. 
iii . Magislrale/judge 
In Study I the children had virtually no understanding of dle teml 'magistrate' but fared better with dle teml 
'judge'. Magistrates were described as being anybody from 'a person in dle Parliament who keeps the noise level 
down', to'a queen or king ' and 'a female judge'. Judges, on the adler hand, were described more in temlS of 
peripheral details without any knowledge of U,e actual function of such a person. Tbe following descriptions were 
forwarded: 'a person who tells people to keep quiet and dle lawyers speak to him'; ' d,e man with the hammer'; 
'the boss'; and 'someone who shouts at prisoners'. A number of children perceived judges as having omniscient 
qualities: one child explained that 'when you have done somedlillg wrong, the judge knows it ' and another said 
that a judge was ' a man who can see if you killed or not'. 
In Study 2, the position was completely reversed. Here the children were confused by the teml 'judge' and had 
very little knowledge of who a judge was or what he did. He, in turn, was described as anydling from a preacher 
to an author, a person in charge of the police and a doorkeeper. Although dle majority of die children in this group 
associated tbe judge with a courtroom , they were unable to provide any detail as to what his actual function was. 
He was said to keep order in court when there was a noise, to withdraw cases, to assist dle magistrate, and was 
also described as an investigator and a prosecutor. A few children knew d,at he was in charge of the court and 'd,e 
boss', whereas oUler had certain reservations and believed that 'you win dle case if the judge knows you or your 
father' . 
In dtis group dle children generally had some idea of who a magistrate was and what he did in court. According 
to them, he asks questions, demands that you speak the truth, explains the charge, says you are guilty and sentences 
dlieves. He was described by a ten year old as being ' the supreme person in court, he listens to the allegations and 
breaches of the law such as theft from banks, shops and shebeens'. 
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As ill other studies conducted on children's knowledge of the legal process, the children in this study believed that 
one of dIe magistrate' s functions was to see if people spoke the tru th. If people do not speak the truth then the 
magistrate sends them to prison. This adds further weight to the theory that younger children are less likely to lie 
in court because of the consequences they perceive will foll ow. Here too a number of cbildren described a 
magistrate in tertns of peripheral details. He is the person 'who says attention please people and then the people 
stand up ' ; ' be beats the desk'; ' he wears the gown of a graduate or a reverend'; and ' be sits at a big table and 
attorneys go up to him '. 
The children in dIe second study appeared to regard magistrates in a positive light, accepting that they were persons 
in control of the court and dlat dley took care of people who broke the law. An eight year old said dlat he was a 
person 'wbo stands for the truth ' , while another believed that ' he was the person who corrected things'. 
iv . Lawyer 
The children in the traditionally white schools (Study I) held lawyers in very higb regard and described dIem as 
people 'who help you in court'; 'who help people in trouble'; 'somebody who sorts out other people's problems'; 
and 'who were on your side'. One child described a lawyer as a 'very special man'. 
The children in the traditionally black school (Study 2) were well acquainted wi th the concept of a lawyer and 
explained that he was a person 'who speaks on your behalf at a trial '; 'defends you' ; and who 'represents you' . 
There were, however, three perceptions in particular that these children had about lawyers which carne strongly 
to the fore. 
Firstly, lawyers were seen primarily in their role of representing the accused or the wrongdoer. They help people 
'who are to be imprisoned for a long time in jail' ; they are 'employed to speak for the dlief and bring him out'; 
and ' some people have got lawyers and when they do wrong things the lawyer will talk for them in the court'. One 
twelve year old explained that 'when one wants to get Out of jail he says here is my lawyer ' . 
The second noticeable trend seems to be linked to the children'S perception that the lawyer represents the accused. 
The majori ty of the children in Study 2 were distrustful of lawyers and many saw them as people who lied and 
twisted facts. An eleven year old explained that 'a lawyer was a person who did not tell the truth '; and a dlirteen 
year old added that a lawyer was a person 'who changes the trudl to lies'; whilst another defined a lawyer as 
someone who 'does not want people to te ll the truth' . The image of manipUlating wbat people said was very strong, 
and perhaps one of the most important findings of dlis study. A lawyer was described by an eight year old as being 
a person 'who confused things'. A ten year old was more vehement when he explained that a lawyer was 'someone 
who twists the charge; be twists dIe magistrate's statement ; be twists what the thief has said '. A few of the other 
comments made included the following: 'a lawyer changes what you have done and says you did not do it'; ' he 
changes things and puts it in another way' ; 'a person who changes what is right and makes it wrong'; and 'a 
person who changes what an individual has said '. 
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Thirdly, the children emphasised the concept of money in relation to lawyers. A lawyer is someone 'who wants 
to be paid'; 'he speaks for the person who gave him money' ; and he is someone to whom 'money is supposed 
to be paid'. A thirteen year old explained that 'when a lawyer is employed money is necessary - the lawyer cannot 
work for nothing' . A ntJOlber of children seemed to see the payment of money as being related to the winning of 
a case, as can be seen from the following statement: 'when you are in court you will give money to a lawyer who 
will speak for you in court so that you win dIe case'. Lawyers were, dlerefore , perceived by dlese children to be 
arch manipulators who twist what you say. They are closely associated with the wrongdoer and use dleir talent at 
manipulation to ensure the release of the accused. 
The contrast in perceptions between Study I and Study 2 are indeed significant. Whilst lawyers are perceived by 
some as very special and helping (Study I), dley are also seen as arch manipulators who are not to be trusted (Study 
2). 
v. Prosecutor 
This concept gave rise to the most significant finding regarding the perceptions of the children in dIe first study. 
The prosecutor was the ' real bad guy' and was described as a person 'who kills people ' ; 'who insulted other 
people'; 'who had a bag over his head and prosecuted people' ; and 'who chops off heads'. He was frequently 
described by the children as being 'a man who was against you in court '. Clearly dlere appears to be some 
confusion between the term 'prosecutor' and that of 'executioner' , but the fact dlat the children do confuse the two 
does not detract from their misconception and the accompanying stress when having to meet the person 'who chops 
off heads'. 
The children in the second study did not have the same negative feelings towards a prosecutor as their counterparts 
in the 'white' schools with most of the children unsure as to what the term actually meant. Of interest in this study 
was a perception amongst the children that a prosecutor was someone who hurries you. The foll owing explanations 
were given: ' he is somebody who hurries people' ; ' he doesn ' t give people enough time to speak' ; 'he makes you 
do things in haste' ; ' he is a person who wants you to talk fast' ; ' he makes the person to speak the trutll quickly 
nOt to dlink too much'; and ' he hastens you to speak dIe truth ' . The conunents seem to imply that these children 
perceive a prosecutor as being a person who urges you to answer quickly and does not give you an opportunity to 
think. 
VI. Witness 
In bodl studies the children seemed to be qui te confused as to what was meant by dlis term . Two noticeable trends 
were identified in relation to this word , perhaps highlighting the confusion. Firstly, a majority of the children were 
adamant that a witness was a person 'who speaks dIe trudl' and an eleven year old explained that a witness was 'one 
who witnesses what he saw with his own eyes and when the time has come to go to court, he argues for what he 
saw' . 
The second observation, also held by a substantial number of dIe children, was dlat dIe witness was perceived to 
be particularly partisan. He was a person 'who acted on behalf of people'; 'who is in your favour' ; 'who agrees 
1 
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with the one being questioned'; 'who agrees with your lies' ; and he 'helps you' . Closely related to this was the 
fact that wiluesses were perceived only in the sense of giving evidence on behalf of the accused. 11ms, a witness 
was described as 'someone who agrees with the thief or speaks for him so that the thief is not arrested '; ' he 
represents the thief or rapist ' . 
Despite the fact that children seem to have a good idea of what a witness is supposed to do ('someone who says 
what he saw') , there is a lot of confusion as to the actual role. Although they believe that a witness has to tell the 
truth, they also believe he has to give evidence for a particular party and that party is the accused. Hence, perhaps, 
the confusion. The children perceive the witness as being someone who has to take sides and thereby the objective 
trutll is compromised. 
VII. Victim 
Knowledge of this term was virtually non-existent with only a handful of children providing reasonably accurate 
descriptions, namely that a victim was 'one who suffers' and 'a person who has suffered a painful thing'. 
Although the vast majority of the children had no knowledge of what the term meant, they perceived it in a very 
negative light. A victim was frequently referred to as the person 'who is guilty '; 'who is looked for by tlle police 
or who has run away from jail '; a person 'who wants to kill you'; 'who speak lies' ; and 'who is a criminal , 
dishonest or a rapist ' . In addition to that, he was also referred to as an ' untidy person' ; a ' lazy person'; and a 
'liar' . 
MotIler explanation given, which came perhaps closest to tile truth, was that 'an animal tIlat eats meat, its lunch 
is called a victim '! Again this negative perception of a victim must create stress for the child, especially when he 
is referred to as the victim. 
VIII . Accused 
Amongst both groups of children the perception appeared to exist that the accused was a person who was wrongfully 
charged. He was described as 'a guilty person who is accused of having done something although he did not '; 
'somebody who did not do the crime'; ' a person who is taken by surprise and told tI,at a complaint has been made 
against him' , with one child explaining that an accused was 'when they say you did something but you did not '. 
ix. Abstract concepts (truth, lie, promise, oath) 
It was evident tbat tile children had great difficulty explaining these concepts. One child explicitly stated: 'I know 
what it is, but cannot explain it' . This supports the psychological research that children have difficulty in explaining 
abstract concepts, and has important implications for the competency examination, which in essence is based on 
abstract concepts such as ' truth ', ' lie' and 'promise'. Very few children were able to explain the difference between 
the trutIl and a lie , often merely describing tIlem as opposites e.g . 'a lie is not tile truth '. If children are unable 
to express their understanding of the terms employed in tile competency examination, tIlese examinations cannot 
have any relevancy. 
354 
6.6.3.3 Conclusion 
It was clear from the two studies conducted that children under the age of eleven have very little knowledge about 
the role of personnel in the courtroom or of the procedures used in court. Added to this, children also have some 
serious misconceptions about certain aspects of the process, and tilis would have dramatic implications as far as fear 
and stress were concerned if they had to give evidence in court. 
:.{ This initial study has shown that significant differences in perceptions can exist between different cultural groups, 
and these would also have to be taken into account when addressing children's lack of knowledge as far as the court 
process is concerned . 
From the children who took part in the study, there were traces of a perceptual framework emerging in ternlS of 
which children understand the court process. Combining all the above information, the picture tllat emerges is one 
of a (wrongfully) accused person, assisted by a lawyer (the good guy), who has to fight against all the odds - the 
court, the judge and the prosecutor (the bad guy) - with the help of a witness to prove his innocence. However, 
these findings are, at most, preliminary and further research would have to be conducted to verify the existence of 
such a perceptual franlework . 
The results of these preliminary studies, therefore, emphasise tiUll there is a very strong need to prepare children 
before they give evidence in court. As one nine year old succinctly put it when asked to explain the meaning of 
the word 'victim': 'if you have a robbery and you go to court and they ask you questions and you don' t know, 
you are a victim' . 
6.6.4 Conclusion 
It is generally accepted now that a child should be prepared for a court proceeding . Children need to know what 
is happening to them, who will be involved and what the procedure entails. This will assist in removing part of 
their fear. This finding is described as follows by Melton and Thompson (1987:219): 
"Personality research and theory strongly suggest that child witnesses will find tlle legal process 
(whedler pretrial or trial procedures) to be less stressful and their performance as witnesses will 
be improved if they are prepared sufficiently for tile experience - 'inoculated' against stress." 
The two studies referred to above, including the two conducted by the present autilOr, would appear to emphasise 
that there is a very strong need to prepare children before they give evidence in court. A basic knowledge of court 
proceedings would assist tilem by reducing dle fear and stress Uley experience as a result of their unrealistic 
expectations and tilereby enabling them to partake more effectively in the judicial process. In fact, this was one 
of tile findings made by U,e Pigot Committee in Uleir Report (Home Office 1989:67): 
"The courts should be more receptive to children. Where children do appear in a public court 
they should be informed , insofar as they are able to understand, about Ule purpose of U,e 
proceedings and U,e functions of the people present. Visits to courts and suitably written booklets 
are useful ways of achieving this." 
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7. EVALUATION AND PROPOSALS 
7.1 Ecological Approach 
At the beginning of this research it was suggested that the child witness be approached as a source of infomlation. 
The child. in the context of this researcb , will be a witness (whether as victim or observer) to certain events. The 
purpose of this research then is to find a way in which the information which the child possesses can be accessed 
in its most accurate form while simultaneously protecting both the child against any furtller trauma and the accused 
from any infringement of his right to a fair trial. 
In evaluating the child witness as a source of information , an ecological perspective was adopted (Gabarino and Stott 
1989:8). In terms of an ecological systems approach, there is a constant interaction between systems, and any 
change in one system will have an effect on another system. In viewing the child as a source of information, the 
quality of the child's evidence will depend on a number of interacting factors: the child himself (his cognitive 
ability, language ability and perceptions of his role); tlle context in which the evidence is given (in an open court, 
via closed-circuit television); tlle personnel involved in the process (whetller personnel are trained and competent 
to deal with children); and tlle rules governing the process in which the evidence is to be given (the effect of rules 
of evidence and any constitutional implications) (Cashmore and Bussey 1990: 177). All of these factors are 
interrelated and, tllerefore, any change introduced into one system will cause an effect in another system. 
Tltis study has highlighted a number of instances where a change in one system has created an effect in another by 
the introduction of statutory exceptions to deal with certain aspects of the child witness. In the United States, for 
instance , statutory exceptions were introduced in a number of states to enable tlle out-of-court statements of young 
children to be admitted as evidence in an attempt to protect a vulnerable child from a court appearance. This 
resulted in major constitutional implications, since the accused is granted a right to confront his accuser and it was 
argued dlat these statutory exceptions were, in fact, unconstitutional. A similar situation occurred in South Africa. 
Section 170A of the Criminal Procedure Act of 1977 enabled a child witness to give evidence via closed-circuit 
television. This section was introduced in an attempt to alleviate d,e trauma experienced by children having to give 
evidence. However, it has also given rise to constitutional challenge, where it has been alleged tlIat it interferes widl 
an accused's right to a public trial and his right to cross-exanline, as provided for by dIe Constitution Act 108 of 
1996. In addition, the statutory innovation has not taken account of the developmental needs of children. An 
example would be cross-exanlination. Research has shown that young children are only able to answer questions 
accurately if the questions follow a logical time sequence. Although sl70A enables cross-examination to take place 
via an intermediary, this will not assist young children where tlle questions jump from one time sequence to another. 
The patchwork application of statutory amendments to deal WiOI particular problems on an ad hoc basis wi ll only 
result in confusion and further amendments. It is therefore proposed O,.t, in dealing with dIe c1tild witness, an 
ecological systems approach be adopted in tenus of which all anlendments and proposals regarding the position of 
the child witness must be viewed. The child witness camlot be seen in isolation since all systems are interlinked. 
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The individual child and his family fonn a microsystem. The court, the personnel, the preparation offered to a child 
witness and Ule way in which a child must give evidence will fonn a legal microsystem. Tn order to assist the child, 
as many links as possible need to be established between the various microsystems. Exosystems (legal) are found 
in policy-making and include legislative innovations affecting child witnesses. All these systems operate in a larger 
system (macrosystem) which includes dIe constitution and overriding procedures, such as the accusatorial system 
(Gabarino and Stott 1989:297-302). The acceptance of an ecological perspective on children as sources of 
infonnation demands that Ule focus must be turned inwards to the child's capabilities and outward to the social and 
physical contexts in which Ule infonnation is sought from children. 
7.2 The Constitution 
In tenns of the ecological approach , all systems operate within a larger macrosystem. The Constitution Act 108 of 
1996 would be such a macrosystem since it acts as a standard against which all acts are to be measured. It is, 
therefore, important to understand the implications of this noml on the child witness as any recommendation or 
proposal will have to be evaluated in tenns of this nonn. 
The rights which are of particular relevance to the child witness are contained in s35(3) and s28( 1) of Ule 
Constitution Act of 1996. In temlS of s35(3) an accused has a right to a fair trial which includes, amongst oUlers, 
dle right to a public trial in an ordinary court, the right to be present when tried and the right to adduce and 
challenge evidence. These rights relate to the issues of a public trial , confrontation and cross-examination. Section 
28 provides children with certain rights, nanlely the right to be protected against abuse, neglect, maltreatment and 
degradation. 
7.2.1 Public Hearing 
Section 35(3)(c) of UJe Constitution Act 1996 provides Ulat ule accused has a right to a public trial in an ordinary 
court. The right to a public trial is not absolute and there are statutory exceptions which enable a hearing to be 
closed where it would be in the interests of the State to do so, where a witness would be hanned by giving evidence 
in public, where the witness is a complainant in a case of indecency, and where the witness is a child under 
eighteen. n,e constitutionality of these sections wi ll have to be addressed. Access to Ule courts by dIe public and 
the media may be inherent in the freedom of speech and expression enshrined in the Constitution, as well as being 
a component of the right of access to infonnation protected by s23, and a separately protected right under s22 
(Chaskalson et al 1996:20-34). Chaskalson argues that the probable effect of these sections of Ule Constitution is 
Ulat , although restric tions on access may be based upon reasonable grounds, these will no longer be assumed. In 
each case the court will have to balance the various interests involved and make a decision. 
In the United Kingdom the courts as well as Parliament are bound to confonn with the European Convention on 
Human Rights. In temlS of article 6(1) of the Convention the accused is entitled to a fair and public hearing. This 
right is also qualified by a number of exceptions. The public can be excluded from a trial where it is in the interests 
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of morals, public order, national security, juveniles, protection of private lives or justice. In addition, there are 
statutory provisions in the United Kingdom (s37 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933) which enable the 
court to allow a hearing to be conducted in camera where the victim of an offence against decency or morality is 
a child. 
Although the position in South Africa and the United Kingdom would appear on the face of it to be identical, widl 
presiding officers given a discretion in terms of statute to clear the court, there are, however, differences in 
approach. In South Africa, it would appear from the discussion supra dlat in cases where children or victims of an 
indecent assault are called to give evidence, die courts are automatically cleared. In the United Kingdom , however, 
Morgan and Plotnikoff (1990: 190) have argued that presiding officers are very reluctant to use this discretion and, 
in fact, it is very rarely used. So much so that a number of organisations have suggested that this discretionary 
power to clear the court should be mandatory. This, too, was one of the questions which dIe Scottish Law 
Commission (1990:5) dealt with in their report on dIe evidence of children. They decided against the creation of 
a mandatory provision as they were afraid dlat this would be interpreted rigidly by the court to exclude anybody 
dlat did not fall widlin the provision, irrespective of the facts of the case. 
The Sixth Amendment of the American Constitution provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy " the right to a ... public trial". Although dIe accused has been granted a right to a public trial, this right is 
not absolute and will be weighed up against any competing interest (Myers 1987:425). However, as has been 
pointed out supra in the discussion of the various cases, any denial of the right to a public hearing must be 
exceptional. Evidence will have to be led to show that it is essential that dIe COurt be closed. The courts have 
accepted that the victims of sexual offences and children would in certain circumstances justify the exclusion of the 
press and the public to protect them from dIe trauma and embarrassment of public scrutiny (Press-Enterprise Co 
v Superior Court supra). Although the courts have recognised dlat the accused's rights will yield in favour of the 
above arguments, this does not mean that whenever a child gives evidence the public will automatically be excluded. 
The court will in each case have to decide whether it is necessary to protect the child. 
A number of states in the USA have enacted statutes which bar some part of the public from the courtroom while 
the complainant of a sexual offence gives evidence. Odlers limit dIe privilege to children. These statutes canle up 
against constitutional challenge and in Globe Newspapers Co v Superior Court supra the court found such a statute 
to be unconstitutional and said that dIe question of whether the press and public should be excluded in a particular 
case should be left to the discretion of the presiding officer to detertnine in each case whether dIe interests are 
compelling enough for the judge to close dIe trial. 
According to the argument forwarded by Chaskalson et al (1996 :20-34), the introduction of the South African 
Constitution will create a situation similar to that adopted in the USA. He argues that restrictions on access will 
have to be based on reasonable grounds and will no longer be assumed. This would mean that, although presiding 
officers may have been granted a discretion, they would not be allowed to exclude the public automatically. They 
would only be able to do so where reasonable grounds have been laid for so doing. 
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In countries which are based on the inquisitorial system, the presiding officer has also been given the discretion to 
exclude the public where children and victims of indecent offences are giving evidence. In West Germany, for 
instance, the presiding officer has been granted a discretion to exclude the public where children under sixteen are 
being interrogated (Frehsee 1990:34). However, these provisions do not carry the same importance as in those 
countries which operate within an accusatorial system since there is not the same importance placed on the child 
appearing in coun at the trial. Often, the record of a former interrogation by a judge can be read in court in lieu 
of the child giving direct oral evidence (Frehsee 1990:36). In France, also operating in tern's of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, the accused is also afforded the right to a public trial. Again, the exceptions to a 
public trial do not receive the sallle allention as in accusatorial countries since children rarely give evidence in a 
criminal court and the judges avoid as far as possible making child victims appear in court (Hamon 1990:60-1). 
In Israel, too , protecting a child witness from the public does not attract much attention since the creation of the 
youti, interrogator has resulted in very few children appearing in court. 111e youth interrogator has been granted 
Ule discretion to decide that a child will not give evidence if it is believed that the child may be ham,ed by a court 
appearance (David 1990: 105-6). 
In conclusion, it would appear tilat the vast majority of countries, both accusatorial and inquisitorial in nature, make 
provision for the public to be excluded in cases where a child or a victim of an indecent assault must testify . In 
coumries Wllich follow an inquisitorial system the emphasis on exceptions to a public trial is nOt as great, since 
children do not appear in criminal courts as often, as other methods of enabling children to give evidence are used. 
In coumries following an accusatorial system, much greater emphasis is placed on a trial being public. In tile United 
Kingdom the presiding officers very rarely make use of tileir discretion to clear a court and in the USA a finding 
must first be made that it is essential in the interest of the witness that the court be cleared. The interests of the 
witness will be weighed up against that of the accused. 
In South Africa tile right to a public trial has not been defended as strongly, and statutory exceptions have been 
made use of on an automatic basis where chi ldren and victims of sexual assaults are concerned without a showing 
of need. It has been suggested that this position might change with the introduction of the Constitution, and that the 
public will no longer automatically be excluded. Instead , there will have to be a weighing up of competing 
interests. In weighing up the interests, the court will have to take cognisance of s28(1}(d} of the Constitution which 
provides that children have the right to be protected from neglect, abuse, maltreatment or degradation , and s28(2} 
wbich provides that a child' s best interests shall be of paramount importance in every matter concerning tbe child. 
It can, therefore, be accepted that, althougb tile Constitution does grant the accused ti,e right to a public trial , this 
right is not absolute and can be waived where children or victims of indecent acts have to testify. No amendments 
to OJis position are suggested at this stage since publicity and exceptions thereto can only be addressed once it is 
known how children are to give evidence. For instance, if it is recommended that all child witnesses give evidence 
via closed-circuit television, ti,en publicity will no! playa role. However, if it is reconunended that children must 
testify in court, then the exclusion of the public becomes an important factor. Once again, tbe importance of an 
ecological approach is highlighted. 
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7.2.2 Confrontation 
Section 35(3)(e) of the Constitution Act 108 of 1996 provides that the accused has the right to be present when he 
is being tried. It does not specifically provide that he has the right to confront or face witnesses. Joubert (1995:521) 
argues that this right demands confrontation in Ole sense of being able to see the witnesses and observe their 
demeanour. This right, too, is not absolute and an accused may be removed where he behaves ill a manner which 
makes the continuance of the proceedings impractical. It has been argued that s l70A also provides an exception to 
the right of confrontation because Ole child witness gives evidence from a place other than Ole courtroom. 
Confrontation in the traditional sense is Oms excluded, but this is justified on the grounds of the trauma experienced 
by Ole child in giving evidence in the courtroom in the presence of the accused (Joubert 1995:77) . In Klink v 
Regional Magistrate NO and Others supra the court accepted Ole decision of Ole Canadian court in R v Levogiannis 
supra that a technological innovation which enabled a witness to give evidence out of the presence of the accused 
did not deprive an accused of his right to face an accuser but only limited the right. 
In the United Kingdom Ole position is governed by Ole European Convention on Human Rights. The Convention 
does not specifically grant an accused the right to confront witnesses. Instead, article 6(3)(d) provides that he has 
the right to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of 
witnesses on his behalf under the sanle conditions as witnesses against him. In Delta v France supra Ole European 
Court of Human Rights emphasised that the Convention did not insist on the witness having to give evidence 
personally in court. This could be done by means of obtaining written statements from the witnesses before the trial , 
provided the accused was at some stage given an opportunity to challenge the evidence . 
Section 32 of the Criminal Justice Act of 1988 enables a witness under the age of 17, who is a victim of a sexual 
offence, to give evidence through a live television link from another room. TIlis statutory irmovation has thus 
limited traditional confrontation, but is nevertheless in line wiOI the European Convention which appears to place 
more emphasis on the right to exanline evidence than to face an accuser. An additional limitation has been 
introduced by s32A of the same Act which enables the videotaped interview of a child witness to replace direct 
exanlination, provided that the witness is later available for cross-examination. 
In terms of the European Convention the focus would appear to be on the right to examine or have examined a 
witness ' s evidence rather O,an to face/confront the witness. In fact , in Ole Delta v France case supra Ole court 
specifically emphasised that the Convention did not insist on a witness having to give evidence personally in court. 
It could be done by means of written statements. 
There is, however, much greater emphasis placed on the right to confrontation in the United States of America. 
The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution provides that Ole accused has the right to be confronted wiOI the 
witnesses against him . This has been interpreted to mean that the accused is entitled to confront a witness face-to-
face. This right is, nevertheless. not absolute and can in certain very limited instances give way to competing 
interests where this would be in the interests of justice. A minimum substantive standard must be fulfilled before 
such evidence can be admitted. The evidence must have suffi cient indicia of reliability before it can be admitted 
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(Myers 1987:305). The leading case, Coy v Iowa supra , emphasised that the Sixth Amendment right to 
confrontation entails a strong preference that confrontation between the witness and the defendant be ' face-to-face ' . 
Any exception would have to be based on a case-specific finding of trauma, instead of a general presumption. In 
addition, the trauma experienced by the child must be more Ulan that nomlally experienced by a court appearance. 
In the inquisitOrial system countries do not appear to experience problems with the concept of confrontation. This 
would probably relate to the fact that children rarely appear in court. In Norway children under the age of sixteen 
undergo a judicial intelView by an examining magistrate who produces a report UIat is read as a substitute for the 
child's appearance in court. This procedure was adopted in order to protect the child, but also because it produced 
better evidence (Andenaes 1990: II). In DelIDlark a Cllild under the age of fifteen will be intelViewed in the judge's 
chamber as soon as possible after Ule event. AlUlOugh the prosecution and defence will be present and can ask 
questions, Ule practice has developed of allowing a police-officer to conduct Ule intelView while the judge, 
prosecution, defence and accused watch tile interrogation on a television in another room (Andenaes 1990: 15). In 
Sweden a female police woman conducts the intelView with the child. This is videotaped and this tape is used in 
court to replace the evidence of the child (Smiul 1990:22-3). 
In Israel, confrontation also does not attract as much attention as in ule USA, since the youth interrogator can, in 
temlS of s2(a) of the Law of Evidence Revision Law, intelView the child and, where he believes it to be in the 
interest of ule child, compile a report and himself appear in conrt in lieu of the child. He will then read the report 
and answer questions (David 1990:107). 
There are widely divergent approacbes to the issue of confrontation between the various countries, ranging from 
the position in the USA, where confrontation is regarded as essential to ule discovery of truth, to countries like 
Israel, where confrontation is dispensed with completely in most cases. 
In conclusion, the position in South Africa would be that, altbough the COIlStitution does nOI insist on confrontation, 
it has been argued that tltis is an element of the accused's right to be present when he is being tried. This does not 
necessarily imply tllat he can insist on face-to-face confrontation and exceptions to traditional confrontation, as 
introduced by s170A of the Criminal Procedure Act 1977, would not interfere with his right to a fair trial. 
7.2.3 Cross-Examination 
Section 35(3)(i) of the Constitution Act of 1996 provides tllat the accused has a right to adduce and challenge 
evidence. This right is regarded as so fundanlental Ulat its denial will almost invariably lead to prejudice according 
to Klink v Regional Court Magistrate NO and Others supra at 409 F-G. Although Ule Constitution does not 
specifically mention the right to cross-examine, utis right is also enshrined in s166 of ule Criminal Procedure Act 
1977 which specifically grants the accused tlIe right to cross-exanline any witness giving evidence against him. 
Although this right would appear to be regarded as one of the essentials of a fair trial, it is nevertheless not 
absolute. The court does have a discretion to disallow questions which are irrelevant, unduly repetitive, or otiJerwise 
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improper. It also has the authority to intervene when cross-examination is irrelevant or unreasonably lengthy, in 
temlS of sI66(3). A further limitation of dlis right has been introduced by s170A of the Criminal Procedure Act 
1977 which provides that all questions must be directed via the intermediary, where the latter has been appointed 
by the court. The constitutionality of this section came before the court in Klink v Regional Magistrate NO and 
Others supra. Melunsky J found that this section did not exclude the right to cross-examine, but only limited it in 
the sense that it had to be conducted via an intermediary. At 412 E-F he held that the use of an intermediary did 
not affect the fundamental fairness of the judicial process, since the witness could be questioned on all aspects of 
his evidence whi le at the same time the intemlediary could playa role in balancing the interests of the accused with 
those of dle child witness. 
Of particular interest in this judgment was the connnent by Melunsky J at 412 B-C that, altllough criminal 
proceedings should be scrupulously fair , it did not follow by implication dJat a modification to the accepted rules 
of evidence and procedure wonld automatically be open to objection. He based this on the decision of dle Canadian 
court in R v Levogiannis supra where Judge L'Heureux-Dube explained at 250 that dle criminal process must 
enable a presiding officer to establish the truth while simultaneously affording the accused an opportunity to present 
a proper defence . Rules of evidence and procedure were evolving rules and the trend in Canadian courts was to 
remove those procedures which created barriers to ascertaining dle truth. 
In tbe United Kingdom the right to cross-examination is also regarded as a fundamental aspect of the right to a fair 
trial. The European Convention on Human rights provides that the accused has the right to examine or have 
examined witnesses called against him . The courts and legislature in tl,e United Kingdom have interpreted this to 
mean that the accused (or his representative) must be afforded an opportunity to cross-examine a witness giving 
evidence against him. 
Any infringement of this right in criminal proceedings will amount to an irregularity and a conviction can be set 
aside on those grounds. Other countries in Europe d,at have adopted the European Convention have not necessarily 
interpreted this article in the same way. In many of dle countries which are based on inqui sitorial models of 
evidence, cross-examination is not prohibited by law, but it is completely uncommon in practice (Frehsee 1990:33). 
In West Gemlany , for instance, only tlle presiding judge may pose questions to children under the age of sixteen. 
In France, children are rarely required to testify at a hearing . All necessary evidence is gathered by the examining 
judge before tbe trial and is presented as part of the illStruction (Hamon 1990:62). In dlese countries dle right to 
examine or have examined witnesses simply means that any evidence given against dle accused must be tested, and 
this can be done by a judge or other official when he interrogates a witness. 
10 dle United States of America, on the od,er hand, the opportunity to cross-exanline is regarded as an essential 
safeguard of tbe accuracy and completeness of evidence (Cleary 1984:47). The right to cross-exanline a witness 
is included in the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment and has been accepted by the courts as the most 
important component of the confrontation right (Myers 1987 :300). III Davis v Alaska supra the Supreme Court 
362 
explained at 315-6 that the main purpose of confrontation was to secure an opportunity for cross-examination, In 
addition, the right to cross-examine is regarded as an essential element of due process as provided for by dle 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
AldlOugh confrontation is regarded as the most important aspect of the confrontation rights, it is not absolute, In 
terms of dle Federal Rules of Evidence dle trial court has a discretion to control the way in which witnesses are 
questioned, This means dlat dle court can use this discretion to place reasonable limits on the cross-examination 
of witnesses by, for instance, limiting questions which are embarrassing, irrelevant, confusing or ambiguous, A 
balance must be struck between the accused's right to cross-examine and the court 's power to limit cross-
examination, 111e accused's right can only be overcome for compelling reasons (Westen 1978:581), The court has 
the power to limit cross-examination in exceptional circumstances, but cannot deprive dle accused of the right to 
cross-examination completely , as is the case in inquisitorial countries. 
Again there are widely divergent approaches between dle countries, this time in relation to dle issue of cross-
examination, ranging from the position in dle USA where cross-examination is regarded as fundamental in the 
search for trutll to countries like France, West-Gemlany and Israel where cross-examination is dispensed with 
completely in most cases , 
In conclusion, the position in South Africa can be surmnarised briefly as follows: the accused has been granted a 
right to challenge evidence led against him, The right is not absolute and can be limited where there is a competing 
interest, as in the case of child witnesses, Of significance, as well, is the approach of the courts elucidated in Klink 
v Regional Magistrate NO and Otlzers supra tllat rules of evidence only exist to enable a presiding officer to 
es tablish the truth , and those rules and procedures which create barriers to ascertaining the trutll should be removed, 
7 _2-4 Children's Rights 
Children have been granted the right to be protected from maltreatment, neglect, abuse and degradation in tenns 
of s28(l)(d) of the Constitution Act of 1996, The emphasis here is not on tlle fact that a child has a right not be 
abused, but rather that he has a right to be protected from abuse , This in effect places a positive duty on tlle State, 
and is much wider than that currently in force in the USA, As argued supra this may have implications for the 
rules of evidence where a child is a witness, 
Subsection (2) provides further that a child 's best interests are of paramount importance in every matter concerning 
the child, It has been argued that this standard, traditiOllally confined to issues of custody , access and maintenance, 
be extended to all proceedings in which children are involved (Slodl-NieIsen 1996:25), Melunsky J in Klink v 
Regional Court Magistrate NO and Otlzers supra also referred to tllis concept as being relevant to crimi!lal 
proceedings , 
111e Constitution has thus entrenched an approach towards children which insists that emphasis be placed on 
protecting them from abuse and ensuring that dleir interests are of paramount importance, 
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7.2.5 Conclusion 
The Constitution forms a macrosystem in which the various microsystems operate, and in that way exercises an 
influence on these microsystems. Legal microsystems and those microsystems relating to the child and its 
development need then to be investigated within the framework of the larger macrosystem. In SWlilllary , the 
macrosystem created by the Constitution lays down the following guiding principles: 
• the accused has a right to a public trial, but this right is not absolute and can be waived where children 
who are victims of indecent acts have to testify; 
• ule accused has a right to be present when tried and it has been argued that confrontation is an element 
of this right , although this does not necessarily imply that he can insist on face-to-face confrontation. It 
has been held that exceptions to traditional confrontation, as introduced , for instance, by s170A of the 
Criminal Procedure Act 1977, would not interfere WiUI an accused's right to a fair trial; 
• the accused has been granted a right to challenge evidence that is led against him , but ulis right is not 
absolute and can be limited where there is a competing interest, as in the case of child witnesses; 
• emphasis has been placed on the protection of children from abuse and maltreatment and the best interests 
of children are seen to be paramount in all cases, thereby enforcing the role of the courts as upper guardian 
of children to an even greater extent; 
• finally, in interpreting the Constitution, the courts have been prepared to look beyond the rights to their 
ultimate purpose , namely the ascertaillllent of the truth. Therefore, if rules of evidence create barriers to 
discovering the truth , these should be removed. 
Aoy recommendations to legal rules and procedures (legal microsystems) will, therefore , have to be addressed in 
ule light of ule above macrosystem. 
7.3 The Accusatorial System 
Another legal macrosystem within which legal microsystems and exosystems operate is Ule model of procedure 
adopted in a particular country . In South Africa, as discussed previously, the legal system operates on an 
accusatorial basis. The essential features of this system include the passive role of the presiding officer, the 
existence of two opposing parties, cross-examination, and elaborate rules of evidence. Since this procedural model 
provides the macrosystem within which chi ldren have to give evidence, the model itself will have to be evaluated 
to determine whether it enables children to act as effective witnesses. If it is shown Ulat this model does not lend 
itself to obtaining accurate evidence from children, ulen the model itself will have to be modified. This approach 
was sanctioned by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Regina v Tolen supra where Doherty JA explained at 58: 
"The public adversarial process is, however, a means to an end - the ascertainment of truth - and 
has virtue only to Ule extent that it serves Ulat end. Where the established process hinders the 
search for truth, it should be modified unless process or resource-based considerations preclude 
such modification. " 
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7.3.1 Effect of Accusatorial System on Children 
Giving evidence in a court is a stressful experience for a witness. He will have to give evidence in ule presence 
of a group of people, previously unknown to him, often about embarrassing and intimate details. If he is the 
complainant in ule matter, he has the further arduous task of having to give evidence in the presence of ule accused 
himself. He is Ulen cross-examined by ule accused's representative, or even worse, by ule accused himself. The 
cross-examination is often hostile, is used as a tool to trip up the witness, even confuse him at times, and is finally 
employed to suggest to the court Ulat ule witness has some oUler motive to implicate ule accused falsely. The setting 
of the courtroom is itself alien with the key figures wearing long black gowns. A procedure is followed Ulat is not 
understood by the ordinary lay person . The language used is forrnulistic , at times archaic and very specialised. The 
position is adequately described by Dziech and Schudson (1989: 170) as follows: 
"Courtrooms were designed for the large number of adults who become participants and spectators 
in trials. Their furniture, lighting, acoustics, and uniformed personnel assure a serious and, in 
some ways, intimidating atmosphere. The theory is that in such an envirollllent, witnesses and 
jurors will be more likely to take their responsibilities seriously. For children, however, the 
courtroom can do more than encourage civic responsibility - it can terrify and silence." 
. There has been a growing concern about ule effects on children of giving evidence in an adversarial envirolmlent. 
Many attorneys, mental health professionals and legal commentators claim that court involvement traumatises a child 
victim. Psychiatrists believe Ulat psychological damage is caused not only by the abuse but by being forced to testify 
in an open court in the presence of ule accused (Bjerregaard 1989:169). Adler (1987:51-2) described the incident 
of a little girl of eleven who had a complete breakdown when she was asked to point out the man who had attacked 
her. She was unable to return to court and ule following day the court was informed Ulat psychiatric treattnent had 
to be arranged for ber. 
Bjerregaard (1989: 169-170) refers to a study where a sample of children who had testified in court were compared 
with a random sample of sex abuse victims. It was found that 73 percent of the court victims had behavioural 
problems as compared with only 57 percent of ule random sanlple. The researchers attributed these differences to 
the trauma of testifying in court. 
Goodman et al (1988:47) refer to studies conducted by Gibbens in England in 1963 and DeFranas in New York 
in 1969. [n the fomler study it was found ulat the children who had gone to court showed greater disturbance , and 
the latter study showed that court appearances resulted in much stress and tension for the children. It has been 
widely accepted Ulat child sexual abuse victims experience a variety of psychological problems, including 
depression, low self-esteem, somatic complaints, guilt, phobias, nighttnares, promiscuity, self-destructive and 
suicidal behaviour, to name but a few. Hill and Hill (1987:820) argue tilat these symptoms can be greatly 
aggravated by forcing a child to testify in open court in ule presence of the perpetratOr. 
Goodman et al (1988:48-51 ) studied the emotiollal effects on child sexual assault victims of having to testify in coun 
over a period of a year in Denver, Colorado. They found that the children who testified in court showed a 
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marginally significant increase in overall behaviour disturbance. The children who testified in court exhibited more 
internalizing problems than the children who did not testify, with scores being twice as high as those of the no-<:ourt 
groups. 
Oates and Tong (1987:544) conducted a study in Australia in which parents were asked to rate on a scale how their 
children felt after they had testified in cases of sexual assault. 85,7% of the parents rated their children as being 
very or extremely upset immediately after the hearing. When these parents were again asked to rate how their 
children felt two and a half years later, more than half of the parents rated their children as being extremely upset 
about the court hearing. 
In South Africa the SA Law Commission (1989: 12-13) accepted that the adversarial nature of proceedings in our 
court was traumatic for child witnesses, and quoted the following statement of Mr WGM van Zyl, the Regional 
Court President of Natal: 
"The assault that was already such a traumatic experience for the child is followed by 
interrogation by the Police which again revives the whole unpleasant experience. Now, after 
months, the child is asked to relate the whole story and go through everything in his or her Illind. 
It may be expected that he or she will be afraid and upset; and if he or she is taken into a large 
court room with its exalted bench and odler paraphernalia a measure of dread perhaps descends 
upon him. Besides his guardian he sees dle accused who assaulted him and some odler strangers 
in black robes. Can he then be blamed if he freezes and does not know what to say, or just says 
anydling to escape from this situation as soon as possible? We muSt bear in mind that the tension 
rises in dle presence of his assailant, who has probably dlleatened him with death should he dare 
tell what really happened." 
In contrast to the possible harmful effects of legal proceedings, it has been argued by some that the same procedure 
can, in fact, be benefici al. Pynoos and Edl (1984: 109) argue that open discussion and exploration of trauma can 
be beneficial for children. Testifying can serve as a coping strategy and can provide the child widl the sense of 
psychological closure to a traumatic experience. In fact, Berliner and Barbieri (1984: 135) suggest that testifying 
can be very therapeutic and some children report feeling empowered by their participation in the process. Levett 
(1991: 17) , arguing from Ole SOUdl African point of view, agrees that legal procedures and the outcome of Ole court 
case may be vindicating for the child since it offers the child an opportunity to be heard, but she concludes that 
dlese cases are in the minority. It is submitted that the trial may be able to offer a child an opportunity for ' seeing 
dlat justice is done', but this will only happen where there has been a successful prosecution of dle offender and 
the child has been treated well in the court process and received support. Where, however, a suspended sentence 
has been imposed or even worse, the accused liaS been acquitted, this is seen as a secondary betrayal of the child 
by adults and gives the child a sense of disempowerment (Levett 1991:17). 
Giles ( 1989:5) summarises dle following as possible advantages for children testifying: 
• it serves to identify dle child as dle plaintiff, the person who has been wronged; 
• it ought to give the child an opportunity to be provided with skilled assistance of a legal and psychological 
nature; 
• it provides dle child with an opportunity to explain how he feels about what has happened; 
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• it affords the child an opportunity LO hear expert opinion which contextualises, validates and responds LO 
the trauma; 
• dIe child can see that dIe responsibility of dealing widl dIe accused is taken over by competent and 
powerful adults; 
• in psychological tenns, the court appearance provides a ritual whereby tbe child ceases to be a victim and 
a pseudo-adult and returns once more to childhood; 
• it makes available for the family an effective yet positive way of showing their disapproval of what the 
offender has done and their desire to protect their child . 
The study conducted by Tedesco and Schnell (I 987:270) revealed dlat the interview and litigation process was not 
necessarily harmful to children. In fact , a greater percentage of the victims rated dIe legal process as belpful than 
rated it harmful. However, when the data is a,,"lysed more closely the positive attitude towards the court process 
appears to be linked to die way in which the child gave evidence. For instance, subjects who testified in court rated 
the procedure as less helpful than those who did not testify, and dIOse who testified in court also appeared to be 
more ambivalent or conflicted about dIe process (55 %) as compared widl those who did not testify (13 %). Tedesco 
and Schnell (I 987 :271) concluded that, since children more often viewed the process as hannful when they were 
required to testify in court, a thorough study of courtroom procedures was needed to deternline what aspect of the 
courtroom procedures cbildren found most traumatic. 
Hill and Hill (1987:814-5) conducted an experiment to investigate what effect an environment had on children 'S 
ability to recall. Children were shown a videotape and the following day half the children were interviewed in a 
courtroom and the odler half in a private room . The results indicated dlat children who were in dIe private room 
related more central items in free recall, answered specific questions more often and said ' r don't know' or gave 
no answer significantly less often than the children questioned in the courtroom. 
TIlese fiudings support the argument that traditional courtroom procedures act against eliciting complete evidence 
from children. Afterwards dIe children were questioned about dleir feelings regarding the process. TIle majority 
of the children who testified in the courtroom said they were nervous, embarrassed or scared with only a few saying 
they felt good as opposed to the children in the private room who expressed feeling nervous and feeling good about 
equally . Most of the children in dIe courtroom said dley would not ever want to testify again, aldlOugh a few said 
dley might be willing if they were older. The children in the private room were more willing to take part in such 
a procedure in the future. There were many instances noted in the courtroom where die children showed signs of 
nervousness, for instance twisting hair, trying to leave the witness stand or courtroom before they were fini shed, 
shaking and in one inslance the child cried (Hill and HillI987:816). A further study was conducted by Saywitz and 
Nathanson (1993:615) to explore dIe effect of the courtroom environment on the quality of children 'S evidence and 
the level of stress they experienced. Two groups of children participated in a staged event involving body LOuch play 
between an unfamiliar adult male and small groups of children. The children were then questioned about the event 
two weeks later in a simulated trial environment in a mock courtroom. The other half were interviewed at their 
schools. The results of the study indicated that certain characteristics of the courtroom context interfere with the 
ability of a child to give evidence optimally, and increase dIe stress experienced by children. The children who were 
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questioned in the simulated courtroom produced less complete descriptions of past events in free recall than children 
of the same age who were questioned at school. They made more errors in response to direct questions and 
acquiesced more often to misleading questions than those questioned at school (Saywitz and Nathanson 1993:619). 
The results of tllis study highlight a number of points which are applicable to the efficacy of the adversarial 
procedure. The physical context of the courtroom has for decades been presumed to promote the truth. TIlis study 
suggests that this is not necessarily tile case where the witness is a child . For instance, these findings support the 
idea dlat testifying via closed-circuit television from a room outside the courtroom produces more reliable and 
competent evidence from some children. The findings indicate that a variation iu the environment in which the 
questioning takes place can affect the child 's evidence. It would appear that more complete and detailed reports are 
to be expected in statements gathered from interviews which are held in familiar , private, informal settings than 
those which are obtained in court. The results of tllis study highlight the need to develop itmovative medlOds for 
preparing child witnesses and for modifying standard courtroom procedures when children give evidence (Saywitz 
and Nathanson 1993:620-1). 
From the above, it would appear that the adversarial system of procedure gives rise to two serious problems when 
the witness is a chi ld. Firstly, this system of procedure results in trauma for children and, secondly , it affects the 
accuracy of a child's evidence. The South African Law Commission (1989: II ) accepted that "Iolne of the great and 
repeated complaints against the present system is directed against the adversary system and everything it implies". 
For this reason Zieff (1991 :37) argues that where children are caught up in "a gladiatorial contest between parties", 
as in our adversarial method of trial, the children are bound to suffer. At tile same time, however, a court 
appearance can have a positive, therapeutic effect on children where the court appearance is conducted in a maImer 
sensitive to the child's needs. It would, therefore, be incorrect to argue that children should be eliminated from the 
court proceedings completely. 
Since children are unable to testify in an adversarial framework, it remains to be investigated whedter they will be 
able to testify more effectively in an inquisitorial enviromnent. If proceedings were conducted as an inquiry into 
the truth ratller than a contest, Zieff (1991:37) argues that children would not find giving evidence in court as 
traumatic. He suggests that many problems would be eliminated if an experienced judge conducted an inquiry in 
an informal setting with the object of trying to discover the trud!. 
In order to investigate the efficacy of adopting an inquisitorial-based system of giving evidence in the case of child 
witnesses, the various elements of tile present system will have to be evaluated, namely confrontation and cross-
examination and what effect any reconunendations might have on tile rights afforded to tile accused by tile 
Constitution. However, it is important to note at the outset dlat , aldlOugh a move from an accusatorial to an 
inquisitorial foml of procedure in certain cases would be a dramatic change, this by itself does not mean that such 
a change should be avoided. As pointed out earlier, both the accusatorial and the inquisitorial systems are the 
consequences of historical growth and political developments. They have not developed as a resull of scientific 
inquiry into which of the two models is better equipped for acZurate fact-finding. Each system radler is based on 
popular conviction and speculation rather tIlan on empirical research (Hermlaml 1978: 12). It would, in addition, 
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be an over-simplification to talk about these systems as though they were mutually exclusive. All systems have 
--. 
characteristics drawn from both models (Spencer and Flin 1993 :80) . ...: 
The basis of recommending any change to a system is that it will result in the discovery of the truth. The SA Law 
Commission (1989:28) accepted that if such a drastic change was needed, then the mere fact that the change would 
be of such a drastic nature would nOt stand in the way of reform: 
"If the interests of the entire community - including those of the accused and the child - were to 
demand such a solution, then the mere fact that the said solution is of a drastic nature would not 
stand in the way of law reform." 
This approach was endorsed by the Canadian court in Regina v Toten supra at 58, which is quoted here once again 
for emphasis: 
"The public adversarial process is, however, a means to an end - the ascertainment of truth - and 
has virtue only to Ole extent that it serves that end. Where Ole established process hinders the 
search for truth, it should be modified unless due process or resource-based considerations 
preclude sucb modification. " 
In evaluating any possible cbanges, the following statement by Saywitz and Nathanson (1993:621) should be borne 
in mind: 
"As a society, we have responsibility to create an environment that maximizes Ole completeness 
and accuracy of children's testimony and minimizes the stress placed on children in the process." 
7.4 Confrontation 
The concept of confrontation includes two aspects: firstly tbe fact that evidence must be given in Courl at the trial 
and, secondly, O,at evidence must be given in U,e presence of the accused. 
7.4.1 Evidence at the Trial 
In terms of U,e accusatorial system of procedure, oral evidence is given at Ole trial. The insistence that a witness 
give oral evidence at the trial has two implications for child witnesses: the child must give evidence personally in 
the courtroom and there is usually a long delay between the child experiencing or witnessing the original assault 
and then having to give evidence at the trial. The effect upon a child witness of givi ng evidence in a courl has been 
discussed in great detail supra. It was concluded that children experience a great deal of stress by having to give 
evidence in court and , in addition, research has shown that children give better and more accurate evidence out of 
U,e courtroom. The research conducted involved children who witnessed events and were not necessarily 
complainants or U,e victims of an assault. Yet, Olere was a difference in quality of evidence given in the courtroom 
as opposed to out of the courtroom. 
In accusatorial systems of evidence U,ere is the fundamental assumption that the oral testimony of a witness at the 
trial is superior to all oU,er means of evidence. It is tltis assumption which needs to be challenged since much of 
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lhe stress which the child witness experiences stems from Ule fact that oral evidence must be given personally in 
court at the trial (Spencer and Flin 1990:218). 
"The idea behind this seems to be that by subjecting a witness to fear and stress we make it more 
likely that he will tell the truth: a barbarous and stupid notion, contrary to all psychological 
opinion, and ule logical conclusion of which is the result in various ancient legal systems whereby 
one litigant could insist upon having his opponent' s witness tortured to see if this made him tell 
a different tale." (Spencer 1987b:445) 
This assumption, on the other hand, is not shared by other legal systems. For instance, the French and Gen11an 
systems prefer documentary evidence and they regard oral evidence as second-best. Criminal courts in France use 
• .' • . r , 
the written transcripts of pre-trial in·terV iews··~hich are carried out by an official entrusted with this duty . These 
~-.. --
written transcripts supplement the oral evidence given at trial and, where children are concerned, replace it 
completely (Spencer and Flin 1990:2 19). 
It is , therefore, proposed that children who have to give evidence be removed from the adversarial nature of the 
trial and be allowed to give evidence outside of Ule courtroom. This will be in the interest of children, since it will 
protect them from Ule stress and tranma associated with giving evidence in cOurt , and will accord widl s28 of the 
Constitution Act 108 of 1996 in that it will assist in protecting children from abuse and their interests will be taken 
into account. At dle same time, it will al so be in ule interests of discovering dle truth , and therefore justice, in Ulat 
research bas sbown that children give more accurate evidence outside of Ule courtroom. 
7.4.1.1. Effect of Delay 
The insistence ulat a witness must give oral evidence at the trial has ule practical effect that ulere will be a long 
delay between ule event and tbe trial. The existence of these delays are well documented in most countries. [n 
Aberdeen child witnesses wait an average of five months between witnessing an offence and having to testify, while 
in Glasgow child witnesses wait approximately seven months before they give evidence (Flin et al 1992:324) . In 
South Africa delays of up to five years can occur. In Woji v Santam Insurance Co Ltd 1980(2) SA 971 (SE) two 
boys, aged ten, gave evidence about an accident that had taken place five years previously. [n Damba v AA Mutual 
Insurance Association Ltd supra ule child had to give evidence about an event that had taken place three and a half 
years previously. This delay has two major implications: firstly, there is the question whether the child should be 
allowed to receive therapy ·in the intervening period , and, secondly, there is dle danger that the child 's memory may 
be affected by the long delay. 
Where a child has witnessed a traumatic event, sucb as an assault upon or even ule murder of a parent or bas 
himself been the victim of a rape or assault, ule child will require some fonn of therapy to cope with what has 
happened. For a child to come to temlS with such a traumatic experience, he must, according to psychiatrists, deal 
with the experience, usually by talking about it or sometimes even playing out ule incident, and then he must be 
helped to put it out of his mind (Bentovim and Boston 1988). 
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In the United Kingdom a child witness may not receive counselling until after he has given evidence. Thi s is based 
on the fact that if the child is given the opportunity to talk the incident through with someone (whether counsellor, 
psychiatrist or therapist), there is the danger tllat the child's evidence may become contaminated by suggestion 
which will have an important effect on the child' s credibility (Spencer and Plin 1990:71). 
In South Africa, where there are no rules of practice preventing a child from receiving counselling before tlle trial , 
this matter will have to be considered carefully. Research has shown tllat memory is not static and that children are 
susceptible to suggestion. Therefore, if a child is to receive therapy, which would include talking about the event 
and perhaps even playing out the event, it can be alleged tllat tlle child 's evidence has been contaminated by 
suggestion. Interview techniques employed in tlle course of a therapeutic interview usually include leading questions 
in an attempt to get tlle child to divulge his experiences. Leading questions , it has been proved , can result in a child 
incorporating information into his memory which did not in fact form part of the event. If a child is given an 
opportunity to act out what has happened in play tllerapy, tllere is the danger, especially where the child is young, 
that aspects of the play may become part of the child's memory of the event. 
In order to ensure that evidence is not tampered with , a possible solution would be to adopt the same position as 
in tlle United Kingdom and prevent a child from receiving tllerapy ulltil after he has given evidence. This may, 
however, not be in tlle best interests of tlle child , since a seriously traumatised child may have to wait up to a year 
(if lIot five!) before he can receive any psychological assistance. Also, it will give rise to confusion in situations 
where the abuse is first disclosed in the course of counselling. Rather, it is suggested dlat the child 's evidence be 
captured as soon as possible after dIe event (perhaps on videotape), and this infonnation will tllen be used as 
evidence in court to show whether the child's version has changed by the time of the trial , especially if tlle child 
has received counselling. The details of this proposal will be elucidated once tlle effect of delay on memory has 
been examined. 
The second danger is dIe effect of this delay on a chi ld 's memory and suggestibility. Myers (1987:56-7) explains 
that a child may forget an event as a result of a long delay between dIe event and the time of the trial. In Hollaris 
v Jankowski , 315 I1I.App. 154,42 N.E.2d 859 (1942) an eight year old had to testify about an accident which had 
occurred four years previously. The court found at 861 that tlle child had "little, if any, independent recollection 
as to the facts and circumstances" of tlle accident. In Macale v Lynch , 188 P.517 (Wash. 1920) an accident 
occurred when dIe child was fi ve years old. Fourteen montlls later, at the time of dIe trial, dIe court found that tlle 
boy was not capable of relating tlle facts truly due to dIe lapse of time. 
When dealing widl a child 's memory of events supra, it was emphasised that memory is not static and that memory 
can change as a result of thinking about past events, which means that children may become more susceptible to 
suggestion and coaching . Goodman and Helgeson (1985: 184ft) describe the following incident which highlights tins 
danger. Three year old twins were abducted and found in a refrigerator the following day. One of the twins was 
dead . The other, Tina, reported that a blonde-haired boy called Jackie had put them in the refrigerator. Although 
dlere was a blonde-haired boy named Jackie who lived in the town and was implicated in dIe crime by other 
evidence, no line up was attempted. Over the years Tina was repeatedly interviewed and her story gradually 
, 
, 
-
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changed. She then alleged that she and ber twin were locked up in the refrigerator by a fomler babysitter, a 
mentally-retaJded Indian girl called Jackie. Seven years after the incident the babysitter was charged with the 
murder of the other twin and a trial ensued. At the trial Tina gave a detailed account of what had happened, how 
tbey had been taken from their grandmother' s house to an abandoned house and there forced into a refrigerator. 
The defence argued that Tina had been coached by her parents and the police, and that her memory had heen 
distorted by the passage of time. The trial ended in a hung jury , witll some of tlle jurors believing Tina's evidence 
while others did not. This example indicates how important it is to obtain a factual account of an incident as soon 
as possible after the event. 
Flin et al (1992: 327) conducted an experiment in which children aged six and nine and adults witnessed a staged 
event and were interviewed in tlle days following the event and tllen again five months later. The results of thi s 
study indicated tl,at over a period of time children do forget significantly more than adults. After five months ulere 
was a significant difference between the overall accuracy scores of the two groups of children, with Ule six year 
aIds perfomling less well than the nine year aIds. No significant di fferences were found anlOng tile accuracy scores 
of the three age groups when tested after only one day. This suggests UJat tile younger children were able to 
understand and encode the event, but that uleir memory faded over long intervals to a greater degree Ulan that of 
the older subjects. Of interest is the fact that the six year aIds were not more inaccurate than the adults after the 
delay, but ratber they remembered less. It was furtller found that suggestibility to the leading questions was very 
uncommon at tile immediate test but was apparent to some degree after the five-montb delay. In conclusion , Flin 
et al (J 992:333) suggest that evidence sbould be taken as early as possible, and this becomes increasingly important 
tbe younger the child . 
These findings support those of Jones and Krugman (1986:255) who interviewed a furee year old girl five days after 
she was abducted and sexually assaulted and on a few occasions thereafter. Six and a hal f montlls after the 
abduction the little girl was interviewed on videotape for tlle purposes of tile trial. Altbough her evidence did not 
differ from tI,at contained in the first interview, "Susie was not as spontaneous or detailed as she had been in tile 
earlier interviews, which were closer in time to the trauma". 
In addressing tile problems which children experience in an accusatorial system, tile SA Law COllUnission (J 989:26) 
identified delay as a source of concern for children. They referred to Hanunond and Hanunond (1987:8) wbo 
suggest tllat a maximum time limit sbould be set for the trial of child sexual abuse , namely no more than a three 
montll delay . They argoe the advantages of this rule would be less disruptive for the child and his fanlily and tile 
memory would still be relatively fresh. Parker reconunends a maximum delay of six montlls before the case goes 
to trial. The SA Law Conmlission (1989:34) accepted tllat the avoidance of delay should be stressed where children 
were concerned, but tllen ineffectually referred the matter to tlle Department of Justice for uleir proposals since tllis 
was a matter wbich could not be regulated by legislation. The suggestions supported by Hanmlond and Hanunond 
and Parker do give rise to problems. It would be very difficult to set time limits within which a trial must take 
place. What happens if a child has been raped and the accused is only apprehended a year later , or if an accused 
(or the child) is involved in an accident and the matter has to be postponed for monuls? It would not be practical 
to enforce limits. Rather, one would have to see whetller ulere is perhaps another way that the child 's initial 
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memory can be captured and stored until the trial. 
7.4.1.2. Videotaping Initial Statement 
Based on research findings, it must be accepted that children tend to forget faster than adults and are tilerefore, 
susceptible to suggestion. Tbere is also tbe added danger that a child 's memory can be tainted by therapy which 
the child receives before tile trial. In order to obtain an accurate account of events from a child, the first interview 
must take place as soon as is possible after disclosure. This will be beneficial for a number of reasons. The 
evidence obtained will be fresh and untainted, since there has not been an opportunity for the memory to fade or 
become affected by suggestion. It will also enable tile child to receive counselling thereafter. If, at tile trial, it is 
alleged dlat the child 's evidence has been tainted by suggestion, the court will have access to the original interview 
and can then determine whether there are, in fact, any discrepancies. This will be in the interests of the accused, 
as well as the discovery of tmdl since any pertinent discrepancy between the original statement and the evidence 
given at the trial needs to be brought to the attention of the court. 
One of the grounds on which the accusatorial model has based its insistence on oral evidence at tile trial is the fact 
that it affords the court an opportunity to observe the demeanour of the witness. It enables the court to observe the 
non-verbal conmmnication which accompanies oral evidence. Since this is not possible if the evidence consists of 
a written record , it would appear to be preferable to videotape the ini tial interview so the court would be able to 
observe the demeanour of the witness on the tape. 
It is, dlerefore, proposed that the initial statement which the child witness makes to tile police must be videotaped 
and this videotape must be admitted in court as evidence. This will offer a method by which tile child's earliest 
memory of tile event will be captured and stored until the trial. What a difference it would have made to tile court 
in assessing evidence if tiley had been provided with a videotape of the children's initial statements, made five years 
earlier, in Woji v San/am Insurance Co lid 1980(2) SA 971 (SE). 
The advantages of videotaping a child's initial statement are manifold. Note that it is not suggested dm this 
videotape will replace evidence in court. Rather, the purpose of this videotape is to capture as early as possible 
the child's version of events. The videotape will, therefore, contain a statement made by tile child when tile event 
is still fresh in his memory and before there is an opportunity for his evidence to be influenced in any way. This 
will overcome tile problem of the long delay between the event and dIe trial (Davies and Westcott 1992:212). Since 
tile interview will take place soon after the abuse has been discovered or an allegation has been made, this will 
usually provide an account which will not be tainted by any subsequent discussions or interviews (Home Office 
1989: 18). The court will be given the opportunity to hear exactly what the child said when he was initially 
interviewed. This gives the court tile chance to hear what the child had to say before he began to forget any of the 
details or before there was the opportunity for anybody to influence his testimony (Spencer and Flin 1990: 161). 
By the time the child appears in court, he will have been interviewed by social workers, psychologists, police and 
prosecutors and will have, by this stage , learnt tile correct nanles for body parts. When the child eventually testifies 
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in court, he uses the correct teml (vagina, penis etc.). This creates the impression O,at his evidence has been 
coached. By seeing the videotape of Ole original interview, the court will be able to see and hear what words the 
child himself used, which would in alllikeIihood be appropriate to his age and ability. Spencer and Flin (1990: 162) 
give the following example of how easy it is for a child to appear coached: 
"When an eight year old says, 'And then he ejaculated over me', defence counsel will 
immediately ask, 'did your mommy teach you that word?', to which the answer will probably be 
yes - with the resulting suspicion OJat the child 's knowledge of such things also comes from what 
her mother told her rather than from witnessing an indecent act." 
A further advantage relates to the fact that the court will also be given the opportunity to see how Ole child was 
interviewed. It bas been accepted that the maImer in which questions are phrased can influence the reply. TIle court 
would, therefore, be able to see what questions were asked and be able to evaluate the witness's evidence more 
accurately . 
The conmlents of the court regarding video recordings in S v Baleka alld Others supra are repeated here for 
emphasis: 
" ... 1 am convinced that the video can be a very helpful tool to arrive at the truth. It does not 
suffer from fading memory as do witnesses. The camera may be selective, but so is Ole witness's 
reCOllection, even more so. The best word artist calmot draw his verbal picture as accurately and 
as clearly as does tile cold eye of Ole camera. Not to mention dle faltering witness who has 
difficulty in expressing himself. The tape records and retains for d10 benefit of the Court not only 
dle words but also the intimation and emphasis of the speaker and Ole reaction of the audience. 
A tape sound and video recording can often be more reliable than the recollection of a witness. " 
-l Since the courts are wary of the evidence of children, because they are alleged to be suggestible, inaccurate and have difficulty in distinguishing between fact and fantasy, dle existence of such a videotape will go a long way in 
assisting the court in evaluating die child 's credibility. It will be able to detemline whed10r the child's version in 
court accords widl the initial statement. The videotape will serve to supplement the child's evidence, especially if 
he is inarticulate in cour~.--\ 
One of the proposals received by the SA Law Conmlission was that the initial statement of the child be recorded 
on video and used as evidence at the trial. In evaluating this proposal, the Commission (1989:32-3) found that it 
could not be supported since a video recording of a child's initial statement would be inadmissible because it would 
serve as self-corroboration, be a previous consistent statement, and be irrelevant as witnesses must testify in person 
in court. As argued earlier, Ole Conunission simply accepted dlat the video recording would be inadmissible in 
temlS of our current rules of law, and did not go further and question the basis of inadmissibility . They did not 
address the issue, for instance, that , in the case of child witnesses, previous consistent statements should be 
admissible as self-corroboration to support the credibility of Ole child, but simply acknowledged that such a video 
recording of the initial statement may be of infonnal alld practical use to the police and prosecution. In fact, Zieff 
(1991:41) argued d,at the Commission was short-sighted ill their approach to alternative video proposals. This again 
is the danger of proposals that are not made within a holistic (ecological) framework . 
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The proposal that a child witness's initial statement be videotaped and admitted as evidence subsequently at the trial, 
must be evaluated within an ecological franlework. A change in this system would influence other systems, and the 
latter need also to be considered. This proposal would have an effect on the training of police, resources as far as 
the making of the videotape is concerned, and specific rules of evidence, such as the rule against previous consistent 
statements. 
7.4.1.3 Training of Police 
It has been argued that if videotapes of child witness's statements are to be made admissible, this will lead to a lot 
of court argument about whether proper interviewing techniques have been used. This will waste time, cost money , 
and change the focus from whether Ille accused molested Ille child or not, to whether the social worker or police 
officer interviewed the child properly or not (Spencer and Flin 1990: 160). 
This problem can be overcome if the interviewers are trained in tJle correct maIUler in which to conduct an 
interview Illat will be legally acceptable. In South Africa ule police already have a specialised unit for dealing with 
cases of cbild abuse, nanlely the Child Protection Unit. This would simply involve training those officials in aspects 
of child development, acquisition of language and techniques of conducting a legally acceptable interview. In order 
for this proposal to be effective, it is essential that the police officers interviewing the child be adequately trained. 
Although reference is made to police officers, ulere is no reason why this could not be extended to include, for 
instance , social workers, where this would be practical. In fact, this has been extremely successfu l in Ule United 
Kingdom. In 1991 s32A was introduced into Ille Criminal Justice Act 1988 and provided that a video recorded 
interview WiUl a child complainant be admitted in a criminal trial in lieu of ule child's evidence-in-chief. This 
section introduced a procedure which differs from the present proposal in that it has not been suggested Ulat the 
latter be used to replace ule child 's evidence at the trial. However, what is relevant is that police officers and social 
workers were given the task of conducting ule videotaped interviews. These interviewers were thoroughly trained 
and an offici al Code of Practice (The Memorandum of Good Practice) was developed in ternlS of which these 
interviewers would operate. The contents and shortcomings of the Memorandum have been dealt with in great detail 
earlier. It suffices to say Ulat a similar Code of Practice would have to be implemented in South Africa which would 
give guidance as to where the interview should be conducted, ule preparation necessary and Ole mallller in which 
Ute interview should be conducted. The importance of such a code would be ule need to ensure a particular standard 
of interviewing and to ensure as well that Olere is a level of consistency in the way interviews are conducted. Since 
the videotapes are to be admissible at the trial, it is essential that proper interviewing techniques be applied. 
A further issue relates to the availability of resources to implement a system of videotaping initial statements by 
children. Although resources would have to be made available to implement such a system, the cost need not 
necessarily be exorbitant. As mentioned already, it seems logical Olat this task would be taken over by the Child 
Protection Uni t (as in Ule United Kingdom) , who already have offices in the various centres where they interview 
children. It would , therefore, be required that these centres be provided with the necessary video equipment to 
videotape these interviews. Since this equipment would be necessary to ensure that a complete record be placed 
before the court and would be in the interests boul of justice and child witnesses in general , it is submitted Ulat Ole 
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costs would not outweigh the interests involved. 
7.4.1.4 Previous Consistent Statements 
The SA Law Commission (J 989:32-3), when evaluating tile proposal that a child 's initial statement be videotaped 
and admitted at the trial, found that they could not suppon the proposal because the videotape would be irrelevant 
and because it would amount to a previous cOllSistent statement. As far as regarding the videotape of an initial 
interview as being irrelevant is concerned, I submit that the Law Commission was incorrect in their approach. They 
believed that tile videotape would be irrelevant because the person would testify at the trial. Evidence which is 
irrelevant is evidence which has no bearing directly or indirectly on the matter before the court. It would be 
incorrect to say dIe videotaped interview would have no bearing directly or indirectly on tile matter before tbe courl. 
The videotape of tile interview would be relevant to show the court what the child said when the event was fresh 
in his memory; it would be relevant to show that suggestion had or had not taken place by the time of Ille trial; it 
would be relevant to show how the child had been interviewed and whether it had any effect on the child's 
evidence; and it would be relevant to the child's credibility. For these reasons, I believe it would be incorrect to 
say that the videotaped interview of a child's initial statement becomes irrelevant because the child himself gives 
evidence at the trial. Children are a particular type of witness and Illere are particular dangers (real and perceived) 
associated widl their evidence. The videotape would be very relevant to tllis issue. 
It has already been accepted insofar as the psychology of human memory is concerned that memory for an event 
fades gradually with time and that stress impairs the power of recall. AltllOugh these problems apply to both adults 
and children, they are much worse in tile case of children. Children are frightened more easily tllan adults and tlley 
forget more quickly Illan adults (Spencer and Plin 1993:268). In view of this , it would appear that a statement 
made by tile child as soon after the event as possible would therefore be more accurate since it would be made when 
the event was still fresh in the child's memory. This was accepted by the Scottish Law Commission (1990:25) in 
their report, where they made the following statement: 
"It is probably fair to say that, in many instances, a witness's recollection of events is likely to 
be more accurate and reliable shortly after the events in question than will be the case many 
months later. It appears tllat tllis may be particularly so in the case of children, and especially 
young children. " 
The previous statement, in the form of the videotape, would be admissible at the trial to supplement Ille child's 
evidence. This seemed fair, according to the Scottish law Commission, since previous inconsistent statements were 
admissible to challenge the witness's credibility. 
In the United Kingdom Ille Pigot Committee, having considered the various criticisms levelled agaillSt dIe 
inadmissibility of previous consistent statements, felt tlJat there should be a more general change relating to prior 
statements and that these criticisms raised wider questions about the rules of evidence than tllOse relating particularly 
to children (Home Office 1989: 14). In Canada til ere is a statutOry provision which admits a videotaped prior 
statements provided the proceedings relate to a sexual offence, the complainant is under eighteen, the videotape is 
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made within a reasonable time and the complainant adopts the contentS of the videotape. I submit that dIe adoption 
of such a statutory provision would probably give rise to greater difficulties. 
Since it has been accepted that children in general experience stress when testifying and that their memories fade 
faster , there does not appear to be any sense in limiting the use of previous consistent statements to complainants 
in sexual offences. Nor does it appear to be in the interest of justice to admit a previous consistent statement if the 
complainant adopts the contents. Surely , if the contents are not adopted because the evidence has changed, the 
courts should have access to the videotape as well? The statement must have been made within a reasouable time 
of the event. Since ODe of the main reasons for wanting to admit previous consistent statements was to capture an 
accurate and fresh acconnt, this requirement appears to be sensible. However, the phrase "within a reasonable time" 
is vague and imprecise and could give rise to endless arguments as to what is meant by "a reasonable time" , as has 
happened in dIe case of the conunon law exception to prior consistent statements, complaints in sexual crimes. [n 
the case of the latter, a complaint must be made at the first reasonable opportunity. This has given rise to a number 
of cases in which the courts have had to decide whether the complaint was made at the first reasonable opportunity. 
The Scottish Law Conmlission (1990:30) recommended that a statutory provision be introduced in temlS of wh.ich 
any witness giving evidence could introduce a prior statement if dIe statement was in a written fonn and signed by 
the witness or in the foml of an audio or video recording or in any other pennanent foml which accurately and 
completely records what was said. 
It is submitted d13t previous consistent statements are relevant, and this has been accepted by the courts in the 
creation of the conmlon law exception which allows complaints in sexual cases to be admitted. However, the 
insistence that rigid requirements be complied with has led to the courts having to detemline metaphysical questions 
like what a reasonable opportunity would be and when a complaint would be voluntary. This exception was 
introduced to admit evidence which was obviously relevant, but the requirements that must be complied with are 
so rig.id that the majority of complaints are excluded anyway. As argued above, it makes no sense to create an 
exception in order to admit evidence, if that evidence becomes iuadmissible due to the requirements of the 
exception. 
A more detailed criticism of the rule against previous consistent statements was made earlier , in the d.iscllssion of 
the position under South African Law. At this stage it suffices to say !llat it is my submission that the reasons for 
excluding previous consistent statements do not have a valid basis. They are excluded , firstly, because they are 
insufficiently relevant. However, a number of exceptions have been introduced to admit previous cOI1~i stent 
statements wh.ich are, in fact, relevant. Secondly , it is argued dIat it is easy to manufacLUre previous consistent 
statements. This may be so, but this is a factor which goes to weight and depends on the circumstances of a 
particular case. In view of this, I submit that the common law rule against previous consistent statements be 
repealed by a statutory provision. TIle nomlal rules of evidence, i.e. relevance, should remain the guiding principle 
for admissibility. If the previous consistent statement is relevant, then it will be admissible. All other factors will 
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go to the weight to be accorded to the individual report before the court. If the previous consistent statement is not 
relevant to the matter before the court, then it will be inadmissible in terms of s2 1 0 of the Criminal Procedure Act 
of 1977. 
As far as videotaping a child witness's original statement is concemed, it is submitted that this situation differs from 
other instances of previous consistent statements. The latter will relate to consistency of the witness whereas in the 
case of a child witness the videotape will be used to assess aspects of memory and suggestibility, and will enable 
the court to formulate a more accurate position on the credibility of the child. 
Since it bas been proposed that tbe rule against previous consistent statements be repealed and the normal rules of 
evidence apply, the admission of the videotaped initial statement of a child witness will be governed by the normal 
rules of admissibility, namely relevance. The danger of this, however is that presiding officers are not aware of 
the research that has been conducted on children's memory and suggestibility and may not understand the relevance 
of such a videotaped interview and may , therefore, declare the videotape to be irrelevant and consequently 
inadmissible. For this reason, it is furtller submitted that any statutory provision repealing the rule against previous 
consistent statements should also include a section stating that the videotaped interview containing the child's initial 
complaint or statement may be admissible at the subsequent trial. Although such a section would still leave the court 
with a discretion, the emphasis would be on the admission of such videotapes. It would also provide the police with 
a statutory basis for conducting videotaped interviews. 
7.4,2 Confronting the Accused 
Not only is it required of a witness to give evidence in court, but the witness must also give evidence in the 
presence of the accused. The right to confrontation in accusatorial and inquiSitorial systems was discussed earlier. 
What remains to be noted at this stage are the widely divergent approaches to the issue of confrontation between 
the various countries, ranging from the position in the United States where confrontation is regarded as essential 
to the discovery of truth to countries like Israel where confrontation is dispensed with completely in most cases. 
This begs the question of how essential confrontation really is in the process of discovering the trutl1. In Norway, 
for instance, confrontation was dispensed with because tlley found that children became so nervous that they 
produced inaccurate evidence (Andenaes 1990: 11). In the United States the courts have repeatedly held the opposite. 
In Tennessee v Street supra confrontation was found to ensure accuracy and in Ohio v Roberts supra it was believed 
to augment accuracy. At 63 the Supreme Court explained that confrontation makes it more difficult to lie since the 
person about whom you are lying is present. This premise is fundamentally flawed. It has been proved tl13t children 
experience stress at having to give evidence in the presence of tile accused and that this stress has an effect on tile 
accuracy and completeness of tlle child's evidence. In addition, a person who has deliberately (and malici ously) laid 
a false charge against the accused is probably the kind of person who would be quite capable of giving fal se 
evidence in the presence of the accused. 
Children experience stress at having to give evidence in a courtroom, and this stress increases when tile child is 
forced to testify in the presence of tile accused. Empirical research has shown tllat physical confrontation witll tile 
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accused damages the reliability , quality and often the very existence of the child 's evidence (Hill and Hill 
1987:820). Two studies have examined the effect of stress, caused by confrontation, on dIe retrieval of memory . 
Children were asked to identify an adult who had been involved in a staged event from a live identification parade 
as opposed to a photo parade . The results showed that the children made fewer correct identifications when viewing 
tbe live parade tban when viewi ng the pboto parade. The one study (Dent 1977:340) used behavioural observations 
wltile the other (Peters 1991:60) used objective ratings of stress. Both studies found dIe chi ldren who viewed dIe 
live parade to be more allXious . In fact, several children commented that they failed to identify the adult in dIe li ve 
parade because dley were afraid. Saywitz and Nad1allSOn (1993:614) therefore argue d,at confrontation is one of 
the characteristics of the courtroom context whicb creates allXiety , associated widl the fear of perceived 
cOilSequences, which influences the quality of evidence. 
Tbe effect of confrontation on child witnesses has already been dealt with in detail in earlier discussions. These 
arguments were accepted by the SA Law Commission (1989: 12) widl a poignant reference to dIe little boy wbo held 
bis hand against his face to blinker out dIe sigbt of his father while testi fying how the latter had repeatedly 
sodomised bim. As a result of d,e Conmlission's recommendations, s l70A of the Criminal Procedure Act 1977 was 
introduced. An evaluation of sl70A will have to be undertaken to detennine whedler it serves dIe needs of all in 
tenns of an ecological systems approach. Comparisons also need to be drawn with irmovations introduced in other 
countries to see whedler lessons can be learnt from tbese approaches . 
7.4.2.1 An Evaluation of s170A 
Section 170A of tbe Criminal Procedure Act 1977 enables the child witness to give evidence from outside of the 
courtroom, thereby protecting d,e child both from dIe court envirolmleot and dIe presence of the accused. Before 
examining dIe section in detail , it will be compared with the innovatiOilS introduced in the odler systems studied 
previously. 
7.4,2.1.1 Depositions 
In the United Kingdom s42 and s43 of the Children and Young Persons Act of 1933 enable a complainant, under 
the age of fourteen, to give evidence against tbe perpetrator by means of a deposition where the child has been too 
badly injured to appear in court. Tile Pigot committee found that this procedure was very rarely used in practice 
(Home Office 1989: 12), and Spencer and Flin (1990:74) support dlis view, saying that they have found no written 
record of this procedure being used. The reasons for dlis probably relate to the fact d,at dIe accusatorial system 
supports dIe oral tradition of justice, as well as "a feeling shared by advocates and judges that a written transcript 
of an interview is a poor thing indeed, because it does not enable dIe court to listen to tbe witness's tone of voice 
and see his or her demeanour when giving evidence" (Spencer and Flin 1993:85). In addition, the sections 
dlemselves insist that very rigid requirements be complied with, thus limiting dIe application of dIe section. For 
instance, the cbild must be under the age of fourteen; tbe section can only be used in the case of certain specific 
offences; and the court appearance must involve serious danger to the child 's life or health. In addition, the accused 
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or his legal representative must be afforded an opportunity to cross-examine the child . Spencer and Flin (1 993:86) 
suggest that this procedure may be improved if the sections were amended to include videotaped statements so tIJat 
the court could hear and see the child when the latter gives evidence. 
In Scotland it has been possible for a commissioner to take the evidence of a witness on commission since 1980, 
provided that the accused and/or his representative are present. The evidence will be written down and the transcript 
will be handed in at the trial. This procedure was also very rarely used in the case of child witnesses and , for this 
reason, the Scottish Law Commission (1 990: 15-17) proposed tIJat pre-trial depositions be conducted in the case of 
children where an application to do so was made to court. The accused must be present during tile proceedings, 
although he would be separated from tile child by one-way glass or closed-circuit television. This proposal was 
enacted as section 33 of the Prisoners and Criminal Proceedings (Scotland) Act, and came into effect on I January 
1994. 
The deposition does not appear to offer any advantage to the procedures already adopted in South Africa. The 
deposition requires the accused (or his representative) to be present. The child is tIlerefore not protected from 
confrontation. The deposition is an attempt to protect the child from the adversarial enviromnent of the court and, 
by implication, means that the evidence will be taken in a place other than tile courtrOOIll . However, as the accused 
is entitled to be present and his presence has been acconunodated by tile use of one-way glass or closed-circuit 
television, tltis means the deposition will have to be taken in a place that has such equipment available. At present, 
dIe courts in England and Scotland have closed-circuit television equipment installed. Does this mean that tile 
deposition will have to be conducted using tItese facilities? Why could tIus then not be done on the day of the trial? 
Since s 170A already enables a child to give evidence from outside dIe courtroom, tile deposition does nO! offer any 
improvement. In fact, it raises Illore difficulties. For instance, the Scottish Law Conmlission (1990: 17) insisled tIJat 
the deposition be conducted as close to the trial date as possible to afford the accused tile opportUluty to prepare 
his defence properly. It was argued on behalf of the accused tIIat all available evidence usually ouly becomes 
available closer to the date of tile trial. The deposition would have to be held after the accused has requested and 
received further particulars, otherwise he will not be in a position to cross-exanline fully , since statements made 
by other witnesses will generally have application. The procedure introduced by sl70A el iminates these difficulties 
as evidence is given at the trial. The manner in which the deposi tion will have to be conducted (presence of 
accused, an opportunity for cross-examination in a setting which has tile necessary electronic equipment) anlOunts 
to a trial in another foml and there is no evidence to suggest that the child will experience any less stress. 
In tile United States a number of states have enacted provisions which enable judges to authorise tile video 
depositions of child wiwesses. The videotaping usually takes place in the judge's chambers or a similar enviromnent 
and the accused is given an opportunity to cross-examine tile child. The videotape is then handed in instead of the 
child giving evidence personally. The statutes vary from state to state with some states requi ring tIJat the child must 
suffer from severe emotiOltal or mental strain before a deposition may be used, while others simply require that 
'good cause' be shown (Myers 1987:387-8). 
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The videotaped deposition has lost much of its support in dIe USA because many professional s believe the 
deposition to be more harrowing than dIe actual giving of evidence in coun, since the deposition is usually 
conducted in a room tbat is much smaller than the courtroom and consequently the child ends up much closer to 
the accused. Tbis is likely to be even more stressful , and prosecutors believe that dIe videotaped deposition simply 
substitutes one formal procedure for anotller (Whitcomb et al 1985:65). 
In those countries wbich are based on an inquisitorial model of procedure, the general procedure adopted for child 
witnesses is to give evidence by means of deposition. In West Germany the record of a former interrogation by a 
judge can be read in court in lieu of the child giving direct evidence where all the parties agree. This procedure 
can also be used where there are "insurmountable impediments" to the child appeari ng personally (Frebsee 1990:34-
5). In France cbildren very rarely appear in court, but are interviewed by the j udge d' instruction in hi s chambers 
and this evidence replaces the court appearance. However, the interview by the judge d ' instruction must be 
conducted in the presence of the perpetrator. In Norway dIe exanlining magistrate interviews children under dIe age 
of sixteen and then complies a report which is read in court as a substitute for the child 's appearance in court 
(Andenaes 1990: 10). In Israel, as well, the child investigator interviews the child and where he believes that it 
would not be in dIe interests of the child to appear in court , he compiles a report and this is read in lieu of dIe 
child 's evidence (David 1990:107). 
Hamon (1990:63) has argued that depriving the child of a court appearance (not necessarily confrontation) may be 
detrimental in itself since it may have the perverse effect that tile victim feels 'his' trial has been confiscated from 
bim. This accords witil scientific findings discussed earlier that a trial can have a therapeutic effect on children and 
can form part of the dlerapy. Depriving the child witness of ' his' trial may only further disempower tile child. 
In conclusion then, it would appear dlat tile introduction of any statutory provision dealing widl depositions for child 
witnesses is not feasi ble. The present procedures offered by s158 and s1 70A of dIe Criminal Procedure Act 1977 
give rise to less problems than those created by the introduction of depositions. 
7.4.2 .1.2 Closed-circuit Television 
In the United Kingdom s32 of the Criminal Justice Act of 1988 enables a witness, under the age of fourteen in cases 
of violence and seventeen in cases of sexual offences, to give evidence from another room via closed-circuit 
television. This system was evaluated over a period and was found to have widespread acceptance amongst the legal 
professionals involved. The most widely cited reason for this acceptance was that the child 's stress was reduced 
and dIe quality of the child ' s evidence improved (Davies 1994:226). The reduction in stress was ascribed to two 
factors, namely that dIe child did not have to appear in the courtroom and that tile chi ld did not have to face the 
accused. It therefore had tile related benefit that children who would not previously have been able to give evidence, 
were able to do so via the live link (Spencer 1987b:445). This was found to be especially so when the accused is 
a member of the child ' s fantily (Davies and Westcott 1992:212). 
A complaint made by some barristers in the evaluation was that there was a loss of rapport and eye contact wi th 
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the child when leading their evidence via the live linle Communication via the live link was an artificial medium 
and many examples of inept use of the live link were noted during the evaluation. For instance, some barrister did 
not talk directly into the camera and thereby presented a view of the top of their head to the child (Davies and Noon 
1992:25). 
Although the child does not have to face the accused in person, tbe method of closed-circuit television employed 
in the UK is the use of a two-way system which means that the child still sees the courtroom and the officials in 
the court. Since the child sits alone in the other room, this may give rise to a sense of alienation and fear as the 
child in theory is still being forced to face dle officials in tile courtroom. For this reason tile judge has been given 
a discretion to allow an usher to accompany the child in dle odler room. However, the usher must be a stranger 
and it is, therefore, debatable whether this person will in fact be of any assistance to dle child (Sharp 1989:95): 
"However sympadletic a court usher may be, her appearance in a black gown, the fact d,at she 
is unknown to the child and the necessary restrictions upon the usher's ability to relate to the child 
may, in some cases, produce great difficulties." 
In addition, dle judge bas a discretion which means he can refuse to allow an usher to accompany the child. Tbe 
section itself gives rise to a number of problems. It is limited to certain offences, has particular age limits, and can 
only be used in certain courts. An application to use tile live link must be made in writing and he will then decide 
the matter widlOut a bearing. There appears to be some unease because dlere is no official guidance as to how the 
judge should exercise dlis discretion (Spencer and Plin 1990: 87). This bas resulted in dle situation tllat some judges 
grant live-link applications while others do not. What is, however, important is that the prosecution does not have 
to make a special case for the use of tlle live link because tllere is a presumption of need (Davies and Westcott 
1995:206). 
In comparing tlle procedure introduced by s170A and s158 of tlle Criminal Procedure Act 1977 with that applied 
in the United Kingdom, one could argue tllat children giving evidence in the Soudl African system would be 
exposed to even less stress and trauma since tlle child does not have to see the courtroom nor tlle officials and is, 
therefore, protected from tlle adversarial envirolllllent. 
However, there is merit in the argument that there will be a loss of rapport and eye contact witll the child when 
leading bis evidence from tlle courtroom. The procedure offered by sl70A of the Criminal Procedure Act 1977 
offers a superior foml of communication since tlle questions are asked via tlle intermediary who is able to develop 
rapport and eye contact with the witness . An artificial quality nevertheless remains since the prosecution and defence 
are not able to develop rapport with the willless, and the intemlediary who can develop such rapport has no control 
over the marmer in which the examination is to be conducted. This difficulty will be relurned to later when 
evaluating tlle role of the intemJediary. 
The criticism would, however, apply to the provisions of sl58 (as amended) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1977. 
TIlis section enables a witness to give evidence by means of closed-circuit television or similar electronic media. 
If this section were to be used for a child. the prosecution would have to lead evidence via closed-circuit television 
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and dtis would make it very difficult to develop rapport and eye-contact, especially with a young child. This links 
up widt the further issue that the child will be alone in the other room without support. Although sI58(4) gives the 
court the power to allow the use of closed-circuit television subject to "such conditions as it may deem necessary" 
to ensure a fair and just trial, there is no mention of allowing a support person to accompany the child in dle room. 
It may be argued that the legislature did not intend for tIus section to be used in the case of children since s170A 
is available and therefore did not address the question of a support person. In temlS of s 170A the intemlediary 
would be able to function as a support person. According to Hill and Hill (1987:809-810) a child should be 
provided with an emotionally supportive person to help the child through the legal proceedings. This could be 
anyone from a parent, aunt, teacher to a social worker who will be able to lend support. This person would sit with 
the child while he testi fies in the other room. If this person is to provide support, dle appoinunent of a stranger at 
the trial to fulfill dlis role will not be successful. 
Insofar as the particulars of the section are concerned, s 170A appears to be an improvement On its UK counterpart. 
It is not limited to particular offences and applies to all children, uot necessarily complainants, under the age of 
eighteen. It is nOl limited to specific courts either. But the UK section is superior in one respect, dle prosecution 
does not have to make a special case for the use of the live link because there is a presumption of need. Section 
170A requires an application to be made in court and undue mental stress or suffering need to be proved. However, 
in practice, a discretion needs to be exercised in both sections and this can give rise to problems in application. 
Section 158 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1977 reads a little wider and says dtal a court may "on its own ilutiative 
or on application by the public prosecutor order" that evidence be given via closed-circuit television. But again there 
is a discretion to be exercised and the procedure can only be used if there is the likelihood that prejudice or harm 
might result. 
It is, therefore, proposed that if dle court is going to allow a child to give evidence via closed-circuit television in 
terms of s158 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1977, then the child must be allowed to be accompatued by somebody 
who cau offer support to dle child. It is not necessary omt the person be a stranger, since the court wi ll be able to 
view dle child and the support person on the monitor and can observe if the person attempts to influence Ole child 
in any way. 
More than half of the states in tbe USA have statutory provisions which authorise Ole use of one-way or two-way 
closed circuit television in dle case of child victims who have to give evidence in sexual offence cases (Bjerregaard 
1989: 168). The statutes vary from state to state with some allowing only the prosecution and defence counsel to 
be present with the child in the room, others require the accused to be present as well and oOlers allow the child 
to sit in the room alone although he may be accompanied by a support person. The Americans believe that Ole main 
advantage of closed-circuit television is that it protects the child from having to confront the accused. Admittedly 
olis only applies to those statutes which do not insist that the accused be present in the room WiOl the child , in 
which case the child is even closer to the accused and perhaps in an even worse position. MacFarlane (1985: 147) 
argues that since the child gives evidence outside of the courtroom, he is less likely to be frightened by the strangers 
in the court. This argument is debatable since the child in most instances has to sit in the other room with the 
prosecution, defence and judge who will also be strangers. 
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With respect to the model where the child sits alone in the adler room, MacFarlane (1985:147) argues that the child 
might feel isolated by being separated from the courtroom and from the person with whom he is communicating. 
He may, in addition, find it difficult to concentrate on a voice and a face that he views on a monitor. This 
disadvantage was raised by researchers in the United Kingdom as well and would seem to be a valid criticism. 
Although this criticism does not apply to s170A of the Criminal Procedure Act 1977 since the child has to 
communicate with the intermediary, it does bear application to s158 of the same Act (as amended) . In temlS of this 
section dIe child will be allowed to give evidence via closed-circuit television and would, therefore, have to 
conullunicate via a monitor or earphones. The sense of isolation can be overcome by allowing the child to have a 
support person present, as proposed supra. However, as far as a young child is concerned, it is going to be very 
difficult to communicate via a monitor or earphone. The official in the courtroom will not be able to keep a small 
child 's attention. For this reason it is submitted that sl58 should not be used for children under the age of twelve. 
In a receut, as yet unreported, case in the Eastern Cape (Uitenhage) a four year old boy gave evidence via an 
intenuediary in ternlS of s170A. The boy was dIe only witness to dIe murder of his mother. The boy was found 
to be a very good witness and the accused was convicted on his testimony. However, the child was cross-examined 
for three hours. It was obviously impossible for a young child to sit still for such a lengdlY period and he would 
frequently get up and wander around tbe room. The intenuediary would then have to draw him back to the table 
with a puzzle to get his attention. It would not be possible for this to happen via a monitor or closed-circuit 
television. 
Closed-circuit television has not captured much interest in inquisitorial countries since children rarely appear in 
court. Attention has heen focused on avoiding court appearances, therefore the emphasis has been on allowing 
children to give evidence by deposition which then replaces the court appearance. 
Having closely investigated the position in various countries with respect to closed-circuit television, it would appear 
that sl70A of the Criminal Procedure Act 1977 has the fewest disadvantages and the most advantages. For tilis 
reason, sl70A will be used as basis to work from. The section itself, as argued in much detail earlier, is not 
flawless. The section grants a presiding officer the discretion 10 appoint an intertllediary and a discretion to use 
closed-circuit television. Firstly, a distinction needs to be drawn between children who need to give evidence via 
closed-circuit television and those who need dIe services of an intertllediary. Research has accepted that children 
experience stress and are often traumatised by having to testify in court, and that this stress has an effect on the 
accuracy of their evidence and their ability to testify effectively. These findings have been accepted by courts 
drroughout the world, hence the introduction of videotaped depositions, closed-circuit television and countless 
exceptions to the hearsay rule which have all been introduced in an attempt to protect tile child from having to give 
evidence in court in the presence of the accused. 
Despite the fact that the courts have accepted that it is traumatic for children to testify in open court, it is still 
necessary in each case to prove that the particular child will experience stress. TIlis does not make logical sense. 
The court in Klink v Regional Court Magistrate NO and Others accepted that appearing in court was stressful for 
children and tilat s170A did not deprive the accused of his right to a fair trial. Since s28 of the Constitution Act 
1996 has emphasised that children need to be protected from abuse and tbat their best interests are paramount in 
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all matters, children should be allowed to give evidence via closed-circuit television on an autOmatic basis. The 
accused has not been deprived of his right to confrontation, since confrontation gives an accused the right to observe 
the demeanour of the witness as he testifies. The accused is able to do this by means of the closed-circuit television. 
It is, therefore , proposed that all children under the age of eighteen automatically be allowed to testify via closed-
circuit television. At this stage only the aspect of confrontation is dealt with and not the appoinUTIent of an 
imemlediary. By eliminating the court' s discretion, problems relating to the concept of undue mental stress or 
suffering will also be eliminated. This will remove the need to determine what amounts to undue mental stress or 
suffering. It will also eliminate the different standards employed between sl70A and s158, since the latter only 
requires 'the likelihood that prejudice or harm might result' and gives rise to the situation that a much higher 
standard of stress is required to be experienced by children as opposed to adults. 
One of the disadvantages of using closed-circuit television highlighted in earlier discussions was the argument that 
by allowing children to testify out of the presence of dle accused, there is a suggestion that dle child has a reason 
not to confront the accused and the latter is guilty. It is argued that dlis goes against the presumption of itlDocence. 
It was for this reason that dle Law Commission of Victoria (1988: 103) in dleir Report referred to the proposal of 
New South Wales dlat closed-circuit television be used in all cases involving children. Since this procedure would 
be d,e standard procedure used in the case of all children it would therefore not imply guilt on dIe part of dIe 
accused as it might do if only used in certain circwllstances. The Law Con1lllission of Victoria (1988: 105) proposed 
that all complainants under sixteen in cases involving sexual offences be allowed to testify via closed-circuit 
television, and that this decision be a matter for the prosecution, thereby eliminating the court's discretion . TillS 
approach is supported by Schwikkard (1996: 148) who argues that the discretionary nature of sl70A of the Criminal 
Procedure Act 1977 as a whole appears to be to the detriment of children. The discretionary nature of sl70A means 
that dlOse children who give evidence via an intermediary must be viewed as the exception rather dIan the norm. 
By removing the court's discretion, it will also eliminate the calling of expert witnesses on an adversarial basis to 
prove that a particular child has or will experience undue mental stress, as is the position at present in the USA. 
7.4.2.1.3 Videotaped Evidence 
Generally videotapes of interviews conducted widl children will be inadmissible because they comravene the rule 
against hearsay , if dley are used to replace the child's evidence in court, and because they will amount to a previous 
consistent statement, if dIe child does give evidence (Home Office 1989: II). For this reason a number of statutory 
exceptions have been introduced in accusatorial systems to enable the videotaped evidence of children to be 
adntitted. The videotaped interview that is introduced as a previous consistent statement has already been dealt with 
under deposi tions. What remains to be discussed is the introduction of videotaped evidence to replace the whole 
or part of dIe child's evidence in court. 
In the United Kingdom s32A of the Criminal lustice Act 1991 provides d,at video recorded interviews conducted 
with children may be admissible in criminal proceedings and will replace the child's evidence-in-chiefprovided that 
the child is available to be cross-examined at the trial. There are a nwnber of limitations on the availability of s32A 
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in dlat it only applies to certain crimes, certain courts and is further limited with respect to age. The admissibility 
of the videotape is not automatic, and the court has the discretion not to admit a recording in the interests of justice. 
In practice, therefore, there are two possible ways in which a child witness can give videotaped evidence. TIle 
videotaped interview, conducted by a police officer or social worker, will replace the child's evidence in court. 
The child will then either be cross-examined via closed-circuit television or he will give evidence personally in open 
court. 
In the evaluation of videotaped evidence conducted by Davies et al (1995: 12-15) it was found that children 
experienced less stress and less trauma when allowed to give evidence via videotape and closed-circuit television. 
Videotaped evidence also provided a practical medlOd of putting evidence before dle court which, in the case of 
a young or traumatised child, would not normally be able to be placed before dle court. For instance, dIe videotaped 
interview is conducted by a police officer or a social worker trained to interview children . The above evaluation 
found that in 12 % of the cases where the prosecution barrister decided to conduct dle exanlination-in-chief, dle case 
collapsed within minutes of dle opening because the child was unable to follow dle barrister's questioning, despite 
the fact that in each of these cases a successful videotaped interview had been conducted (Davies et al 1995:25-31). 
The advantages of videotaped evidence used to replace a child's evidence in court were discussed in greater detail 
earlier. At this stage it is necessary to look at a few di sadvantages of the system adopted in the United Kingdom. 
An important objection to dle use of videotaped evidence to replace evidence in person raised by dle Pigot 
Conmlittee was whether it would in fact relieve the stress experienced by children since dley would still have to 
undergo cross-examination. In addition, the defence would have access to the videotape as part of discovery and 
would therefore be prepared to question the child in great detail about what was said in the videotaped interview 
with dle purpose of exposing the minutest inconsistency (Home Office 1989: I 9). 
A furdler objection focuses on dle time delay between dle original videotaped interview and the cross-examination. 
Tlus would have the implication that a child witnesses may, and probably very likely, have forgotten a lot of detail 
mentioned in the original interview by the time they are cross-exanlined. This would have a very negative effect 
on credibility and increase the pressure on dle child, especially if he was wJable to remember some of the finer 
detail. For instance, if in dle initial interview the child mentions that he was wearing a blue tee-shirt and, months 
later, at the cross-examination says the tee-shirt was green, the cross-examiner will focus a lot of attention on dlis 
discrepancy. The questions that follow would most likely be phrased as: 'You say the tee-shirt was green? Are you 
sure? Could you perhaps be making a mistake? Can you still remember what the tee-slurt looked like? You see, 
dle reason I'm asking you this question is because when you were interviewed originally, you said dle tee-shirt was 
blue'. 
The purpose of these types of questions is to suggest to the court that they should be wary of accepting the child 's 
evidence, since he is no longer sure of the details. It is meant to raise the following questions in the nund of the 
386 
presiding officer: How sure was the child at the time the interview was conducted? If he can make a mistake about 
these details, it is likely that he could make a mistake about other details as well. And the more doubts raised in 
the mind of the presiding officer, the less likely the prosecution is to be successful in obtaining a conviction. 
These questions will also increase the stress experienced by tlre child . If he is unsure about the detail and it is being 
suggested tirat he eitiler cannot remember correctly or is lying, he is far more likely to have difficulty with rhe rest 
of tile cross-examination. This can occur even if the child is given the opportunity to refresh his memory from the 
video before the cross-examination, since he will no t be able to 'relearn' what he said in such detail three or even 
six months before. This is especially so in regard to the finer details or peripheral details of how the assault actually 
occurred. For instance, if a child was indecently assaulted (offender pushed the child against a wall and put his 
hands in his underpants) in perhaps a passageway in a house, the cross-examiner would have a fertile opportunity 
to confuse him witil the finer detail. Where exactly were you standing when X touched you? How far away was 
that from the doorway? And how far was tilat from the table? If the child gave this evidence a few months before 
the cross-examination, it would be very easy to trip him up at the cross-examination, create confusion in his mind 
about the discrepancies in tile two versions and then try to suggest to tlle court that tile child is actually unsure of 
his evidence and in fact all the accused did was pass the child in the passage and accidentally bump against him . 
These are problems which can OCCur when giving evidence in the traditional courtroom situation. How much worse 
will tilis be when tile giving of evidence is separated from the cross-examination by months. And even the 
opporrurlity to refresh the child 's memory by means of viewing tile videotape will by no means ass ist children to 
cope with detailed cross-examination, especiall y as the child is only given one opportUllity to view the videotape 
and that is when he appears in court for tbe cross-examination. 
In the Urli ted States of America tilere are similar provisions in tenns of which the videotape of the child 's interview 
can replace the child's evidence-in-chief in court provided that the child and the interviewer are available for cross-
examination (Whitcomb et al 1985:60). The availability of this procedure is not automatic and can only be used 
where giving evidence in court will be traumatic for the child. In Siale v WaTford supra tile court held at 58 1 that 
the use of a videotape to replace a child 's evidence- in-chief would infringe the defendant 'S constitutional rights and 
could not be admitted unless tilere was evidence of "a compelling need to protect the child from further hann ". 
A great deal of argmnent has gone into what is meant by the phrase "compelling need" and has led to the si tuation 
where in many cases an expert witness will be called to give evidence to detemline the existence of such a need. 
The system of videotaping the hlitial interview and using it to replace the child's evidence in court has attracted 
some attention in otller countries. In Israel , for instance, a regulation was issued which required a youth interrogator 
to tape-record tile interview, unless there were special reasons for not doing so. Hamon (1990:91) argues that tile 
nex t step in tilis direction would be to require that the interview be videotaped. It must, however be noted that under 
this system the child is not requi red to appear in court or be cross-exanlined. Such a videotape would fornl part of 
the youtil interrogator's report. In countries like West-Germany and France there is not tile same emphasis on 
confrontation and consequently videotaped depositions are used to replace the child 's evidence in court. Children 
are not required to appear in court to be cross-examined by the defence. 
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[n conclusion, it would appear, I submit, that the videotaping of an interview WiOl a child witness for the purpose 
of admitting it in lieu of the child 's evidence-in-chief at the trial provided Ole child is cross-examined at the trial 
does not offer a way forward for Ole South African courts. The difficulty for the child in having to be cross-
examined on evidence given montils beforehand and its consequent effect on the child 's credibility , as outlined 
above, does not make this a favourable option. In addition, tile discretionary nature of admitting the videotape 
results in endless argument as to what is meant by a compelling need, and thus uncertainty. 
7.4.3 Conclusion 
It would appear from the evaluation of Ole different systems tilat the amount of emphasis placed on confrontation 
by accusatorial systems does not seem to be justified. Confrontation is not an issue in inquisitOrial systems, and the 
very fact that accusatorial systems have had to introduce statutory exceptions indicates that there is a fundamental 
flaw in their approach to confrontation. 
The common law principles of our law of criminal procedure and evidence were formulated when the present 
technology available was not even foreseen. This does not mean that these innovations should be excluded for that 
reason. This particular argument was raised by Ole court in Commollwealth v Willis supra at 230-31: 
"In the Eighteen and Nineteentil Centuries, live testimony was the only way tilat a jury could 
observe the demeanour of a witness. The use of videotapes does not represent a significant 
departure from that tradition because the goal of providing a view of the witness's demeanour to 
Ole jury is still achieved. A witness has never been disqualified by mere refusal or illabili ty to 
look at tile defendant. The testimony of a blind victim would not be invalid . The sanle is true for 
the testimony of a witness who refuses to look on the accused. By analogy a defendant would not 
be denied the right of confrontation when a young victim is so intimidated by his mere presence 
that she camot testi fy uuless she is unable to see or hear him. 
The strength of the State and Federal Constitutions lies in the fact olat they are flexible documents 
which are able to grow and develop as our society progresses. The purpose of a criminal or civil 
proceeding is to detemline Ole truth ." 
The Pigot COllUllittee too observed that many of tile procedures adopted in the courts, and therefore the rules 
emanating from these procedures, were developed many years before the technology which is now available and 
which can e!lable witnesses to be treated with greater consideration (Home Office 1989:20) . 
A summary of the proposals suggested above follows. It is proposed that the initial statement made by the child 
witness to a police officer or social worker be videotaped . This videotape must be admissible at the trial as a 
exception to the rule against previous consistent statements, altilOugh it was pointed out Olat the latter rule as a 
whole needs to be refonned. The purpose of admitting this videotape will be to provide the Court with an account 
that was given when the event was still fresh in the child 's mind. [n addition, it will offer the court an opportunity 
to evaluate the maImer in which the child was interviewed, and assist tile court in assessing Ole child 's credibility. 
At the trial , all children under the age of eighteen should automatically be allowed to give evidence from a room 
outside the courtroom via closed-circuit television, tilUS removing the court's discretion and eliminating endless 
argument as to what is meant by vague concepts such as 'undue mental stress and suffering'. It has been accepted 
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that all children experience stress when having to testify in court , and especially when they must do so in the 
presence of tile accused, and that tllis stress has an effect on their memory as well as their ability to testify. 
This proposal will, therefore have certain statutory implications . Section 170A of ti,e Criminal Procedure Act 1977 
will have to be amended to remove tile discretionary nature of the section and to provide that all children under tile 
age of eighteen be allowed as a matter of course to give evidence via closed-circuit television . The question of tile 
intertnediary will be addressed next. As far as s158 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1977 is concerned, this section 
will have to be amended to indicate whetller it is applicable to child witnesses under the age of eighteen or whether 
the court must proceed in tertns of sl70A when dealing with child witnesses under tile age of eighteen. If s l58 is 
to be used for child witnesses under the age of eighteen, then it must make provision for the child to be 
accompanied by a support person. It is also suggested that it not be used for children under the age of twelve since 
it will create difficulties witll communication and concentration. The better proposal would be for tile legislature 
to indicate clearly tllat s1 58 applies to witnesses aged eighteen and over and that s170A applies to witnesses under 
the age of eighteen. Tltis will elintinate the confusion between the discretionary nature of s l58 and the proposed 
automatic nature of s l70A i.e. child witnesses under eighteen can automatically give evidence via closed-circuit 
television in tertns of s170A whereas s158 would require a finding of a likelihood that prejudice or hartn might 
result before a witness could give evidence via closed-circuit television. 
The reasons for the introduction of the above proposals have all been argued in detail earlier. However, it should 
be remembered that tile law of evidence, like tile legal system as a whole, should adapt itself to changing social 
requirements and attitudes, always taking into account any countervailing interests (Hamon 1990:92). 
7.5 Cross-Examination 
7.5.1 Basis for the Belief in Cross-examination 
Cross-examination, according to Davies (1993:3), is the strategy of words and actions which the advocate employs 
during the presentation of evidence by tile opposition that serves to cast doubt upon the opposing party's case. The 
purposes of cross-examination are twofold. firstly, to elicit infonnation that is favourable to the party conducting 
the cross-exanlination and, secondly, to cast doubt upon the accuracy of the evidence given in chief by the witness 
(Klink v Regional Court Magistrate NO and Others supra). This would mean that in the course of cross-
examination only questions concerning facts relevant to tile issue or to dle witness' s credibility may be asked 
(Hoffmann and Zeffertt 1988:458). 
In accusatorial systems there is a fundamental belief that cross-examination, and the tecltniques employed in tile 
course of it , are tools for discovering the trutll and assessing credibility. According to Wigmore (1 974: 1367), it is 
"the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of the trutll" and leaves not a moment 's doubt in the mind 
of any lawyer as to its effectiveness: 
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"Not even the abuses, the mishandlings, and the puerilities which are so often found associated 
with cross-examination have availed to nullify its value. It may be that in more than one sense it 
takes the place in our system which torture occupied in the medieval system of the civilians. 
Nevertheless, it is beyond any doubt the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of 
the truth. However difficult it may be for the layman, the scientist, or the foreign jurist to 
appreciate this, its wonderful power, there has probably never been a moment's doubt upon this 
point in the mind of lawyers of experience .... If we omit political consideration of broader range, 
then cross-examination, not trial by jury, is the great and permanent contribution of the Anglo-
American system of law to improved methods of trial procedure. " 
This passage from Wigmore highlights the strengOl of this beli ef, referring to cross-examination as "the great and 
permanent contribution" of the accusatorial system to trial procedure. Carson (1995:4), however, argues that this 
fundamental belief is unchallenged and based upon "anecdote and supposition rather than upon evidence". For 
instance, a witness may make a lot of mistakes in cross-examination, which could lead to his evidence being 
disbelieved by O,e court , but it in no way proves that Ole witness was lying. The person may simply "be very poor 
at being a witness rather Olan as a truth-teller" (Carson 1995:4). How does it assist the court in its truth-finding 
role to rely upon questioning techrtiques which serve only to demonstrate that a particular witness is fallible under 
cross-examination? These techrtiques are accepted because the standard of proof in legal matters is based on 
persuasion rather than scientific proof as pointed out by Hart (1963: Introduction): 
"The problem arises because ' legal reasorting ' about facts is based upon persuasion to a much 
greater extent than is the case wiOl more formal and scientific systems of proof." 
Cross-examination is often regarded as a feature of an adversarial system which enables it to claim superiority over 
the inquisitorial system. However, adherents of Ole latter system have often accused the adversaria! system of giving 
an "exaggerated efficiency" to the right of questiorting. They argue that cross-examination bends and distorts the 
evidence by means of suggestive questions and that justice cannot prevail in an atmosphere where witnesses are 
influenced and badgered (Gorphe 1927:90). In fact, Davies (l993:xxxii) emphasises that words are weapons and 
the outcome of a case depends on confrontation between one side's witnesses and the other's lawyer, which he 
describes as a "battle". He finishes off with the following imagery (Davies 1993:397): 
" .. then it is incumbent upon Ole advocate to cross-examine in such a way that the witness is 
damaged or neutralized to some degree. " 
It is often assllllled that the tradition of cross-examining a witness is of ancient origin. In fact, in English criminal 
proceedings it is a very recent development. The procedure used to be for Ole judge to examine tile witnesses and 
Olis they did by allowing the witnesses to tell their stories freely in their own words. It was only in tile course of 
tile 18th century tI,at the practice developed of having batrister prosecute and defend (Spencer and Flin 1990:79). 
It is obvious that in order to protect the accused there has to be some examination of the witness's credibility and 
his motivation to tell the trutll, but this does not mean that it call only be done by uaditional cross-examination as 
we know it. 
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7.5.2 Effect of Cross-examination on Children 
The medium of exchange in the courtroom is a particular language which is so steeped in legal tradition that it falls 
outside the normal language repertoire of adults and, even more so, of children (Brennan and Brennan 1988:31). 
In addition to this, and operating at the same time, are the emotional stresses and fears which the child experiences 
when having to be questioned about traumatic events in an adversarial environtl1ent that traditionally does not 
differentiate between children and adults. What needs to be investigated then is the distance between the child's 
language capacity and the language of the courtroom. In fact, the questions which need to be addressed are set out 
succinctly by Brennan and Bremlan (1988:41): 
"What language features particular to the courtroom contribute to !lIe mismatch between children's 
language abil ities and !lIe language of lawyers? How and why are these language characteristics 
employed by members of the legal profession and how justifiable is tileir usage? .. . What 
provisions are made for relatively inexperienced language users who appear as witnesses?" 
A number of techniques employed in cross-examillation give rise to serious difficulties in comprehension for the 
child witnesses. The following serves simply to highlight a few of the difficulties children encounter with cross-
examination. 
7.5.2.1 Communicating in an Adversarial Environment 
In court the nomlal conventions of communication are subservient to a set of procedures which have been 
established over generations. Brennan and Brennan (1988:31) explain that these conventions are not only foreign 
but also intimidating and confusing. They list the fo llowing examples to show how court procedures domilla te 
language usage: the fact that the person examining the child often faces !lIe bench while questioning tile child; that 
questions are directed through tiIe bench; that questions are interrupted by procedural objections; that discussions 
of what the child has been asked and how tile child has replied are discussed at length while the child remains 
present; and that the alleged perpetrator sits in a special place while this is happening and frequently says nothing. 
The court provides a prescriptive enVirOl11l1ent wimin which me scope for responding is very limited. The child 
witness has to cope with mese limitations and translate !lIe formalities of !lIe environment into linguistic terms in 
order to deal with !lIe language of me COUfUoom. Within this environment the child has little room for negotiation 
or manoeuvre. In addition, the environtl1ent is alien to the child's previous experience of language where words 
have been used to learn about, explore, test and generally establish relationships. Children are confronted with this 
change in !lIe use of language and they quickly became "the victims of a set of language rules which prohibit !llem 
from expressing tilemselves in a meaningful and truthful way" (Brennan and Bre111lan 1988:31): 
"The courtroom context and the language in particular reinforces quickly in the child 's mind their 
role as tile victim in !lIe proceedings and members of the court do little to contradict !llis." 
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A child 's experience of language does not prepare him for interactions on an adversarial basis. Ordinary 
conversation includes various language forms, such as questions, descriptions, narratives etc. In the courtroom only 
one of these forms is used - various people will ask questions and the child will have to answer. 
"In cross-examination bowever, tlle order of the speakers is fixed in advance and whatever else 
is accomplished interactionally their discourse must be fitted into the mould of the question answer 
sequence. This means that in contrast with spontaneous conversation, there is no negotiation over 
their right to speak or what may be said " (Danet 1980:449) . 
There is no provision for the child to address the court on certain questions wllicb he does not understand or to 
negotiate the direction of a line of questioning. 
A very good example of this is found in S v Nozakuzaku supra where the thirteen year old complainant was giving 
evidence at a trial for rape which took place two years after the offence was conmlitted. In this case tbe prosecutor 
objected to the fact that the girl was being forced into a yes/no reply and the magistrate had to admit, albeit 
reluctantly, that this technique was part of cross-exanlination: 
"Attorney: 
Prosecutor: 
Court: 
The question is did they then suggest tJ,at you accompany them around the 
shebeen, they pointed out a certain SpOt and you had to confirm where you were 
raped? 
Your worShip, if I could just object. The line of questioning is a bit dangerous. 
Because it is put in such a way that the child must say yes or no. Can' t he 
rather ask it in a way that the child can explain. 
Well, it is cross-examination, but I agree to some extent." 
Forcing a yes/no reply can create a distortion of the truth as in the following example where a Ulirteen year old girl 
tried to explain that she was not sure, but the defence insisted on her choosing yes or no as a reply . The case is 
S v Els supra: 
"Attorney: 
Child: 
Attorney: 
Child: 
Did she say she made a statement to the police? 
No, but I don ' t think she did because her mother doesn' t even know about this. 
You say you do not koow or you do not think she did. Is it yes or no? 
No." 
Originally she was not sure whether her friend made a statement to the police, but she ends up saying no, because 
her options to reply have been limited to yes or no. 
By implication adversarial examination is aggressive; it is U,e weapon with which the battle between the two panies 
is fought. The casualties, of course, are the witnesses . As Davies (1993: 155) instructs, it is often good to begin 
cross-examination by just looking at ule witness for a longer period U,an seems appropriate as ulis device "often 
makes witnesses uncomfortable and they begin to fidget. It serves in some small measure to begin to break down 
Uleir confidence". 
Davies (1993:61) also refers to silent cross-examination as a possible technique. It is the ability to dismiss a witness 
in such a way that it conveys to Ule court Ule impression that nouling the witness could possibly say is worth 
listening to, and he describes the maItner in which this is to be achieved as follows: 
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"He will stand and look intensely at the witness with scorn or derision on his face for some time 
and tben as if to say 'what 's the point, you' ll probably continue your lies if I take the trouble to 
question you,' be waves him off tbe stand." 
Davies (1993:72) goes on to suggest to prospective cross-exanliners that they should begin their observation of the 
witness from the moment the witness enters the courtroom, because "witnesses 3re particularly vulnerable" at that 
stage, and these observations can disclose a great deal about the witness. He Ulen goes on to advise how this can 
be done: 
"Often a witness will bring a friend or family member to court for support ... If you recognise 
ule setup, you can use it to your advantage by blocking ule witness's view of the person he's 
relying on for help . It can have a devastating effect ... This behaviour by a witness can be turned 
to your advantage even thougb you bave been unable to shake dle substance of dle testimony. " 
And this is behaviour that is advocated in the search for the tmuI! It would appear from tbe above that cross-
examination has much to do with a battle between two parties and very little to do with the need to establish the 
tmdl. Hwniliating and scaring a witness seem to be dle products of a successful cross-examination. This approach 
has a devastating effect on adult witnesses, how much worse will the effect be on children. The witness is perceived 
as being dIe prey and treated likewise, as can be seen from the following advice given by Davies (1993:88-89): 
"the advocate in his cross-examination must be subtle in the way that he leads the witness to a 
trap .. . After the initial point is made ule advocate must not let up. It is not enough to merely 
ensnare the quarry; radler, ule quarry must be held in the trap and allowed to squiml for a 
sufficient time to make a forceful , and, hopefully devastating, impact on the jury. " 
And then, finall y, the wi tness must be destroyed (Davies 1993: 175-6) : 
"Desuoying the witness attacks him at every possible level of his life and seeks to place him in 
such a repugnant light that, not only does the jury disbelieve him, but uley may bend over 
backwards to find a solution in the case that serves to deliver an insult to the witness." 
It is submitted that this envirollllent is not conducive to the discovery of ule truth , especially where a cllild witness 
is concerned. In addition, ule child is being questioned in a hostile enviromnent about often, very intimate and 
emotionally-laden events. The foll owing is an excerpt from the Eastern Province Herald Saturday, 24 August 1996 
where an adult rape victim was cross-examined by ule accused, and serves to highlight the trawna that is often 
experienced by victims in this situation: 
"Julia Mason, a 34-year-old mother of two, said sbe felt as if sbe had been raped all over again 
by Ralston Edwards who insisted on defending himself. The serial sex offender was allowed to 
cross-examine his victim in minute and intimate detail at his trial. 
Making it worse, was that on every day of tbe trial, Edwards wore tbe same grubby clothes he wore the 
night be repeatedly raped Mrs Manson in a 16-bour ordeal in bis squalid London flat." 
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The victim broke down several times and on one occasion fled from the courtroom. She explained that the cross-
examination forced her to relive every moment of the rape. The investigating officer in charge of the case was of 
the opinion that tile accused "had enjoyed every minute of it" and was obviously getting some kind of sexual 
grati fication from the cross-exanlination. 
7.5.2.2 
"After tile trial Mrs Mason said: ' I was raped once by Edwards, and again by the British justice 
system. , II 
Purpose of Asking Questions 
Questions asked in a courtroom are not asked for tile sanle reasons that questions are asked generally in society , 
and children do not understand tile purpose for which questions are being asked in court. They are accustomed to 
being asked questions because people are interested in their replies, and are not prepared for questions that are 
aimed at manipulating their replies (BremulD and Brennan 1988:60). 
In court a child will be faced with two types of questions. The first are referred to as elaborate questions, and are 
usually used in examination-in-chief. These questions offer the child an opportunity to explain, expand and describe 
events and are also known as 'open questions' e.g. Can you tell us what happened? The second lype of questions 
is restrictive in nature and also referred to as ' closed questions'. In the latter type of questions the options for 
response are so restricted by the manner in which the questions were phrased that the child has possible responses 
already set out for him. These questions appear to be clear and precise, requiring a particular answer. Often they 
restrict the child to a yes/no reply and effectively remove the child's right to offer any more infom13tion (Brennan 
and Brennan 1988:60).As seen from the example supra in S v Nozakuzaku, the child is not given an opportunity 
to discuss tile conlent of the question. These restrictive questions are a tool of the cross-examiner and relentlessly 
used to achieve his aim. Davies (1993:150), in his book for student cross-examiners, instructs tilem as follows: 
"The speci fic objectives of cross-examination must be pursned in the most direct line possible. 
this means conrrolling the witness and the pace of the examination; otherwise, the cross-
examination is ineffective. Control can best be accomplished by asking questions that require a 
'yes' or 'no' answer. The ideal cross-examination is achieved when the advocate is testifying and 
the witness is reduced to agreeing or disagreeing with what tile advocate says." 
Further on in his manual Davies (1993:203) remarks as follows on tilis point: 
"Because control of the witness is crucial to any successful cross-examination , the advocate must 
develop the skill of phrasing questions in such a way as to limit tile ability of tile witness to 
elaborate on his answer. " 
The child is, therefore, forced to agree, disagree or maintain that he does not know. As BremJan and BremJan 
(1988:60) explain, the question is phrased in such a way tiJat tile child is forced to respond to rather than answer 
the question. The questions do not require an answer frol11 the child and demand no information. They require only 
a response. 
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In cross-examination the defence is obliged to place his version of events before the witness. 111is is usually done 
in the foml of statements. These statement confuse children since they do not know what response is required from 
them, especially as no question has been asked. The following examples of dlis technique were taken from S v 
Nozakuzaku supra. 
• ''I'm going to put it to you that you are fabricating dlis now Tuliswa. That the impression that you gave 
to this Court the whole time was that dlat vehicle was locked and that you never unlocked or attempted 
to unlock that vehicle. " 
• "Now, if your aunt said to the Court yesterday that it is a busy shebeen dlat and while she was dlere she 
saw people coming in and leaving the shebeen and she described that she can't say how many but she gave 
the indication dlat they were a lot of people. What would you say to that? " 
• "Now I'm going to put it to you dlat if necessary there will be people dlat will say when you told dIe 
police inside the charge office at Modlerwell , giving a description when or where and how you were raped , 
you told the police you were raped at the Smimoff board at Zwide." 
Unless the child understands wllat dIe purpose of a question is or why it is being asked, it is impossible for the child 
(0 make an accurate contribution. 
As mentioned above, cross-examination has two purposes, llaDlely to test the credibility of a witness and to find 
further details which will assist the questioner's own case. Examples of questions used to test credibility would be: 
"You've made up dlis story because you do not like your stepfather and you do not want him to live with you", 
or "I put it to you that you are lying". These questions antagonise witnesses, causing them to become angry or 
distressed . According to Spencer and Flin (I990:225) this puts the witness in a state of stress which causes him to 
become confused , and be may even contradict himself. They object to the use of cross-examination as an instrument 
for discovering dIe truth in that its two purposes conflict widl each odler. Questions that are aimed at testing 
credibility will cause witnesses to become angry and confused, and dlis will not enable them to provide furdler 
delails accurately. The ability to create confusion could, according to Spencer and Flin (1990:226-7), be reduced 
"if cross-examiners had to keep questions designed to test the honesty and sincerity of dIe witness separate from 
questions designed to elicit further infoffilation in two distinct phases of dIe examination". In practice, a cross-
examiner moves from one point to another which confuses dIe witness and dlis undermines dIe whole value of 
cross-examination as a tool to discover the tmth. 
7.5.2.3 Leading Questions 
Earlier when the research relating to children 'S suggestibility was discussed, the findings demonstrated that children 
are capable of providing highly reliable evidence provided they are interviewed correctly (McGough 199 I: \IS). 
However, a number of dIe studies showed that children, especially young children, were susceptible to suggestion 
when certain interviewing techniques were employed. The most obvious method of suggestion was the use of 
leading questions. The results of the studies showed that the way in which a question was phrased could determine 
the accuracy or inaccuracy of the response (Dale, Loftus and Ratllbun 1989:274). The position is summarised as 
follows by Cohen and Hamick (1980:209): 
39 5 
"Suggestive or leading questions can have effects at all age levels. In particular, leading questions 
may provide witnesses with responses in instances where they have no recollection of the actual 
events. This type of interrogation would obviously be avoided in the elicitation of eyewitness 
testimony. " 
Despite these fmdings, the use of leading questions is a technique employed in cross-examirtation and gives rise to 
serious difficulties with comprehension for the child wi tness. The anomaly here is that leading questions are not 
allowed when a witness is giving evidence-in-chiefbecause they suggest replies and are, therefore, unreliable. Yet, 
despite this, leading questions are allowed when a child is being cross-examined. This seems to imply that it is all 
right to suggest answers to a child during cross-examination and thereby make their evidence unreliable. TIlis has 
the following ridiculous result: 
"Suggestive questions produce unreliable infoIDlation - except when asked by lawyers in cross-
examination." (Spencer and Flin 1990:224). 
According to Carson (1 995: 3) it does not make sense to allow leading questions to be used in court when they have 
effectively been banned in all other stages of investigation because they have the propensity for producing false 
evidence. 
A further problem with leading questions, according to Carson (1995:6), is that they are "particularly effective with 
people who are urtassertive". This would apply specially to children who are being cross-examined in an advers.rial 
environment by adnlts. As discussed in detail earlier, interviewer bias and repeated questioning do affect the 
suggestibility of children especially when they are linked to leading questions. Both of these teChniques feature in 
cross-examination. The interviewer in this case would be the accused or his representative and he is obviously 
partisan. In fact, one of the purposes of cross-examination is to elicit evidence favourable to your case . In addition, 
cross-examiners often repeat their questions. The following example taken from S v Nowkuzaku supra highlights 
the matmer in which repeated questioning can be used to confuse and underntine a child witness: 
"Now can you tell His Worship what time did you go to Zwide that evening? --- I cannot recall. 
Can you recall what time you went to NU6, Motherwell? --- It was still light when we went there. 
To the NU6? --- Yes. 
What time did you go to the shebeen ? --- We went there when we returned from Zwide. 
Yes, but can you tell His Worship more or less what time did you go to the NU6, Motherwell, 
that particular she been where you say that Nozakuzaku raped you? --- I do not know. 
Was it very dark then or was it light? --- It was light. 
And when Nozakuzaku raped you was it light or was it dark? --- It was dark there at the back of 
tile house. 
Yes, but now over all, over all now, was it at night or was it during the day? --- It was in tile 
night. 
In the night. Can you tell time? --- It was very late in the night already. " 
Twice the child explains that she does not remember the time. However, after asking her five times what tile time 
was, the cross-exanliner sncceeds in getting her to change her evidence from not knowing, to agreeing that it was 
light to saying that it was dark and very late in the night. And all in the pursuit of truth! The cross-exanliner 
succeeds admirably in highlighting to the court that the child is not a credible witness, but this is in fact not so. The 
child has been questioned in a maImer which has been proved by research to elicit confusion and inaccuracies . It 
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would appear clear, as pointed out by Flin (1991 :23), dlat legal rules and procedures are based on an inaccurate 
or ouonoded knowledge of developmental psychology . 
7.5.2.4 Peripheral Matters 
Peripheral questions are those questions which do not deal widl the direct issues in a case, but rather which deal 
with questions relating to surrounding matters that are aimed at testing dle witness's credibility. Research has shown 
that it is easier to get children to give false answers by asking them leading questions when dealing with peripheral 
matters rather than when dealing with matters thaI are of central importance (Spencer and Flin 1990:225) . Despile 
dlese findings, the defence is allowed to put leading questions to children about peripheral matters, which will have 
a dramatic effect on tile child's credibility. For instance, an attorney may ask a series of relatively unimportant 
peripheral questions, the purpose of which is simply to try to cause tile witness to make a mistake, raOler dIan 
focusing on central issues. It ought, therefore, not to be surprising thaI witnesses, especially child witnesses, make 
mistakes about matters which they do not regard as important. Leading a witness into making such mistakes should 
not be regarded as a means to discover Ole truth or test the credibility of a witness (Carson 1995:4). 
Questions of dlis type are actually improper. Authority for this is found in R v Baldwin (1925) 18 Cr App R 175 
where Lord Hewarl CJ set Out the position as follows: 
"It is right to remember in all such cases that the witness in the box is an amateur and the counsel 
who is asking questions is, as a rule, a professional conductor of argument, and it is nOt right that 
the wits of the one should be pitted against the wils of the oOler in dIe field of suggestion and 
controversy. What is wanted from the witness is answers to questions of fact." 
In S v Nozakuzaku supra the court questioned a thirteen year old rape victim about certain details re lating to the 
offence, which had taken place Iwo years previously . The rape had occurred at a shebeen which the child had 
visited in the company of her aunt. The details of Ole drinking that look place in the shebeen had no relevance to 
the actual rape which took place outside dIe back of Ole shebeen, yet the court put dIe following questions to Ole 
child, even Ihough the rape had occurred Iwo years previously : 
7.5.2.5 
"What section of the she been? --- AI the front. She was al the front. 
Is that now where all Ihe people drink? --- Yes. 
Was she sitting Olere or standing Olere or what was she doing there? --- She was seated. 
And whal was she doing? --- She bought beer now and then. 
How many beers did she drink while you were Olere? --- They were many. 
How many beers did she drink whilst you were slill there? --- Five. " 
The Use of Language in Court 
Language is fundamental to Ole legal profession and the court appearance is seen as a verbal contest between parties 
(Viljoen 1992:65-6) . It is this specialized language which creates problems for the layman. Children especially 
experience major problems WiOI the language used in the course of giving evidence in court. In 1979 Charrow and 
Charrow (1979: 1321ff) identified certain features of language that were specifically court-related. These were 
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refined by BrelUJan and BrelUJall (1988:62) who concentrated on thirteen features of legal language Olat had 
implications for the child witness. In 1993 BrelUJan (1993:38) added two more features and these were further 
elaborated by Kranat and Westcott (1994: 16) to include thirteen more features that were present in lawyer-child 
communications. Carson (1995:5) divided the major problems which children have with court language into three 
broad categories . The categories suggested by Carson will be adopted here with the other features incorporated 
where relevant. The three broad categories are as foll ows: 
• age-inappropriate vocabulary; 
• complex syntax; 
• general ambiguity 
Age-inappropriate vocabulary 
This would include the use of words which do not fall within the child's language repertoire. Every profession has 
language conventions which are particular to it. Law happens to be one of the professions which uses vocabulary 
and technical temlS that are specific to its discipline. Children, who are relatively inexperienced language users, 
experience the specificity of legal language as very difficult to comprehend (BrelUJan and Bremlan 1988:68). For 
instance, in Riggs v State , 235 Ind . 499, 135 N.E.2d 247 (1956) a twelve year old girl was asked whether she had 
sexual intercourse with a certain Hiram Riggs to which the girl replied 'yes' . There was no evidence placed before 
court that the child understood the meaning of Ole phrase "sexual intercourse". She gave no details of the acts. The 
court concluded as follows at 249: 
"A child of 12 is not competent to give her conclusion of 'sexual intercourse' without showing 
her understanding of details supporting such conclusion, while at the same time a more mature 
person with more knowledge of such matters might be qualified." 
Not only do children lack an understanding of certain words, but they also have misconception about certain words. 
For instance, in a study conducted by Aldridge (1996), she found that the two most common misconceptions 
amongst British children were the meanings of tile following two words: victim and prosecutor. There was general 
confusion as to who the victim was, and the prosecutor was the person who 'gave out the punishment'. 
This problem was highlighted in Ole case of R v Willoughby supra where a nine year old girl was abducted and 
then indecently assaulted by a stranger. A few weeks later an identity parade was held and the girl pointed out the 
accused. At the trial the defence suggested that she had only identified Willoughby because the police had told her 
timt the attacker would be at the identification parade. The police said that they had told the girl 'a suspect' would 
be present at the identification parade. In cross-examilmtion the defence asked the child : "Did they tell you the 
attacker would be there?" The girl replied that they had and tilis was used to discredit her evidence. Could one in 
all certainty say that a girl of nine would be able to understand the significance of tile difference in meaning 
between the word 'suspect' and 'attacker' in this context. 
The following examples of the use of difficult andlor technical language were isolated in tile cross-exanlination of 
tbe child witness in S v Nozakuzaku supra: 
• "Can you tell His Worship what is the blanket used for?" 
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• "I'm going to put it to you that you are fabricating this now Tuliswa." 
• "You see why I'm asking you the question Tuliswa is, my Learned Friend when she led you in 
evidence in chief, she put two questions to you. " 
Complex syntax 
This category includes a number of linguistic features found in legal language which create difficulties for children. 
Legal language is riddled widl dIe use of the negative expression. The grammatical structure of these negatives, 
and their position in a question conform to a sct of rules which children do not have acctss to. The following 
example given by Brennan and Brennan (1988:63) illustrates dIe confusion created: 
"Q. Now you had a bruise, did you not , near one of your breasts, do you remember that? 
A. No." 
By inserting the phrase ' did you not' , three questions are generated within the one question. The child is then 
confronted with dlfee possible questions , and it is unclear which one dIe child should respond to. In dIe above 
example, for instance, the possibilities are: did you have a bruise? was it near your breast? do you remember that? 
This linguistic technique is closely aligned widl multi-faceted questions , which occur when a number of sub-
questions are subsumed into one question. In such a case the witness is not sure which question should be answered, 
and if a reply is hazarded nobody else knows which question has been answered (Carson 1995:6) . 
Language used by cross-examiners is sometimes very compact and a lot of information is squeezed into one 
question. Consequently legal language contains a large nwnber of embeddings. This occurs when a question contains 
a series of qualifying clauses. The following are a few examples taken from S v Nozakuzaku: 
• "When you discussed the place where you were raped as well as the way in which you 
were raped by dIe accused , you infoffiled the police - there 's a person by the name of 
Gani, I don't know if you recollect Gani, but in his presence you said you were raped 
in Zwide at the Sntirnoff board." 
• "Would you agree with me that according to dIe statement that aunt Ethel made in your 
presence and what I read to you now, certain passages, she didn 't make mention iliat you 
informed her that you were taken behind the shebeen." 
These constructions do not follow dIe nornlal pattern of speech conventions and are more like Latin. It is unlikely 
that children will be able to understand these multiple clauses (Brennan and BremJan 1988:76). The above are also 
examples of long questions which create difficulty , especially for children. Even d,e courts have accepted that these 
questions are confusing and create ambiguity, as was pointed out by the court in S v Gidi supra at 540: 
"Questions should be in a foml understandable to the wi mess so d,at he may answer them 
properly . Multiple questions, that is to say, interrogation which poses a series of questions for 
simultaneous answer should be avoided because they tend to confuse. The witness may answer 
the last question, but forget what dIe others were, or dIe answer may be ambiguous because of 
uncertainty which of the series of questions is being answered. Long and involved questions would 
be avoided when short and simple questions suffice. " 
A frequent technique employed in cross-examination is dIe use of the passive voice. This tends to objectify the doer 
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of the action, making him appear anonymous, and has the added danger that it confuses children (BremUln 1993 :41). 
As discussed earlier, children acquire language in simple components: subject-verb-object, and this is the limit of 
wbat they are capable of understanding . A test used to assess a child's ability to understand syntax is to let the child 
say somedling, then count the number of words that his sentence contains. This will be the maximum number of 
words that the chlld is capable of understanding in a sentence, and all questions addressed to that child should only 
contain that number of words (Saywitz 1996). 
General ambiguity 
The vagueness, deliberate or otherwise, of cross-examiners in phrasing questions contributes to dIe confusioll 
experienced by chlldren. For instance , when a statement does not take we clear form of a question, the witness may 
not interpret it as a question and therefore not feel it necessary to reply (Carson 1995:6). Hypothetical questions 
also create a great deal of difficulty for children. These are questions which require children to evaluate, a skill 
whlch they do not develop until at least ten years of age, as discussed earlier when investigating tbe developmental 
psychology of children. The following are examples from S v Nozakuzaku supra: 
• "Now if one can see tbe vehicle from the entrance and you were standing there at this 
vebicle, would you agree with me it would be easy to see when Nozakuzaku took out a 
pistOl?" 
• "Now would you agree with me or let's ask you the question differently. Was there any 
reason wby he should've put the pistol back in hi s belt?" 
Multiple guess questions offer the witness a choice of more than two answers e.g. "When you came into dIe room, 
d.id you sit down or sland or walk around?" 111e child may be confused by the cboices available, especially if the 
selection covered does not include what really happened (Carson 1995:6). 
111is ambiguity can create confusion in conmlUnication. Lawyers are not aware how literal children are in their 
interpretations and tltis can lead to problems. The following example of an interchange which took place during 
cross-exanlination is quoted by Cashmore (1991: 198): 
"Defence: 
Child: 
Defence: 
Child : 
Defence: 
Child: 
Defence: 
Child: 
And dlen you said you put your moutil on his penis? 
No 
You didn't say that? 
No 
Did you ever put your mouth on his penis? 
No 
Well , why did you tell your mother tilat your dad put his penis in your mouth. 
My brother tOld me to . 
At tilis point, it looked as if tile child had completely recanted her earlier testimony about dIe 
sexual abuse and had only fabricated tile story because her brother told her to. However, dIe 
experienced prosecuting attomey recognised the problem and clarified tile situation. 
Prosecutor: 
Child: 
Prosecutor: 
Child : 
Prosecutor: 
Child: 
Jennie, you said that you didn't put your mouth on daddy's penis. Is that right? 
Yes 
Did daddy put his penis in your moutil? 
Yes 
Did you tell your mom? 
Yes 
Prosecutor: 
Child: 
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What made you decide to tell? 
My brother and I talked about is, and he said I better tell or Dad would JUSt 
keep on doing it. " 
Carson (1995: 10) refers to a few further instances where vague and ambiguous questions may give rise to 
confusion. Very often a child is asked whether 'anything' happened. Vague questions like this are usually used when 
the questioner is trying to avoid a leadiug question. If the child is unsure what the questioner is referring to or what 
time reference is being referred to, then the child may answer ' no'. For ins tance, if the child were to be asked: 'Did 
anything happen when your father called you into the room? ' The child may think that the question only relates to 
the instant that he came into the room. If the child replied 'no' , this could create problems if something did happen 
in the room after that. 
Confusion is also created when one is asked wbether one ' knows' someone . It is difficult to determine what degree 
of ' know' is required. It would be very easy to challenge the credibility of a child who answers that he ' knows' 
someone, when he actually is using the words in a loose way, such as ' know about ' . This is exactly what happened 
in S v Mathebula supra where the accused asked the child whedler sbe knew him (I 721-J), and she replied that sbe 
did not. The court interpreted dlis to mean that she did not recognise the accused as the perpetrator. 
This kind of confusion gives rise to stress on the part of tile child witness, as the following description of the cross-
examination of a nine year old girl by Giles (1989: 6) indicates: 
"The defence attorney spent one and a half hours asking increasingly complex questions about 
only the first of the six or seven alleged assaults. These questions became increasingly complex 
in terms of space, time, relative position, causality , intent and probability. He induced a phobic 
response to questions about who said what by questioning with unusual intensity details of exactly 
which words were used and their meaning. Over time the child began to hesitate before reporting 
on what was said. These pauses were interpreted as implying deceit or lack of complete honesty 
on the part of the child. She becanle increasingly anxious, unable to connect widl her original 
statement, and began to make impetuous conllllents in order to obtain short-tenn relief from the 
mounting stress. " 
The above is a very brief sllllllllary of some of the techniques of cross-examination which cause difficulties for child 
witnesses: 
"[Olne only needs to witness a single instance of the cross-examination of a child witness to 
realise that dIe procedure is ill-suited to children. It is easy to confuse a young child with the use 
of age-inappropriate language, long and circuitous questi ons, and a confrontational style. The 
adversarial system creates as many problems as it solves in the area of child abuse." (Yuille 
1989: 191) 
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7.5.3 The Position in South Africa 
Both the South African courts and the legislature have accepted that children experience difficulties with cross-
examination in the traditional courtroom, hence the introduction of s170A of the Criminal Procedure Act 1977 
which created the intemlediary. In Klink v Regional Court Magis/rate NO and Others supra Meluosky J made the 
following observation at 411 E: 
"it is sufficient to say that I am quite convinced that a child witness may often find it traumatic 
and stressful to give evidence in tbe adversarial atmosphere of the courtroom and that the forceful 
cross-examination of a young person by skilled counsel may be more likely to obfuscate than to 
reveal the truth." 
The intermediary was, therefore, introduced to assist the child witness by removing all hostility and aggression from 
a question and by changing a question, where necessary, so tllat it would be more understandable to the child . 
However, in tile earlier evaluation of the intemlediary 's role, a number of problems were raised. The power of the 
intemltdiary was argued as being very limited , since an intemlediary was nothing more than an interpreter and the 
court could insist that tile intermediary repeat the question exactly as it was phrased. 
A further disadvantAge of the present system is tllat the intermediary does not have tbe authority to comment on 
a question and give his opinion as to whether a child understAnds a question or not. The intermediary is powerless 
to intervene and argue that questions should not be asked in a particular sequence or not phrased in a certAin 
manner. The real problem is that the intermediary is not an expert witness, but only an interpreter. 
Having investigated Ille relevant aspects of developmentAl psychology and the acquisition of language by children, 
it becomes clear that children are nOt able to give accurate evidence when cross-examined in an adversarial 
enviromnent. All accusatorial countries have accepted this fact , hence the introduction of stAtutory exceptions to 
ameliorate Ille position of the child witness. It is submitted that Slatutory exceptions created on an ad hoc basis 
simply give rise to further confusion and, sometimes , place the child in an even worse position, as has happened 
in the United Kingdom. It does not make sense to modify a system to suit children when the system does not 
support children. In such a situation it is tile system itself which needs to change. Accusatorial cross-examination 
does not enable children to give evidence accurately and effectively . For that reason it is proposed tllat children he 
questioned within an inquisitorial framework. 
From tile research that has been conducted on the interviewing of child witnesses, it would appear that Illis is a 
highJy specialised field requiring trained specialists to carry out these functions. It does not seem feasible to train 
magistrates, judges and prosecutors to this level of competence since child witnesses only fonn a small proportion 
of their duties. [n addi tion, it would not be possible to insist that defence counsel be trained and it is the defence 
counsel who are responsible for conducting cross-examination. 
The European Convention on Human Rights gives an accused the right to have evidence examined. This does not 
mean that the accused bimself or his representAtive are entitled to examine the witness in person. In most 
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inquisitorial countries dlis is done by an examining magistrate or, in the case of children, by specially trained police 
officers. It is, therefore, proposed that a skilled interviewer be used during all stages of the investigation, from the 
pretrial stage all the way through to the actual trial. This appointment would assist the child by allowing rapport 
to develop between the child and the interviewer as well as enabling the child to provide the court wiul an accurate 
account of events. The latter advantage was described by Benedek and Schetky (1986: 1228) as follows: 
"In addi tion, a pool of professionals trained in the relevant psychological and legal technical skills 
might avoid the confusion created by the improper use of leading questions, language Ulat the 
cllild calmot understand , and techniques designed to harass and intimidate a young child . " 
The skilled interviewer'S role would start with ule initial investigative interview. He would meet the child and 
conduct the initial interview, which would be videotaped and later admitted at court. At the trial , the interviewer 
will sit with the child in the other room which has been linked to ule court via closed-circuit television. He will lead 
the child 's evidence himself and examine any discrepancies or confusions that may arise from the evidence. It will 
be his functi on to ensure that ule child's evidence be placed before dIe court in ule most accurate fonn possible. 
In addition, the child will already have been met and interviewed by this person before so ulis should contribute 
to a reduction in stress. The child will also be interviewed in a developmentally appropriate maImer, which should 
eliminate the fear and stress created by cross-examination. This interview will be viewed by the accused, his 
representative and dIe court, UlUS introducing an element of the accusatorial system. This will enable ule court to 
watch the interview and object if dIe interviewer perhaps asks a leading question or acts in an inappropriate manner. 
In this way ule accusatorial 'day in court' is still preserved and the child is not deprived of making a contribution 
at the trial while at ule sanle time the accused's rights are also protected in that he can watch the demeanour of ule 
child while ule latter is testifying and can also hear the way in which the child is being interviewed. The interviewer 
would have to be linked to dIe courtroom by means of earphones in the event that the court may wish to 
conmlUnicate widl we child or interviewer. When the interviewer has placed the chi ld's evidence before dIe court. 
the defence and the court will be afforded an opportunity to raise any matters that have not been covered in the 
evidence or which may have appeared inconsistent. This must not be viewed as an opportunity to cross-examine 
the c1lild , and the coun will have to guard against this danger. It will only be an opportunity to raise any matters 
that have not been covered or which have created confusion. The interviewer will ulen exanline ule child furuler 
on these aspects. By the term 'examine' is meant dIe placing of evidence before the court and questioning the child 
in detail about any aspects of the case which appear inconsistent. If, at the end of ule interview, the child is unable 
to provide an aCcoWlt of events or provides an inconsistent account, then the court will take this into account when 
weighing up the evidence. By implication the defence will not be able to put their version to the child, but it has 
already been shown dlat children do not understand the purpose of this technique and young children especially are 
not able to place themselves in a position where they can view matters from another perspective . 
This proposal of interviewing the child combines aspects of bodl ule accusatorial and ule inquisitorial model. The 
exanlining of the evidence is done by one person, in much the same way as is done by the examining magistrate 
in inquisitorial systems. However, aspects of dIe accusatorial system have been assimilated, nanlely affording the 
defence on opportunity to view the child and hear while the child is giving evidence, and to put further matters to 
the interviewer. In addition, this proposal requires a professionally trained person to interview dle child, since ulis 
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was one of dIe problems experienced in inquisitorial systems supra, namely that examining magistrates were not 
trained in the intricacies of child interviewing. 
This proposal has certain implications. It is essential that the interviewer be professionally trained to conduct an 
investigative interview with children. This proposal requires the creation of a specialist who will interface between 
law and psychology and fonn a link between the two disciplines. This training will include knowledge of 
developmental psychology so that the interviewer will be able to assess the developmentalleve! of the child he is 
interviewing and interview accordingly. In addition, the training must also focus on the psychology of abuse so 
the interviewer has a knowledge of how victims of abuse react i.e. non-disclosure, recantation etc. Thorough 
training will be required with respect to d,e acquisition of language by children so that age-appropriate questioning 
techniques can be employed. An essential component of this training would include aspects of procedure in court. 
The interviewer would require a basic knowledge of criminal law and procedure so that he knows what infonnation 
needs to be elicited from the child i.e. that in the crime of rape , for instance, it is necessary to prove dlat 
penetration took place. The interviewer will need to know this so that when he interviews the child, he will focus 
on certain details that are relevant. Rules of procedure are also important since he will have to understand the rules 
relevant to investigative interviews. Practical training will also be essential and the interviewer will have to have 
experience in interviewing children. Harvey and Daun (1993:9) suggest that in order to conduct an interview with 
a child, an interviewer should llave a knowledge of child development, children and communication, child memory 
and suggestibility , children and sexuality and the psychology of victimisation. They need a thorough knowledge of 
investigative interviewing procedures as well as the law relating to child witnesses and certain aspects of substantive 
law, sucb as the elements of offences, for instance. In practice, universities would be able to introduce a Masters 
Degree programme which would amount to an interface between law and psychology. A similar progranlme has 
been introduced by the Open University in dIe United Kingdom. 
Two further points need to be noted at this stage. If the child witness is viewed in an ecological perspective, tben 
il becomes clear that the child requires preparation for the court process so that he will understand what his role 
is, why he is being interviewed, the implication of tell ing dIe truth etc. Also, judicial officers need to undergo 
training so dlat they have an understanding of certain aspects of the child witness and can understand why and how 
dIe investigative interview is to be conducted. These two aspects will be returned to. 
This proposal will have an effect on s170A and sl58 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1977 . It has already been 
proposed that s170A should provide that all children under the age of eighteen automatically be allowed to give 
evidence via closed-circuit television. Since research has shown dlat children per se have great difficulty in 
understanding court language, the use of an internlediary for chi ldren below a certain age would also appear 
necessary. If all children have difficulty with court language, it does not make sense to require that undue mental 
stress or suffering must be proved. In order to obtain an accurate account of events from a child witness it is 
essential that the child understands what is required of him. It is, therefore, proposed that an intelmediary be 
appointed in all cases where a child witness is twelve years or younger The intennediary would be the skilled 
interviewer referred to above. To avoid confusion, I shall refer to dlis person as dIe child expert. This will be 
an automatic procedure and will not involve an exercise of discretion by dIe court. However, in the case of children 
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aged thineen and older the coun will have a discretion to appoint a child expert if U,ere is evidence that Ule child 
may have difficulty in comprehending questions. This discretion is important, because there may be a d,ineen or 
even fourteen year old witness, for instance, who is a special needs child and will have difficulty wiul 
comprehension. The standard employed must not be so high and so rigid that in practice it tends to exclude its use. 
A commonsense approach needs to be adopted. If a child is going to have difficulty understanding a question, Ulen 
justice demands that a method be adopted which will enable the child to understand what is being asked. 
In addition, the section will have to set out that the examination of the witness will be conducted by the child expert 
himself, that the court may intervene where necessary, and that the defence may have an opportunity to raise any 
issues wiU, the court that may appear to be unclear from the evidence. The section should also set out the training 
and or qualifications that a person would have to have in order to qualify as a child expert. This qualification can 
be standardized by the Minister of Justice in liaison with universities in much ule same way as has happened widl 
regard to interpreters. The Institute of Interpreters offers a qualification ulrough various partiCipating universities 
to interpreters. The course content of this qualification would have to include ule subjects listed supra. The status 
of the child expert should be changed from that of an interpreter to more of an expen who can assist the court by 
eliciting an accurate account from a child using scientifically approved methods. 
It is for the above reasons that it is strongly recommended that sl58 not be used for child witnesses since it will 
deprive them of the assistance of such a child expert. AltllDugh it may provide the same result for witnesses aged 
sixteen or seventeen perhaps who do not require the assistance of a child expert, the resultant confusion would best 
be eliminated by insisting that s l70A be used for all witnesses under dle age of eighteen and s l58 apply to witnesses 
aged eighteen and older. 
II is envisioned that ule child expert be attached to the Ministry of lustice on a full-time pemlanent capacity. By 
creating such an office , Ule Ministry will enable the child expert to become experienced at the task he is to perfono. 
One of ule deficiencies of the present system is that , because intenoediaries are only appointed for a particular trial 
and from such a vast array of persons, there is very little opportunity for them to specialise in the skill of 
interviewing children. The creation of an office of the child expert would promote specialisation. Oates (1990: 133) 
argues that this specialisation has become necessary. 
"It may be that the time has come for the development of a speciality in child law where ulDse 
undertaking ulis speciality have some training in developmental psychology, child development, 
and experience in interviewing children." 
It would also enable these proposals to be carried out as effectively as possible. When the police receive a complaint 
where a child may be a potential witness, they would contact the child expert who would visit the child , introduce 
himself and arrange for the initial interview to videotaped. The arranging of pretrial preparation of ule child would 
remain Ule responsibility of Ulis expert. The prosecution would contact the child expert with details of Ule trial. Al 
Ule trial this person would lead Ule child 's evidence. It will not be possible for Ulis system to work on ad hoc 
appointments because there will be untold confusion in trying to discover which expert conducted the initial 
interview and whether Ulat person was available again at Ule trial. Although it is not essential for the same child 
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expert to conduct the initial interview and the trial interview, it has already been argued that this would be to the 
advantage of tile child. The child expert will have an opportunity to gain the child 's confidence and this will 
decrease a great deal of the unfamiliarity of the situation for the child. 
Initially , in the discussion of an ecological approach it was suggested that the more links that can be created between 
the different nticrosystems, tile better the position for the child will be. The position will therefore be strengthened 
by allowing the child expert to form a link between the microsystem comprising dle child and his family and tile 
microsystem of the court . 
As far as manpower is concerned, a centre the size of Port Elizabedl would require at mOSt the services of two such 
experts, and their responsibili ties would extend to smaller surrounding towns and villages. Larger centres, such as 
Cape Town and Joballllesburg would require more such posts to be made available, but the implications are not 
overwhelming. The availability of these persons would free already overladen police and social workers. 
7.5.4 Conclusion 
Cross-examination is seen as the most crucial time in court for the child witness, especially where the witness is 
a victim of abuse. The purpose of cross-examination is to attack the credibility of tile child witness by displaying 
inconsistencies and to discover any evidence that might assist in proving the accused's innocence in a context within 
which all the details of the case are examined microscopically. In order to achieve this purpose, certain language 
devices are used with very few modifications being made to the fornlat or language of cross-exanlination when the 
witness is a chi ld. In fact, dlis is set out clearly by Brennan and Brellllan (1988:61 ) as follows: 
"Questions of linguistic appropriateness, comprehensibili ty and concern for the psychology of dIe 
child witness are peripheral at best, and totally exploited at worst. The language format of cross-
exanunation has a linguistic life of its own, independent of the age or status of dle witness." 
Research relating to child witnesses bas focused a great deal of emphasis on the rights of the accused in dle criminal 
justice process. With the introduction of s28 of the Constitution Act 108 of 1996 it is necessary also to take 
cognisance of a child 's rights as set out in the section. It is, therefore, necessary to balance tllese rights when 
evaluating cross-exanlination. The accused's rights to employ techniques of cross-examination must be weighed up 
against the linguistic rights of the child witness. A mismatch between the language of the court and the language 
understandable to the child does, according to Brennan and Brellllan (1988:61) , very little to preserve tile rights of 
children or to arrive at the ultimate truth . It is essential , therefore, to modify the system to assist tile child in 
providing the court with an accurate account as well as to ensure tI,at tile accused is accorded a fair trial. 
Modifications need to be based on scientific research, and it is for this reason that it is proposed that a professional 
interviewer conduct tile exanlination of the child at the trial while the defence is afforded an OPPOrtUluty to view 
the interview and object, where necessary. 
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7.6 Rules of Evidence 
One of the aspects of the accusatorial system which also presents a hindrance in the prosecution of cases where a 
child is the witness is the proliferation of technical rules of evidence. Although the elaborate rules of evidence have 
been linked to the presence of juries, they nevertheless remain part of rules of procedure despite the fact that 
presiding officers are now professionally trained. Since the emphasis is placed on the admissibility of evidence, 
strict rules are employed to exclude certain types of evidence rather than to admit all evidence and assess the weight 
to be attributed, as is done in inquisitorial systems. The rules of evidence which are of particular relevance to child 
witnesses have already been evaluated in detail. All that remains to be done is to summarise the main cri ticisms 
and the proposals which have been suggested. 
7.6.1 The Competency Rule 
The ecological perspective adopted in this study focused on children as sources of information. It is, tberefore, 
essential to focus not only on the social and physical context in whicb the child has to provide information but also 
on the child 's capabilities. The rules relating to competency in various jurisdictions were investigated and then 
available researcb relating to the developmental psychology and memory of cbildren was evaluated . It is now 
necessary to determine whether tbe legal rules of competency are based on modern scientific principles. 
The competency of the child witness relates to tlle child's ability to differentiate the truth from a lie and the ability 
to understand the duty to tell tlle truth and the consequences of not doing so (Benedek and Schetky 1986: 1225). To 
determine the above it is necessary to discover whether tlle child has adequate cognitive skills to comprehend the 
events he has witnessed and be able to communicate his memories of the event in response to questions (Melton 
1981:75). TIle test of a child 's competency, therefore, involves four fundamental issues : firstly, the child must have 
the mental capacity at the time of the occurrence to observe and register the event; secondly, the child must possess 
memory which will be sufficient to enable him to retain an independent recollection of the observations made; 
thirdly, tbe child must have tlle capacity to translate the memory of these observations into words; and , fourthl y, 
the child must possess sufficient intelligence to understand the obligation to tell the truth (Stafford 1962:3 13). 
Therefore, to assess a child's competency to testify, an assessment will bave to be made of the child 's moral, 
cognitive and emotional capacities to give evidence (Melton 1981:75). 
In the United Kingdom the Pigot Committee were of the opinion that the competency requirement was only useful 
if it could be used to ascertain whetller a child was able to give a truthful and an accurate account in court , and they 
felt tllat tlle competency test in England did not acllieve this . The weigbt of modern research bas shown that children 
are no less accurate than other witnesses, and tbe Committee was, tllerefore, of the opinion tllat the courts should 
consider any relevant understandable evidence, and whether evidence was coherent or consistent was a factor to 
be taken into account when weighing up the evidence. Consequently tlle Pigot Committee proposed that tlle 
competency requirement applying to children be dispensed with completely (Home Office 1989:48-9) TIlis proposal 
culminated in S52 of the Criminal Justice Act 1991 which insisted tllat all children under the age of fourteen give 
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their evidence unsworn, thus dispensing Witil the need for an inquiry into whether tile child understands the oatil. 
It also repealed s38(1) of tile Children and Young Persons Act 1933, which means that the judge no longer has to 
be satisfied that the child has sufficient intelligence to give evidence and understands the duty to speak the truth 
before he can allow the child to give evidence. Children , therefore, are in the same position as adults. They no 
longer have to undergo a competency ex.amination, but if at any stage the court becomes aware that the witness 
cannot communicate intelligibly, then a competency examination will become necessary. 
The position in tile United States of America is governed by Federal Rule 601 which provides that every person 
is competent to be a witness. The intention of the legislative drafters was, according to Myers (1987 : 63), to remove 
the emphasis on competency as a prerequisite for giving evidence. Commentators on Rule 601 have suggested that 
the Rule was designed "to curtail tile need for preliminary inquiry into witness competency" so that tile jury simply 
have to evaluate the evidence in ternlS of its weight and credibility. This Rule does not mean that the court will nOt 
decide issues of competency. It presumes witnesses to be competent so the traditional preliminary examination into 
competency is no longer required. However, if at any stage of tile trial a witness would appear to be incompetent, 
then tile court still has the discretion to hold an inquiry (Myers 1987:65). 
In West Genuany and France children under the age of sixteen give unsworn evidence. They may not take the oatil 
and in this way the distinction, and consequent confusion, between sworn and unsworn evidence is eliminated . In 
Norway, as well , there is no specific competency requirement. In each case it wi ll have to be deternlined whether 
the child has sufficient understanding and ability to express himself (Andenaes 1990: 12). 
7.6.1.1 Criticisms of the Competency Rule in South Africa 
In SOUtil Africa the competency of witnesses is governed by sl92 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1977 which 
provides tllat a witness is presumed to be competent and compellable to give evidence in criminal proceedings 
subject to any other exclusions. Since s162(1) provides that every witness must give evidence under oath the court 
will have to deternline whetller a child understands the nature of the oath. If not, the court may proceed in tenns 
of s164 which enables a witness, who does not understand the nature of tile oath , to be warned to speak the trutll. 
It will then have to be detennined whetiler tile child understands the nature of the warning. 
In South Africa competency examination of children remains, despite the fact that it has been dispensed with in 
most otller jurisdictions. In evaluating the competency examination earlier, the fo llowing criticisms were 
highlighted. It was argued that the competency examination did not test the real basis of competency , namely the 
child 's ability to observe , remember and conmmnicate. The examination was aimed at only one aspect, namely the 
ability to distinguish between truth and lies. 
The second criticism related to tile maImer in which the competency examination is conducted. Competency 
exruninations were extracted from various cases to highlight the cursory manner in which they were conducted. 
Statements were put to the children witllout attempting to frame tllem in a way understandable to the child and 
abstract concepts were used without explaining tllem. In S v T supra, for instance, a five year old child was told 
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to speak the truth ("waarheid"), without an indication of what this meant. Often the courts have simply asked the 
child whether the child knows what it means to tell the truth and the latter replied in the affirmative. This was 
accepted without any examination being conducted to determine whether the child actually understood the concept. 
Other competency examinations did not refer to the concepts of truth and lies at all , and the children were simply 
asked how old they were and what school they went to. 
Thirdly , the language employed in the competency examination does not attempt to reach the linguistic ability of 
the child. If the competency examination is to be effective, children must be questioned in an age-appropriate 
manner so that they are able to understand the content of the questions. 
A further criticism levelled at the competency exanlination is that it focuses on whether the child understands dIe 
distinction between truth and lies, but this is no guarantee that the child will in fact be trudlful. The latter is a moral 
concept i.e. is there a consciousness of dIe duty to speak the truth (Woji v Santam Insurance Co Ltd 1981(1) SA 
102 1 (A) at 1028D). The present competency exanlination does not address tltis issue and since, according to 
Melton (1981:79), a child 's behaviour is influenced primarily by the rewards, punishments and models available 
in a given situation, dIe gravity of speaking dIe truth will have to be impressed upon the child. 
Hoffmann and Zeffert (1988:376) have argued dlat the distinction between sworn and unsworn evidence has lost 
much of its importance, and this leads to d1e next criticism. The distinction between sworn and unsworn evidence 
creates the perception tllat a child who is capable of understanding the oath will be developmentally more advanced 
(and therefore a better witness) than a child who does not understand wllat it means to give evidence under oadl. 
Examples of where tlle court accepted such perceptions were quoted earlier. All that needs to be repeated here is 
the fact dlat dIe perception created ntay not necessarily be true, as was pointed out in R v Manda supra where 
Schreiner JA at 1633 explained that a child may not be able to understand what is meant by the oath , but may 
nevertheless "appear to the court to be more dian ordinarily intelligent, observant and honest". 
This raises dIe question of how a presiding officer makes a decision as to whedler a child will give sworn or 
unsworn evidence. The competency examinations conducted in S v CiLliers earlier illustrate dlis problem. The two 
boys, aged eight, were asked the sanle questions (and even more) dIan the eleven year old . All the answers were 
correct yet the eight year olds were warned to tell the truth while the eleven year old was allowed to take dIe oath. 
The final criticism relates to the fact that dIe competency rule has not kept pace with the scientific research 
available. These findings were summarised earlier and only dIe conclusions need to be repeated. Competency 
involves aspects of cognitive, moral and language development as well as a child 's ability to remember. In addition, 
a child 's competency is affected by the perceptions which the child has of the court process. 
Research has shown tllat children as young as three are capable of giving accurate evidence (Jones and Krugman 
1986:253). Children pass dlroUgh stages in their cognitive, moral and language development, and an understanding 
of dlese stages enables children to be questioned in a developmentally appropriate manner. Research studies have 
also shown that storage capacity, insofar as meDlory is concerned, does not change greatly wi th age. Once 
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information has been successfully stored in memory, a preschooler will probably remember it as well as an adult 
(Werner and Perlmutter 1979: 56). What is important, however, is bow to retrieve this memory. Interviewing a child 
is a very specialised skill and certain techniques can affect memory. It was for this reason Ulat it has been proposed 
that a skilled interviewer conduct the entire examination of children. The conclusion that was reached from Ule 
evaluation of recent research was that the present laws relating to children's competency and credibility are based 
on questionable assumptions and standards from the past and need to be re-evaluated in the light of recent research. 
7,6,1.2 Recommendations 
As a general rule, children possess most of the characteristics necessary to serve as competent witnesses. They have 
the capacity to observe, are intelligent, are able to remember, can distingnish between fact and fantasy and are able 
to appreciate the duty to speak the truth. What remains a hurdle for the child is the ability to communicate in an 
adversarial environment (Perry and Wrightsman 1991: 195). The effect of conlllUlucation in this enviromnem is 
explained by Brennan (1994:53): 
"In a combative arena where the fornlat for questions is determined by the questioner, who is also 
the more sophisticated and skilled language user, inequalities in language usage and expertise must 
confer lower status on the respondent. Any confused responses given by the child , the inevitable 
tearful and emotional breakdowns, and any exanlples of conflicting infornlation offered, all 
confirm the child 's lack of credibility within the corporate mind of the court .. . the fact remains 
that the credibility of the child witness is systematically destroyed by a combination of language 
devices and questiOIung styles. " 
If a child is offered an envirollllent which is non-uneatening in which to tell his story; if a child is questioned in 
a developmentally appropriate manner using proven scientific methods (i .e. avoiding repeated and leading 
questioning to minimise suggestion); and if a child is questioned using linguistically appropliate language, tllen a 
child will be a competent witness and as accurate, if not more so, tllan an adult. This again highlights the 
importance of adopti ng an ecological approach. Competency carIllot be evaluated in isolation si nce it relates to all 
otller aspects of the trial. As explained by CasllrDore (1991: 193), the competence of children to interact with the 
legal system is a function of the competence of tJlOse dealing wi th dlem within that system. 
It is, therefore, proposed that, in line with the approach adopted in other countries, dle distinction between sworn 
and unsworn evidence must be dispensed with for children since it does not serve any valid purpose. This must be 
done, as in the UK and the USA, by the introduction of a statutory provision which provides that all children under 
a particular age must give unsworn evidence. This wi ll have the effect of removing the perception that children who 
give sworn evidence are better than tllOse who do not. In addition, it will eliminate the competency examination 
to deternune whether a child understands the llature of the oath or not. With respect to the age of the child to which 
tllis provision will apply, in the UK children under fourteen give unsworn evidence while in inquisitorial countries 
tlus has been eXiended to children under the age of six teen. It is submitted that the competency of a child to give 
evidence is very much dependent on the way in which commUIucation Witll dle child takes place. Therefore, if a 
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child is going to need a child expen, it is suggested that that child give unsworn evidence . Since it has already been 
proposed that all children aged twelve and younger automatically be examined by a child expert, it is submitted that 
all children under the age of thirteen give unsworn evidence. 
The introduction of a provision such as the one suggested may still give rise to a competency examination. The 
court will dlen hold an exanlination to detennine whether a child understands the difference between dIe truth and 
a lie before warning the child to give unsworn evidence. To prevent dlis situation from arising the above suggested 
statutory proposals should also contain a section expressly stating that sl92 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1977 also 
applies to children, in that cllildren are also presumed to be competent unless the contrary is proven. This will mean 
that a child who appears in court will be assumed to be competent and will be warned to speak dIe truth in a 
developmentally appropriate marUler If, in the course of the child's evidence, it becomes clear that the child is 
incompetent, then the child will be treated like any other witness who becomes incompetent in dIe course of a trial. 
Any inconsistency on the part of dIe child will relate to credibility and will be taken into account when assessing 
what weight is to be accorded to the child 's evidence. 
Competency examinations will still arise where, for instance, it becomes clear in the course of giving evidence that 
a child cannot remember or cannot communicate. The presiding officer will then have to conduct a competency 
examination. It is suggested dlat presiding officers receive sufficient training to conduct competency examinations 
that are meaningful and based on scientific principles rather than cursory questions that have very little, if any , 
relevance to competency. The Law Refonn COImnission of Victoria (1988:94) recommended a competency test, 
for installce, for witnesses of any age which provided that a witness would be competent to give evidence if he of 
she understood that he or she was under an obligation to tell the truth and could give a rational reply to questions 
about the facts in issue. 
In addition, it is also proposed that child witnesses who have to go to court undergo pre-trial preparation so that 
they can be assisted in understanding dIe distinction between truth and lies and so that dIe duty to speak dIe truth 
can be impressed upon dIem. 
7.6.2 The Cautionary Rule and Credibility 
Traditionally children have been regarded as untrustwordlY or unreliable witnesses and a rule of practice arose 
which developed into a rule of law and required that the coun had to warn itself of the dangers involved in 
accepting a child's evidence. In some jurisdictions corroboration was automatically required while, in others, 
corroboration was only necessary if the court was not satisfied with the witness's evidence after it had warned itself 
of dIe dangers involved in the evidence of a child . This rule of practice, known as the cautionary rule, applied not 
Oldy to children but also to complainants in sexual cases. The dangers involved in a child 's evidence can roughly 
be divided into three main criticisms: children tell lies; children camlot distinguish between fact and fantasy; and 
children are highly suggestible. 
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As a result of the criticisms which were levelled against the duty to warn, these warnings were either modified or 
completely abandoned in other jurisdictions. The rules relating to corroboration were abolished in the USA in tile 
1970s and Australia abolished them in the 1930s. New Zealand has prohibited judges from giving warnings, as has 
the state of Victoria in Australia. In 1987 tile Canadian Criminal Code abolished the corroboration requirement 
relating to children and forbade any warning to be given (Spencer and Ain 1993:214). 
In the United Kingdom the Pigot Committee reconnnended that the corroboration requirement and tile wanting be 
abolished since "[e]xisting safeguards wltich apply in all criminal cases are ." sufficient". They felt that any 
additional rules relating to this particular class of persons were "neither necessary nor desirable" (Home Office 
1989:57). On the basis of tilese recommendations, s34 of tile Criminal Justice Act 1988 was introduced which 
abolished the common law rule that a judge must warn about the danger of acting on the evidence of children, 
whetiler sworn or unsworn. Section 34(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 provides: 
"Any requirement whereby at a trial on indictment it is obligatory for the court to give the jury 
a warning about convicting tile accused on the uncorroborated evidence of a child is abrogated 
in relation to cases where such a warning is required by reason only that the evidence is the 
evidence of a child. " 
For a time the cautionary rule was still applicable to children insofar as they were complainants in sexual cases, 
but in ternlS of s32 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act of 1994, which came into force on 3 February 
1995, the wanting in sexual offences has also been abolished. 
7.6.2.1 The SA Position: Children and the Cautionary Rule 
In South Africa the dangers inherent in a child 's evidence were summarised in S v S supra as follows: a child 's 
memory is unreliable; children are egocentric; children are suggestible; children have difficulty in distinguishing 
fact from fantasy, and complaints of rape are fundamentally suspect. 
Having evaluated the available research findings on children'S ability to testify, it becomes clear that tile cautionary 
rule is another instance where the courts are operating on premises that have long been discounted by scientific 
findings . Modern findings on the suggestibility of children have discovered that young cltildren are suggestible but 
no more so than adults. Children were found to be as accurate witnesses as adults, sometimes even more so. 
However, tiley were found to be susceptible to suggestion when interviewed using suggestive techniques. The same 
findings were found with adults too. There is no scientific evidence to support tile belief tilat children are per se 
more suggestible than adults. It was for tilis reason that it was proposed that a skilled interviewer (a child expert) 
exanline a child 's evidence to ensure that suggestive techniques are not employed in tile examining of the evidence. 
The factors giving rise to suggestion were discussed in detail supra. 
As far as distinguishing fact from fantasy is concerned, it is rare for children to imagine tilat they have been 
physically or sexually abused, unless children suffer from paranoid or marnc psychosis, but even in these instances 
it is rare for children to have delusions of sexual abuse (Nurcombe 1986:476). Rather, children are vulnerable to 
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suggestion and this could give rise to false memories, as in the case where children undergo certain types of ulerapy 
or are interviewed using suggestive means. Ceci and Bruck (J 995: 225) point out that adults also display similar 
memory problems in these situations and they discuss available research on adults which indicates that adults LOa 
can come 10 believe fal se memories. 
As far as lies are concerned , children and adul ts both tell lies , and there is no available evidence LO support the 
belief that children are more prone to lie Ulan adults. Many experts believe that it is much easier to detect lies in 
young children Ulan older children or adults and , according to Feldman and White (1980: 128), utis would account 
for the belief tbat they lie more frequently. It would , therefore , seem that the basis upon which the courtS regard 
the evidence of a child with suspicion does not accord with modem scientific findings. Recent research, accepted 
by the court in S v S supra, has concluded that children are no less credible than adults insofar as suggestibility, 
memory and the distinction between fact and fantasy is concerned (Hammond and Hannuond 1987: 3) . 
The cautionary rule relating to cltildren was criticised in great depul earlier when evaluating the South African 
position. These criticisms will be briefly summari sed here for the sake of completeness . The standard employed 
in the case of children makes it almost impossible to convict where the only witnesses are children. The courts do 
not simply warn themselves of the dangers and determine whether any are applicable to Ule case before them, rather 
they raise ule standard employed in the case of children, requiring almost that a child needs LO be a perfect witness. 
Although corroboration is not essential , the fact that tlle evidence of children is to be viewed as suspicious results 
in corroboration becoming necessary in every case. 
A further criticism levelled against the wanting is the fac t that the courts scrutinise every child witness for possible 
dangers wiUlOut a basis being presented for so doing. AltllOugh a court is not supposed to hypothesise as to probable 
causes without an evidentiary basis being laid, Ule courts nevertheless do so when applying the cautionary rule. 
In fact, other than ensuring that the evidence of children is treated with suspicion, these principles do not assist in 
any way in evaluating ule reliability of this type of evidence. There is no scientific basis in terms of which evidence 
can be evaluated , and this task is left to ule discretion of individual judges, the opinions of whom differ vastly as 
to the reliability and accuracy of children's evidence. Since there is strong empirical research available that children 
are no more unreliable Ulan adults as witnesses, the South African Law Commission's (1989:34) vague belief in 
the cautionary rule as having been developed over many decades and having been founded on ule practical 
experience of legal professionals will have to be re-assessed. 
7.6.2.2 The SA Position: Complainants in Sexual Offences and the Cautionary Rule 
A detailed review of the cautionary rule relating to complainants in sexual cases was made supra and a number of 
criticisms were levelled at the rule. These criticisms will be sunnnarised here for the sake of completeness. 
The motivation and basis for the cautionary rule appears to be ulfeefold: charges of a sexual nature are easily laid ; 
there are a multiplicity of motives; and charges of ulis nature are difficult to disprove (Olckers 1992: 427). There 
is no empirical data to support uJe contention that in cases of ulis nature more false charges are laid than in any 
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otber type of crime. In fact, according to Frank J in S v D supra tbe available evidence indicates dIe contrary . 
Empirical studies indicate tbat dlese cases are under-reported and that the incidence of fal se reports in cases of rape 
was 2 % - exactly dIe same as dlat for other crimes. 
Different motives may exist for laying fal se charges, but this would apply to any offence and not only to cases of 
sexual assault. In fact, Frank J in S v D supra was of dIe opinion that dIe existence of such hidden motives 
depended upon tbe fertility of dIe presiding officer's imagination (5I6D). It would also be unfair to say these are 
cases tbat are difficult to disprove, since dlere is no onus on dIe accusec! to disprove. The onus is on dIe State to 
prove and tbis is almost impossible where tbe only witness is the complainant. As in the case of children, the 
standard employed in evaluating dIe evidence of a witness in a sexual case is higher tban that used for other 
witnesses, as was emphasised in S v F supra. This difference in standards was also referred to in S v D supra where 
Frank J, in applying the cautionary rule in a rape case, added that: 
.. Had dIe charge against dIe appellant been, for instance one of dleft, requiring no more dlan dIe 
ordinary high but not exceptional standard of careful scrutiny ... tbe verdict of guilty must have 
stood." (5ISA) 
Finally, dlis rule has been criticised as discriminating against the victim and implies dJat the evidence of women 
must automatically be approached with suspicion (HoffuJalID and Zefferu 1988:579). In S v D supra tbe court 
severely criticised tbe use of dIe cautionary rule in sexual offences, holding that it served no purpose other than 
to discriminate against female complainants and was tberefore contrary to the Namibian Constitution (5 16F-G). 
7.6.2.3 Recommendations 
Other jurisdictions, including the UK and dIe USA , have dispensed with the cautionary rule in relation to children 
and complainants of sexual offences since it has no rational basis and is not supported by any empirical evidence. 
In South Africa a number of cases have urged that a common sense approach to dIe cautionary rule be adopted, 
but dlis has proved difficult in practice because it has been left up to the discretion of individual judges. It is 
submitted dlat the ordinary onus of proof employed in criminal cases is sufficient securi ty against wrongful 
convictions. Labuschagne (1992: 136) argues that the fact that the court needs to prove a conviction beyond 
reasonable doubt means that there is no need for dIe cautionary rule. The ordinary onus affords adequate protection 
for tile accused, and the case of S v D supra offers an excellent example of how this would work in practice. The 
nature and circumstances of each case mUSt be considered, including whether the child or tile complainant is a single 
witness or whether there is evidence before the court which may suggest the child is fantasising or the complainant 
has a motive for laying a false charge. However, tile final test must be tile sanle whether the crime is one of theft 
or rape. 
It is therefore proposed, along the lines of the approach adopted in dIe UK, that a statutory provision be enacted 
which would abolish tile cautionary rule applicable to child witnesses and complainants in sexual offences. This 
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would also be in accordance with tbe Constitution Act 108 of 1996, section 28 of which has placed a positive duty 
on the state to protect children from abuse and neglect and ensure that their best interests are paramount. It will 
also eliminate any discrimination with respect to complainants in sexual cases . 
It would however, appear from the cases that the perception of children as being unsatisfactory witnesses is so 
ingrained that when a child does give a detailed account of events this in itself is regarded as highly suspicious, 
as happened in R v J 1958 (3) SA 699 (SR). It will be of no assistance if the legislature were to introduce a 
statutOry provision abolishing the cautionary rule and legal personnel continued to hold the same perception of 
children as unreliable witnesses. A statutory imlovation will not change the perceptions of people and for that 
reason it is strongly urged that court personnel receive training with regard to scientific research on children's 
evidence and capabilities. 
7.6.3 The Hearsay Rule 
A detailed analysis of the hearsay rule was attempted supra at 5.7. in ten1lS of which s3 of the Law of Evidence 
Amendment Act 45 of 1988 was studied with reference to case law. The approach of the courts to the admission 
of bearsay in terms of this section was highlighted, and its effect on the hearsay statements of child witnesses was 
evaluated. 
The above analysis was sufficiently detailed that no purpose would be achieved by repeating the details here. All 
that remains to be done is to provide a brief sUllunary of the proposals that were forwarded. Although a strong 
argument was made out for the reception of the hearsay statements in tenus of the discretion given to the presiding 
officer by s3(1)(c) of the above act, it was felt that the matter would still remain in the discretion of the court and 
courts may be very wary to admit bearsay statements emanating from cllildren, due to issues of competency and 
the cautionary rule. 
Additional statutory provisions admitting tile hearsay statements of children in certain circumstances was also not 
thought to be acceptable , since this would result in a situation very similar to that created by s3 (1)(c) supra in 
teruls of which the presiding office would have to exercise a discretion again. Instead, it was proposed tilat all that 
was needed was a conunon sense approach. In order to convict an alleged perpetrator in a criminal case, the 
accused's guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. To detemline whether the guilt has been proved beyond 
a reasonable doubt, the court evaluates the evidence that has been placed before it. If tile evidence is unreliable, 
the court will be unable to convict. In order to detenuine whether guilt has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, 
all relevant evidence should be placed before the court. The court, in evaluating the evidence, will accord tbe 
necessary weight to the evidence. Obviously, in assigning the weight to be attributed to tile hearsay evidence of a 
child, the court would look at the source of the evidence, the age of the cbild , his possible competence, wby he is 
llot giving evidence etc. 
My submission, therefore, is tilat all bearsay statements emanating from child victims should be admissible. This 
is the position in other inquisitorial countries, and it has not been alleged tilat accused are wrongfully convicted in 
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this system as opposed to the accusatorial systems. The ordinary rules of evidence would apply. The evidence 
would have to be relevant in order to be admissible. The mere fact that the evidence will be admissible does not 
mean that the accused will automatically be convicted. There will have to be evidence before the court which 
proves the accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The fact that evidence is hearsay is a factor which should 
go to weight and not to admissibi lity. 
The problem, however, is that the rules relating to hearsay statements need to be reassessed on a holistic basis. 
The introduction of a special statutory provision requiring Ule hearsay statements of child witnesses to be admissible 
may create the impression that these hearsay statements carry more weight than oUler hearsay statements. The 
recommendations here apply to the hearsay rule in general and it is proposed that the law relating to hearsay be 
revised and a common sense approach be adopted. Relevant evidence ought to be admissible. The fact that evidence 
amounts to hearsay is a factor which will affect Ule weight to be attributed to that evidence and not its admissibility. 
In tile meantime, however, magistrates and judges should be urged to admit the hearsay statements of children in 
terms of s3 (I)(c) where this is applicable for the reasons argued earlier. 
If a wholesale re-evaluation of the law relating to hearsay is not possible, then a statutory exception would have 
to be introduced, declaring the hearsay statements emanating from children to be admissible and that the hearsay 
element of these statements would go to weight and not admissibility. 
7.7. The Preparation of Children 
Research findings on the perceptions of children have highlighted the need to prepare children for an appearance 
in court to enable them to give evidence effectively. Personality research and tileory strongly suggest that child 
witnesses will find the legal process to be less stressful and their performance as witnesses will be improved if they 
are prepared sufficiently for the experience (Melton and Thompson 1987:219). 
A number of studies referred to earlier found Ulat the majority of children who testified in court experienced stress 
as a result of their participation in the process. The reasons given by tile children for these negative emotions 
included, amongst the more obvious fears such as confrontation and retribution, anxiety due to a lack of information 
while waiting to go to court, not being warned about delays or that Ule accused's family and friends would be in 
the waiting room and not understanding why certain questions were asked in tile course of cross-examination (Sattar 
and Bull 1995: 1-2). Children may not understand the purpose of the trial , the decision-making process involved, 
and Ule functions of the professionals. They may misunderstand the reason for their court involvement, believing 
that the aim of the trial is to find out who's guilty - the accused or themselves (Cashmore 1991:194-5). Saywitz 
and Nathanson (1993:620), in their study on cbildren's perceptions of stress, concluded that certain characteristics 
of tile court environment do interfere with a child's evidence and increase tile stress experienced by Ulem. They 
suggested tilat Ule results of their study highlighted the need to develop innovative methods for preparing children 
for their court appearance. Christiansen (1987: 707) is also of tile opinion that one of tile solutions to problems 
associated with child witnesses is the introduction of preparation procedures which will acquaint the child with the 
environment and the purpose of the trial. 
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7.7.1 Pre-trial Preparation 
Pre-court preparation progranunes aim to demystify the courtroom through education and thereby address and 
reduce fears. The purpose of these progranmles is to reduce the stress whicb the child experiences by empowering 
the child. This will have Ole consequent result that the child will be able to testify more effectively at the trial 
(SaywiLZ 1996). The most fanlOus empowerment progranmle was conducted by Dezwirek-Sas (1992: 189) at the 
London Family Court Clinic in Ontario, Canada. The project ran for three years and included an empirical 
evaluation of the project 's outcome. It was found that providing children with a pre-court preparation prognurune 
led to children giving better evidence in court. Crown attorneys rated the behaviour of the prepared children as 
significantly superior to that of the controls. Also, providing children with stress reduction teChnique training 
enabled the children to develop better coping strategies when they experienced anxiety. Dezwirek-Sas and colleagues 
judged the project to have been an overall success. 
To be effective, a preparation prograrmne would have to include the following sessions, based on the prograrmnes 
used in Canada and summarised by Harvey and Daun (1993:78-105): 
Preparation for the Oath or Warning 
This will depend very much on the legal requirements dlat must be complied widl. In countries where a child will 
have to undergo a competency examination, children will have to be prepared for the oath. Where dlere is 110 
competency examination, the preparation will bave to focus on Ihe distinction between truth and lies and the 
importance of telling the truth . TIle topics that need to be covered would include dle following (Harvey and Daun 
1993:78-9): 
• die oadl; 
• what the Bible is; 
• what a promise is; 
• examples of promises; 
• what the truOI is; 
• what a lie is; 
• what the difference is between telling dle truth in the courtroom or somewhere else; 
• die type of questions the judge will ask. 
This section of the preparation can also assist in detemlining whedler the child is capable of giving evidence and 
has an understanding of the concepts necessary to do so. For exanlple, the child could be asked simple, factual 
questions to probe short-teml and long-teml memory capabilities. These questions would obviously be unrelated 
to the alleged incident the child is going to have to testify about (Perry and Wrightsman 1991 :254). 
Preparation re Parts of the Body 
Where the child must give evidence about a sexual offence, it is necessary to learn what nanles tbe child uses for 
body parts. Children may describe body parts with temlinology whicb is different from that which adults use. 
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Harvey and Daun (1993:83) offer the following example to illustrate the confusion that can arise: 
"During one investigative interview, a child complainant had stated that her faOler had put his penis into 
her 'bum '. Before the preliminary hearing , the Crown counsel discovered that the child called her vagina 
a ' bum '. TIle indictment had to be changed to delete the anal intercourse charge. Her mother had called 
the vagina Ole 'little bum' and the buttocks the 'big bum'." 
This is not to be regarded as an opportunity to instruct the child in the correct terminology to be used. Where the 
child uses a eupbemistic teml for a body part, this must not be corrected as it may give rise to allegations of 
coaching or suggestion. To avoid the latter allegation the child should be asked to give the names for all body parts 
without particular focus on the genitals. 
Preparation for Trial 
Children need to be told wbat will happen at tbe trial. The process needs to be explained to them in a malDler 
understandable to them. This can be done by means of role-playing, puppets or stories, always ensuring that the 
details of the child's own incident are not alluded to. The functions of Ole various role-players must also be 
explained to children. This would also include a visit to the courtroom so the child can be shown where he will sit 
and where the questions will come from . 
Preparation for Cross-examination 
The following topics must be discussed with child witnesses to prepare them for cross-examination (Harvey and 
Daun 1993:101): 
• Ole purpose of cross-examination; 
• when cross-exanlination will take place; 
• what foml it will take; 
• how the child migbt feel ; 
• what Ole child can do if those feelings arise; 
• what tbe child can or calmot do. 
Preparation of children re possible reactions 
Children bave common fears about testifying in court, which have been compiled by professionals who work with 
child witnesses. Preparing children for dealing with these fears can be done by asking children to list their fears 
of going to court and then working through these fears with Ole child. The following are some of Ole common fears 
Olat need to be addressed (Harvey and Daun 1993 : 103-3): 
• The child may cry on the witness stand. 
• The child may get mixed up and say something wrong. 
• The accused will give the child hateful looks. 
• The accused will be acquitted. 
• The child may laugh out of nervousness. 
• Untold secrets may be discovered. 
• People will find out. 
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• The child may not want to be responsible for tile accused going to jail. 
• The child may lose control. 
• The child may go to jail. 
In dealing with these fears, children need to be offered ways of dealing with these situations if they should arise. 
For instance, tile chi ld may be afraid he gets mixed up and says something wrong. It should then be explained to 
dIe child that he can admit to being confused or wrong etc. The legal process will be a little easier for children if 
dleir fears about it have been allayed in advance. 
Debriefing 
After tile child has given evidence, tile child will have to be debriefcd. The cb.ild will probably have questions about 
the trial or require an explanation of what took place. It would be appropriate at tilis stage to do sometiling with 
dIe child to reduce stress levels, such as giving the child a courage badge or certificate to colour in (Harvey and 
Daun 1993:57). 
The above is simply an example of the kind of preparation progranmles offered to children in Canada and the 
United States. Obviously any progranmle would have to be adapted to suit the situation in SaudI Africa and make 
it applicable to our courts and our children. 
7.7.2 Conclusion 
The need to prepare children for a courtroom appearance has been accepted by research and a number of tilese 
progranlilles are offered to child witnesses in the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada. In fact , there are 
already a few preparation progranmles being conducted on an ad hoc basis in South Africa by organisations such 
as Childline and by social workers. The danger of these progranmles, however, is that they are not standardised 
and there is no guarantee that suggestion has not taken place. These programmes are offered by people from a 
social science background and they would probably not have knowledge of legally inadmissible techniques tIlat are 
best avoided. 
It is proposed that all children who have to give evidence in a criminal trial take part in a pre-trial preparalion 
progranlille. It is furOl er proposed that this preparation progranlll1e be standardised so dlat dIe sanle progranmle 
can be offered at all centres and so that dangers of coaching and suggestion can be eliminated. It is furtiler 
suggested tIlat the progranlille be based within the Ministry of Justice so that the courts are seen to embrace the 
progranlille. 
It is important that preparation be distinguished from coaching to avoid the possibility or appearance of 
contamination (Saywitz and Snyder 1993 : 124). In addition, the preparation process must be fair to tile accused, 
which is why Christiansen (1987:713) suggests dlat a trained professional conduct the preparation of child witnesses 
to eliminate the above possible criticisms. For instance, a professional will be trained to avoid any conduct ulat may 
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be perceived as 'bribery' i.e. taking a child to a favourite restaurant or treating him to ice-cream (Harvey and Daun 
1993:50). It is therefore, reconuuended that the child expert proposed above be responsible for the preparation 
progranuues within his jurisdiction. This will enable him to follow the matter from the initial statement taldng all 
the way to the trial. He will become acquainted with the child's abilities and the child will gain confidence from 
dealing with one person as opposed to a number of different individuals. 
7.8 Training of Legal Personnel 
A number of proposals recommended earlier have suggested that judicial officers mUSt undergo training in order 
to deal competently witll all aspects of the child as witness. If training is not provided for judicial officers, many 
of the proposals forwarded will remain ineffective. 
"The English judge is a professional decision-maker, he is a respected lawyer but, unless he sits 
in the Family Division of the High Court he is a geneticist not a specialist. He has forensic sldlls 
inculcated by years of practice at the bar but also lacks both knowledge and sldlls which might 
be thought desirable for someone maldng decisions about children. His background will have 
provided him with very little experience about children and families except those he may have 
acted for in the past. His own education will have separated him from the start from ordinary 
families and probably from conuuon patterns of family life. " (Masson 1988: 141) 
It is important that judicial officers make infortned decisions, not ones based upon opinion or emotion or legal 
precedent alone. Technology is advancing at a rapid rate and as scientific knowledge accumulates, it should be 
disseminated and used in tile service of public good. This cannot happen unless officials are educated with respect 
to new knowledge made available in other disciplines (Perry and Wrightsman 1991:180). The solution to the 
problems associated with child witnesses lies in the interface between law and psychology, and it is important that 
legal personnel be exposed to this knowledge, as explained by Myers (1995:267): 
"Finally, lawyers in practice and in academia must realize that they do not have all or most of the 
answers to poverty and child abuse. Such problems lie at the interface among psychology, 
sociology, economics, and law. The only realistic way to achieve solutions is for lawyers to 
abandon the professional elitism to which tlley sometimes fall prey and join forces with their 
colleagues in other helping professions. By worldng together, solutions will emerge." 
The need for judicial officers to receive training to deal with child witnesses has been voiced from a number of 
quarters. In their Report the Law Commission of Victoria (1988:20) mentioned that a number of submissions 
received, criticised legal practitioners and members of the judiciary for the unnecessary difficulty and stress they 
caused for child witnesses. Some of the matters complained of were easily capable of being remedied, like knowing 
when to give the child a break or offering the child some water. Birch (1992:275) also suggested that all people 
involved in the trial process needed to receive training in how best to handle a child witness. An obvious example 
of this arose in the Zimbabwean case S v S supra where Ebraltim JA castigated the trial court at 60D-I for their 
insensitivity in allowing a little girl to testify about the intimate details of her rape to a courtroom full of male 
officials: 
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"Regrettably, instances of lack of professionalism were evident in the conduct of tllis trial. My 
main criticism is the court persOlUlel. All the principal officials were male. This despite the fact 
that it must have been known well in advance that a female juvenile would be appearing in tllJlt 
court on that day as a complainant in a serious rape case. It surely would not have been 
impossible to arrange for a female prosecutor or magistrate to officiate or to have a female 
presence of some sort. As it happened, no criticism can be made of tlle conduct of either tlle 
prosecutor or the magistrate, bOtll of whom appear to have been patient and solicitous of the 
wellbeing of tlle complainant and her companion who gave evidence on her behalf. But surely 
tllOse responsible for physically allocating cases and courts must be aware of the embarrassment 
likely to be felt by a little girl when relating the detailed descriptions of the perpetration of a rape 
required by a court of law. Such embarrassment can only be exacerbated when the evidence must 
be given before an exclusively male audience because: 
( I) the discussion of intimate sexual matters in the presence of members of the opposite sex is 
normally taboo; 
(2) tlle absence of a female listener means that a female witness who has been sexuall y abused 
lacks any substantial sympatlletic support. No male person can possibly understand the feelings 
of a female victim. It is thought probable that even very young complainants feel this almost 
instinctively; and 
(3)it is likely tllJlt a woman or girl who has been recently or badly abused will associate, if only 
subconsciously, all males with her assailant. 
An all-male audience is, therefore, unlikely to encourage a complainant to give full and obj ective 
evidence. " 
The Law Commission of Victoria (1988:21) concluded that difficulties experienced by child witnesses could to some 
extent be alleviated by appropriate judicial intervention and reconUllended that educatiollJll material be prepared for 
judicial officers on issues relating to children as witnesses. 
Because of the central role played by judges in controlling trial proceedings, it is especially important that j udges 
be educated adequately regarding the special issues attendant on working with children as legal wittlesses. In fact, 
Yates (1987:479) suggests that tlle most expeditious and positive changes of the legal system might be attained 
through the education of the judiciary : 
"Through tlle judge's discretionary powers, child witnesses may be seen in chambers, granted 
recesses, or be accompanied to the courtroom by a familiar supportive adult. The judge may 
caution attorneys who question children inappropriately and may speak directly to the child. The 
court may appoint a special attorney with a background in child development to examine the child . 
This attorney would use questions supplied by the other attOrneys and would have the right to 
object to questions that might confuse or be unduly upsetting to the child." 
Although the specific recoIlUllendations referred to in this quote have already been dealt with, the focus of tlle 
matter is what powers judges and magistrates have and what tlley could do if they were educated regarding the 
psychology of child wittlesses. 
For instance, it has already been argued that children have great difficulties with the language used in court and 
that researchers argue that even young children are capable of being effective, competent witnesses if tlley are 
interviewed in a manner which takes proper account of their abilities and needs (Bull 1992:5) . Experts in tlle 
interviewing of child witnesses have indicated how these interviews need to be conducted and what techniques affect 
the reliability of a child 's evidence. It is not suggested that judicial offi cers become experts in this field. Rather, 
what is required is a knowledge of available research which will assist tllem in evaluating, not only the child 's 
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evidence , but also the way in which the child has been interviewed. Judges need to be encouraged to take a more 
proactive role in the management of cases. The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice commented that the cost-
effectiveness of further judicial training could not be questioned and specifically recommended the introduction of 
inter-disciplinary courses (Carson 1995:2). In fact , Walker (1993:63) argues that lawyers bear the final 
responsibility of enabling children to tell what they know and judges "act as the last gatekeepers for clear 
conullunication in their court". In order, dlerefore, to act as an effective 'gatekeeper' judges need to know how 
children perceive, remember and report events. 
They need to know why leading questions may be particularly problematic for child witnesses. They need to 
understand why children often recant their statements after allegations have been made and how to assess the 
credibility of statements made by children. Without such education, judicial officers calmot render infortned 
decisions in cases in which children are witnesses . 
Spencer and Flin (1989: 1602) suggest that lawyers need to know what other disciplines can teach them about Ule 
features of a child 's evidence which suggest that dle testimony may be true or false. TIlis is especially relevant to 
a number of approaches adopted in other countries. For instance, a detailed discussion was attempted earlier 
regarding the topic of statement validity analysis, which was pioneered in West Gemlany and which has attracted 
a great deal of attention and research in England and in the United States. The available research on the detection 
of deception and the judgment of the credibility of children's statements has shown that there is no such thing as 
' lie bebaviour' even dlOugb surveys have shown that people do believe Ulat these indicators do exist. Research has 
also shown that people's ability to discriminate successfully between truthful and deceptive statements is only 
slightly better than chance level. Statement validity analysis is a technique which involves dle analysis of a statement 
according to a set of 19 reality criteria which describe certain qualities of its COntent. The underlying dleory is dm 
a child witness will not be able to fabricate a statement widl these qualities, so if these criteria are found in a 
statement it is likely to be based on genuine personal experience (Bull 1994:333) . A number of studies have 
examined the effectiveness of statement val idi ty analysis and found dle procedure to be reliable. If judicial offi cers 
were exposed to dlis type of research, it would be able to assist dlem when attempting to evaluate the credibility 
of child witnesses. Again, it is not suggested dlat judicial officers become experts in dlis fi eld , but if they have all 
understanding and working knowledge of dle reality criteria used in statement validity analysis it would contribute 
towards adopting an infonned approach to the evidence of children. 
Statement validity analysis depends on obtaining an account from the child which is uncontaminated by inappropriate 
interviewing techniques (Bull 1995:240). This again emphasises Ole need for an ecological approach when dealing 
wi th the evidence of children. Statement validity analysis can onl y be used when the child has been interviewed in 
a non-leading, non -suggestive way, odlerwise the cri teria are no longer valid. Therefore, statement validity analysis 
can only be used where Ole first interview with the child has been conducted by a professional and the court has 
a record or videotape of the interview available to ensure that the interview was uncontaminated. However, 
disseminating olis infonnation to legal professionals will go a long way in assisting olem to evaluate the credibility 
of a child on a scientific basis radler than on emotions and perceptions, which research has shown are not very 
accurate. 
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Finally, court persolll1el dealing with child witnesses need to be educated in matters of child psychology and 
cognitive development in order that their perceptions regarding children as witnesses can be re-assessed. Gothard 
(1992: 115), a judge of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal in Louisiana, says that his experience has shown that 
judges show the same general biases against children and believe most of the prevalent myths about child sexual 
abuse: 
"Too many judges have no understanding or knowledge of the dynamics of this problem; even 
worse, they have no compassion or empathy for the child victims." 
Education will be a vital step in changing the perceptions which court personnel have with regard to child witnesses. 
It is only through education and training that this paradigm shift can be achieved. This was, in fact, one of the 
recommendations of the Pigot Connnittee (Home Office 1989:67): 
"We suggest that a fundamental change of attitude towards children in the legal context is now 
required. The professional training of judges and lawyers could usefully address some issues in 
child psychology and cognitive development." 
Knowledge can contribute to a profound understanding of the dynamics of child sexual abuse and its effect upon 
children. This knowledge and understanding can then be applied in a compassionate yet thoroughly legalisticmalll1er 
to cases involving children. In view of the above, it is proposed that all court personnel dealing with cases which 
involve child witnesses should receive general education regarding child development and the dynamics of abuse 
as well as specialised training in interviewing children. They should also be kept abreast of the latest scientific 
developments in other fields. 
The implementation of such training need not involve any additional resources. Magistrates and prosecutors are 
required to undergo certain in-house training programmes. A section of these courses could be devoted to a study 
of child witnesses. Update courses could be arranged for judges, magistrates and prosecutors on a regular basis to 
keep them abreast of latest developments. This need for training was further endorsed by Ebrahim JA at 60B-C in 
S v S supra: 
"A rational decision as to the credibility of a witness (especially a child witness) can be arrived 
at only in the light of a proper analysis by means of testing it against likely shortcomings in such 
evidence . ... To reach an intelligent conclusion in such an analysis it is necessary to apply, as 
they do, a certain amount of psychology and to be aware of recent advances in that discipline. 
This will undoubtedly mean an increase in the workload of judicial officers and the machinery of 
justice generally, but ways must be sought of accommodating this, as it is the price to be paid for 
professionally administering justice in an increasingly complex society." 
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7.9 Conclusion 
The aim of this research was to investigate whether it was at all possible to reconcile the image which the law has 
of children as "vulnerable, unformed, dependent creatures needing protection" with the necessity of obtaining an 
accurate, reliable account of events (King and Piper 1990:57), Is it possible to obtain accurate evidence in an 
adversarial environment while at the same time protecting the child witness from further trauma and ensuring that 
the accused is afforded a fair trial in terms of the Constitution Act 108 of 1996? 
In an attempt to answer this question an ecological systems approach was adopted in terms of which children were 
viewed as sources of information. The adoption of an ecological perspective requires that attention be focused on 
the child's developing capacities in the context of the family as well as the social and physical contexts in which 
information is sought from children. This involved an investigation of various microsystems, exosystems and 
macrosystems. An ecological approach is based on the premise that any single action in one system will have an 
effect on another system to which it is linked. It was, therefore, essential that the child witness in the adversarial 
system be studied on a holistic basis. It was not possible to view different aspects of the trial or different rules of 
evidence in isolation. The challenge lay in developing an approach to children in the legal system that was fair to 
the children and respected their developmental needs while simultaneously being fair to an accused and respecting 
the latter's rights (Gabarino and Stott 1989:291-315). 
Since tile microsystem relating to the child himself involved the child' s developmental, cognitive and language 
abilities, it was necessary to access the field of psychology in an attempt to answer questions relating to a child's 
competency and credibility. This approach was highlighted by King and Piper (1990: 58): 
"The problem that the law has faced has therefore been how to bring the evidence of young 
children before the COUft in a form that is likely to result in conviction and how, at tile sanle time, 
to protect the child from tile ill-effects of criminal procedures both outside and inside the 
courtroom which, according to some psychologists, have a more deleterious effect on the child 
than the abuse itself. Unable to solve such problems through its own internal communications, the 
law has turned to otiler discourses and to other institutions in its truth-constructing endeavours ... 
Enter social workers, forensic psychologists and child psychiatrists ready to assist the law by 
producing from behavioral science knowledge and procedures to solve these problems." 
The interface between psychology and law is essential if the dilemma of the child as witness is to be solved. 
The macrosystems including constitutions, conventions and adversarial procedures were investigated. The legal 
rnicrosystem comprising legal rules, confrontation, cross-examination and the need for public trials was evaluated 
in terms of modern research findings on the cognitive, moral and language abilities of children. The resultant 
findings were that children are not able to give evidence effectively in an adversarial environment with all aspects 
of the trial causing problems for child witnesses. 
In an attempt to find a solution that would be fair to both the child witness and tile accused, tile following model 
was proposed for dealing with a child witness in the criminal justice process: 
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• The Ministry of Justice need to create the office of an intennediary or skilled interviewer. It is 
suggested that the tenn intermediary' be replaced by a more appropriate title, since this official 
will no longer simply be an interpreter but will be more of a child expert. For present purposes, 
ulis official will be referred to as the child expert. n,e office of the child expert will be housed 
in the Ministry of Justice and will be a pertnauent office with appointees in all centres. 
• The child expert will have to bold a qualification as detemlined by the Ministry of Justice in 
conjunction with participating universities. This qualification will include aspects of child 
development, the psychology of abuse, relevant law and specialised training in the interviewing 
of children. 
• The child expert's duties will begin when he is infonned by the police that there is a child witness 
in a particular case. The child expert will arrange to meet the child after which he will set up the 
taking of the initial statement. The child expert will conduct the interview with the child . This 
interview will be videotaped and the videotape will be admissible later at tile trial. 
• The child expert will be responsible for conducting pre-trial preparation prograullnes for all 
children who have to testify at a trial. These pre-trial preparation prograOlllles muSt be 
standardised and be based on empirical research. 
• All children under the age of eighteen will automatically give evidence via closed-circuit television 
and will thus be spared tile traditional confrontation with the accused. All children under the age 
of thirteen will automatically be exaulined by the child expert in a room other than the courtroom. 
The expert witness will examine the child's evidence on au inquisitorial basis. There will be no 
cross-examination of tile chi ld by the defence although the defence may ask that certain matters 
be addressed which were not dealt with. 
• All children under the age of thirteen will give unsworn evidence and will only be warned to 
speak the truth in a developmentally-appropriate manner. In addition, all children will be assumed 
to be competent unless the contrary is proved. When a competency examination does become 
necessary it must be conducted in a meaningful way aud must be based on scientific principles. 
• Once the child has been examined by the child expert to tile satisfaction of the court , tile child will 
be allowed to step down and can tllen be debriefed by the child expert. 
• n,e cautionary rule applicable to children and complainants in sexual cases must be abolished, 
and the credibility and evidence of children be evaluated on the basis of scientific research. 
• Rules relating to hearsay evidence and previous consistent statements must be abolished. 
J 
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• Finally , all court personnel who deal with child witnesses must receive general education 
regarding child development, the dynamics of abuse and specialised training in the interviewing 
of children. 
• Since children will not give evidence in court , it does not appear necessary to change the rules 
relating to a public hearing. 
The proposed model involves a move away from traditional adversarial procedures and incorporates a number of 
aspects of the inquisitorial system. But this should not necessarily be considered a negative move. The aim of a trial 
is to arrive at the truth using procedures that are fair to all parties involved. The SA Law Conunission (1989:28) 
accepted tbat if such a drastic change was needed, then the mere fact that the change would be of such a drastic 
nature would not stand in the way of reform: 
"If the interests of Ule entire community - including tllDse of the accused and the child - were to 
demand sucb a solution, then the mere fact that Ule said solution is of a drastic nature would not 
stand in the ways of law reform. " 
In conclusion, this approach was endorsed by Ule Canadian court in Regina v Tolen supra at 58: 
"The public adversarial process is, however, a means to an end - the ascertaimnent of truth - and 
has virtue only to the extent that it serves that end. Where tlle established process hinders tlle 
search for truth, it should be modified unless due process or resource-based considerations 
preclude such modification." 
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8. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS 
Proposal 1 
It is proposed that, in dealing with the child witness, an ecological systems approach be adopted in tenus of wlllch 
all amendments and proposals must be viewed. This approach to child witnesses as a source of infomlation demands 
tbat the focus be turned inwards to Ole child's capabilities and outward to the social and physical contexts in which 
the infonuation is sought from children. 
Proposal 2 
It is proposed that children who have to give evidence be removed from the adversarialnature of Ole trial and be 
allowed to give evidence outside of the court. 
Proposal 3 
It is proposed that the illltial statement which the child witness makes to the child expert must be videotaped and 
this videotape must be admitted in court as evidence at the trial. 
Proposal 4 
It is proposed that Ole common law rule against previous consistent statements be repealed by a statutory provision. 
TIle nonnal rules of evidence (i.e. relevance) should remain Ole guiding principle for admissibility. The provision 
sbould also include a section stating that the videotaped interview containing the child's ittitial complaint or 
statement may be admissible at the subsequent trial. 
ProposalS 
It is proposed that if the court is going to allow a child to give evidence via closed-circuit television in tenns of 
s158 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1977, Olen the child must be allowed to be accompanied by somebody who can 
offer support to the child. 
Proposal 6 
It is proposed Olat s158 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1977 not be used in the case of child witnesses under Ole 
age of thirteen since conlllUnication and concentration will be hampered by using earphones or a monitor. 
Proposal 7 
It is proposed that all children under the age of eighteen automatically be allowed to testify via closed-circuit 
television, thereby eliminating the court's discretion in Olis respect. 
Proposal 8 
It is proposed that a child expert be used during all stages of the investigation, from the pre-trial stage all the way 
through to the actual trial. 
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Proposal 9 
It is proposed that the child expert, referred to above, undergo professional training in the fields of developmental 
psychology, acquisition of language by children, psychology of abuse and a knowledge of law and procedure. 
Universities should be approached to introduce a Masters Degree programme which would cover the above aspects. 
ProposallO 
It is proposed that a child expert be appointed automatically in all cases where a child witness is twelve years or 
younger. In the case of children aged thirteen and older, the court will have a discretion to appoint a child expert 
if there is evidence that the child may have difficnlty in understanding court language. The section will empower 
the expert to conduct the entire examination of the child witness, allowing the court to maintain a discretion to 
intervene where necessary. 
Proposal 11 
It is recommended that s170A set out the qualification and training required for a person to act as a child expert. 
It is proposed that a standard qualification be required which will be decided upon by the Ministry of Justice in 
conjunction with the various universities involved. This will require the provisions. as set out in the Government 
Gazette with respect to who may act as a child expert, to be repealed . 
Proposal 12 
[t is proposed that an office of the child expert be created which would fall under the Ministry of Justice. The 
person assigned to this office would be responsible for interviewing all child witnesses and for organising necessary 
court preparation. 
Proposal 13 
It is proposed dtat s170A of dIe Criminal Procedure Act 1977 apply to all witnesses under the age of eighteen while 
s158 of the same Act apply to all witnesses aged eighteen and older. 
Proposal 14 
It is proposed tilat a statutory provision be introduced which provides that all children under the age of dlirteen must 
give unsworn evidence , and need only be warned to speak the truth in a developmentally-appropriate manner. 
Proposal 15 
It is further proposed that the above statutory provision also contain a section which expressly states that sl92 of 
the Criminal Procedure Act 1977 also applies to children and that children are presumed to be competent unless 
the contrary is proven. 
Proposal 16 
It is proposed that presiding officers receive sufficient training to conduct competency exanlinations dlat are 
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meaningful and based on scientific principles. 
Proposal 17 
It is proposed that child witnesses undergo pre-trial preparation so Ulat uley can be assisted in understanding the 
distinction between truUI and lies and so that the duty to speak the truUI can be impressed upon them. 
Proposal 18 
It is proposed that a statutory provision be enacted which would abolish the cautionary rule applicable to child 
witnesses and complainants in sexual offences. 
Proposal 19 
It is also proposed that court persOlmel receive training with regard to scientific research on children's evidence 
and capabilities to remove any perceptions of unreliability or untrustworthiness that might exist in the minds of court 
persorUlel. 
Proposal 20 
It is proposed that the law relating to hearsay as a whole be revised and a common sense approach be adopted. 
Relevance is the basis of admissibility. The fact that evidence amounts to hearsay is a factor which will affect the 
weight to be attributed to that evidence and not its admissibility. If a wholesale re-evaluation of the law relating to 
hearsay is not possible, then a statutory exception would have to be introduced, declaring the hearsay statements 
emanating from children to be admissible and that the hearsay element of these statements would go to weight and 
not admissibility. 
Proposal 21 
It is proposed that all children who have to give evidence in a criminal trial take part in a pre-trial preparation 
prograrnrne. 
Proposal 22 
It is proposed that the preparation progrannne be housed within Ule Ministry of Justice and be standardised so that 
the sanle progrannne can be offered at all centres and so ulat dangers of coaching and suggestion can be eliminated. 
Proposal 23 
It is proposed that the child expert be responsible for preparation progranmles within his jurisdiction. 
Proposal 24 
It is proposed that all court personnel dealing WiUI cases which involve child witllesses should receive general 
education regarding chi ld development and Ule dynamics of abuse as well as specialized training in interviewing 
children. TIley should also be kept abreast of the latest scientific developments in oUler fields. 
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